


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THE RAJPUT STATES AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY  
FROM THE CLOSE OF THE 18TH CENTURY TO 1820.

BY

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SCANNED

## PREFACE

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Rajputs were almost a played-out people. The fall of the Mughal Empire and the expansion of the Maratha power shattered the political fabric in Rajasthan reared by Akbar's genius. Political bankruptcy, military weakness, economic ruin and moral degradation exposed the Rajput states to internal dissensions and external aggressions which they could not control or resist by their own efforts. Utterly exhausted and sunk in frustration, they bartered away their independence for security under British protection. They succumbed, indeed, to the logic of Indian history in that age of sweeping changes. By that time all the leading Indian powers with the sole exception of the Sikhs had fallen before the rising British imperialism. The Company, in view of its political and military interests particularly in Central India, was fully alive to the strategic and military importance of the Rajput states. Their inclusion within the expanding British zone, delayed by political and financial expediency, was a natural corollary to the Company's succession to the Marathas.

The present treatise is an attempt at a critical analysis of the first phase in the history of Anglo-Rajput relations. It is comprehensive in scope so far as geography is concerned; it covers all states in Rajasthan, big and small. Chronologically it covers the period from the end of the eighteenth century to the years immediately following the conclusion of treaties between the Rajput states and the East India Company. In respect of both geography and chronology it is different from earlier works relating to the subject. In Tod's "Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan" the treatment of British relations with the Rajput states is brief and restrained by caution imposed by his official position. Although occasionally outspoken in his criticism of

British policy he could not disclose all facts to which he had access as servant of the Company. Sir J.N.Sarkar's "Fall of the Mughal Empire" surveys the Rajput states in the perspective of the Mughal Empire and of Maratha policy; it is not concerned with Anglo-Rajput relations. In his "History of Mahrattas" Grant Duff refers to the oppression of the Rajputs by the Marathas as also to the Rajput alliances with the British, but the fate of the Rajputs is only a side issue in <sup>his</sup> principal theme. "History of British India" by Mill and Wilson is a general work in which the Rajputs occupy a very minor place. "The Rajput States and the East India Company" by Dr.A.C.Banerjee is a large-scale commentary on some portions of Tod's work. His treatment of the political history of the Rajput states leading to the imposition of British suzerainty is not exhaustive. Dr.M.S.Mehta's "Lord Hastings and the Indian States" deals with the Rajput states during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Hastings only. Recent works, such as "The Relations of Jaipur State with the East India Company (1803-1858)" by Dr.H.C.Batra, "British Relations with the States of Rajputana (1815-1835)" by Dr.S.C.Maheshwary, and "Relations of the States of Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmer with the English East India Company" by Dr.R.M.Mathur, do not cover the entire geographical area or the period dealt with in my treatise.


This work is based on the materials derived from: (1) the unpublished records available at the National Archives of India, New Delhi; (2) published records such as those printed in "Poona Residency Correspondence" and "The Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence of the Marquess of Wellesley" (edited by Martin); and (3) contemporary or semi-contemporary secondary works listed in the Bibliography. I had been twice to the Rajasthan State Archives at Bikaner in search of fresh materials, but in spite of my best efforts I could not discover new documents throwing more light on my subject. The following extract from a communication of the

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Director of the Rajasthan State Archives dated April 25, 1964, will elucidate my point : "The records pertaining to Jaipur, Jodhpur, Alwar, Bikaner, Udaipur etc. have been arranged but .... only a few among them have a direct bearing on the chronological limits assigned to the subject in question. It seems that an overwhelming majority of the documents on the subject have not been transferred to us; they have remained either with the Princes or their Mutsaddis". Further, as there was no catalogue of the records in the custody of the Rajasthan State Archives, I found great difficulty in my search for relevant documents. I have, however, made use of the "Descriptive Lists of Records (Kharitas) received by the rulers of Bikaner from the rulers of the neighbouring States lying in the custody of .... the Maharaja of Bikaner (Prepared by the Directorate of Archives, Rajasthan, Bikaner during the period 1.10.62 - 31.12.62)".

In conclusion, I may be permitted to express the hope that I have succeeded in bringing out new facts overlooked or omitted by previous writers and also in putting the facts in a fresh perspective based on critical appraisal.

Sukumar Bhattacharyya



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION : RAJPUTANA IN DISINTEGRATION

The decay of the Mughal empire during the first half of the eighteenth century gave a splendid opportunity to Rajputana not only to recover her freedom but also to attain ascendancy in Northern India. Unfortunately the Rajput nobles and princes who had in the past fought gallantly on so many occasions for freedom and faith and then played a vital role in the affairs of the Great Mughals failed to take advantage of "this depression of the empire". There was lack of political foresight as also of vigorous leadership. "Among the Rajputs there was no Rana Sanga who could even visualize the restoration of Rajput suzerainty in the north".<sup>1</sup> On the contrary Rajputana was entangled in the political disintegration and general disorder which followed the decline and fall of the paramount power.<sup>2</sup> By the close of the eighteenth century this "Land of Rajas" was almost in a state of dissolution — political, economic, social and moral.<sup>3</sup>

The rot which crippled the Rajput states by the end of the eighteenth century had started long ago and was deep-rooted. The head of the state himself, upon whom the peace and happiness of the Rajputs greatly depended, was the first and foremost victim. "Throughout Rajasthan", says Tod, "the character and welfare of the States depend on that of the sovereign: he is the mainspring of the system — the active power to set and keep in motion all these discordant materials; if he relax, each part separates, and moves in a narrow sphere of its own".<sup>4</sup> In the latter half of the eighteenth century the Rajput states were

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1. A.C. Banerjee, Lectures on Rajput History, pp. 137, 138. Tod, Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan (ed. Crooke), Vol. I, p. 483; Vol. II, p. 1054.

2. Rajputana Gazetteer (1879), Vol. I, pp. 45-46.

3. J.N. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. IV, pp. 68-74.

4. Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 174.

ruled in most cases by minors, weaklings, drunkards or debauchees<sup>5</sup> who were quite incapable of maintaining the traditions of their ancestors in war and government. Bhim Singh, the then reigning Rana of Mewar (1778 - 1828), was fit neither by his character nor training to rescue Tod's beloved land "from the depth of weakness and misery into which she had sunk".<sup>6</sup> He came to the throne at the age of eight and was the fourth minor to inherit Mewar in four decades. According to Tod who knew him well personally, "Vain shows, frivolous amusements, and an ill-regulated liberality alone occupied him.... He had little steadiness of purpose, and was particularly obnoxious to female influence".<sup>7</sup> Marwar had no better fate. The year 1793 saw the end of the long reign of over forty years, in Marwar, of weak and unwarlike Bijay Singh who never won a battle and whose last years were "engrossed by sentimental folly with a young beauty of the Oswal tribe".<sup>8</sup> His grandson and successor, Bhim Singh (1793 - 1803), was imprudent.<sup>9</sup> The crown of Jaipur came to Sawai Pratap Singh (1778 - 1803) when he was a boy of thirteen.<sup>10</sup> He is described by Tod "as a gallant prince, and not deficient in judgment",<sup>11</sup> But in a despatch dated September 25, 1799, from J. Collins, British Resident with Sindhia, Pratap Singh is characterized as a mixture of "pride, meanness, cunning and avarice".<sup>12</sup> Sir J.N. Sarkar says : "Sawai Pratap Singh had no brains but was not harmless and quiescent like most other imbeciles; his folly burst out in capricious violence .... he used to dress himself like a female, tie bells to his ankles and dance within the harem. His time was mostly devoted to drinking and attending

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5. J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 69.

6. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 289.

7. Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 511, 558.

8. Ibid, Vol. II, pp. 1060, 1066, 1075, 1077. J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 179; Vol. II, p. 521; Vol. IV, p. 56.

9. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 1077, 1079.

10. Ibid, Vol. III, p. 1362. J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 330.  
Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 150.

11. Tod, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 1363.

12. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 172, p. 213.

songs and dances.... Sometimes he would sally forth at night with the ruffianly companions of his wine-cup, raid the houses of the bankers and jewellers, beat them and snatch away their money "<sup>13</sup> These "unkingly and unmanly vices" as also "reckless speech and violent temper" sullied his character."<sup>14</sup> In Kotah Maharao Ummed Singh (1771 - 1819) was also an imbecile.<sup>15</sup> The Raja of Jaisalmer, Mulraj (1762 - 1820), was another weakling.<sup>16</sup> The Raja of Bikanir, Surat Singh, was cruel, intriguing and unscrupulous to a degree.<sup>17</sup>

This, in brief, is the picture of the decline and degradation of the Rajput princes under whom the Rajputs lost those qualities of chivalry and nobility which had once made them a valiant people. About two centuries of subjection under the Mughals had done the damage. The Rajputs, in general, were no longer the patriots of the past. Their love of freedom and straight-forwardness had given place to love of intrigue and petty diplomacy.<sup>18</sup> In April, 1809, Broughton, commander of the escort of the British Resident with Sindhia, wrote: "That chivalrous courage and high sense of honour, by which the Rajputs were formerly so eminently distinguished, seems to have quite deserted them, and to have degenerated into tameness and apathy, and a despicable love of intrigue and domestic squabbles!"<sup>19</sup> The old social and administrative systems had disintegrated; new classes, new techniques and new crimes dominated the scene. Instead of the nobles whom tradition had invested with the right to share political power, barbers, tailors, elephant-drivers, and water-carriers were taken into confidence by the worthless rulers. Assassination was a common political weapon. A Rajput would stoop to any crime for land. A father

13. Op.cit., Vol. III, p. 337. See also Sardesai, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 150-151

14. J. N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 337.

15. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 210. Tod, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 1540, 1575...

16. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 1228-1232. Rajputana Gazetteers (1908), Vol. IIIE, p. 11; (1909), Vol. IIIEA, pp. 14-15.

17. Rajputana Gazetteer (1879), Vol. I, p. 183.

18. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, pp. 245-246.

19. Letters written from a Mahratta Camp, <sup>1892,</sup> p. 91.

would kill his son and a son would murder his father.<sup>20</sup> Opium ate into the brain and vitality of the Rajputs. Sir J.N.Sarkar says: ".....the martial manhood of Rajputana has sunk into the placid sleep of opium."<sup>21</sup> Domestic concubinage also brought about utter degradation in the character of the Rajputs. In their relations with women they were no better than "the pampered princes and grantees of the "Mughal Court".<sup>22</sup> Society was so depraved that even the royal zenana was not immune from the suspicion of pollution.<sup>23</sup> The Marathi despatches, as Sir J.N. Sarkar points out, reveal that some Rajput Rajas, nobles and ministers were victims to the "filthy unmentionable disease which is Nature's punishment for gross licentiousness".<sup>24</sup> Tod, however, has more pity than the impartial critic of today for the grave blemishes that marked Rajput character during this period.

Under the control and protection of the mighty Mughal suzerains Rajputana had enjoyed political peace and security for a century and a half. Besides, her princes and nobles had fought for them and got opportunities to carve out new domains for themselves and their younger sons. The decline of the Mughal empire changed the situation. The Rajputs who, by character, tradition and training, were warriors, had no longer to render the Mughals military service abroad. Land continued to be the source of their wealth and determined their social position.<sup>25</sup> Trade and commerce were "repugnant to their martial traditions"; moreover these were in the hands of the non-Rajputs.<sup>26</sup> Hence, "cooped up within their small sterile districts" and with practically "no means of advancement left to them", they started "devouring each other".<sup>27</sup> With the withdrawal of the Mughal control,

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20. J.N.Sarkar, op.cit., Vol.I, p.131. A.C.Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p.246.

21. Op.cit., Vol.I, p.132. When the city of Merta was plundered after the battle of Merta(1790), opium worth Rs. 50,000 was found in one of its mosques. (Ibid, Vol. IV, p.37.)

22. Ibid, Vol. IV, p.72.

23. A.C.Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p.246.

24. Op.cit., Vol. IV, p.72.

25. Ibid, Vol. I, p.131, Vol. IV, pp.72-73.

26. A.C.Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p.417.

27. J.N.Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, p.73.

there was left no superior authority to enforce lawful rights and maintain general order.<sup>28</sup> To perform this task was beyond the capacity of the weak and inefficient Rajput Rajas of the second half of the century. "All the pent up personal ambitions and inter-State rivalries now burst forth without fear or check".<sup>29</sup> Rajputana turned into a vast "zoological garden with the barriers of the cages thrown down and the keepers removed".<sup>30</sup> Disputed succession, the rise of over-mighty ministers, continual conflict between the ruler and the aristocracy and fierce clan contest characterized the disorder and confusion that ensued.

Lest this should be regarded as over-dramatization of the inevitable symptoms of political decline, we might refer to some prominent succession disputes of the eighteenth century. Brothers or adopted sons now and then fell out with one another for succession to the throne; sometimes pretenders claimed the gaddi as the former ruler's posthumous sons; sometimes uncles and nephews fought over their claims; even son was occasionally set against father. In Mewar the civil war that followed the succession dispute between Rana Ari Singh II and a youth named Ratan Singh, falsely declared to be the posthumous son of the former Rana, culminated in the fatal end of the Rana (1773).<sup>31</sup> Raja Bhakt Singh of Marwar, who in 1751 captured the throne after overthrowing his nephew Ram Singh, is said to have been poisoned to death only a year later.<sup>32</sup> The reign of his son and successor, Bijay Singh, the early part of which witnessed Ram Singh's unsuccessful attempt to redeem his birth right, terminated in horrid inheritance quarrels. Before he died, his Oswal concubine intrigued to secure the throne for his grandson, Man Singh, whom she adopted as her son after the death of her son Tej Singh. She murdered Guman Singh, son of Bijay Singh. She then killed the old and loyal minister, Khub Chand Singhavi, and his brother and eldest son. Her enemies retaliated by killing her paramour, a minister named

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28. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 131.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 518; Vol. IV, p. 69. Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 498, 506.

32. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 1056, 1058. J.W. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 179.

Bijay Singh, and then they killed her also.<sup>33</sup> After the death of the Raja, his grandson Bhim Singh drove out Zalim Singh, the eldest surviving son and legitimate heir, and ascended the throne. Bhim Singh made away with the other claimants in the traditional Muslim fashion. He took the life of his uncle Sardar Singh. He put out the eyes of another uncle Sher Singh, who later "released himself from life by dashing out his brains". A fatal end also awaited Sur Singh, a grandson of the late Raja. Only Man Singh, who took shelter in the stronghold of Jalor, remained to disturb Raja Bhim Singh. The citadel of Jalor was subjected to a rigorous blockade for ten years by the latter. The luckless Raja passed away when the surrender of Jalor became inevitable.<sup>34</sup>

In Jaipur Ishwari Singh (1743 - 1750), son and successor of Sawai Jai Singh, was opposed by Madho Singh, the latter's son by a princess of Mewar. Madho Singh claimed the throne in accordance with the terms of his mother's marriage settlement. This conflict between brothers came to an end with the suicide of Ishwari Singh.<sup>35</sup> After thirteen days' rule, Raja Raj Singh of Pikaner, son and successor of Guj Singh, was poisoned by the mother of Surat Singh, another son of the late Raja. Raj Singh's minor son, Pratap Singh, became the ruler, and Surat Singh the regent. Later, Surat Singh himself usurped the throne. He, it is said, strangled with his own hands his nephew and sovereign. He had already rendered the minor ruler quite helpless when Surat forced his sister into an abhorred marriage in order to rob the luckless boy of her protective watchfulness.<sup>36</sup> In Jaisalmer, Maha Rawal Mulraj was for a few months held captive and his son Rai Singh made the ruler. When Mulraj was reinstated, the opponents, including Rai Singh, were exiled.<sup>37</sup>

The power of the overmighty premiers in those days constituted /

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33. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1060-1065, 1076-1077. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 54-57.

34. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1077-1080.

35. Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 1356-1357. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 158-168.

36. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1138-1139. Rajputana Gazetteers (1908), Vol. IIIB, p. 86.

37. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1228-1230.

no insignificant threat to the royal authority weakened by the factors noted above. A premier<sup>38</sup> was a "military minister with the political government of fiefs". He was the "dispenser of the favours of the sovereign". He had unlimited authority over the military classes as well as the inferior officers of the state. He had a powerful body of retainers always at his command. His office, moreover, was sometimes hereditary. The imbecility in the rulers helped these ministers considerably to increase their power and influence and in some cases they became all-powerful in the state. In Mewar when the Rana left the capital, the Salumbar chief, in whose family the office of the premier was hereditary, was invested with the administration of the city and the charge of the palace in his absence. By him the sovereign was girt with the sword, and from him he received the mark of inauguration upon his accession to the throne. The lack of the Rana's control over his premier was revealed when the chief of Salumbar espoused the cause of the pretender Ratan Singh and joined the rebellion against Rana Ari Singh II.<sup>39</sup> The premier subsequently returned to his allegiance "not from the principle of loyalty....but from finding the superiority of intellect of the heads of the rebellion too powerful for the supremacy he desired".<sup>40</sup> The rivalry between the Bohra and Maladia ministers that distracted Jaipur during the reign of Sawai Pratap Singh is another striking illustration of the failure of the ruler to control his ministers in those days.<sup>41</sup> In Marwar the pardhans, as Tod points out, "have always been mill-stones round the necks of the princes....."<sup>42</sup>. In Jaisalmer Swarup Singh and his son Salim Singh, the premiers of Maha Rawal Mulraj, were too powerful. The state groaned under their tyranny. The puppet ruler could do nothing to prevent it.<sup>43</sup> In Kotah Ummed Singh was the nominal ruler; the real ruler was his prime minister Raj Rana Zalim Singh, who was absolutely supreme.<sup>44</sup> This overmighty minister carved out a

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38. In different states he had different titles - bhanjgarh in Mewar, pardhan in Marwar, musahib in Jaipur, kiladar or dewan in Kotah. (Ibid, Vol. I, p. 216)

39. Ibid, Vol. I, pp. 214-217.

40. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 499.

41. J. N. Sarker, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 331-338.

42. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 218.

43. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 219; Vol. II, pp. 1228-1232. Rajputana Gazetteers (1909), Vol. IIIA, pp. 14-15; Vol. IIIB (1908), p. 11.

44. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 219. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East Company, Part II, p. 394.

principality for his house even in the nineteenth century.<sup>45</sup> It may be noted, however, in this connection that in Rajputana, "a sea of trouble" the territory of Kotah, under this famous minister, "was a harbour where there was comparative repose...."<sup>46</sup>

The baronial troubles of the period were closely related to the Rajput clan system. A Rajput state, generally speaking, was the development of the political organization of a particular clan into one unit. The state was identified with the clan. The head of the clan was the sovereign. He was the pivot of the administration. The state, however, did not belong to him. It was the property of the clan as a whole. The nobility who belonged to the clan considered that they enjoyed their patrimony by the same right as the prince himself.<sup>47</sup> The clan-purity of the nobility was, however, lost in the eighteenth century. Princes anxious to curb the authority of the clan as represented by the nobles had started to introduce within their states some nobles "foreign in country and blood". They could rely more on outsiders having no root in the soil and dependant on their favour. In consequence the different tribes became intermingled. Yet the clan system was too strong to be dissolved fully. The ruler was never quite at liberty to grant the 'foreign' nobles any substantial portion of the patrimony<sup>of his clan</sup>.<sup>48</sup> The influence of the clan system upon the position of the nobles even after its partial dissolution was made manifest in the complaint of the chiefs of Marwar to the British

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45. A.C. Banerjee, Lectures on Rajput History, p. 113.

46. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, pp. 491-492.

In his despatch to Lord Hastings, dated April 23, 1816, Close, British Resident with Sindhia, wrote: "Kota is the only country in all this part of India in which the administration is conducted on anything approaching to fixed principles. The internal government is good, and its foreign policy is regulated with much ability,...." (Secret Consultations, May 11, 1816, No. 11.)

47. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, pp. 246-247.

48. Ibid, Part II, pp. 247, 249. Mod, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 193, 195.

against their prince, Man Singh(1821). They stated ;" Sri Maharaja and ourselves are of one stock, all Rathors. He is our head, we his servants.....When our services are acceptable, then is he our lord; when not, we are again his brothers and kindred, claimants and laying claim to the land".<sup>49</sup> Hence the nobles who owed their estates and privileges to the membership of the clan and not to the will of the Raja, could not be easily controlled by him.<sup>50</sup> Further, the sovereign had nothing to do with those vassals who did not have their holdings direct from him. No sub-vassal could do any service to him except through his own immediate superior. The sub-vassals were to follow their chief even against sovereign. As Tod says, "If the question were put to a Rajput to whom his service is due, whether to his chief or his sovereign, the reply would be, Raj ka malik wuh, pat ka malik yih : He is the sovereign of the State, but this is my head:....the phrase...(implies) that his own immediate chief is the only authority he regards".<sup>51</sup> There are numerous instances of the whole clan supporting the chief against their sovereign.<sup>52</sup> Thus the clan system, "something very like feudalism",<sup>53</sup> made the central authority basically weak. Only a Raja, "a born leader of men, a victor in battles and possessed of the power of bending others to his will",<sup>54</sup> could control his barons and clansmen and keep a state of tolerable discipline and peace in his realm. In the second half of the eighteenth century when minors, imbeciles, or sensualists reigned, the country was thrown into baronial strife and anarchy. Chiefs and clansmen often rose in rebellion against the prince. Baronial factions sought to usurp the control of the government. Related clan branches fought among themselves. The nobles encroached upon ~~the~~

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49. Tod, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.228-229.

50. A.C.Banerjee, Lectures on Rajput History, pp.112-113.

51. Tod, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.182-183.

52. Ibid, p.183.

53. Rajputana Gazetteer(1879), Vol.I, p.59.

54. J.N.Sarkar, op.cit., Vol.IV, p.68.

the neighbours' lands or the royal estates.<sup>55</sup>

Reference may be made to a few episodes illustrating the relations between the ruler and the nobility. In Mewar Rana Ari Singh's "insolent demeanour" and "ungovernable temper" highly offended his nobles who, including eleven of the sixteen great chiefs, revolted in support of the pretender Ratan Singh. The Bundi heir who was responsible for the atrocious assassination of the Rana was probably prevailed upon by the disaffected nobles to commit that crime.<sup>56</sup> The Mewar government had to invoke the assistance of the Marathas to suppress the rebellion of the Begun chief, the head of a grand division of the Chundawats, and to recover the crown lands taken by the refractory chief.<sup>57</sup> The murder of the Chundawat chief by Rana Ari Singh was followed by a bitter conflict between the Chundawats and the Saktawats in Mewar. This was one of the worst clan feuds. During the reign of Hamir Singh II (1773 - 1778) the Saktawats supported the queen-mother, who was naturally opposed by the Chundawats. In October, 1789, the Chundawat chief, Arjun Singh of Kurawad, murdered the capable and faithful minister, Somchand Gandhi, almost in the presence of Rana Bhim Singh. The prince, unable to punish the defiant chief, had to be content with branding him as a traitor and bidding him begone. The new ministers, supported by the Saktawats, entered into open hostilities with the Chundawats. The Rana was a helpless spectator of this internecine war.<sup>58</sup> Referring to the outcome of such feuds, Tod says : "The period was rapidly advancing, when this fair region of Mewar, the garden of Rajasthan, would have reverted to its primitive sterility. The tiger and the wild boar had already become inmates of the capital, and the bats flitted undisturbed in the palaces of her princes".<sup>59</sup>

The nobility of Marwar had always possessed more power than their counterparts in any of the neighbouring states. In the early .

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55. Ibid, Vol.IV, pp.68-69.

56. Tod, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.496-499, 506.

57. Ibid, p.509.

58. Ibid, Vol.I, pp.506-507, 514-515.

59. Ibid, p.210.

years of the reign of Bijay Singh, the Champawat Rathors and their allies, led by the chief of Pokaran, seized the capital and its palace-citadel. They captured the government and reduced the king to a puppet. When the king lamented the distracted condition of his realm, the Pokaran chief Devi Singh used to say : "Why trouble yourself about Marwar? it is in the sheath of my dagger". In February, 1760, the king's partisans, led by Dhabhai (nurse's son) Jagu, hired a powerful band of seven hundred mercenaries from Sind and treacherously murdered most of the usurping chiefs. For a time feudal anarchy was allayed. But the Raja's dotage for the Oswal beauty and her insolence produced fresh troubles. The barons resented her authority. She controlled the government through a Chabuk Sawar (horse tamer) named Bhairo Sani. She seized several landed estates acquired forcibly or fraudulently by the nobles. When her royal partner became old and infirm, she consoled herself with a Champawat chief who used to visit her at night. This noble bore the same name as the prince. He was made the chief minister. The king's clansmen were greatly enraged. As they expressed it, "Our master's wife, even when she is a slave girl, is like a mother to us. This (minister) Bijay Singh had laid a stigma on us all. The shameless woman must be given a fright". They, as already referred to, first stabbed the minister and then murdered her. The king died in the midst of rebellion of his clansmen.<sup>60</sup>

The unkingly vices of Sawai Pratap Singh and the predominance of men belonging to the tailor, water-carrier and bania classes, became unbearable for the nobles of Jaipur, many of whom were his clansmen and had fought loyally for his predecessors. They kept away from the capital even as late as 1786. The Shekhawat nobles were more aggressive. They seized the crown lands.<sup>61</sup> One of the most conspicuous examples of the baronial insubordination may be found in the growth of the fief of Macheri into the state of Alwar. Its chief, Rao Pratap Singh, belonged to the Naruka branch of the Kachhwas and was a petty vassal of the Raja of Jaipur. His estate comprised two villages and a half only. Sawai Madho Singh banished him "for some fault". The Jat

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60. Ibid, Vol. II, pp. 1066-1073, 1075-1077. J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 53-57.

61. Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 337-339.

Raja gave him shelter. Subsequently, however, he regained his overlord's favour and the ancestral fief. In Jaipur protracted anarchy and confusion followed Madho Singh's death (1768). The unscrupulous and opportunist Wacheri chief did not fail to take advantage of it. He captured territories round his estate, built fortresses and set himself up as an independent ruler. In course of time the area of this new principality of Alwar increased to 3,158 square miles.<sup>62</sup>

If clan - consciousness gave rise to feuds within the Rajput states, it was also responsible to a great extent for the inter-state rivalries that followed the withdrawal of Mughal control. The Rajput rulers used to meddle in the internal strifes of the other states. The minor princes were sometimes at the mercy of their powerful neighbours. The bitter conflict between the Rathors of Marwar and the Kachhwas of Jaipur for political primacy among the Rajputs was a dominant feature of Rajput history throughout the eighteenth century and also later.<sup>63</sup> Maharaja Abhay Singh of Marwar (1724 - 1749) attacked Bikaner for some minor offence. The Raja of Bikaner belonged to a junior but independent branch of the Rathor clan; he was nominally subordinate to Abhay Singh, the head of the clan. Bakht Singh, who was always on the look-out for an opportunity to dethrone his elder brother Abhay Singh, prevailed upon Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur to take up the cause of the Raja of Bikaner. Jai Singh told the Raja of Marwar to raise the siege of the capital of Bikaner. Abhay Singh defiantly asked the Kacchwa chieftain not to poke his nose into this affair on the ground of its being a purely domestic feud between two Rathor families. Jaipur and Jodhpur became involved in a war. The clan-feeling in Bakht Singh got the better of his jealousy towards his elder brother, and he joined the war against Jaipur which he himself invaded. A levee en masse of the Jaipur vassals and allies, including the Hadas of Bundi, Jadavas of Karauli and Sesodias of Shahpura, met the Rathors at Gangwana (1741). Sawai Jai Singh suffered an ignominious defeat at the hands of Bakht Singh who had a cavalry of only one thousand Rathors.<sup>64</sup>

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62. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 1360-1363. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 326, 328-329. Sardesai, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 150.

63. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 130.

64. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1047-1052. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 156-158. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 317.

In the course of the protracted antagonism between these two states, Sawai Madho Singh of Jaipur often threatened to overthrow Bijay Singh, the Raja of Jodhpur, in order to put his "protege" and Bijay Singh's "inveterate enemy" Ram Singh on the throne.<sup>65</sup> The fight between Jodhpur and Bikaner also continued right through the eighteenth century.<sup>66</sup> The desire to secure the throne of Jaipur for his nephew Madho Singh prompted Rana Jagat Singh of Mewar (1734 - 1751) to entangle himself in the civil war between the Jaipur Raja Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh. The Hadās of Kotah and Bundi also supported the latter.<sup>67</sup> In the strife between Rana Ari Singh II and Ratan Singh, already referred to, both Jaipur and Jodhpur supported the pretender.<sup>68</sup> The Rana lost "the rich province of Godwar" which passed into the hands of the Jodhpur Raja Bijay Singh.<sup>69</sup>

In Rajputana the land was sandy or rocky, dry and barren; the rainfall, uncertain and scanty; the water supply, scarce. As a result, people frequently suffered from famine. Moreover, the country was not rich in mineral resources. She was not advanced also in industry. To such a country of limited resources came prolonged anarchy and disorder, chaos and confusion. The peasants went away leaving their lands. Tradesmen, in dread of robbers and the unscrupulous and oppressive nobles, were afraid of carrying on their normal business. Trade and commerce declined alarmingly. Industry was in no better position. The royal revenue generally, owing to lavish grants to the nobles or usurpations by them and poor collection, dropped to one - third of the normal amount. Tod's graphic picture of the typical situation that prevailed in Mewar is well worth quoting : "The agriculturist, never certain of the fruits of his labour, abandoned his fields, and at length his country; mechanical industry found no recompense, and commerce was at the mercy of unlicensed spoliation.

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65. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, pp. 319, 349.

66. Rajputana Gazetteer (1879), Vol. I, p. 183.

67. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 482, 494-495.

68. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, pp. 287-288.

69. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 505-506. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, p. 14.

In a very few years Mewar lost half her population, her lands lay waste, her mines were unworked, her looms, which formerly supplied all around, forsaken".<sup>70</sup>

To the moral bankruptcy, political chaos and economic disorder in the Rajput states, was added their military decadence. Clever swordsmanship and reckless courage of the Rajput cavaliers which once brought them so much glory were of no avail against the superior strategy of guns and cannon and trained mobility of the infantry. Sindhia's general De Boigne, by his two great victories (1790) over the Rajputs at Patan and Werta, demonstrated the magic of the quick-firing guns and disciplined musketeers. George Thomas' march against Bikaner in 1799 also revealed the weakness of Rajput artillery. Partly on account of the military and social traditions of the Rajputs and partly due to the restricted financial resources of the Rajas, it had not been possible to create a standing army. The prince had to depend, therefore, on the armed retainers of the selfish and short-sighted nobles. This was a fundamental weakness in Rajput military organisation. "Under the sense of their own military inferiority, the Rajput Rajas made a pathetic attempt to hire some thing to match Sindhia's European-trained brigades". They began to employ mercenaries consisting of Purbia Rajputs, Sindhis, Arabs and Rohillas. These hired bands were "composed of infantry, having a slight knowledge of European tactics". A little later, following the example of the Marathas, even Jaipur, Kotah and Bikaner employed European officers to discipline their troops. But the mercenaries did more harm than good. They were mostly inefficient. Their heavy pay-bills increased the insolvency of the Rajput rulers. Disorder followed in the realm. A barrier between the prince and the vassals was created. The employment of Muslim mercenaries highly offended the Rajputs. The cleavage between the ruler and the ruled was widened. Though the Rajput princes made this approach towards a standing army to check, even to crush the power of the nobility, it failed throughout except in the case of

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70. Tod, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.515-516, Vol.II, p.1066. J.N.Sarkar, op.cit., Vol.IV, pp.1, 68-73, 78-79. A.C.Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, pp.268-273. Rajputana Gazetteer (1879), Vol.I, pp.91, 96.

Kotah, where a hundred pieces of artillery and twenty trained battalions were kept up mainly from feudal sequestrations. Thus the experiment of engaging mercenary troops, opposed to the age-old clan system, resulted in strife and jealousy at home but did not put the Rajputs on a par with the Marathas ready for raids.<sup>71</sup>

The decline of the Mughal paramountcy about the middle of the eighteenth century created a political vacuum in India which the Marathas aimed at filling up. There was no power in North India to sustain the imperial tradition of the Mughals. "Locust swarms of the south" overran the different parts of Hindustan. Rajputana, morally and militarily debased, was a good hunting ground for the Marathas, "the hydra-headed banditti". Greedy and unscrupulous, they took the desert of Rajputana "to be as good a pagoda tree as the fertile Doab and the smiling plains of Bengal".<sup>72</sup> Even in those dark days the Rajput clan system prevented effective united action against the common enemy, the Marathas. Unity of interests might have helped them to defy "the Parthian-like warfare of the Marathas".<sup>73</sup> But such unity had ever been something foreign to the Rajputs. Their internal broils were an invitation to the Marathas to intervene and aggrandize. One faction sought help from the Peshwa or the Peshwa's local agent, Holkar. The opposite faction immediately sent envoys to Poona - or more often to Holkar's rival, Sindhia. The Rajputs made promises of payment of large sums of money which it was not possible for them to pay out of the revenue of their war-ravaged, small, stony or desert country. In 1786 the Jaipur minister Khush - hali Ram Bohra told Mahadji Sindhia, "You demand the payment of 60 lakhs of Rupees as our debt. We have not even sixty lakhs of broken potsherds in our

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71. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 1067-1068, 1074, 1119. J. N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 71-72. Compton, A Particular Account of the European Military Adventures of Hindostan, pp. 156-157. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, pp. 268, 416-417.

72. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 244; Lectures on Rajput History, p. 138, <sup>Tod</sup>op.cit., Vol. III, p. 1400. J. N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 194.

73. Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 482-483.

Treasury. How can we pay so many Rupees?" Invasions followed to exact the promised sums.<sup>74</sup> Following the Holkar-Sindhia attack on Bundi in 1734, the Marathas marched again and again upon Rajputana. Her people were plundered, heavy contributions levied and their lands taken. In short, the Marathas "drained the very life blood" of the Rajputs.<sup>75</sup> The depredations of the Marathas "grew in extent and horror" with the increase of the non-Maratha elements in the armies of Holkar and Sindhia.<sup>76</sup> Tod says : "... (the internal) feuds alone were sufficient to ruin the country; but when to such internal ills shoals of Mahratta plunderers were added, no art is necessary to describe the consequences".<sup>77</sup>

A temporary setback for the Marathas, however, came in the wake of the battle of Tunga (1787) - miscalled that of Lalsot, but it could not bring deliverance to the Rajputs.<sup>78</sup> In February, 1788, the Marathas defeated the forces of Mewar "with great slaughter". De Boigne's trained battalions won two resounding victories in quick succession - one at Patan (June 20, 1790) in Jaipur and the other at Werta, "the Gateway of Marwar" (September 10, 1790) - and humbled the Rajputs. The Sindhia-Holkar rivalry for domination over Hindustan (1791 - 1793) prevented the Marathas

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74. J.N.Sarkar, op.cit., Vol.IV, pp.69-71.

In 1809 Broughton wrote in a letter from Sindhia's camp : "...the mode in which the Jypoor Durbar is accustomed to execute such arrangements (about contributions) is quite notorious. They pay one-half, and agree to pay a quarter, after a certain number of months; and the remainder after another lapse of time. The payment of the second instalment is generally delayed, upon various pretences, for about a year, and for the last, they fight again, and if worsted, enter into another treaty". (Broughton, Letters written from a Mahratta Camp during the year 1809,<sup>1892,</sup> p.128)

75. Tod, op.cit., Vol.I, p.510. Tod, Travels in Western India, pp.XXIII-XXIV. A.C.Banerjee, Lectures on Rajput History, p.139.

76. A.C.Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p.245. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol.I, p.129.

77. Tod, Annals<sup>and Antiquities of Rajasthan</sup>, Vol.I, p.516.

78. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol.VIII, p.3. J.N.Sarkar, op.cit., Vol.III, p.380; Vol.IV, p.19. Sardesai, op.cit., Vol.III, pp.154-156, 157-158.

from taking full advantage of these successes.<sup>79</sup> Grant Duff says: "It was supposed that Sindia would have completely subjugated the Rajpoots, but the opposition and dissensions to which he was exposed from his colleagues, Holkar and Ali Buhadur, induced him to grant them peace on their promising to pay a moderate tribute annually".<sup>80</sup> Yet, for a decade, De Boigne and Perron collected the tribute from Rajputana "with tolerable case". The Rajputs groaned under the domination and exactions of the Marathas. But their disaffection did not burst into flames till the battle of Malpura (1800). In fact during this period there was no regular clash between the two.<sup>81</sup>

By 1792 Mewar, already greatly denuded of wealth and territory by the Marathas,<sup>82</sup> became a protectorate of Sindhia.<sup>83</sup> Early in 1791 the Rana, embarrassed by the Chundawat rebellion, sought his help. A contingent under Ambaji Ingle was sent. In June Mahadji Sindhia personally came to Mewar. It was decided that a tribute of fifty lakhs of rupees was to be paid by Mewar. A further sum of ten lakhs was to be levied on the chieftain of Devgarh and one lakh on the district of Banhedā. The Chundawat rebellion was crushed. Sindhia was made the regent by the Maharana. The Rana paid him five lakhs, and the Naga Bairagi captain Lalgir Gosain one lakh, as nazrana. Sindhia left Ambaji in Mewar to govern it as his deputy. Ambaji remained there for eight years (1791 - 1799). Mahadji Sindhia died in 1794. His successor, Daulat Rao Sindhia, had to face the "Bais' War" of which Mewar could not take advantage to overthrow the domination of Sindhia. Ambaji gave some respite to Mewar from feuds and external aggression. He, however, exacted half of the agricultural produce

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79. J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 4, 5, 29.

Sardesai, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 213-214, 218-220.

80. Grant Duff, History of the Mahrattas 1912, Vol. III, p. 74.

81. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, Introduction, p. III.

82. In 1755 Mahadji Sindhia took five lakhs of rupees from the Rana. In 1769 Rana Ari Singh paid Sindhia 33 lakhs of rupees out of the promised 64 lakhs. The Marathas took Jawad, Jiran, Nimach, Morwan, Nimbahera, Singoli and other districts. See A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, pp. 287-289.

83. J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 50.

and accumulated £2,000,000 sterling for himself. The country was almost bleached white. In 1794, at the time of the marriage negotiation of his sister with the prince of Jaipur, the Rana had the humility to borrow £50,000 from the Maratha general in order to purchase the nuptial presents.<sup>84</sup>

The battle of Patan gave the Marathas as spoils of victory one hundred five pieces of artillery, twenty one elephants, eight thousand flintlocks, thirteen hundred camels, three hundred horses, besides other objects worth many lakhs. No triumph was more complete. Jaipur was knocked down. She agreed to pay fifteen lakhs of rupees to Sindhia and two lakhs to his ministers.<sup>85</sup> Thereupon his jealous rival, Holkar, sent his troops to ravage the territory of Jaipur. The insolvent Raja of Jaipur<sup>86</sup> had to give up the district of Rampura to Holkar in lieu of monetary contribution. The battle of Lakheri (June 1, 1793) "knocked Holkar out of the North Indian ring" and Jaipur passed under the control of Sindhia.<sup>87</sup> In 1795 nine parganas of Jaipur were in the possession of the Marathas.<sup>88</sup> The country was desolated by Sindhia's army under De Boigne or Perron.<sup>89</sup> The condition of this country in 1794, in the words of Pillet, a French military adventurer, was as follows: "Their country (Jaipur) having been devastated and depopulated

84. Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 516-528. J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 51, 62-68.

85. J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 25-26, 48-49. Sardesai, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 218, 220.

86. According to the report of a Maratha diplomatist dated August 3, 1790, "The Jaipur Rajah is sitting down quietly. His ancestors left treasures. Many of their vaults were opened, but no money was found in any of them". (J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 40.)

87. Ibid, pp. 49-50. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 5.

88. Ibid, Vol. VIII, No. 4.

89. Tod, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 1364.

by the (Maratha) armies which eat up their produce, although immense, ..... destroyed all the branches of commerce which made it flourish, and...left for their subsistence only what escapes the activity of these armies. Nearly 25 years of such calamities leave their ruinous effect to be easily judged ..... the deluge ready to descend on the Rajah's head (had been) already preceded by a frightful tempest".<sup>90</sup>

Anxious to wipe out the disgrace of Patan, Raja Bijay Singh of Marwar assembled 30,000 Rathors to meet De Boigne and his battalions at Merta about thirty miles east of Ajmer.<sup>91</sup> Marwar had a disastrous defeat. Severe terms were imposed upon her. Her contribution was determined at sixty lakhs of rupees. She would pay seven and a half lakhs instantly. Twenty lakhs, for which Sambhar, Parbatsar and two other mahals would be mortgaged, were to be paid in four years. Twenty-two lakhs and a half were to be paid off in kind within four months. The balance of ten lakhs was excused to compensate the loss of crops during the invasion. Ajmer was to be ceded to the Marathas. Marwar paid immediately only four lakhs out of the first instalment. Sindhia got Ajmer on March 7, 1791. A few months later a vakil of Jodhpur visited Sindhia and presented jewels worth one and a half lakhs as part of the payment in kind.<sup>92</sup> During Bhim Singh's reign the states of Rajputana were often threatened by Daulat Rao Sindhia's officers in Hindustan. For about ten years after Merta Marwar did not venture to challenge the Maratha authority.<sup>93</sup>

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90. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 1.

91. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 320. Sardesai, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 219.

92. J.W. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 31-37, 58-60. Sardesai, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 219-220.

93. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 320.

Since the beginning of the Maratha inroads the minor states also were repeatedly exposed to plundering incursions and heavy contributions, with occasional loss of territory. Kotah suffered from the spoliation of the Marathas and became a tributary to them; but owing to the clever diplomacy of Zalim Singh, her celebrated minister, her distress was much less.<sup>94</sup> Bundi was among the greatest of the sufferers.<sup>95</sup> In 1795 Palmer, Resident with Sindhia, wrote to the Governor-General that the Naibs of Daulat Rao Sindhia had been compelled by their pecuniary distresses to make heavy exactions upon the Raja of Macheri to whom the late Sindhia had been indebted for his safety and recovery of his power after his defeat in Jaipur (Lalsot).<sup>96</sup> By the middle of 1795 three parganas of Bundi—Patan-Sani, Lakheri and Khatauli, the Ramsar mahal of Kishangarh, and three mahals of Karauli—Aleepoor, Somanlee and Chounra—were in possession of the Marathas.<sup>97</sup> On August 25, 1795, the British Resident, Palmer, informed the Governor-General that after the reduction of the strong fort of Sabalgarh belonging to the Raja of Karauli, it was generally believed that the intention of the Marathas was to dispossess the Raja of his dominions entirely.<sup>98</sup> Jaisalmer, because of its geographical situation, escaped the ravages of the Marathas.<sup>99</sup> The Raja of Bikaner never paid any tribute to the Marathas. "He owed his exemption perhaps more to the poverty and difficulty of his country than to his policy and ability".<sup>100</sup> In short, by the close of the eighteenth century the states of

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94. Ibid, Part II, p.394. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, p.45.

95. Rajputana Gazetteer (1879), Vol. I, p.220.

96. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, pp.33-34.

97. Ibid, Vol. VIII, No.4.

98. Ibid, Vol. VIII, p.50.

99. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p.409.

100. Foreign Miscellaneous Records, Vol.124.

Rajputana, with the exception of Bikaner and Jaisalmer, "were, more or less, in the grip of the Marathas".<sup>101</sup> It was only the rising imperial power of the East India Company which could free them from that fatal grip and offer a milder yoke.

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101. A.C. Banerjee, Lectures on Rajput History, p. 142.

## CHAPTER II

## WELLESLEY AND THE RAJPUT STATES

It was the terror of Maratha exploitation and domination which brought the disintegrating Rajput states into close political relations with the East India Company. Towards the close of the eighteenth century, on account of their own inability to defend themselves, the Rajput rulers were willing and ready to ally themselves with any power that would save them from the Marathas.<sup>1</sup> The rising English power which John Pillet, a French military adventurer in the service of the Jaipur Raja Sawai Pratap Singh, described in 1794 as "so much superior to all others" in India,<sup>2</sup> could give them effective help against the Marathas. The Rajput rulers had the shrewdness to understand this.<sup>3</sup> They also realised that they could offer an alliance which was worth having from the Company's point of view, for they were opposed to the Company's Maratha rivals. Moreover, they had faith in the character of the British nation and Government in India.<sup>4</sup> So, even before the end of the century and the extension and consolidation of the British power by Lord Wellesley, the Rajput prince tried to secure their alliance and assistance against the Marathas. But till the Governor-Generalship of Lord Wellesley (1798 - 1805) the Company's Government refused to respond to these approaches and followed a policy of non-intervention, though the English records of this period reveal the Company's "watchful jealousy" towards the movements of the Marathas in Hindustan.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Roberts, India under Wellesley, p. 24.

2. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 1.

3. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 418.

4. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. II, No. 173.

5. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 89.

The treaty of Salbai (1782) established peace between the English and the Marathas after their first war. It stipulated that neither of the parties would afford assistance to the enemies of the other.<sup>6</sup> In his letter of instructions to Col. Muir the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, wrote : "We are under no engagements to protect the present dominions of the King, or those of Nudjiff Khan, and the Rajah of Jaynagur; and if the peace is settled betwixt Madajee Sindia and us, I do not desire that he should be restrained in carrying into execution any plans which he may have formed against them; ..... It will be sufficient for us.....if he is only restricted in the treaty from making encroachments on our own territory and those of our allies"<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, it was provided that no obstruction by the treaty with the English should be offered to the execution of Sindhia's project of invading the territories of the Mughal Emperor, as also those of Najaf Khan and other chiefs in the province of Delhi and the adjoining regions.<sup>8</sup> Hence the treaty of Salbai left the Marathas free to molest the Rajput territories without any fear of British opposition or intervention.

In 1784 Pitt's India Act, enjoining among other provisions a general and rigid policy of non-intervention, was passed. Clause 34 of this Act declared "schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India" as "repugnant to the wish, honour, and policy" of the British nation. It further stated : " ..... it shall not be lawful for the Governor-General and Council, without the express command and authority of the Court of Directors, or of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, in any case (except where hostilities have actually been commenced, or preparations actually made for the commencement of hostilities, against the British nation in India, or against some of the Princes or States dependant thereon, or whose territories the Company shall be at such time engaged by any subsisting

6. Ibid, pp. 6-7. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads (Sunnuds), 1863, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 49-54.

7. Mill, History of British India, Vol. IV, p. 293.

8. Ibid.

treaty to defend or guarantee) either to declare war or commence hostilities, or enter into any treaty for making war against any of the country Princes or States in India; or any treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any country Princes or States".<sup>9</sup> These statutory restrictions reflect the persistent unpopularity, in England, of the policies of war and conquest or extension of the system of alliances with the "country powers".<sup>10</sup> Hence the possibility of the Rajputs enlisting the aid and alliance of the English in their fight against the Marathas was remote indeed.

In 1786 the Raja of Jaipur, threatened by an expedition of Sindhia, wrote to his minister Dowlat Ram, who had gone privately to Lucknow, a letter in which he desired to know whether he could hope for assistance from the British. In reference to this letter James Anderson, Resident with Sindhia, informed the acting Governor-General John Macpherson (February, 1785 - September, 1786) that, as the British were yet unconnected with the above Raja, it would not be expedient for them to support him against the Maratha leader. At the same time he remarked that it would also be inexpedient to give Sindhia the indirect aid which he might necessarily derive from any positive declaration of forbearance by them in the aforesaid expedition.<sup>11</sup> The helpless Raja, however, had to agree to pay sixty-three lakhs of rupees to Sindhia. Sindhia, after having collected eleven lakhs in cash and kind, left Rayaji Patil in the territory of Jaipur to collect the balance and to hold the ceded territories.<sup>12</sup> Macpherson had

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9. A Collection of Charters and Statutes Relating to the East India Company (London, 1817), p. 227. Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India (1756-1858), p. 174.

10. Thornton, History of the British Empire in India, pp. 374, 391-392. Alfred Lyall, The Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India, p. 231.

11. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. I, No. 42.

12. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 344-345.

neither the ability nor the authority to deviate from the policy of non-interference. The financial position of the Company's Government at the end of the administration of Warren Hastings prevented it from assuming new political responsibilities. According to the report of the Select Committee, 1810, the war ending in 1783 was "particularly prejudicial to the financial system" of the Company. Its revenues were used up, there were large arrears in the pay and allowances of its civil and military servants, and its credit deplorably decreased. Macpherson stated in 1785 that "the public distress was never so pressing as in this moment".<sup>13</sup> The next Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis, who was "conscientiously pacific",<sup>14</sup> acted in conformity with the views and sentiments of his superiors at Home and to the provisions of the Act of 1784.<sup>15</sup> Naturally he felt reluctant to enter into any alliance with the Rajput princes. In 1788 he remarked : "Whilst England is at peace in Europe, and whilst the powers of this country abstain from offering injury to us or to our allies, this Government is not at liberty to take any step which might lead to hostilities with any of our neighbours".<sup>16</sup> He further stated that in consideration of the hostility with Tipu Maratha co-operation would be of the utmost value to the British interests in India.<sup>17</sup> If the Marathas were left alone, their dissensions would lead to the disintegration of their power, while a provocation on the part of the British

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13. Mill, op.cit., Vol.V, pp.8-9.

14. Owen, A Selection From The Despatches, Treaties And other Papers of The Marquess Wellesley During His Government of India, p.XIII.

15. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol.II, pp.53-54. Memoir of the Life and Correspondence of John Lord Teignmouth by his son Lord Teignmouth, Vol.I, p.477-478. Sardesai, op.cit., Vol.III, p.157.

16. Charles Ross, Correspondence of Charles, First Marquiss Cornwallis, Vol.I, p.346.

17. Ibid.

would involve the double danger of uniting them and bringing about a Maratha-Mysore combination, as in the time of Warren Hastings, which would not be desirable for the British.<sup>18</sup> Further, before the Company fully recovered from the exhaustion of resources caused by various kinds of drainage during the long series of wars in the previous years, it came to be involved unavoidably in another war with Tipu.<sup>19</sup> In this state of affairs Cornwallis obviously could not offend the Marathas, still at peace with the Company, by interfering in favour of the Rajputs. In 1787 he wrote to captain Kirkpatrick: "...We cannot...enter into a plan which has a tendency to violate the faith of the treaties and to embroil us with them (the native powers)".<sup>20</sup> On the eve of the Maratha invasion of Rajputana in 1790, in vain did Raja Bijay Singh of Jodhpur propose to Lord Cornwallis the conclusion of an alliance between the two Governments.<sup>21</sup> In 1787 Sindhia wrote to Nana Fadnavis that he had reason to believe that the English were about to form an alliance with the Rajputs. But, as Grant Duff points out, this observation was incorrect.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, Cornwallis, for obvious reasons, refused to help Sindhia in any way against the Rajputs. Prior to the commencement of the war with Tipu, Sindhia made overtures to be a party to the coalition against him. In return, he wanted the British Government to engage to defend his possessions in Hindustan during his absence. Besides, he asked for the general aid of the Company against the Rajput chiefs who continued to challenge his authority. Cornwallis regarded these and other conditions as inadmissible and the alliance was not made.<sup>23</sup>

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18. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, Introduction, p. VII.

19. Owen, op. cit., p. XIII. Charles Ross, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 493.

20. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. I, No. 68.

21. Ibid., Vol. I, No. 258.

22. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 24-25. Sardesai, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 157-158.

23. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 88. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 72.

Lord Cornwallis' successor, Sir John Shore (1793 - 1798), a cautious civil servant, conformed more scrupulously to the prevailing sentiments in Britain and to the statutory restrictions which left, in his words, "little to the discretion of this Government".<sup>24</sup> In 1794 Mahadji Sindhia died. The Rajputs, like the other powers groaning under the heels of Sindhia, would have taken advantage of it to throw off the yoke of the Maratha leader if the British Government in India came to their aid. But the new Governor-General, though fully alive to the danger of the establishment and growth of Maratha influence in Hindustan and the desirability of its diminution, thought that it would be "improper and unjust" to avail himself of this opportunity. In the words of Sir John Shore, "unprovoked hostilities are equally prohibited by the Legislature and sound policy".<sup>25</sup> In the same year John Pillet, on behalf of the Raja of Jaipur, proposed to Col. John Murray, Military Auditor-General in Bengal, conclusion of a defensive and offensive alliance on definite terms between the East India Company and the Raja. Pillet pointed out that the Raja would support the British with a cavalry of 50,000 and the resources of his territory. In exchange, the Company would engage to protect him firmly against the Marathas and to ensure his full liberty to enjoy his territory in peace.<sup>26</sup>

In the opinion of Murray, "The remote situation of the (Rajput) Rajahs renders us less uneasy about their subjugation by the Marathas than we ought to be; the Northern Rajahs ought to be held up in their independence of the Marathas as a counterpoise ... but this is chiefly to be effected by the Rajahs, through their own wisdom, by uniting to resist encroachment and by resolution to guarantee each other in their

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24. Memoir of the Life and Correspondence of John Lord Teignmouth, Vol. I, pp. 466, 479. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. II, p. 54.

25. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. I, No. 289.

26. Ibid, Vol. VIII, No. 1.

respective dominions".<sup>27</sup> In a letter to Sir John Shore dated July 10, 1794, he suggested the desirability of sending a resident to the court of Jaipur. He thought that the mere act of sending a British agent to the "Northern Rajas" without any ties whatsoever would encourage them to unite and coalesce among themselves. They might feel that the English wished them well and had not any particular or exclusive partiality for the Marathas. The latter would also understand that the British did not wish those Rajas to be crushed. Consequently there was some chance for the consolidation of the power of the "Northern Rajas" to resist the depredations of the Marathas.<sup>28</sup> Earlier, Jaipur had made an indirect application for the appointment of a British Resident to its court with a proposition to furnish a cavalry of 50,000 in case they should be wanted, in return for the grant of British protection against the Marathas.<sup>29</sup> But in view of the outbreak of the war between England and Revolutionary France in Europe, the decline of the Company's revenue by about £165,000 a year since 1793,<sup>30</sup> and the fact that Tipu would avail himself of any fresh opportunity to establish the power and honour which he had lost in the last contest with the British,<sup>31</sup> it was rather risky on the part of Sir John Shore to give offence to the Marathas and assume new responsibilities in respect of the Rajput states.

The decisive victory of the Marathas over the Nizam at Kharda (1795) added to the dread of the Rajput rulers. Under the impression that this triumph would lead to the execution of the design long contemplated by the Marathas to exterminate their Governments entirely, the Rajas of Jaipur and Kotah sent express messengers to Major Palmer, British

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27. Ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 2.

28. Ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 3.

29. Ibid., Vol. I, No. 289.

30. Roberts, op. cit., p. 28.

31. Memoir of the Life and Correspondence of John Lord Teignmouth, Vol. I, p. 467.

Resident with Sindhia, for the purpose of soliciting the Governor-General's intervention to ward off their imminent danger and intimating their willingness to conclude engagements of mutual defence with the Company's Government. Major Palmer, however, told the envoys that the Governor-General was connected with the Marathas "by alliance, and by the ties of mutual friendship and good offices". Hence the Governor-General, having regard to public faith and private sentiment, could not intervene in their relations with other states unless they violated the rights or security of the Company and its allies.<sup>32</sup> Some other Rajput chiefs also made applications for assistance, but without any result.<sup>33</sup>


The British policy of non-intervention in the fight of the Rajputs against their invaders from the South contributed to political chaos in Rajputana and indirectly helped the Marathas. They desolated and coerced the much weaker Rajput states with comparative ease in the absence of any opposition or interference from the Company. To let down the Rajputs was, however, not altogether desirable from the British point of view. As pointed out above, Murray had realized the necessity of holding up the Rajputs as a "counterpoise" to the Marathas. But in the last years of the eighteenth century the Company was not prepared politically and economically to play an active role in this regard. The "Northern Rajas" were, therefore, expected to "unite to resist encroachments". The Marathas reaped the harvest of British neutrality till Lord Wellesley adopted a bolder policy.

Sir John Shore's successor, Lord Mornington, who afterwards became Marquess Wellesley, entered upon his office in May, 1798. The new administration marked the termination of the general policy of neutrality or non-entanglement hitherto

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32. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 19.

33. Ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 30.



pursued by the Company towards the Indian States.<sup>34</sup> This change was reflected in the relations between the Company and the Rajput States. The general political situation in India as also the character and views of the new Governor-General were responsible for a new outlook and a new political strategy.

Upon his arrival Lord Wellesley found the Company's position in India insecure and described it as "extremely critical" though "by no means alarming".<sup>35</sup> The Nizam who, in consequence of Sir John Shore's policy of non-intervention, had suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the Marathas at Kharda, was highly indignant at the English and had engaged French officers to train an army for him.<sup>36</sup> The Marathas, who considered the British as their chief rival, also took the assistance of French officers. The French military adventurer Perron, one of Sindhia's principal agents and subsequently for some time his supreme commander, held a big jagir in Northern India. He gained some control over the unfortunate Emperor Shah Alam and extended his sway over the Rajput States, particularly Jaipur and Jodhpur.<sup>37</sup> Tipu Sultan was intriguing on all sides not only to recover his former dominions but also to expel the English from India. Particularly he was in negotiations with the French.<sup>38</sup> An invasion of Hindustan from the north-west by Zaman Shah, ruler of Kabul, was for some time apprehended.<sup>39</sup> The connections of the Indian rulers with

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34. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 168.

Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VI, Introduction, p. I.

35. Martin, The Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley, Vol. I, p. 192.

36. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 118. Owen, op. cit., pp. XVI and 1XXV. Sardesai, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 291-297, 350.

Burton, The Mahratta War and Pindari War, pp. 1-2.

37. Ramsay Muir, op. cit., p. 200. Owen, op. cit., pp. XXII, 1XXVI.

J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 245-251. Batra, The Relations of Jaipur State with East India Company (1803-1858), p. 14.

Martin, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 210-211. Burton, op. cit., p. 2.

38. Martin, op. cit., Vol. I, Nos. XLVIII, CCVII.

39. Owen, op. cit., pp. XV, 1XXVII, 1XXXIII.

the French were looked upon as a matter of grave concern in view of the antagonism in Europe between England and Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Bonaparte was not only in Egypt in 1798-1799 but avowedly cherished designs for the conquest of India.<sup>40</sup> Thus the Company thought itself as confronted with not only the threat of the hostility of the "country powers" but also the danger of revival of French power in India. To the political dangers of the Company were added its serious financial difficulties which the cautious administration of Sir John Shore had failed to remove.<sup>41</sup>

Historians like Mill have detected exaggeration in the above official interpretation of the critical position of the Company. There has been perhaps some exaggeration, particularly with regard to the peril of French aggression from within and without. Yet the apprehensions were not entirely baseless. As Roberts says : "The difficulties and dangers at the beginning of (Lord) Wellesley's (Governor-Generalship) are sometimes not appreciated simply because they were so triumphantly surmounted ..... Further...the dangers and difficulties of the purely Indian situation were overshadowed by the peril arising from Republican and Napoleonic France".<sup>42</sup>

The task before Lord Wellesley was, therefore, to secure and consolidate the Company's dominions in India. He believed that security lay in boldness.<sup>43</sup> His uncharitable remarks about his predecessor clearly point it out. He said : "His (Sir John Shore) low birth, vulgar manners, and eastern habits, as well as education in the Company's service, his natural shyness and awkwardness, added to indolence, timidity, and bad health, contributed to relax every spring of this government from one extremity of the empire to the other; and at the seat of the government established a systematical

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40. Ibid, pp. XIII, XXII, XXIII.

41. Roberts, op. cit., p. 28.

42. Roberts, op. cit., p. 31.

43. Ramsay Muir, op. cit., p. 201.

degradation of the person, dignity and authority of the Governor-General ..... never did there exist in India one more inefficient in its control over the subordinate presidencies, more careless or timid with respect to all our foreign relations".<sup>44</sup> As an Imperialist Lord Wellesley thought that if the Company was to stay in India, it must attain to the position of the paramount power.<sup>45</sup> It was his firm conviction that no greater blessing could be conferred on the inhabitants of India than the extension of the British authority, influence and power.<sup>46</sup> Hence the necessity of securing the Company's position as well as Lord Wellesley's boldness and imperialistic convictions led to the reversal of Sir John Shore's timid policy of non-intervention as also to the attempt by the former to establish British paramountcy in India.

Lord Wellesley sought to attain his aim by a comprehensive system of alliances and political connections in Hindustan and the Deccan, besides war and annexation. He wanted to establish British ascendancy in the councils of the Indian States.<sup>47</sup> He staunchly held that the best British policy would be to convince the several powers of India that their real interest lay in respecting the rights of their neighbours and in cultivating their resources within the limits of their several territories.<sup>48</sup> Lord Wellesley's policy of contracting alliances with the Indian powers, commonly called the Subsidiary Alliance system, was, however, not his invention. It originated long before him. But he greatly developed and extended the system, and, unlike his predecessors, he made a daring avowal of a public policy of such nature. This system was ostensibly a commitment on the part of the Company to protect the allied powers; in practice it ~~proved to be a~~ <sup>proved to be</sup> a

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44. Roberts, op.cit., pp.180-181.

45. Ramsay Muir, op.cit., p.201.

46. Martin, op.cit., Vol.II, p.607.

47. Ibid, Vol.III, p.379. Duff, op.cit., Vol.III, p.316.

48. Martin, op.cit., Vol.I, p.104.

"potent" force "for the infiltration of British supremacy". It brought also the advantage of relieving the Company's finances by making the Indian princes themselves defray the expenses of British protection and control.<sup>49</sup> In extending the Company's system of alliances Lord Wellesley put forward the plea that the Company's Government in India was permitted by "the Acts of Parliament"<sup>50</sup> to make alliances for the defence of its territories.<sup>51</sup> The pursuit of this Forward policy by Wellesley was facilitated by the fact that he had "the inestimable benefit of early friendship and confidential intercourse with the great statesmen" (like Pitt, Grenville and Dundas) "who then directed in England the general interests of the empire".<sup>52</sup>

Thus Lord Wellesley came to India not only to secure the position of the British Raj in India but also to transform it into the British Raj of India. This object required the curbing of the Maratha power. Consequently it led to the severance of the ties of mutual friendship and the outbreak of war between the two. This conflict - the Second Anglo-Maratha War - necessitated the alliance of the Rajput rulers against the Marathas and therefore made possible the breaking away from the policy of aloofness followed by Lord Wellesley's predecessors towards the Rajputs. Prior to the Anglo-Maratha conflict, however, the Company had to think seriously of some sort of general arrangement with the Rajput states for the defence of the north-western frontier of its territories against Afghan invasions. It was too early to contemplate any regular treaty of alliance with the Rajputs, for the rupture with the Marathas was yet to come. But a new .

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49. Roberts, op.cit., pp. 34-36.

50. Pitt's India Act of 1784 and the Charter Act of 1793.

cf. A Collection of Charters and Statutes Relating to the East India Company, pp. 227, 296-297.

51. Owen, op.cit., p. XV. Martin, op.cit., Vol. V, Supplement-Mahratta War, p. 336.

52. Wilkes, Historical Sketches of the South of India (History of Mysore), Vol. III, p. 347.

wind had begun to blow : the Governor-Generalship of Lord Wellesley marked a new and important phase in Anglo-Rajput relations.

One of the early concerns of the Company under Lord Wellesley was the security of the north-western frontier of its territories from the threatened invasion of the Afghan King, Zaman Shah. Towards the close of the eighteenth century this Durrani King, encouraged by the anti-British as well as anti-Maratha elements in India, planned to invade Hindustan and thus to repeat his grand father's performance in restoring Muslim supremacy here. The puppet Mughal Emperor Shah Alam invited him to expel the Marathas from Hindustan. Tipu Sultan made large promises of aid. As Kaye finds it, the Raja of Jaipur, owing to his dread of the Marathas, offered the Afghan ruler a lakh of rupees a day as his army would enter his dominion.<sup>53</sup> The project of Zaman Shah was, however, treated very lightly by some of his contemporaries. Sir John Shore treated the danger from Zaman Shah as "an event very little probable."<sup>54</sup> Daulat Rao Sindhia himself told Lord Wellesley that Zaman Shah was not a real danger.<sup>55</sup> Mill doubts the authenticity of the reports about the invasion of Zaman Shah who was far away from the Company's dominions, and regards it as based upon rumour.<sup>56</sup> Some scholars hold a similar opinion. Sir J.N.Sarkar writes : "From our fuller knowledge of the facts we can now see that the Afghan menace was not really so great as the men of the time feared. In fact, the Durrani King's power was hopelessly weakened by his empty treasury and the incurable disputes in his family, while the Sikhs gradually set as a concrete wall guarding the land of the

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53. J.N.Sarkar, op.cit., Vol.IV, p.148. Kaye, History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol.I, pp.2-3.

54. Mill, op.cit., Vol.VI, p.128. See also Kaye, op.cit., Vol.I, p.3.

55. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol.VIII, No.105.

56. Mill, op.cit., Vol.VI, pp.126-131, 142.

five rivers .....<sup>57</sup>

Yet there is no doubt that Zaman Shah seriously proposed invasion of India and repeatedly made demonstrations of carrying his purpose into effect. In 1794 (January), 1795 (November), 1796 (November), 1797 (October) and 1798 (October) he advanced as far as Peshawar; and in 1797 and 1798 he actually occupied Lahore itself.<sup>58</sup> In 1798 the Shah plainly apprised Lord Wellesley that his object was to restore Shah Alam and to drive out the Marathas from India. The Shah also called for his services, in a tone of command, for this project.<sup>59</sup>

Moreover, he sent letters to the Rajas of Jaipur and Bikaner in order to know whether they would join him.<sup>60</sup> Although it is said that the Sikhs would have proved a great obstacle to the progress of the Shah's army,<sup>61</sup> the Governor-General wrote in August, 1798, that the Shah had advanced to Lahore sometime before without meeting any formidable opposition from the Sikhs.<sup>62</sup> Further, between the country of the Sikhs and the frontier of Oudh no barrier existed to check the Shah, except the power of Sindhia. The dominions of Sindhia were then weakened by internal dissensions. His tributary chiefs of Hindustan, particularly the Rajputs, were notoriously disaffected to his cause and were ready to seize any favourable opportunity to annihilate his power.<sup>63</sup> The frontier state of Oudh was also weak.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, particularly in view of the vulnerability of its north-western borders, the Company's Government could not treat the idea of an invasion from

57. J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 148.

58. Roberts, op.cit., p. 120. Owen, op.cit., p. lxxiii. J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 148.

59. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 69. Martin, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 258.

60. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 85.

61. Hari Ram Gupta, History of the Sikhs, Vol. III, p. 120.  
J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 148.

62. Martin, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 189.

63. Ibid, Vol. I, pp. 189, 220.

64. Roberts, op.cit., p. 118.

Kabul "as a mere visionary danger".<sup>65</sup> Rather, previously on more than one occasion in the eighteenth century "tremendous and catastrophic invasions" from the north - west had devastated the northern plains of India.<sup>66</sup> As Roberts points out, the extent of the seriousness of the danger arising out of the Afghan threat "could not have been known at the time, and Wellesley was bound not to underrate his enemy".<sup>67</sup> Sir John Shore had found it difficult to decide upon measures to be adopted to meet the Afghan menace which had already appeared during his time.<sup>68</sup> Zaman Shah (as we have pointed out above) asked Lord Wellesley to join him against the Marathas and threatened, in case of non-compliance, to treat the Company as his <sup>enemy</sup> ~~enemy~~. But the Governor-General decided that it would be utterly inconsistent with every principle of faith and policy to assist the Shah in the prosecution of his declared purposes.<sup>69</sup> So the Company, guided by Lord Wellesley, decided to obstruct the progress of the Shah at the greatest practicable distance from the frontier of Oudh.<sup>70</sup>

It was possible that the Shah, himself advancing through the country of the Sikhs, might detach at the same time a large part of his army to advance by the route of Multan across the desert of Bikaner to Jaipur.<sup>71</sup> It was felt that the principal powers whose common resistance might offer a serious obstacle to the Shah's army included the Rajput chiefs as also the Maratha power under Sindhia. Normally, for their religious prejudices the Rajput rulers could not favour ~~of~~ the establishment of the Shah's power in their region. Yet the Company's Government rightly feared

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65. Martin, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 27.

66. Roberts, op. cit., p. 120.

67. Ibid, p. 122.

68. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 127.

69. Martin, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 258.

70. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 129. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 111.

71. Martin, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 679.

that the Rajput Rajas would not easily forget the injuries committed upon them by Sindhia; it was felt that this bitter recollection might drive them into an alliance with their natural enemy, Zaman Shah, against Sindhia.<sup>72</sup> To rule out such an ominous possibility the Company thought it prudent to convince Sindhia of his deep interest in making such concessions to the Rajputs as would conciliate them towards him; Sindhia was to be induced to afford to the Rajas some effective protection against future oppression on his part. But politic generosity on Sindhia's part was not enough. Lord Wellesley was also of the view that a general defensive alliance with the powers of Hindustan, including the Rajput states, would not only be the best security against the success of an Afghan invasion but also might deter the Afghan prince from such an undertaking.<sup>73</sup>

Major-General Sir James Craig wrote to the Governor-General that it would not be practicable for the British to enter into any alliance with the Rajputs but through the Marathas. As the dominions of Sindhia lay between the Rajput principalities and the Company's territories, the British could join or co-operate with the Rajputs only with the concurrence and in concert with the Marathas. Further, any communication with the Rajputs without the participation of Sindhia would be fatal to the Company's friendship with the latter.<sup>74</sup> The Governor-General, however, told the Major General that at all events it would be necessary to consider the formation of a defensive league, to which the Rajputs must be invited, whether Sindhia joined it or not.<sup>75</sup> In reply to the said letter of the Major-General, the Governor-General said : "The suggestions stated in my former letter with regard to.....the Rajputs were not intended to refer to any

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72. Secret Consultations, 1798, November 23, Nos. 1, 2.

Martin, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 259-260, 284.

73. Ibid, Vol. I, pp. 12, 220, 260.

74. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 284.

75. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 262.

regular treaty with them, unconnected with Scindiah but merely to such general encouragement as (in the absence of Scindhia) might be offered to those powers by our advice and amicable communication and by the appearance of our army in the field until the ruin or restoration of Scindhia shall have been finally decided".<sup>76</sup>

In January, 1799, Zaman Shah retreated from Lahore which he had occupied in 1798. The Shah of Persia, urged by the agent of the British Government, had incited Zaman Shah's treacherous brother to rise in insurrection. This was the end of the threat from Zaman Shah, who in 1800 was overthrown and imprisoned.<sup>77</sup> With the passing away of the threat, the plan of a defensive arrangement between the Company's Government and the Rajput states became unnecessary and remained unexecuted. But it provided a significant hint of a change in the British attitude towards the Rajputs. It is true that the Company was not yet prepared to offend the Marathas and conclude independently of them any regular treaty with the Rajput states. The Company, however, now for the first time thought of entering into some arrangement with them. This change in the British outlook, as we shall see, foreshadowed the conclusion of treaties of alliance between the English and some Rajput states subsequently when Lord Wellesley went to war against the Marathas.

In 1799 the flight of Wazir Ali, ex-Nawab of Oudh, brought the Company into direct contact with the Government of Jaipur. In January he murdered Cherry, the British Resident at Benares, and some other Europeans. He then gathered an army several thousand strong and endeavoured to establish himself in Oudh. But the strong British detachment baffled his effort and forced him to seek shelter in the territory of Jaipur (June 1799).<sup>78</sup> It was not unlikely

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76. Ibid, Vol. I, pp. 314-315.

77. Ibid, Vol. I, p. 428. Roberts, op. cit., p. 120.

78. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 357.

that he might effect his escape from Jaipur and attempt to reach Kabul by the route of Bikaner, in which case he must pass through Jodhpur territory. The Government of Jaipur prevented him from pursuing his journey towards Kabul and detained him in the fortress of Amber. At the instance of the Governor-General, Colonel Collins, British Resident with Sindhia, went to Jaipur and requested Sawai Pratap Singh to hand over the assassin to him so that he might be brought to condign punishment by the Company. Colonel Collins, in order to prevent Wazir Ali's escape through Jodhpur, also addressed a letter to the Raja of Jodhpur intimating him about the baseness, treachery and cruelty of Wazir Ali's disposition and strongly claiming, as well on the principles of policy as of common justice, the seizure of the person of the assassin should he attempt to pass through Jodhpur territory.

The Raja of Jaipur solemnly pledged his word not to release the murderer without the consent of the Governor-General. He was anxious not to give offence to the British by affording protection to the assassin. In his conversations with Colonel Collins, the Raja expressed his eagerness to maintain and increase friendliness between his Government and the English. He, however, pointed out that it would be inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the honour and feelings of his family to surrender, for the purpose of being put to death, any person who had sought protection in his dominions. Such a surrender, being contrary to the customs and religious principles of his subjects, would excite general dissatisfaction among them. There were rigid bigots among them who would not willingly permit even the most noxious animal to be deprived of life. Hence the Raja was only willing to surrender the assassin, provided Collins would engage that the assassin should not be put to death nor be confined in chains. Colonel Collins, therefore, had to give Pratap Singh a written guarantee that Wazir Ali's life would be spared and he would be condemned to perpetual imprisonment without chains. In

December, 1799, Wazir Ali was surrendered and then sent to Calcutta.

In his talks with Colonel Collins, Sawai Pratap Singh described with much feeling the oppressions and injuries his subjects had suffered from the rapacity and injustice of the Maratha leaders. He also expressed his earnest desire and that of "several other" Rajput chiefs to form an alliance with the Company. Colonel Collins, however, told the Raja that he was not authorized by the Governor-General "to enter upon any subject of importance which involved matters foreign to the object of (his) present mission".<sup>79</sup>

The Maratha depredations continued in Rajputana without showing any sign of abatement. Rajput opposition proved as little effective as before. In 1798 Daulat Rao Sindhia's troops mutinied in Poona, and the widows ("Bais") of Mahadji Sindhia also began war against Daulat Rao.<sup>80</sup> These troubles of the latter encouraged Rana Bhim Singh of Mewar to attack early in 1799 those places in Ajmer which he had to cede to Mahadji. The Rana's troops were, however, defeated after a sharp conflict by the troops of Ambaji, the lieutenant of Sindhia, who was reinforced by some new levies raised by Gulabji Kadam, an officer in the latter's service.<sup>81</sup> The troops of Marwar, however, occupied a part of the city of Sambhar which the late Raja Bijay Singh had lost to Mahadji Sindhia.<sup>82</sup>

Meanwhile Ambaji and Lakhwa Dada had entered into a conflict for Sindhia's lieutenancy in Hindustan.<sup>83</sup> This conflict distracted Rajputana, particularly Mewar. Lakhwa Dada had also taken up the Bais' cause in North India against

<sup>79</sup>. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, Nos. 153-165, 168-172, 178, 183, 184, 186-190, 191A, 193-198. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 136.

<sup>80</sup>. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 152-153.

<sup>81</sup>. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 131.

<sup>82</sup>. Secret Consultations, 1799, May 20, No. 32. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 132.

<sup>83</sup>. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 525-526.

Daulat Rao.<sup>84</sup> The Bais' party tried to engage Udaipur and Jaipur against the latter. Udaipur joined Lakhwa Dada who also held negotiations with the Raja of Jodhpur. Lakhwa Dada sent 3,000 horse and foot with artillery to the assistance of the Rana of Udaipur who defeated Gulabji Kadam with great slaughter (April, 5). Lakhwa Dada himself arrived in Mewar and attacked Hamirgarh to which Gulabji had fled for refuge after his disastrous defeat. Ambaji Ingle was at his wits' end how to keep hold of Mewar. He hired George Thomas for half a lakh of rupees a month. Bala Rao and Bapu Sindhia marched from Malwa with troops to relieve Ambaji's distress. Lakhwa Dada had also become the ally of Sindhia's rival, Jaswant Rao Holkar.<sup>85</sup> The Raja of Kotah was induced by Daulat Rao Sindhia and Kashi Rao Holkar to refuse the pecuniary demands of Jaswant Rao Holkar. In consequence of this refusal the latter threatened an immediate attack upon Kotah. Zalim Singh led the troops of Kotah against Holkar. The latter, however, left Kotah on being paid two lakhs of rupees.<sup>86</sup>

Confronted with these troubles, Sindhia decided to change his ministers and reconcile the royal widows ("Bais"). In May, 1799, he sent formal letters to Lakhwa Dada appointing him his viceroy in Hindustan. But Ambaji declined to part with his viceroyalty over Mewar. He began to coerce the Mewar barons who had sided with Lakhwa Dada in the last contest. George Thomas in junction with Ambaji's son, Bhau Ingle, reduced several forts in the vicinity of the town of Shahpura. This move brought Lakhwa Dada from Udaipur to the scene in support of his partisans. Skirmishes between the two sides continued for weeks. On August 9, 1799, Lakhwa's troops severely defeated Ambaji's dewan, Nana Ganesh. George Thomas could give no support to the latter. Ambaji made frantic efforts to hire battalions of Perron's infantry

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84. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 153-154.

85. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, pp. 176-183,  
J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 155-156.

86. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, Nos. 157, 163, 166.

for service in Mewar. But nothing was done by the French general. In September Daulat Rao gave order to deprive Ambaji of authority over Mewar.<sup>87</sup>

Meanwhile, the Raja of Jaipur was solicited by Lakhwa Dada for assistance with a body of troops for the purpose of opposing Perron. In return for his assistance Lakhwa promised to restore to him those places of which he had been deprived by Daulat Rao Sindhia, and likewise remit all arrears of tribute due from the Raja to the Maratha Government. Though Pratap Singh seemed inclined to accept these offers, those who enjoyed his confidence asked him to temporize till fuller information was available about the strength of the contending parties.<sup>88</sup> In consequence, as the Raja of Jaipur complained in October, 1799, the troops of Lakhwa Dada committed depredations in his territories.<sup>89</sup> Lakhwa Dada had also besieged Kishangarh and exacted two lakhs of rupees from its Raja.<sup>90</sup> However, Ambaji at last admitted defeat and relinquished Mewar. Lakhwa Dada's viceroyalty began in November, 1799.<sup>91</sup>

During the first four months of 1800 Lakhwa Dada carried on a most successful campaign in Rajputana. With the help of Pohlman's brigade of De Boigne's army, he besieged and reduced the strong fortress of Jahazpur belonging to the noble of Shahpura in Mewar. The Rana of Mewar had to make payment of five lakhs of rupees. Lakhwa then moved towards Jaipur to collect the arrears of tribute. Raja Pratap Singh of Jaipur, taking advantage of the Bais' war and the departure of De Boigne, had stopped payment and begun preparations to expel the Marathas. Lakhwa Dada decided to

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87. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 155-157. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, Nos. 146, 149, 150, 163.

88. Ibid, Vol. VIII, No. 164.

89. Ibid, Vol. VIII, <sup>No.</sup> 179.

90. Ibid, Vol. VIII, Nos. 173, 179.

91. Ibid, Vol. VIII, No. 185. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 158.

strike a decisive blow at the army of Jaipur.<sup>92</sup> A little earlier the Raja of Marwar had declared war against the Marathas. He sent a cavalry contingent to the assistance of the ruler of Jaipur. The latter marched from his capital to meet Lakhwa Dada who assembled his troops to the south of the town of Malpura. Lakhwa's army consisted of about 16,000 men. The Kotah regent, Zalim Singh, contributed a battalion to this army. The Jaipur army had a total of 27,000 men and 54 pieces of artillery. The Rajput cavalry, estimated at upwards of 15,000, included 5,000 Rathor horsemen from Jodhpur, led by Sawai Singh. The Raja of Jaipur himself led the Rajput army.<sup>93</sup> The battle fought on April 16, 1800<sup>94</sup> was decisive. Although the Rathors cut the Maratha cavalry to pieces, the slaughter in the ranks of the Jaipur army was terrible. Compton says : "Pratap Singh never recovered from the blow to his power and prestige which was dealt him on this eventful day". Sawai Pratap Singh after this disgraceful engagement retired to Jaipur.<sup>95</sup> The Marathas

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92. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. IX, p. ix, p. 2. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 158-159.

93. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. IX, Nos. 6, 7, 8A. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 159-160.

94. Different authors have given different dates for this battle. Compton gives April 15. In Asiatic Annual Register (Vol. II, p. 127) we have April 16. In his letters Collins, British Resident with Sindhia, gives April 17. In Thakur Narendra Sinhji's "The Decisive battle of Jaipur" we find Baisakh Vidi 8, equivalent to April 16. Hence April 16 seems to be the correct date (See Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. IX, p. X)

95. Ibid, Vol. IX, Nos. 8, 8A. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 355. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 158-162. Compton, op. cit., p. 240.

Broughton states that after his defeat the Raja of Jaipur "himself fled in confusion towards the capital, leaving everything even the ladies of the prince's family to the mercy of the victorious Mahrattas; the ladies were subsequently taken by Kushali Ram Bohra". (Broughton, op. cit., p. 92)

ravaged his territories.<sup>96</sup>

Sindhia's court had become "a battle-ground of conflicting interests".<sup>97</sup> Sharza Rao Ghatge who was released from confinement won over Daulat Rao Sindhia. The prime minister, Baloba Tatya, was arrested treacherously. The anti-Lakhwa group got into power and orders were issued for the arrest of Lakhwa. Thus Lakhwa's reward for the splendid victory at Malpura was his dismissal. He fled from Jaipur towards Mewar where he stayed for three months and collected money. Ambaji once again became Sindhia's viceroy in Hindusthan and was directed to act in concert with Perron.<sup>98</sup> Lakhwa entered into an agreement with Bhim Singh of Marwar and sent his family and effects to Jodhpur for security.<sup>99</sup> After Lakhwa's flight Perron arrived near Jaipur and made a settlement with the Raja who agreed to pay to Sindhia nine lakhs of rupees - six lakhs within one month and three lakhs within six months. In return, the Maratha troops were to vacate the territories of Jaipur.<sup>100</sup> Perron then marched towards Jodhpur towards the end of May to coerce the Raja. He intimidated the Jodhpur ruler into acceptance of his own terms. Perron, however, was compelled to return in a fortnight on account of the revolt of a partisan of Lakhwa in Saharanpur. After Perron's departure Bhim Singh continued his intrigues with Lakhwa.<sup>101</sup>

This indomitable Maratha chieftain had been living on the plunder of the territory of Jaipur. He now moved from the Ajmer frontier to Sambhar. In October, 1800, he hastened to Udaipur and extracted two lakhs of rupees from the Rana.<sup>102</sup> The Bais' war had broken out afresh and for

96. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. IX, No. 9.

97. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 293.

98. J.N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 163.

99. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. IX, No. 14.

100. J.N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 163.

101. Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 164. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. IX, Nos. 14, 15, 18, 19, 21.

102. Ibid, Vol. IX, No. 23. J.N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 164.

their defence Lakhwa set off for Malwa. Ambaji moved to Mewar<sup>103</sup> and, after the capture of a small fort, employed himself in reducing Jawaḍ, a fort subject to Lakhwa's authority. He could do nothing more for his master. Perron, however, exacted two lakhs of rupees from Jaipur. Meanwhile Pohlman had deprived Bhim Singh of his portion of the city of Sambhar.<sup>104</sup> Compton says that after the battle of Malpura Jaipur and Jodhpur paid the Marathas 25 and 12 lakhs of rupees respectively.<sup>105</sup> The Raja of Jaipur early in 1801 desired to form a confederacy with the "other" Rajput States, but the long-subsisting jealousies among them as usual stood in the way of union either in counsel or in action.<sup>106</sup>

However, the fortunes of the Maratha chieftains were constantly changing. Lakhwa Dada, having failed to defeat Sindhia's forces, took shelter in Mewar and died there on February 7, 1802.<sup>107</sup> The Bais' war also terminated by "being engulfed in a colossal contest between Daulat Rao Sindhia and Jaswant Rao Holkar."<sup>108</sup> The latter took to a roving life after his defeat at Indore on October 14, 1801. In January, 1802, he went to Mewar and plundered the famous shrine of Nathdwara. He levied three lakhs of rupees on the priests and inhabitants, several of whom he carried to his camp as hostages for payment. By this impious act the capricious Maratha leader proved himself no better than an infidel "Turk". Then this plunderer, hotly pursued by Ambaji's brother Bala Rao, appeared before Kotah. Raj Rana Zalim Singh had no means of securing his ryots from plunder but by immediate payment of one lakh of rupees. Bala Rao along with Sachdev

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103. Ibid, A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 293.

104. J.N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 175. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. IX, Nos. 24, 25, 26.

105. Compton, op. cit., p. 241.

106. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. IX, No. 245.

107. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 293.

108. J.N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 177-178.

committed barbarous outrages in Kotah under the pretext that Zalim Singh had given protection to some members of Holkar's family. Though the Rana of Udaipur had been saved temporarily from the exactions of Holkar by the latter's pursuers, they came back and realised three lakhs of rupees from the Rana. The Rana had to raise the money by selling household effects and the jewels of the ladies of his family. Moreover, Bala Rao fostered the ancient feud between the Chundawats and the Saktwats. Holkar came again to Udaipur to demand 40 lakhs of rupees. "The palace was denuded of everything which could be converted into gold; the females were deprived of every article of luxury and comfort : by which, with contributions levied on the city, twelve lakhs were obtained while hostages from the household of the Rana and chief citizens were delivered as security for the remainder and immured in the Maratha camp".<sup>109</sup>

Naturally enough, the internal administration in the Rajput states showed no improvement. During the time of Lord Wellesley new rulers came to the throne of Jaipur and Jodhpur. Both succeeded in 1803. In Jaipur Sawai Pratap Singh died on August 1, 1803, and was followed by Jagat Singh whom his contemporary Tod describes as "the most dissolute prince of his age or race". An Islamite concubine called "Ras-Kafur" infatuated him. She was "formally installed" as queen of half his dominions. Jagat Singh "conveyed to her in gift a moiety of the personality of the crown, even to the invaluable library of the illustrious Jai Singh, which was despoiled, and its treasures distributed among her base relations". Coins were struck in her name. The king rode with her on the same elephant. He demanded from his nobility those forms of respect towards her, which were paid only to the legitimate queen. The nobles who refused to honour her as a queen were heavily fined. The barons held both the authority and person of the Raja in utter contempt and even seriously thought of dethroning

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109. Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 529-532. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. IX, Nos. 45, 47.

him. The state had a very miserable time. As Tod points out, "The lofty walls which surrounded the beautiful city of Jai Singh were insulted by every marauder : commerce was interrupted and agriculture rapidly declined, partly from insecurity but still more from the perpetual exactions of his (king's) minions". Such was the prince who "continued to dishonour the gadi of Jai Singh" till his death on December 21, 1818.<sup>110</sup>

In Marwar the sudden death of its Raja Bhim Singh in October 1803 brought to the throne Man Singh, the prince who had been besieged in the fort of Jalor by the former and who had negotiations with Lakhwa Dada for deposing him. Tod knew the new ruler personally. In a graphic description of this Raja's character and appearance Tod says : "In person the Raja is above the common height, possessing considerable dignity of manner though accompanied by stiffness of habitual restraint. His demeanour was commanding and <sup>altogether</sup> princely; but there was an entire absence of natural majesty or grace. The features of Raja Man are good : his eyes are full of intelligence : and though the ensemble of his countenance almost denotes benevolence, yet there is ever and anon a doubtful expression, which..... gave a momentary cast of malignity to it. The biography of Man Singh would afford a remarkable picture of human patience, fortitude, and constancy, never surpassed in any age or country. But in this school of adversity he also took lessons of cruelty ..... though he showed not the ferocity of the tiger, he acquired the still

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110. Tod, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 1364-1366. Martin, op.cit., Vol. V, (Supplement - Mahratta War), p. 79.

Broughton wrote in 1809: Jagat Singh "....is a disgrace to the rank he holds ....is already reduced to a state of perfect debility, both of body and mind, by unlimited indulgence in every species of excess and debauchery. His caprices are without end and absolutely intolerable..... He ...has given such proofs of his passion as would, in any European state, entitle him to a private apartment in a mad house". (Broughton, op.cit., p. 202)

more dangerous attribute of that animal - its cunning..... he concealed under.....(his gentle) exterior a heart so malignant as his.... acts evinced". This malignant personality ruled Marwar for the next forty years (1803 - 1843) and saw many vicissitudes of fortune. His position, when he came to the throne, was very critical. Sawai Singh of Pokaran, in order to avenge the murder of his grandfather by the late Raja Bijay Singh, put himself in hostility to the new ruler. He held his sword "suspended over the head of Raja Man from his enthronement to the hour of his death". He found a rival candidate for the throne in a posthumous son of Bhim Singh. For the time being, however, Sawai Singh's plot did not succeed, as the child was born under suspicious circumstances and his legitimacy was not generally acknowledged.<sup>111</sup>

This was how the Rajput states, after the arrival of Lord Wellesley in India, continued to suffer from internal disorder and external aggression. Needless to say, they badly required British help and alliance. In order to obtain the assistance and protection of the Company Jaipur held negotiations with the British Resident with Sindhia in July - August, 1800, February - March, 1801, and May, 1802. On May 31, 1802, the, Jaipur minister Dinaram Bohra met Colonel Collins. From his discourse the British Resident discovered that the Raja of Jaipur was then more desirous than ever of concluding a treaty of defensive alliance with the British Government. These negotiations, however, failed to win any assurance of help from the Company. On this occasion Collins told the representative of Jaipur that he had no authority whatsoever to enter into any discussion of the kind.<sup>112</sup> To Lord Wellesley .

111. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 823, 849, 1070-1071, 1079-1082. Martin, op. cit., Vol. V, (Supplement - Mahratta War), p. 79. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. VIII, No. 168.

112. Ibid, Vol. IX, Nos. 18, 18A, 18B, 20A, 20B, 62, 236, 236A, 246, 246A, 246B, 246C.

the time was not yet ripe for entering into alliance with the Rajput States.

By 1802 Lord Wellesley had succeeded to a large extent in consolidating the Company's position in India. He had crushed Tipu Sultan, strengthened British control over Hyderabad and Oudh, and taken over fully the administration of Tanjore, Surat, the Carnatic and Farruckabad.<sup>113</sup> "The destruction of the hostile power of Mysore accompanied by the consolidation of our alliances with the Court of Hyderabad had left no antagonist to the British Government among the native states in India excepting the Marathas". - So wrote the Governor-General himself.<sup>114</sup> He also stated that those achievements put an end to the importance, as a means of necessary and immediate security, of a connection with the Marathas.<sup>115</sup>

Wellesley now vigorously and more freely applied himself to establishing British control over the Marathas. In December, 1802, Peshwa Baji Rao II by the treaty of Bassein accepted the subsidiary alliance. He "sacrificed his independence as the price of protection". An invitation was extended to Sindhia for a similar engagement. The Maratha leaders found in the new policy of the Company a grave threat to their power and independence. Sindhia declined to become a party to the defensive alliance. Sindhia and Bhonsle negotiated to find out the means to cement a general confederacy against the common enemy. Though they declared that their intentions were friendly to the British Government, they really prepared for war. They wished Holkar to join forces with them. Holkar, however, retired to Malwa and preferred to be guided by the course of events. The Governor-General, aware of the Maratha leaders' hostile determination, resolved to strike a decisive blow. On August 3, 1803, the British Resident with Sindhia was withdrawn and the Second Anglo-Maratha

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113. Roberts, op.cit., p.143.

114. Martin, op.cit., Vol. III, Introduction, p. XXIX.

115. Ibid, Vol. V, (Supplement - Mahratta War), p.305.

War began.<sup>116</sup> Lord Wellesley had also the aim of destroying the power and influence of French adventurer Perron. Of course, his apprehension about Perron was much exaggerated. Perron, he thought, was building up "a French State in the heart of India" with the aim of "extending it to the Satlaj and beyond". But Sir J.N.Sarkar points out, "such a theory ignores the practical, mercenary character of Perron and the basic facts of Indian geography".<sup>117</sup>

At any rate, the fortunes of Rajputana came to be vitally linked up with the vicissitudes of the war. It accentuated the political uncertainties in the Rajput states. Rajputana became the battle ground of the British and the Maratha armies. The war thus created a situation that was really favourable to the establishment of alliance and treaty-relations between the Company and the Rajput states, so long desired by the latter. Hence this war may be regarded as a landmark in Anglo-Rajput relations.

The Company made very elaborate preparations for this war. While General Wellesley and his lieutenants were given the task of destroying Sindhia's power in the Deccan, Lord Lake, the Commander-in-Chief, took up the duty of seizing his territories in Hindustan. The English, aware of the geographical importance of the Rajput principalities and their bitter relations with the Marathas, thought of utilising them as a "barrier against the return of the Marathas, to the northern parts of Hindustan".<sup>118</sup> Tod ardently refers to "the enlarged and prophetic views" of Lord Wellesley which suggested the policy of uniting all these "regular Governments" in a league against the "predatory powers",<sup>119</sup> i.e., the Marathas, particularly Sindhia and Holkar, who were associated with the

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116. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 225-234.

117. J.N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 252, 265-266.

118. Secret Consultations, 1804, September 6, No. 6. Martin, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 169. A.C. Banerjee, Lectures on Rajput History, p. 158.

119. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 1368.

Pindaris. On the eve of the war, Lord Wellesley wrote to General Wellesley, on June 27, 1803, "In the event of hostilities I propose to dispatch proper emissaries.....to the Rajput Chiefs. You will also employ every endeavour to excite those powers against Sindhia. I propose to engage to guarantee their independence and to secure to them any other reasonable advantages which they may require. The independence of the Rajput Chiefs would constitute a power which would form the best security to our north-western frontier in Hindustan."<sup>120</sup> Lord Lake was empowered to negotiate and conclude any engagement with the Rajput rulers.<sup>121</sup>

Accordingly, negotiations were carried on between the Company and the Rajput Governments. There is no doubt that Maratha ravages and internal disorder had made the Rajputs willing to accept British protection and alliance. And now the British Government in India was willing and ready to respond to their wishes. But the Rajputs on their part, curiously enough, showed some hesitation in accepting promptly the British offer of protection. There were, however, certain reasons for this hesitation which delayed a little the conclusion of alliances between the Company and the Rajputs. As we find in a report of the Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated December 28, 1803, the existence of "the considerable army" of the Marathas in Hindustan "alarmed those native chieftains who were disposed to unite with the British Government...."<sup>122</sup> To the dread of the Maratha name were added the internal dissensions which for some time prevented the Rajput states from entering into negotiations "with a spirit of sincerity and decision."<sup>123</sup> In Jaipur as also in Jodhpur the death of the rulers was another impediment.<sup>124</sup> Further, the Marathas endeavoured to rouse the

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120. Martin, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 157.

121. Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 234-235.

122. Ibid, Vol. III, p. 553.

123. Ibid, Vol. V, (Supplement - Mahratta War), p. 79.

124. Ibid.

religious feeling of the Rajputs against the English. As Lord Lake informed the Governor-General on November 24, 1803, the Marathas "entreated the Rajah (of Jaipur) as an Hindoo to reflect on the fatal consequences that might result to the religion should the British become masters". Lord Lake also pointed out that these people were in general so dilatory and had so little energy that if fear did not operate most forcibly, the negotiation might be pending.<sup>125</sup> It is also possible that the stories of "the shabby manner" in the treatment of the rulers and subjects of subordinate states by the British Residents hindered the progress of negotiations between the Government of Jaipur and the English. It is recorded in the Private Journal of Marquess Hastings that instead of acting in the character of an ambassador the British Residents with the Indian powers assumed the functions of a dictator, interfered in their private affairs, countenanced refractory subjects against them and made the most ostentatious exhibition of the exercise of authority.<sup>126</sup>

However, the success of the British arms against the Marathas, along with the more deeprooted factors of chronic internal ills and continuous Maratha depredations in the Rajput states, helped Lord Lake to bring his negotiations with the Rajputs to a successful conclusion.<sup>127</sup> It may be mentioned in this connection that at that time Raja Man Singh's position in Jodhpur was seriously endangered by Sawai Singh's intrigue. Before the close of the year 1803 Lord Lake settled treaties with several Rajput states.

The newly — founded petty State of Alwar(Macheri) was the first among the Rajput principalities to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Company. Rao Raja Bakhtwar Singh

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125. Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 470-471.

126. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. I, pp. 47-48.

A recent writer attributes the procrastination on the part of Jaipur partly to the love of freedom. (Batra, op.cit., pp. 19-20.)

127. Martin, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 555; Vol. V, (Supplement - Mahratta War), p. 79.

signed the treaty on November 14, 1803. Even before the conclusion of the treaty Alwar had co-operated with the British against the Marathas, when Lord Lake had defeated Sindhia's forces on November 1, 1803 at Laswari, situated in Alwar itself. This battle completed the annihilation of the whole of the regular forces in Sindhia's service commanded by French officers. Besides alliance, Alwar, for its co-operation with Lord Lake, received several districts and its vakāḍ, Ahmed Bakhsh Khan, also got the grant of Firozpur from the British Government. The treaty established "a permanent friendship" between the East India Company and Alwar; the friends and enemies of each were to be considered so by the other. The Company agreed not to interfere with the country of the Rao Raja nor to demand any tribute from him. Alwar troops were to co-operate with the British Government in the event of any enemy evincing a disposition to attack the territories then in possession of the Company or its allies in Hindustan. The foreign relations of Alwar were virtually made subject to British control. The Company agreed to guarantee the security of the territory of the Rao Raja against external enemies. If any misunderstanding should arise between him and any other chieftain the Rao Raja in the first instance would submit the cause of dispute to the Company's Government for its amicable settlement. If due to the obstinancy of the opposite party, no amicable terms could be arrived at, then the Rao Raja might claim aid from the Company's Government but he would bear himself the expense of such aid.<sup>128</sup>

Jaipur also concluded a treaty of "firm and permanent friendship and alliance" with the Company. The treaty was signed on December 12, 1803, and ratified by Lord Wellesley

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128. Aitchison, op.cit., 1932, Vol. III, pp. 346, 400-401.

A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 411.

J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 306, 311-312.

Martin, op.cit., Vol. V, (Supplement I-Mahratta War), p. 235.

on January 15, 1804. It was settled on much the same conditions as those of the treaty with Alwar, but it contained two additional clauses. According to one of them, although the Raja was in reality the master of his own army, he agreed to act during the time of war or prospect of warlike action according to the advice and opinion of the commander of the English army which might be employed with his troops. The other article provided that the Raja should not entertain in his service, or in any manner give admission to, any English or French subject, or any other person from among Europeans, without the consent of the Company.<sup>129</sup>

The treaties with the Rajput states were calculated not only to form an "insuperable" obstacle to Maratha influence in those regions but also to secure British ascendancy there. Through such an alliance the Company sought security against French power or influence in these parts of Hindustan. The extension of British protection and control was also expected to help the cause of tranquillity.<sup>130</sup>

Jodhpur also concluded a treaty with the Company on December 22, 1803. The terms were similar to those in the treaty already made with Jaipur. Although Lord Wellesley ratified this treaty, Raja Man Singh refused to do so and proposed another. The Raja in withholding his ratification was probably influenced by the apprehension of the immediate resentment of Jaswant Rao Holkar who then occupied a position near the territory of Jodhpur.<sup>131</sup> Before any decision was arrived at, the Company terminated the hostilities with Sindhia and Bhonsle by two separate treaties.

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129. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. III, pp. 66-67.

130. Martin, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 151-152; Vol. V, (Supplement - Mahratta War), p. 89.

131. Aitchison, op. cit., <sup>1932</sup> Vol. III, 1932, pp. 126-127. Martin, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 150-151; Vol. V, (Supplement - Mahratta War), p. 79. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 325.

Though the Governor-General had felt the necessity of similar treaties with Mewar and Kotah (whose vakils had waited upon Lord Lake)<sup>132</sup> in order to strengthen the British position in this part of Hindustan, the establishment of peace with Sindhia suspended the negotiations with those states.

According to the peace settlement, known as the treaty of Sarji Anjangaon, concluded on December 30, 1803, Sindhia ceded to the East India Company his territories between the Jumna and the Ganges and all territories situated to the northward of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Gohad territories; but the territories lying between Jaipur and Jodhpur and to the southward of the former place were reserved. This treaty also confirmed the engagements already concluded by the Company with the Rajput rulers and declared those allied chiefs - and those chiefs only - independent of Sindhia's authority.<sup>133</sup> Obviously this provision applied to Alwar and Jaipur only. Thus at the close of the year 1803 which saw the conclusion of the first phase of the Second Anglo-Maratha War and curbed Sindhia's power, it had been possible for the Company to make treaties of alliance and protection with only three Rajput states; Jaipur, Jodhpur and Alwar. The future of the treaty with Jodhpur remained uncertain. The termination of hostilities with Sindhia prevented the Company from extending its system of alliances over the other Rajput states and rescuing them from the Maratha menace.

So long Holkar had been a passive spectator and had utilised Sindhia's preoccupation in plundering and raising money in Malwa and Rajputana. After Sindhia's submission to the English, he opposed them and threatened to overrun the Company's territories with his troops. Lord Wellesley replied to Holkar's threats by declaring war. For a few months Sindhia gave "lukewarm support" to the English. His commander, Bapu Sindhia, with 10,000 horse was despatched to assist Lord Lake.

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132. Martin, op. cit., Vol. V, (Supplement - Mahratta War), p. 80.

133. Martin, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 634-636.

But the ascendancy of Sarāṇa Rao Ghatge<sup>134</sup> in the court of Sindhia led to an open breach with the English. In April, 1805 Sindhia "threw off the mask and openly joined Holkar".<sup>135</sup> War with Holkar, subsequently joined by Sindhia, revived the necessity of the co-operation and alliance of the Rajput states. But the Company found it difficult to take any decision, so long as the treaty with Sindhia was not dissolved. On May 13, 1804, Webbe, British Resident with Sindhia, told Lord Lake that it would not be expedient at the time to ask Sindhia to relinquish his right to the tribute of Mewar.<sup>136</sup> When the war with Holkar had just begun and Bapu Sindhia had just been sent to co-operate with Lord Lake, it would be most unfavourable to ask Sindhia to recognise the independence of a state with which the British Government was not directly connected. On June 18, 1804, Webbe also informed Colonel Murray that Sindhia would "entertain great jealousy of any communication which you (i.e., Colonel Murray) might be induced to open directly" with the Rana of Mewar, then tributary to Sindhia.<sup>137</sup>

However, in November, 1804, Colonel Murray, commanding the British troops in Gujarat and Malwa, concluded a treaty with the petty state of Pertabgarh, tributary to Holkar and situated on the borders of Holkar's territories. According to this treaty, the Raja of Pertabgarh repudiated the authority of Holkar and agreed to pay to the Company the tribute formerly paid to him. The Raja also consented to

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134. Broughton describes him as "the most unprincipled, sanguinary and daring public man that has for many years figured in Hindustan". Ghatge was, according to Broughton, "bold and hasty in conception". (Broughton, op.cit., No. XX)

135. Martin, op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 52; Vol. V, (Supplement - Mahratta War), p. 80. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, pp. 294-295.

136. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 6.

137. Ibid, Vol. XI, No. 21.

consider the Company's enemies as his own. He would allow the British troops and stores of every description for the army to pass freely through his territories. He would afford the British troops every assistance and protection. He would supply fixed quotas of rice, gram and jowar. The British would raise no contributions. The Raja further agreed to coin in the mint of Pertabgarh "such bullion as the commanding officers of British troops may find it convenient to send there, the British government defraying the actual expense".<sup>138</sup>

Meanwhile Jaswant Rao Holkar's movements put both Marwar and Jaipur in trouble. Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur had to enter into negotiations with Holkar and also to help him by providing shelter for his family. The Company was exasperated at his conduct. He had not yet ratified his treaty but proposed a new treaty. The proposed treaty contained articles framed more on the basis of equality than that of subordination of the Raja to the Company. So it differed widely and fundamentally from the treaty already concluded. Certain articles were, however, common. Among the new provisions, which were vital, one stated that the Company would not deprive the Raja of Jodhpur of his ancient possessions, nor of those which he might have lately acquired, nor take any money from them. The Company would pay the expense of the troops that the Raja might furnish for its assistance. Should any of the Raja's subjects rise in rebellion the Company would afford aid to him. In the time of war the Company would act agreeably to the Raja's counsel or to the advice of his approved servants. Should Ajmer fall into the hands of the British Government, it should be delivered to the Raja; otherwise, when the Raja would find it convenient to seize it, the Company would assist him. It was further stated that should any person create disturbances or carry war into the Company's possessions, the Raja would assist the Company with his troops; but the Company should pay the expenses of the troops sent. Thus the proposed treaty would have imposed upon

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138. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. III, pp. 459-460.

the Company more obligations than the treaty already concluded. Further, those obligations were inconsistent with the Company's system of subsidiary alliance. Naturally the Company not only refused to accept the proposed treaty but also cancelled in May, 1804, the treaty of 1803. The Governor-General issued orders to remove the name of the Raja of Jodhpur from the list of the chieftains whose independence according to the treaty with the Company Sindhia was bound to acknowledge. After the retreat of Holkar the Raja, however, expressed his eagerness to conclude a treaty of alliance. But the Governor-General did not consider it expedient to renew the engagement.<sup>139</sup>

Man Singh was now confronted with a serious difficulty. Free from the restraints imposed by the treaty with the Company, Daulat Rao Sindhia demanded contributions from him. Man Singh, unable to protect himself against Sindhia, appealed for assistance to Lord Lake. The Governor-General held that the Company was under no obligation to assist the Raja as the treaty had not come into force at all. Under the circumstances the Company had no right to withhold Sindhia from the prosecution of any demands upon Jodhpur except only in the event of their being prosecuted under the denomination of tribute payable to the Emperor Shah Alam, for such an exaction by Sindhia would violate the 12th article of the treaty of peace by which the latter had renounced all concern in the affairs of the Emperor. Major Malcolm, Resident with Sindhia, was, however, asked to seek from the latter "an explanation of the nature and the extent of these demands, or at least a disavowal of any intention to make those demands as under the denomination of tribute to the Emperor". The Company also thought that Sindhia could not claim the aid of the British power under the defensive alliance in recovering any demands not demonstrably just nor even in the possible

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139. Secret Consultations, 1804, June 14, Nos. 56A, 57A. Martin, op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 150-151. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 325.

event of his being exposed to danger by the successful resistance of the Raja of Marwar to the demands founded on injustice and rapacity.<sup>140</sup> Fortunately Sindhia chose a policy of hesitation and Man Singh was relieved from immediate danger. Though he asked his agents to tell Lord Lake that he did not require military assistance from the English "in the event of either internal commotion or external attack", he seemed to be eager for a treaty. In September, 1805, Malcolm stated that his sole object appeared to be "the attainment of avowed countenance of the British Government and to have the security of a written engagement for its never adopting the cause of his enemies".<sup>141</sup>

Although more or less indifferent towards Jodhpur, the Company felt concern for Jaipur which was connected with it by the treaty. In April, 1804, Holkar was engaged in plundering Jaipur territory.<sup>142</sup> The Company saw that the plunder of the opulent city of Jaipur would afford to Holkar a great accession of pecuniary resource, enable him to retain a formidable force and consequently augment his means of plunder and devastation. Hence the Company thought the employment of its military force for the suppression of Holkar's predatory operations as indispensably necessary.<sup>143</sup> General Lake advanced against him, sending Monsol with a vanguard. At the same time Colonel Murray was asked to proceed north-eastward from Gujarat into Malwa. Sindhia was also requested to co-operate. These measures produced the desired effect on Holkar. He abandoned his position within the territory of Jaipur and "commenced his march with great precipitation to the southward".

On his retreat Holkar arrived at Kotah on April 23, his condition being "in the utmost degree wretched

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140. Secret Consultations, 1804, September 6, No. 6.

141. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 326.

142. Roberts, op. cit., p. 242.

143. Martin, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 116.

and distressed".<sup>144</sup> The British followed up their success by taking Rampura under Colonel Don. Lord Lake ordered Monson to occupy the passes of Bundi and Lakheri, to the south of Rampura and north of Kotah, for the purpose of completely obstructing Holkar's return in that direction. As Lord Lake pointed out, these passes afforded the only entrance through the mountains from Malwa into Hindustan. Monson, however, was not content with his safe defensive position; he determined to march forward and enter Holkar's territory. When Colonel Monson, crossing the river Chambal, marched through Kotah to attack Holkar, he received from Zalim Singh supplies as well as men. Monson came to the Mukund<sup>a</sup> Pass, thirty miles from Kotah. After having made some advance beyond the pass, he began his retreat towards it. At the pass, where he arrived on July 9, he turned for a moment and repulsed Holkar's cavalry. But he feared that Holkar would get behind his rear and cut him off from communication with Kotah. So he continued his retreat to that town and on July 12 arrived before it. His troops were then exhausted and dispirited.<sup>145</sup> The British commander demanded admission within the walls of the city. But the Kotah ruler, now that the clouds of disaster seemed to hang over the British cause, refused to receive the British army. Although Zalim Singh refused to invite Holkar's wrath on his capital by giving shelter to "a panic-struck, beef-eating army within his walls", he dispatched his forces to ensure the safety of that army until it left the pass in its rear. Holkar was obviously offended. He encamped before the walls of Kotah and realized three lakhs of rupees. Under such circumstances Monson's complaint of "treachery, and a connivance with the enemy" against Kotah can hardly be justified. He continued his disastrous flight through the Bundi and Jaipur dominions. Holkar, flushed with victory, followed hard on the heels of

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144. Ibid, Vol. IV, No. XXXI.

145. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 242-246. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 1571.  
 Martin, op. cit., Vol. IV, No. XC, pp. 327 f.

retreating Monson's troops.<sup>146</sup>

From Kotah Monson struggled on to a ford on the river Chambal, about seven miles away. Owing to heavy rains for a few days the soil was soft and the river was not fordable. It was found impossible to proceed with the guns. On the morning of July 16 the guns sank so deep in the mud that they could not be extricated. The grain in the adjoining village was exhausted; retreat was now necessary to procure subsistence. The ammunition was, therefore, to be destroyed, and the guns were spiked and abandoned. At the same time Monson wrote to the Raja of Bundi desiring him to dispatch people to extricate the guns and to deposit them in a place of security. The Raja of Bundi had the courage to maintain relations with the English in the face of the threat from Holkar's forces although the former could not save the guns.<sup>147</sup> Tod's words of high praise for Bundi in this connection are worth quoting : "It was not on the advance of our army, when its ensigns were waving in anticipation of success, but on its humiliating flight, that a safe passage was not only cheerfully granted, but aided to the utmost of the Raja's means, and with an almost culpable disregard of his own welfare and interests."<sup>148</sup>

Monson's broken army reached Agra on August 31 in utter confusion and disorder.<sup>149</sup> Holkar, who in hot pursuit of the retreating army marched across Kotah and Jaipur without meeting any armed opposition, made a thrust into the newly acquired territories of the Company in Northern India. To the British authorities it was an unpardonable offence that the Raja of Jaipur did not attempt to prevent Holkar's advance through his territories. Lake charged him with direct violation of the fourth article of

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146. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 1571. Martin, op. cit., Vol. IV, No. XC, p. 334. Batra, op. cit., p. 24.

147. Martin, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 334. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 280-281.

148. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 1516-1517.

149. Roberts, op. cit., p. 247.

the treaty, for he had permitted Holkar to pass through his territories without opposing him. "That chief", he wrote, "has drawn supplies from your country, and from his respecting your territories, there appears just reason to conclude that he, at the period he was actually advancing with the declared purpose of invading the territories of the Company, maintained a secret understanding with your court".<sup>150</sup> Subsequently, the acting British Resident in Jaipur, Captain Sturrock, in his letter to Lt.Col. Malcolm dated June 19, 1805, also complained against the conduct of Jaipur. Early in 1805 Major-General Jones with the Bombay Army was stationed at Tonk-Rampura to hinder the advance of the enemy in that direction. In his allegation against Jaipur Sturrock stated that though the position occupied by the Bombay Army under Jones contributed to the defence of the Jaipur territory the servants of the Jaipur Government meted out to him and his men an insolent conduct. Those Jaipur men refused to sell grain to the people sent from Jones' camp with money to purchase it and prevented supplies of any kind being procured for the use of the troops under his command. Supplies on the way to his camp from other parts were frequently stopped on the road by zaminders to exact duty from them. Sturrock who had talks with the Raja of Jaipur and his ministers on this matter was not satisfied with the reply of the Raja's ministers who denied the charge of insolent behaviour of the inhabitants of the city towards the British, and on the contrary pointed out that Jones' men frequently behaved in an irregular manner.<sup>151</sup> In spite of these allegations and counter-allegations it will be an injustice to say that the Raja of Jaipur did not fulfil the duties of the alliance against the common enemy. As Tod points out, "we vainly attempted to throw the blame of violating the treaty upon our ally".<sup>152</sup> Sturrock himself admitted that in April,

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150. Batra, op.cit., p. 24.

151. Secret Consultations, 1805, July 11, No. 2.

152. Tod, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 1367.

1804, when Lord Lake advanced against Holkar, the Raja exempted from the payment of duty all articles which Lake's army stood in need of.<sup>153</sup> Further, the Raja was certainly useful to the Company when he assembled his troops and publicly manifested his desire to co-operate with the British forces. In a report to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated May 31, 1805, the Governor-General-in-Council wrote : "Had the Rajah of Jeypore been unconnected with us, the difficulties of the war in Hindostan would have been increased by the necessity of adopting measures of precaution to guard against the possible effect of intrigues at that court, which we should not then have had the means of controlling".<sup>154</sup> If the Raja sometimes failed to satisfy the British, it was rather due to the internal state of politics of his court and the dread of the Marathas who regularly threatened an attack on his territories than to his treacherous motive.<sup>155</sup> Lake himself afterwards admitted that "his conduct was not perfidious".<sup>156</sup> In June, 1805, Holkar threatened that "as the Rajah did not join him in endeavouring to reduce the British power within its limits.....he would destroy his country".<sup>157</sup> This letter was shown to Captain Sturrock in order to convince him that the Jaipur Government did not hold any improper correspondence with the enemy. But the Resident was not convinced. He reported to the Governor-General that the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur were willing to form an anti-British coalition from the apprehension that they had more to dread from British encroachments than from the Maratha chiefs whose interests principally lay in the collection of tribute.<sup>158</sup>

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153. Secret Consultations, 1805, July 11, No. 2.

154. Martin, op. cit., Vol. V, (Supplement - Mahratta War), p. 235.

155. Ibid. Secret Consultations, 1805, July 11, No. 1.

156. Batra, op. cit., p. 24.

157. Secret Consultations, 1805, July 11, No. 2.

158. Ibid.

Without dismissing the apprehensions of Captain Sturrock as entirely baseless, it may be pointed out that the Rajputs who bitterly resented the ravages of the Marathas plunderers were ever ready to throw off the Maratha control, even in co-operation with British power. Captain Sturrock, in the letter of June 19, 1805, mentioned above, wrote to Malcolm that the ministers of the Raja of Jaipur informed him that they had advised the Rana of Udaipur to communicate to the British Commander-in-Chief the demand of Sindhia to deliver up the fort of ~~Kumalmeer~~ <sup>Kamalmeer</sup>. Further, they also desired that Jodhpur and Udaipur should unite with the British Government to subdue the Marathas. Captain Sturrock could merely give them the assurance that he would inform the Commander-in-Chief.<sup>159</sup> Both Sindhia and Holkar were desirous of sheltering their families and valuables in the strongholds of Mewar.<sup>160</sup> Sindhia asked the Rana by the middle of 1805 "to deliver up the fort of Kumulmeer ..., for him and Holkar to put their families in".<sup>161</sup> Thus threatened, the Rana approached the Company for alliance. The Rana's vakil, Bhairon Baksh, met Lord Lake at Mathura in June. The agent of Mewar informed the Commander-in-Chief of the sufferings of Mewar on account of the repeated Maratha invasions for the last 35 years. Lord Lake was also told that the Rana having refused to surrender the fort of Kumulmeer "from regard for the kindness of the English Company", the angry Sindhia was preparing to plunder Mewar. In these circumstances the Rana sought the co-operation of the English Company.<sup>162</sup>

In this connection it may be noted that during this period Mewar not only faced the danger of plunder but even her territorial integrity was at stake. In order to further his selfish interests Ambaji Ingle agitated for the partition of Mewar among the Maratha chiefs. This would have

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159. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 115.

160. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 533.

161. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 115.

162. Secret Consultations, 1805, July 4, No. 21.

completed the ruin of Mewar. It was not British intervention but Holkar's jealousy of Sindhia which frustrated the plan. Baiza Bai, Sindhia's wife, also contributed powerfully to Mewar's preservation on this occasion. Even the hostile clans, the Chundawats and the Saktawats, now temporarily shelved their enmity.<sup>163</sup> The Commander-in-Chief favoured the acceptance of the offer of co-operation from Mewar, which, he thought, besides being "a complete proof of the Rana's sense of the strength of the British power", would considerably help the English in a war with Sindhia.<sup>164</sup>

The Bundi Darbar also applied for an alliance with the British Government. This Darbar gave valuable assistance to Col. Monson during his retreat before Holkar in 1804 and it suffered devastation of its territories by the Maratha troops. This application was supported by Lord Lake, and Malcolm wrote to the Supreme Government on July 2, 1805: "In the event of hostilities occurring with that chief (Sindhia) it is His Excellency's opinion that the Rajah of Bundi, though his possessions are small, may from their local position and natural strength prove an useful dependant to the British Government, and the conduct of that Chief (particularly at the period of the retreat of Colonel Monson's detachment) was such as to give undoubted proof of his sincerity in the wish of meriting the protection of the British Government!"<sup>165</sup>

But despite the endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief the appeals of the Rajput states proved futile.<sup>166</sup>

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163. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 533-535.

164. Secret Consultations, 1805, July 4, No. 20.

165. Ibid, 1805, September 12, No. 133. Martin, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 388. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 1516-1517.

166. Duff points out that the Raja of Bundi, by a treaty (concluded with Lord Lake), had become an ally of the Company. (Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 267, 304.) Notwithstanding ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> reference to ~~the~~<sup>this</sup> treaty between the two and the help rendered by Bundi to the Company in

In communicating to Malcolm the rejection of the offer of Udaipur, Secretary Edmonstone on behalf of the Governor-General-in-Council wrote on July 4, 1805, that the Company had "no intention of proceeding to hostilities against Daulat Rao Sindhia or of acting in any manner contrary to the treaty of peace unless that chief('s) measures (preclude) the possibility of maintaining peace with him".<sup>167</sup> In view of the activities of Sindhia leading to his alliance with Holkar against the English in April, 1805, it becomes difficult to appreciate the plausibility of the Governor-General's contention. Yet we should not forget that the authorities in England had for some time been highly displeased with the expansionist policy of Lord Wellesley which ultimately led to his recall. This may be taken to have put some restraint on his policy towards the Rajput states.<sup>168</sup> On receiving the message from his brother, Arthur

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its war with Holkar, no treaty was concluded between the British Government and the Raja of Bundi. (Despatch of Lord Lake to Sir George Barlow, dated December 28, 1805 : Vide Secret Consultations, January 23, 1806, No. 78).

167. Secret Consultations, 1805, July 4, No. 22.

168. In this connection the following few lines from a letter of Metcalfe, dated June 11, 1805, may be quoted : "It is with regret that I have perceived the last six months of Lord Wellesley's administration marked by an indecision and weakness (caused, I imagine, by his dread of people at home) unworthy of the rest of his wise and dignified government. Shall we....sue for peace, when a Mahratta, in violation of all treaty, insults our Government, and in every act and word hurls at us a thundering menace of war? Peace is, I think, impossible, unless we prepare most vigorously for war.

(Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe, Vol. I, p. 112.).

Wellesley, that "there is great danger of your being dismissed from office", Wellesley resigned his post (July 30) and sailed for England.<sup>169</sup>

Thus the war with the Marathas was left inconclusive; though their position was greatly reduced, they were yet to be fully crushed. The treaty with Jodhpur had been cancelled. The Company was not satisfied with the fulfilment of the terms of treaty by Jaipur. Only two minor states were fortunate enough to receive British favour. The Governor-General expressed satisfaction at the conduct of the Macheri Chief with whom the Company was connected by a treaty of alliance. The Company had also concluded a treaty with the petty state of Pertabgarh. The rest of the Rajput states were yet to be brought under British protection. So the future of the Rajput states hung in the balance. Yet the administration of Lord Wellesley marked an important step towards the incorporation of Rajputana in the British Indian Empire. The war with the Marathas, leading to the establishment of British paramountcy in India through the reduction of the power of the strongest anti-British force in the country, could not but drag the Rajput states into the Company's net. Although initial efforts at treaty-making were halting and almost fruitless, they foreshadowed the extension of British alliance with, and control over, the whole of Rajputana. The logic of events reached its climax a few years later during the days of Lord Hastings who not only crushed the Marathas but also completed Lord Wellesley's unfinished task of extending the system of Subsidiary Alliance to the Rajput states.

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169. Roberts, op.cit., pp. 256-264.

## CHAPTER III

## CORNWALLIS AND BARLOW : REVIVAL OF NON-INTERVENTION

On July 30, 1805, Lord Cornwallis took over charge as Lord Wellesley's successor. The new Governor-General in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief Lord Lake explained the background of his re-appointment : ".....it was no slight cause that urged the Ministers at home to press me to return once more to this country....."<sup>1</sup> For some time past in England there had been growing opposition in Parliament, in the Court of Directors as also in the Board of Control to Lord Wellesley's vigorous foreign policy. Charles Grant, one of his ablest opponents, became the Deputy Chairman of the Company in 1804 and Chairman in 1805. The ministers of the Crown also began to distrust Lord Wellesley's statesmanship and dread the results of his further continuance in office. Pitt opined that "the Governor-General had acted imprudently and illegally"<sup>2</sup> Lord Wellesley's policy of war and aggrandizement which was at variance with the Act of 1784, and lately his protracted war with the Marathas, alarmed the authorities in England.<sup>3</sup> They not only demurred to the extension of dominion, but also to that of the subsidiary treaties which in the case of disputes among the Indian states would render British interference inevitable and might drag the Company into war.<sup>4</sup> To them Lord Wellesley's process of empire-building "was not a paying one".<sup>5</sup> To augmented responsibilities were added impoverished

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1. Ross, op.cit., Vol.III, pp.530,533,545. Duff, op.cit., Vol.III, p.304.

2. Seton-Karr, The Marquess Cornwallis, p.180. Roberts, op.cit., pp.177, 256, 263.

3. Ross, op.cit., Vol.III, p.530. Duff, op.cit., Vol.III, p.303.

4. Ross, op.cit., Vol.III, p.530. Lyall, op.cit., p.265. Duff, op.cit., Vol.III, pp.316-317.

5. Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto, From 1807 to 1814 (edited by His great niece Countess of Minto), p.2.

finances. The Home authorities particularly grew uneasy about the Company's financial embarrassments which very considerably and rapidly increased under the strain of Lord Wellesley's Forward policy.<sup>6</sup> In 1797-98, when Lord Wellesley's administration commenced, there was a deficit to the extent of £118,746. In the year 1805-06 when he was obliged to tender his resignation it increased to £2,268,608.<sup>7</sup> His conquests were becoming, according to many, too large for profitable management.<sup>8</sup> The second Ministry of Pitt which came to power in 1804 was weak at home, and England was still too burdened with the responsibilities of war with Napoleon to be able to give much attention to India.<sup>9</sup> In one of his despatches Cornwallis observed : ".....it is not the opinion only of Ministers, or of a party, but of all reflecting men of every description, that it is physically impracticable for Great Britain, in addition to all other embarrassments, to maintain so vast and so unwieldy an empire in India, which annually calls for reinforcements of men and for remittances of money, and which yields little other profit except brilliant Gazettes!"<sup>10</sup> Col. Monson's disastrous retreat before Holkar and Lord Lake's failure at Bharatpur further contributed to the displeasure of the authorities in England.<sup>11</sup> For a change in policy they determined to recall the ambitious and expensive Lord Wellesley<sup>12</sup> who, as stated earlier, resigned on receiving his brother's intimation about his imminent recall.

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6. Ibid. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 177-178. Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 375. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 448-449. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 303, 316-317.

7. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 473.

8. Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 375.

9. Malleon, Life of the Marquess Wellesley, p. 147. Charles Grant Robertson, England under the Hanoverians, pp. 411-421.

10. Ross, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 545.

11. Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 375. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 303, 316-317.

12. Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 375.

Sixty-seven-year-old and physically infirm,<sup>13</sup> Lord Cornwallis enjoyed the confidence of the Home authorities because during his first Governor-Generalship in India he had acted in conformity with the views of his superiors in England and respected the provisions of the Act of 1784. He was considered the fittest instrument for reversing Wellesley's policy and restoring political and financial balance in the Company's affairs. The aged statesman came out with instructions to terminate the war with the Marathas, to refrain from assuming new political responsibilities, to observe strict abstention as regards the Indian states beyond the British frontier, and, in general, to consolidate rather than to expand.<sup>14</sup> Even with regard to the alliances already formed between the Company and some of the petty chieftains in the north of Hindustan which obviously included Jaipur, Alwar and Pertabgarh, the Court of Directors held that if any proper occasion should arise for their dissolution, there would be no objection on their part to such a measure.<sup>15</sup> Briefly speaking, the authorities in England by appointing Lord Cornwallis in place of Lord Wellesley indicated the revival of the non-intervention policy of the former days; the Indian states — including the Rajput states — were to be left to themselves.

On having assumed the office of the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis proceeded to discharge his duties in accordance with the orders of the Home authorities and the injunctions of Parliament.<sup>16</sup> His primary object was to restore peace.<sup>17</sup> On the very day of his assumption of office he

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13. Ibid.

14. Ross, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 530. Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto, p. 2. Ramsay Muir, op. cit., p. 247. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 449.

15. Letters From the Court of Directors (Foreign Dept., Secret Branch), S. No. 3A, Part II, February 27, 1806.

16. Letters From the Court of Directors (Foreign Dept., Political Branch), S. No. 12, February 25, 1806.

17. Ross, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 530, 533.

intimated to the Commander-in-Chief, General Lord Lake, his earnest desire to put an end to the war with the Marathas. He told him that it was his intention to terminate it by negotiation "without a sacrifice of our honour". He contended that in this fight no further success would be of any advantage. If it should continue it must involve the Company in serious pecuniary difficulties.<sup>18</sup> On an enquiry into the finances he found the treasury empty. The pay of Lord Lake's army which amounted to above five lakhs of rupees a month was above five months in arrear. The Governor-General confessed : "we literally have not the means of carrying on the ordinary business of Government".<sup>19</sup>

In his endeavour to come to terms with the Marathas Lord Cornwallis decided to make the river Jumna the frontier of the Company's dominions to the northward of Bundelkhand. In accordance with the principle of non-intervention ordained by his superiors in England, he determined to abandon all concern in the territories on the west of the Jumna with the exception of Bundelkhand.<sup>20</sup> This meant the abandonment of the Rajput states to themselves; they could no longer expect help and protection from the Company. He planned to restore to Sindhia the tribute of Jaipur amounting to an annual sum of three lakhs of rupees. He proposed to cancel the treaties concluded by Lord Wellesley with Jaipur and Alwar.<sup>21</sup> The agreement with Pertabgarh, yet to be ratified, also faced the same danger.<sup>22</sup> Thus, contrary to the policy of Lord Wellesley, Lord Cornwallis planned to come to terms with the Marathas and to withdraw from Rajputana all British protection and aid.

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18. Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 533-534, Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 449-450.

19. Ross, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 537, 539-542, 545.

20. Ross, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 531, 547-548.

21. Ibid, pp. 548-550.

22. Rajputana Gazetteers (1908), Vol. IIA, Part IV, p. 199.

Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. III, pp. 441-442.

Meanwhile, however, the united troops of Holkar and Sindhia had assembled on the frontiers of the Jaipur state and the Bombay Army had marched to Tonk-Rampura in the vicinity of the city of Jaipur. The British army drew most of its supplies from the territory of the Raja of Jaipur. The Raja had issued directions to prevent supplies of grain being furnished from his territory for the use of the Maratha army.<sup>23</sup> He was, however, anxious to avoid irritating the enemy; he pretended scarcity as the reason for the prohibitory order. Though in the past Jaipur had failed to satisfy the Company, Sturrock now wrote from Jaipur that the views of the Raja had of late appeared less inimical to the British interests than some time ago. He held that this change in his disposition was to be attributed to his having reflected on the dangerous consequences likely to follow from his provoking the resentment of the British Government. The superiority of the British power in Hindustan obliged the Raja for his own safety to act with caution and to decline giving the Marathas any assistance at present. Sturrock, however, had his suspicions, for he further stated that the Raja would evince friendly disposition towards the confederated Maratha chiefs whenever a favourable opportunity offered.<sup>24</sup> Lord Lake reminded the Raja's agent residing in his camp of the consequences which might attend the wavering policy his master had pursued. And keeping in view "the advantages to be derived from the good disposition" of the Raja "in the event of hostilities" and also the recent favourable change in the conduct of his court, the Commander-in-Chief advised the Raja's agent to convey to him "every assurance of the friendship and support of the British", should the Raja continue to discharge his duties faithfully as an

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23. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 122. Mill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 468. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 348.

24. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 122, 125.

ally.<sup>25</sup>

After Lord Lake had made this communication to the agent of the Raja of Jaipur he received a despatch from Lord Cornwallis dated August 3, 1805, in which the latter communicated his decision to dissolve the treaty of alliance between the Company and the Raja of Jaipur. The Governor-General wrote that the Raja had so far not only failed in the performance of his duties towards the British Government under the treaty but had favoured the cause of the enemy. In the opinion of the Governor-General-in-Council, the local situation of the territory of Jaipur and the condition of its Government combined with the Company's experience of the Conduct and disposition of the Court not only precluded the expectation of deriving any advantages from the preservation of the defensive alliance with that state, but rendered that connection "a source of great embarrassment and inconvenience to the British Government".<sup>26</sup> Hence it was resolved by the Company's Government to abandon the defensive alliance with the state of Jaipur. The Company would refrain from any attempt to repel the aggression of Daulat Rao Sindhia, Holkar or any other chieftain against the state of Jaipur. It was, however, not the intention of the Government at that moment to declare the dissolution of the subsisting treaty. Such disclosure, it was felt, of the British determination to withhold protection from the Raja of Jaipur and to abandon the alliance might be productive of considerable disadvantages. Lord Lake was asked to inform Major-General Jones, commanding the army at Tonk-Rampura, not to move his army for the purpose of affording protection to the territory and city of Jaipur against the incursions of the Marathas. The Resident at Jaipur was also to be enjoined to refrain from any communication upon the subject of the alliance with the court of

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25. Secret Consultations, 1805, September 12, No. 120. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, pp. 348-349. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 468.

26. Secret Consultations, 1805, September 12, No. 118. See also Ross, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 535.

Jaipur and to avoid any promise of aid from the British troops in the event of an invasion of the rights or territories of that state by Holkar, Sindhia or any other power. Both Major-General Jones and the Resident at Jaipur were to be directed to observe the strictest secrecy.<sup>27</sup>

Lord Lake felt the greatest embarrassment on receiving these orders and communicated to Lord Cornwallis his assurances of continued support and friendship already conveyed through the agent to the Raja of Jaipur on the condition of that prince meriting by his future conduct the protection of the British Government.<sup>28</sup> At the same time the Commander-in-Chief wrote a letter to Major-General Jones asking him not to comply with the requisition of the Raja or his ministers for aid or support. Major-General Jones was further told that in the event of the Marathas attacking the territories or city of Jaipur he should make no movement with his army without previous reference to the Commander-in-Chief unless the operations of the enemy were such as immediately to endanger the safety of the British army or the security of his own position. Jones was further asked to give on no account any intimation of the matter to any officer of the Jaipur Government.<sup>29</sup>

In reply to the intimation of Lord Lake, Lord Cornwallis said : "Whatever may be my solicitude to abandon our Alliances with the petty states of Hindostan, it is not my intention to prosecute that object by the violation or neglect of any positive and subsisting engagement. The promise of support and protection to the Rajah of Jyenagur which your Lordship has offered to his vakeels, precludes us from taking advantage of the Rajah's antecedent conduct, to extricate ourselves immediately from the obligations of the treaty of

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27. Secret Consultations, 1805, September 12, No. 118.

28. Secret Consultations, 1805, September 12, No. 120; October 4, Nos. 39, 51. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 350. See ante, pp. 72-73.

29. Secret Consultations, 1805, September 12, No. 121.

defensive alliance, and that promise must of course be fulfilled when the occasion demands it, provided the Rajah shall fulfil the condition annexed to it. Your Lordship therefore will not consider the instructions of the Governor-General-in-Council as precluding you from the adoption of measures for the protection of the territory of Jyenagur in the event of an attack on the part of Scindiah or of Holkar".<sup>30</sup> Lord Cornwallis, however, reiterated that with regard to the alliance his views still continued to be the same as described in his letter of 3rd August. He would gladly avail himself of any opportunity of abandoning that alliance without compromising the faith of the British government.

Lord Cornwallis was anxious to patch up differences with the Marathas and put an end to the war with them.<sup>31</sup> But he had his apprehension that they would not be unwilling to come to an understanding with the Company. In a letter to Lord Lake dated August 4, 1805, he expressed his optimistic conviction that Holkar and Sindhia could not in their existing circumstances wish for war.<sup>32</sup> A modern writer, however, points out that the successive failures of Lake before Bharatpur and the chasing of Col. Monson's forces up and down Central India showed that British military power was unable to conquer and hold India. He further states that though great victories were won, the Marathas could not be disposed of in the manner that Tipu had been dealt with, or the Nizam brought under subjection.<sup>33</sup> Yet it can hardly be doubted that the operations of Lord Wellesley had considerably broken the power of the Marathas and had left no single Maratha chief strong enough to withstand the English.<sup>34</sup> "We

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30. Secret Consultations, 1805, September 12, No. 122.

31. Ibid. Ross, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 547. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 304.

32. Ross, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 536.

33. Pannikar, Asia and Western Dominance, p. 81.

34. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 303, 306, 315. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 470. Ross, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 536, 541. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 134.

are now waging war against two chieftains who have neither territory nor army to lose" -- so wrote Lord Cornwallis on August 14, 1805.<sup>35</sup> Duff, however, points out that Holkar was all for continuing the war.<sup>36</sup> Meanwhile, Sharza Rao Ghatge who swayed the council of his son-in-law Sindhia had fallen into the latter's disfavour because of his violent rashness. Holkar expected to find a willing co-adjutor in Ambaji who replaced Sharza Rao. But Ambaji favoured a temporizing policy. The rivalry between the two Maratha chieftains, too deep-rooted to be forgotten, was rekindled. Sindhia became convinced of their inability to contend with the Company. The camp of Holkar became separated from that of Sindhia. Sindhia became willing to adjust the differences with the Company and opened negotiations. He was prepared to postpone open breach with Holkar till he became assured of a favourable adjustment of his differences with the English.<sup>37</sup>

After this change of policy on the part of Sindhia, Holkar could hope nothing from him. He withdrew from Rajputana early in September (1805) and moved with his ill-equipped army towards the Punjab not only to enlist the support of the Sikhs and the ruler of Kabul but also to ravage the territories on his way. The Commander-in-Chief took measures to oppose and destroy the enemy. One division of British troops under Jones would move from Rampura towards Shekhawati to defeat Holkar's infantry and capture his guns. Another division under Col. Ball was sent to Rewari where, aided by the troops of the Raja of Macheri, it would maintain tranquillity, cut off Holkar's communication with Ajmer and Malwa and prevent him from retreating along the route by which he advanced. These efforts of the English commanders proved ineffectual to intercept Holkar. In his march towards the Company's frontier he passed through the territory of Jaipur and, skirting the

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35. Ross, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 541.

36. Duff, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 302.

37. Ibid, pp. 302-306. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VI, pp. 457, 458, 465.

Ross, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 547.

territory of Macheri, proceeded to Dadree and then towards Patiala.<sup>38</sup>

During his march through the territory of Jaipur Holkar not only passed unopposed but also drew supplies. As the British Resident at Jaipur reported, no alarm was manifested by the Raja at the approach of Holkar's army. The Raja asked his vakil to inform Jones at Tonk of the entry of Holkar's army into his territory and enquire what measures Jones would adopt; but he himself, as alleged by the Resident, took no precaution to guard against any hostile attack by Holkar. On the contrary the Raja despatched a force under his principal minister Sambhu Singh to Udaipur in connection with negotiations for matrimonial relations between the Rana's family and his own.<sup>39</sup>

The Resident, Sturrock, ascribed the Raja's conduct to his confidence in Holkar's friendly disposition towards him. Sturrock wrote: "...he (the Raja) appears to rely upon the good understanding privately existing between him and Holkar".<sup>40</sup> Sturrock thought that the Raja had chosen an extra-ordinary time to evince his friendship for the Rana. The Resident pointed out that when Holkar was on his march with the avowed design of invading the Company's territory, the Raja was bound by his engagements to co-operate with his whole force for the protection of that territory. To the Resident it was clear that the Raja's conduct would leave a very unfavourable impression about his future designs. The Resident suspected that if the Raja succeeded in obtaining control over the Rana's resources and affairs by stationing

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38. Persian Correspondence (Letters Received: English Translations), S.No. 51A, Part II, No. 272. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 133, 134, 136. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 240. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VI, pp. 464-65. Duff, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 306.

39. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 133, 136.

Persian Correspondence (Letters Received: English Translations), S.No. 51A, Part II, No. 272.

40. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 125, 133, 136.

a considerable force at Udaipur, he would not hesitate to employ them for purposes inimical to the British Government in the event of the war proving unfavourable to the Company. This suspicion, according to the Resident, was strengthened by the information that the Raja was augmenting his army to effect his ambitious project of extending his control over Mewar. The Raja was then guided by an anti-British party of his court composed of Sambhu Singh, Rai Chand and Rao Ratan Lal. Hakim Shevior had been removed a few months ago from the Raja's Council on account of his attachment towards the British Government. Sturrock also reported that the Raja's despatch of troops to Udaipur would provoke Sindhia's jealousy and resentment.<sup>41</sup>

Lord Lake wrote a letter to the Raja of Jaipur reminding him of the violation of his engagement with the British Government, particularly by his recent conduct, and expressing his great disappointment at his conduct. Since the conclusion of the treaty the Raja had, on several occasions, acted in a manner that gave rise to some doubts about his friendship. After he had expressed his views a few months ago to the Raja's vakil Meetha Lal, the Commander-in-Chief had expected that he would rectify his mistakes, but he was again disappointed. The Raja's conduct was of a nature calculated to destroy the friendship between him and the Company. In direct violation of the fourth article of the treaty of peace he had allowed Holkar to pass through his territory unopposed and to draw supplies. From the fact of Holkar's respecting his territory at the time of advancing with the declared purpose of invading the Company's territories, it appeared that he maintained a secret understanding with the court of Jaipur. Lord Lake also pointed out that the Raja's preparations to send an army to Udaipur in connection with a marriage between his family and the Rana were most extraordinary. The detachment of so

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41. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 136.

considerable a force from his territory at a time when his <sup>duty</sup> was to employ every means against the common enemy could not be reconciled with his obligations to the British Government. His message through his vakil to Jones about Holkar's advance through his territory and also the offer of co-operation made to that officer to act against the invading army were no doubt consistent with his engagement; but it was the custom of the British Government to judge by actions, not by professions. The Raja's conduct, in short, was such as to destroy confidence in him.

Lord Lake did not hesitate to draw the logical conclusion from this assessment. He remarked: "....the Governor-General may no longer judge it (compatible) with the interests of the British Government to preserve the alliance!"<sup>42</sup> But he pointed out that there could never be any intention on the part of the British Government either to attack the Raja of Jaipur or to depart in any manner from the general friendship and good understanding which had so long subsisted between the two states. In conclusion, Lord Lake observed that if the Raja directed his forces to join the British army under Jones and to obey with alacrity all his orders and if every effort was made by his Government to secure plentiful supply of provisions for the British troops, he might yet regain the confidence and friendship of the British Government. Unless the Raja pursued this course in the most decided and unequivocal manner, he could no longer expect to enjoy the benefits of the alliance with the Company, and its protection would be instantly withdrawn.<sup>43</sup> Malcolm points out: "This measure <sup>of</sup> (Lord Lake) was not only in consistency with the line of proceeding which Lord Lake had adopted towards the Rajah of Jypore, but, from the actual situation of the enemy and of our forces, was quite

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42. Persian Correspondence (Letters Received: English Translations), S.No.51A, Part II, No.272.

43. Ibid.

essential to the success of the opening campaign;..."<sup>44</sup>

Meanwhile, under the auspices of Lord Lake negotiations for peace with Sindhia had started. The question of the Company's alliance with the Rajputs was linked up with the settlement with Sindhia. Lord Cornwallis, anxious to terminate the war with the Marathas, was unwilling to undertake the responsibility of fighting for them against the Marathas. He was not at all inclined to add to the Company's liabilities. On Lord Lake's report he had merely suspended his decision to dissolve the treaty with Jaipur; he had not abandoned his plan of withdrawing British protection from Rajputana. In his despatch to Lord Lake dated September 19, 1805, the Governor-General disclosed his plan of pacification and confirmed his resolution in the matter of withdrawing from Rajputana. He desired to give up all connection with the territories on the west of the Jumna with the exception of Bundelkhand and of such small areas as it might appear necessary to retain in the vicinity of Agra for purposes connected with the possession of that fortress. The Jumna was to be the frontier of the Company's dominions to the northward of Bundelkhand. He was anxious to be relieved of the responsibilities and embarrassments inseparably connected with the maintenance of alliances with the petty states in the north of Hindustan. The existing alliances with the Rajas of Jaipur and Alwar were to be abandoned without a positive breach of public faith. With regard to Jaipur he wanted to restore the tribute of the annual sum of three lakhs of rupees to Sindhia. As already pointed out, the violation of engagement would be the plea for severing the relationship with Jaipur. With respect to Macheri, he proposed territorial concessions as an inducement to its renouncing the treaty. The territory to the westward and southward of Delhi was to be divided among the petty princes including the ruler of Macheri, with whom the British Government had formed connections, in order to reconcile them to the

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44. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 351.

withdrawal of British protection. The Governor-General hoped that those princes by means of a union among themselves might in the reduced condition of Sindhia acquire sufficient power for their own defence. Moreover Sindhia's endeavours to wrest those territories from these princes would lead to interminable contests which would afford ample and permanent employment to Sindhia and keep his eyes off the Doab where British interests were to be consolidated. Lord Cornwallis was also desirous of restoring to Holkar all the conquests made from him. His views, the Governor-General thought, were "the most consonant to the British interests as well in Europe as in India."<sup>45</sup> The Court of Directors whole-heartedly approved his policy.<sup>46</sup>

Lord Lake, however, had different views. He was afraid of the effect of the Governor-General's eagerness for peace upon the Maratha minds. Fully convinced of the impolicy of the measures which the Governor-General contemplated, he decided to withhold the former's letter to Sindhia. At the same time, he communicated his views on the subject to the Governor-General. It would be inconsistent, Lord Lake observed, with the interests of the British Government to let the Marathas regain a footing in the upper provinces of India. Moreover, it would be inconsistent with the justice and honour of the British Government to relinquish engagements which it had with minor princes on the Maratha frontier. If the Marathas were expelled from Hindustan they would be thrown back to a great distance from the valuable provinces of the Company in that quarter; a strong barrier would be interposed against them in every direction. To the north-west, Haryana, Bikaner, Jodhpur, and the northern parts of Jaipur

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45. Ross, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 541, 546-555. Duff, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 304-305. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VI, pp. 455-456.

46. Letters from the Court of Directors; Foreign Secret Deptt., S.No. 3A, Dated February 27, 1806; Foreign Political Deptt., S.No. 12, Dated February 25, 1806.

and Shekhawati, - dry, sandy and mountainous and inhabited by a warlike race, - could not be crossed by a hostile army without the greatest difficulty and loss. If the rulers in this region were for some time protected by the British Government, they "would recover from that state of disunion, poverty, and weakness, into which they had been thrown, partly by the policy, partly by the vices of the Maratha governments". But if abandoned to themselves, all of them would soon be ~~subjugated~~<sup>subjugated</sup> either by Sindhia or by some other power - a state of affairs most unfavourable to the interests of the Company. The Commander-in-Chief wrote : "These petty states would first quarrel with each other; would then call in the different native powers in their vicinity, to their respective aid; and large armies of irregulars would be contending upon the frontier of ... (the Company's) most fertile provinces; against whose eventual excesses there would be no well-grounded security, but a military force in a state of constant preparation". The military habits of the people would thus be fostered instead of "those habits of peaceful industry, which it was found by experience they were so ready to acquire".

The Jumna, Lord Lake continued, which it was the intention of the Governor-General to make the boundary of the British territories, ~~which~~ would not be, as had been supposed, a barrier of any value. Above its junction with the Chambal, except during a few weeks in the year, it was fordable in a variety of places, and would afford little security from the incursions of a predatory army into the Doab, Rohilkhand or the territories of the Vizier. Further, the British faith could not be released from that pledge which had been given to the Rajputs and other chiefs on the further side of the Jumna, unless the opposite party either infringed the conditions of the engagement or freely allowed it to be dissolved. "I am fully satisfied", concluded Lord Lake, "that<sup>no</sup> inducement whatever would make the lesser Rajas in this quarter renounce the benefit of

the protection of the British Government. Even such a proposition would excite in their minds the utmost alarm. They would, I fear, consider it as a prelude to their being sacrificed to the object of obtaining a peace with the Mahrattas".<sup>47</sup> Lord Lake's views found support from some experienced officers in the Company's service, such as Malcolm<sup>48</sup> and Tod.<sup>49</sup>

Before the Governor-General received this remonstrance, he had become incapable of discharging his functions properly. His health was already damaged when he left England. During his journey from Calcutta to the upper provinces, it rapidly deteriorated. On September 29 he was seriously ill. He was removed from his boats to a house in Ghazipore, a town in the district of Benares. He lingered till October 5, 1805, and then expired.<sup>50</sup>

Upon the death of Lord Cornwallis the office of Governor-General fell to Sir George Barlow, the senior member of the Council of Bengal.<sup>51</sup> In the particular circumstances of his appointment little scope was left for the new Governor General to follow a line of policy different from that of his predecessor. The task before him was to carry into effect the deceased Governor-General's unfulfilled plan; restoration of peace with the Marathas and revival of the policy of non-intervention with regard to the Indian states. Sir George Barlow's nature and service career facilitated the pursuit of such a task. His natural coldness and apathy of temper

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47. British Museum Records (National Archives of India),

Add. Mss., Microfilm Reel 75, ff. 207-211. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, pp. 345-346.

Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 459-460.

48. Ross, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 531.

49. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 1368.

50. Ross, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 530-531. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 460-461.

51. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 462.

would normally make him indifferent to the interests of others.<sup>52</sup> Metcalfe, when attached to Lord Lake's army, wrote in 1806 : "Our present Governor-General is too cold in his own character to give any warmth to others; and this characteristic of his private life seems to be a feature of his public administration!"<sup>53</sup> As a civil servant of the Company Sir George Barlow had risen through several gradations of office to the rank of the senior member of the Council of Bengal and now to that of the Governor-General.<sup>54</sup> Though formerly "the right-hand" man of Lord Wellesley, he was now likely to show "the permanent official's tendency to caution when vested with supreme responsibility".<sup>55</sup>

Immediately after assumption of office the new Governor-General informed the Commander-in-Chief of his determination to adhere to the policy of his predecessor.<sup>56</sup> His fundamental principle was to confine himself to the administration of the Company's own territories. It implied his desire to avoid complications of interference in the affairs of the Indian states. He meant to recognize the Jumna as the boundary of the British possessions in India north of Bundelkhand. Metcalfe tells us that Sir George Barlow in his closet looking at a map saw a black line marking the course of the river Jumna, drew his pencil along this line, and said: "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther!"<sup>57</sup> He determined to abandon at the earliest practicable period

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52. Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto, p.25

53. Kaye, Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe, p.10.

54. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VI, p.462.

55. Smith, Oxford History of India, p.559.

56. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VI, p.462. In his letter to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors dated October 23, 1805, Barlow stated his intention to prosecute the plan of arrangement proposed by his predecessor for effecting a final accommodation with Sindhia and Holkar. (Letters from the Court of Directors: Foreign Political Deptt., S.No.12, Dated February 25, 1806.)

57. Kaye, Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe, pp.1-3. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VI, p.462.

all connection with the petty states west of the Jumna. Apart from the defensive alliances subsisting between the British Government and the great powers of India, he thought, it was necessary for the security and the interest of the Company to limit all relations with the surrounding states to those of general amity. Such a policy of general amity and non-intervention with regard to the smaller states would keep the Company's force concentrated, its power compact and its 'empire' at peace.<sup>58</sup>

Sir George Barlow's picture of the political situation in India was simple enough. The security of the British dominions must be derived from either of the two sources, - first, from establishing a controlling power over all states of India; second, from the contentions and wars sure to prevail among those states, if left to themselves, combined with efficient measures of defence on the part of the British Government itself. In his opinion, the first alternative, which was connected with subsidiary alliance and would tend to universal dominion, would be inconsistent not only with the provisions of the Act of 1784 but also with the general principles of policy which the Company's Government had professed to maintain. Naturally he fell back upon the second alternative. The line of the Jumna, he pointed out, might be rendered an effective barrier against predatory incursions as also against serious attack on that side by forming a chain of military posts on the bank of that river to the northern extremity of the Company's territories. There was, therefore, no necessity of alliances with the petty states west of the Jumna, obviously including the Rajput states. To justify repudiation of existing treaties with some of them, he argued that the faith was not binding which the British had pledged for the protection of the various chiefs.<sup>59</sup> In the light of all these considerations Sir George Barlow

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58. Kaye, Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe, p. 3.

Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, pp. 361-362.

59. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 462-464.

proceeded to come to terms with the Marathas and to withdraw from Rajputana leaving it to the mercy of the greedy Marathas or any other invader. The Court of Directors approved the policy of the new Governor-General as it conformed to their views and also <sup>was</sup> a continuation of that of Lord Cornwallis.<sup>60</sup>

On November 22, 1805, under the immediate superintendence of Lord Lake, Lt. Col. Malcolm on the part of the Company signed a treaty of peace with Mumshtā Kavel Nyn, the agent of Daulat Rao Sindhia. According to the fifth article of the treaty the river Chambal would form the boundary between the two states from the city of Kotah to the west to the limits of the territories of Gohud to the east. By the sixth article it was clearly stated that Sindhia resigned all pretensions and claims to any tribute from the Raja of Bundi or any other state north of the Chambal and to the eastward of Kotah. By the eighth article the Company engaged to enter into no treaty with the Rajas of Udaipur, Jodhpur and Kotah or other chiefs, the tributaries of Sindhia situated in Malwa, Mewar or Marwar, and in no shape whatever to interfere with the settlement which Sindhia might make with those chiefs. The fifth and the sixth articles of the treaty, however, did not conform to the policy of the Governor-General. They not only made the Chambal, instead of the Jumna, the boundary between the two states but also appeared to the Governor-General to impose upon the British power the obligation of protecting the states and chieftains north of the Chambal from Kotah to the Jumna. Hence in lieu of the objectionable articles two declaratory ones were annexed to the treaty. In consequence, Sindhia was now free to deal with the state of Bundi at his discretion.<sup>61</sup>

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60. Letters from the Court of Directors: Foreign Secret Deptt., S.No.3A, Dated February 27, 1806; Foreign Political Deptt., S.No.12, Dated February 25, 1806.

61. Aitchison, op.cit., 1876, Vol. III, pp. 290-294. Secret Consultations, 1806, January 23, No. 113. Duff, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 307-308. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 362. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VI, p. 466.

While the treaty with Sindhia was being arranged, Lord Lake pursued Holkar into the Punjab. Disappointed in his hopes of aid from the Sikhs and reduced to extreme distress, Holkar sued for peace with the Company. On December 24, 1805, a treaty was concluded by Lt. Col. Malcolm on behalf of the Company and under the immediate supervision of Lord Lake. By the second article Holkar renounced his claims to Bundi, Tonk-Rampura and all places north of the Bundi hills. By the third article the Company engaged to have no concern with the ancient possessions of the Holkar family in Mewar, Malwa and Haraoti. In conformity with his policy of aloofness beyond the Jumna to the west, the Governor-General objected to the second article. As in the case of the treaty with Sindhia, so also in this case Sir George Barlow annexed declaratory articles, annulling the second article. Accordingly, Holkar was not required to renounce his claims to Bundi. On the other hand, the Company relinquished all claims to Tonk-Rampura, which had once belonged to the Raja of Jaipur.<sup>62</sup>

Thus at the beginning of the year 1806 by these treaties Sir George Barlow restored peace with the Marathas and promised not to extend in future British control and protection to the Rajput states, thereby leaving them exposed to Maratha invasions or any other inroads. Thus the price of the peace envisaged by the present policy of the Company was partly imposed upon the Rajputs. So long as the peace remained unbroken, the Rajputs, logically speaking, should not expect help and protection from the Company, particularly against the Marathas. Of course, the British Government was still connected with two states, Jaipur and Alwar, by treaties of alliance. As Sir George Barlow was in favour of withdrawing the British power altogether from Rajputana, he deemed it proper to issue instructions to Lord Lake to dissolve the existing alliances with them.

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62. Aitchison, op. cit., 1876, Vol. III, pp. 341-343. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 308-311. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 466-467.

The Commander-in-Chief, however, as during the time of Cornwallis, strongly remonstrated against this policy of withdrawal from beyond the west of the Jumna, particularly in the case of Bundi and Jaipur. He repeated his apprehension about the consequences of the possible revival of Maratha influence in Hindustan. He pointed out that the proposed arrangements regarding the petty states and territories west of the Jumna would leave Holkar quite at liberty to attempt their conquest; indeed, that would be one of the earliest efforts his ambition. Lord Lake felt that in the event of such an occurrence, attention to its honour and security would force the British Government to interfere, resulting probably in a renewal of hostilities under circumstances of the most serious disadvantage. The maintenance of general control over the states and territories west of the Jumna would not increase the hazard of the Company being entangled in hostilities. On the other hand, the risk of renewal of war with any branch of the Maratha empire would be greatly aggravated by the abandonment of the Company's connection with those states and territories. Sindhia and Holkar would never think of attacking any of those petty states which enjoyed the British protection. However irregular the habits of those states might be, the local situation of their territories and comparative weakness of their power would make it almost impossible that they would ever involve, by any offensive of theirs, the British Government in war with either Sindhia or Holkar. The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that the Governor-General was already in possession of every information regarding the local situation and the political and strategic value of the territories to the west of the Jumna. Lord Lake was sensible of the embarrassment that was likely to be caused if these petty states were to rest entirely on the British Government for defence. In his opinion, however, permanent arrangements might be made by which that embarrassment would be completely removed and these would be rendered an additional source of strength to the British Government. Such arrangements, moreover, might be effected without serious departure from the

spirit of the Governor-General's principles.<sup>63</sup>

As regards the state of Bundi Lord Lake represented that its territory, though not large in extent, commanded a principal pass into the northern provinces of the British dominions. Its Raja, steady in his friendship, rendered eminent services to the British Government, particularly during Colonel Monson's retreat. By his help to the Colonel the Raja provoked the anger of Holkar. Though no treaty subsisted between Bundi and the Company, yet it would be inconsistent with the sense of justice and also the honour and reputation of the British Government to give up the Raja to the rage of his Maratha foe. Rather it would be better to release him altogether from subservience to the Maratha powers. For his services he might be rewarded by a free grant of one of the smaller districts in the vicinity of his territory ceded by the treaties with Sindhia and Holkar. But Lord Lake apprehended that from the probable operation of the declaratory articles any such grant would not be of the least benefit to the Raja, and the territory so given would probably become an early and easy conquest to the very power from which it had been wrested. The least that Lord Lake could suggest was that the Governor-General should delay the adoption of the measure exposing the Raja of Bundi to the vengeance of Holkar at least till the latter's return to his country.<sup>64</sup> But the resolution of the Governor-General with regard to Bundi remained unchanged. He observed : "I shall be disposed to satisfy whatever claims the Rajah of Boondee may possess upon the British Government in any mode which shall not compromise those fundamental principles of policy which my judgment and my duty compel me to adopt for the permanent security of the general interests of the British. (The) Government cannot undertake to guarantee the rights of that Chieftain from any encroachments

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63. Secret Consultations, 1806, February 27, No. 46.

64. Secret Consultations, 1806, January 23, No. 78; February 27, No. 53. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 467-468.

on the part of Sindia or any other state".<sup>65</sup> As stated above, according to the declaratory articles of the treaties with Sindhia and Holkar, the Marathas were at liberty to deal with the Raja of Bundi at their discretion.

As regards Jaipur, the Commander-in-Chief pointed out that though the early conduct of the Raja was at variance with his engagements and would justify the dissolution of his treaty with the Company, he later acted in a manner consistent with his obligations to the British Government. Lord Lake thought that the Raja was then sensible that his true interests could only be promoted by his alliance with the British Government. When Holkar during the month of October(1805) marched to the north by way of Jaipur, the Commander-in-Chief had urged this Rajput Chief to discharge his duties faithfully. In response the Raja recalled the detachment sent to Udaipur in connection with marriage negotiations with the Rana's family. He also sent a force to join the Bombay army under Major-General Jones who later gave strong and repeated testimonies to the regularity and obedience shown by the Raja's officers and troops when acting with his forces. The British troops also received supplies from Jaipur territory. The Commander-in-Chief wondered how far it would be right at that moment to dissolve the alliance and thereby expose the Raja to the immediate attack of both Sindhia and Holkar. Such action would be likely, unless it rested upon the most clear and undisputed grounds, to produce an impression among the other states of India which would be highly derogatory to the reputation of the British Government.<sup>66</sup>

These expostulations failed to change the view-point of the Governor-General who regarded the obligations of the Company as dissolved by the early indications

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65. Secret Consultations, 1806, January 23, No. 113. Mill, op.cit. Vol. VI, p. 468.

66. Secret Consultations, 1806, January 23, No. 78; February 27, No. 46. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VI, pp. 468-469.

of disaffection on the part of the Raja of Jaipur, and not restored by his subsequent co-operation. He pointed out to Lord Lake : "...no formal act of the British Government has imposed upon us an obligation to overlook the Raja's violation of his engagements, or precluded a latitude of decision found on the manifest insecurity of any dependence upon the Raja's fidelity and exertions at a season of future exigency".<sup>67</sup> Sir George Barlow did not even listen to the Commander-in-Chief's request that the renunciation of alliance might be better deferred until Holkar should have passed the territories of Jaipur. The Governor-General decided that the dissolution of the treaty should be immediately declared, lest Holkar, in passing through Jaipur territory, should commit excesses which the Company might be required to resist.<sup>68</sup> Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the apprehension of Lord Lake was not incorrect. When Holkar returned from the Punjab early in 1806, his troops committed ravages in the territories of Jaipur.<sup>69</sup>

The Governor-General conceded to the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief in one minor matter. He agreed that the necessary communication should be made direct to the Raja under his immediate authority. Lord Lake had recommended such a mode which in his opinion would cause the measure to be considered more decisive as coming from the supreme authority in India. It would also in some degree relieve the Commander-in-Chief of personal embarrassment, for he had offered the Raja repeated assurances of friendship.<sup>70</sup> In spite of this Lord Lake had afterwards to receive the bitter reproaches of the Raja through his agent at Delhi.

Although Sir George Barlow proved adamant in

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67. Secret Consultations, 1806, February 27, No. 55. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 469.

68. Secret Consultations, 1806, February 27, No. 55.

69. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 243.

70. Secret Consultations, 1806, February 27, Nos. 46, 55.

respect of Bundi and Jaipur, he had to modify his decision about the treaty with Alwar. As the Raja of Macheri (Alwar) had been most loyal to his alliance with the British Government, the Governor-General in conformity with his fundamental principles had directed the Commander-in-Chief to enter into negotiations with him and to offer him considerable accessions of territory as a price for dissolution of the alliance. Lord Lake pointed out that even the rumour of any such desire on the part of the Company would again let loose the forces of uproar and destruction in that quarter of India. Endeavours had been made by the agents of Holkar and the Raja of Jaipur to shake the fidelity of the Chief of Alwar. They sought to excite in his mind an apprehension that he would not derive from his alliance with the Company the benefit of its protection; the Company, it was insinuated, was disposed to sacrifice its public faith to considerations of convenience. Lord Lake expressed his apprehension so strongly that the Governor-General, while reiterating his policy, disclaimed any intention for precipitate action.<sup>71</sup> Referring to the treaty with Alwar he observed: "Its dissolution at present is evidently impracticable, without a deviation from the fundamental principle of public honour....Until an opportunity should occur therefore of abandoning....(the alliance) without a sacrifice of faith it must be the object of the (British) Government to place...(it) on a footing calculated to preclude the hazard of being involved in embarrassment and trouble on account of (it)"<sup>72</sup> Thus the Raja of Macheri was not to be deprived immediately of British protection. On August 7, 1806, the Raja was told that he had fulfilled the obligations of his engagement with perfect fidelity and, therefore, the British Government possessed no just motive for declaring the dissolution of the treaty.<sup>73</sup>

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71. Secret Consultations, 1806, August 7, Nos. 92, 93; October 2, No. 70. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VI, p. 469.

72. Secret Consultations, 1806, August 7, No. 93.

73. Ibid , No. 96.

Thus in spite of the frank, and strongly expressed, remonstrance of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir George Barlow actually revived the policy of aloofness towards the Rajput states except in the case of Alwar. To quote the Jaipur vakil's not unreasonable complaint: the British Government made "its faith subservient to its convenience".<sup>74</sup> The Commander-in-Chief's dissatisfaction was shared by experienced and well informed officers like Grant Duff, Malcolm and Tod. This is clear enough from their correspondence and published works. Grant Duff dubbed the measures of Sir George Barlow short-sighted and contracted as they were selfish and indiscriminating.<sup>75</sup> Malcolm referred to the impolicy and impracticability of the principles by which the measures of the Government were regulated.<sup>76</sup> The following remark made by him in connection with the dissolution of the alliance with Jaipur shows his bitter reaction: "This is the first measure of the kind that the English have ever taken in India, and I trust in God it will be the last!"<sup>77</sup> Tod's disapproval was implied when he illustrated the evils resulting from the Company's policy, by referring to the miseries which were in consequence inflicted upon Rajputana.<sup>78</sup> The differences of opinion between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief on the arrangement of affairs in Hindustan, including the treatment offered to the Rajput states, and Sir George Barlow's disregard of Lord Lake's suggestions finally led to the resignation of the latter who set sail for England in February, 1807.<sup>79</sup>

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74. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 373.

75. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 317.

76. Secret Consultations, 1806, August 7, No. 92. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 385.

77. Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir John Malcolm, Vol. I, p. 358.

78. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 1368.

79. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 470-471.

In retrospect, it is clear that whatever arguments there might be behind the adoption of the policy of withdrawal from beyond the west of the Jumna, including Rajputana, the accusation of the Jaipur vakil is irrefutable. Bundi and Alwar had been friendly and faithful; they had rendered eminent services to the Company during its war with the Marathas. The Company on its part, for the sake of restoring peace with the Marathas and also for keeping itself free from embarrassment and trouble, sacrificed Bundi and intended to sacrifice Alwar as well. The treaty with Jaipur was dissolved, not when that state had given indications of disloyalty, but after it had rendered useful services to the Company. This appears to be a breach of faith on the part of the Company's Government. Its action seems to be inexpedient as well, for it produced a general distrust of its principles and a doubt of its strength.<sup>80</sup> It was really ungenerous on the part of the Company to deny protection to, and deliberately abandon, the weak Rajput states to the mercy of the unscrupulous Marathas, particularly at a time when the Rajputs badly needed and sought for British help.

On March 8, 1806, Captain Sturrock, the British Resident at Jaipur, informed the Raja that he was directed by the Governor-General to declare the dissolution of the alliance between him and the British Government. The alleged ground was that the Raja had failed to fulfil his engagements.<sup>81</sup> Mercer, the British Resident with Sindhia, told the Raja's agent Sheolach that the Company had the right of dissolving the alliance on account of the Raja's failure in fulfilling its stipulations.<sup>82</sup> Sturrock assured the Raja that it had not been actuated by the slightest degree of ill-feeling towards him; the British Government was determined to avoid interfering in the internal affairs and

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80. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 470.

81. Secret Consultations, 1806, April 10, No. 4; May 22, No. 37.

82. Ibid, 1806, May 1, No. 96.

dissensions of the chiefs of Hindustan and to respect their rights and independence. The Raja was assured that it was the earnest desire of the British Government to maintain the same friendly intercourse and good understanding which had formerly existed between the two states previous to the conclusion of the treaty.<sup>83</sup>

The charges levelled against the Raja were :-  
 (a) he had recalled his troops from Monson's detachment during its retreat; (b) he had intentionally failed to send his troops to the siege of Bharatpur; (c) he had not sent his troops to join the British army when it marched in pursuit of Holkar into the Punjab but despatched them to Udaipur; (d) he had not only failed to cut off Holkar's supplies but allowed him to march through the territory of Jaipur to the Punjab.<sup>84</sup>

The Raja denied the charges and pointed out ~~that~~ that mutual explanations were needed to justify the dissolution of the alliance. The truth and falsehood of the case, he argued, should have been weighed in the scales of impartial<sup>justice</sup>; if he should have been proved to be in fault, the dissolution of the alliance would have been consistent with the principles of justice.<sup>85</sup> According to him, temporary delay or dilatoriness in assembling his army or in the march of his troops might afford a just ground of complaint, but would not warrant the dissolution of the treaty.<sup>86</sup> He pointed out that Lord Lake had given him strong assurance of the stability of the alliance. He contended that if the British Government had been dissatisfied with his conduct at any particular time, it should have expressed its displeasure at that time and have at once declared the alliance annulled.

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83. Secret Consultations, 1806, April 10, Nos. 4, 5.

84. Ibid, 1806, May 1, No. 96; May 22, Nos. 36, 37, 38. Political Consultations, 1807, January 15, No. 82. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 62.

85. Secret Consultations, 1806, May 22, No. 38.

86. Secret Consultations, 1806, May 22, No. 36.

To continue to have employed his services until they could be safely dispensed with, and to have reserved all expression of displeasure until<sup>it</sup> could be used as a pretext for getting rid of inconvenient obligations, was disingenuous dishonourable.<sup>87</sup>

Apart from general repudiation the Raja also sought to refute the individual charges. He claimed that he was not deficient in co-operating with Monson for the expulsion of Holkar from his territory. His troops under Rai Ratan Lal returned from the other side of Kotah in conformity with the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and with the permission of Monson himself. After the disaster Monson despatched the Jaipur cavalry to Rampura for the purpose of collecting provisions while he proceeded to Agra. The disaster which befell the British detachment after Monson's coming to Rampura was occasioned solely by his want of confidence in the advice of the commanders of the Jaipur troops. The Raja further stated that although he had recommended to the British Resident, Captain Sturrock, before Holkar's arrival, the propriety of Monson's coming to Jaipur, the Resident "did not think it right".<sup>88</sup> As Sheolal had told Mercer, the British Resident with Sindhia, the Raja had no standing army and it required some months to collect troops from the Thakurs.<sup>89</sup> Delay in despatch of troops was, therefore, unavoidable.

In regard to the charge of failure to send troops to the siege of Bharatpur, the Raja replied that during the siege he had not received any communication from the Commander-in-Chief requiring such assistance; he had merely been asked to station his troops on the frontier, so that in the event of any attempt by the enemy to pass through Jaipur territory he might be opposed and his progress cut

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87. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 63.

88. Secret Consultations, 1806, May 22, No. 38. Political Consultations, 1807, January 15, No. 82.

89. Secret Consultations, 1806, May 1, No. 96.

off. Accordingly he detached an efficient body of troops; but as Holkar did not proceed towards Jaipur, those troops stationed on the frontier had no occasion to do anything. When Holkar came to Rajputana after some delay, Raja Jagat Singh remained inactive in accordance with the advice of Major-General Jones.<sup>90</sup> The charge of supplying provisions to Holkar's army was categorically denied. On the contrary, the Raja said, he had stationed officers in different posts to furnish supplies whenever they were procurable for the British troops.<sup>91</sup>

So far as Holkar's march through Jaipur was concerned, the Raja's explanation was simple. As the British troops arrived too late, Holkar by forced marches was able to pass with safety through his territory. His forces were on march to Udaipur; but subsequently on the arrival of Major-General Jones in this quarter, he responded to the Commander-in-Chief's desire. Rao Sambhu Singh sent with the army to Udaipur was recalled and ~~Sardar~~ Rao Chund with a force of 10,000 was detached to the assistance of Major-General Jones. The Raja further stated that both Major-General Jones and Lord Lake had furnished him with their written acknowledgements of the promptitude and efficiency of his co-operation. To convince the Company of his sincerity about the alliance the Raja also pointed out that he had rejected the propositions of the Southern Chiefs who had sought an alliance with him.<sup>92</sup> But no explanation was of any avail; the Jaipur Government failed to satisfy the British authorities in Calcutta. It was the inflexible policy of the Governor-General to abstain from interference.

The observations of the Court of Directors in connection with the dissolution of the alliance with

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90. Ibid, 1806, May 22, No. 38. Political Consultations, 1807, January 15, No. 82.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

Jaipur provide an interesting commentary on the Barlow-Lake differences : "...although the Raja had failed in the performance of his engagements during the war with Holkar, yet he had furnished assistance towards its conclusion at the instance of Lord Lake, and under an expectation held out by his Lordship that the protection of the British Government would be continued to him; and they thought it necessary to enjoin the Government of India to take care, in all its transactions with the native princes, to preserve its character for fidelity to its allies from falling into disrepute, and to evince a strict regard, in the prosecution of its political views, to the principles of justice and generosity". This belated insistence on "the principles of justice and generosity" served no practical purpose; the Court did not interfere in the matter of continuing the alliance with Jaipur.<sup>93</sup>

While the Company's Government in India was thus replacing Lord Wellesley's expansionist policy by the more familiar and safer policy of non-intervention and leaving the Rajput states to themselves, the question of the marriage of the Udaipur princess Krishnakumari gradually involved them in a prolonged suicidal conflict. In this internecine conflict which severely dissipated their energy and violently disturbed their political life, Jaipur, a chief participant, alone spent more than one crore and twenty lakhs of rupees.<sup>94</sup> The Marathas could not remain inactive in this situation so favourable to them for exploitation. The evils of internal conflict were thus aggravated by external intervention. Rajputana turned into a scene of strife, plunder and desolation. The British, who were attaining to the position of the paramount power of India, did not come forward to prevent such developments. Rather, they by their non-interference indirectly permitted the Marathas to worsen the situation. As stated in the

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93. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 390. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 63.

94. Foreign Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 124, Memorandum on Jaipur.

following pages, the Rajputs during this period from time to time sought British help or protection. But on grounds of the general policy of non-intervention and the stipulations about Rajputana in the treaties with Sindhia and Holkar the Company refused to entertain such appeals. For a study of the situation prevailing in Rajputana during this conflict and the policy of the Company towards the hapless Rajput states reference may be made, in some details, to the episode of Krishnakumari.

That tragic story had its origin before the dissolution of the treaty with Jaipur and even before the Governor-Generalship of Sir George Barlow. Krishnakumari, one of the daughters of Rana Bhim Singh of Mewar, was exquisitely beautiful; she was the 'Helen of Rajwara'. She was first betrothed to Raja Bhim Singh of Marwar, who, however, died in 1803 before the marriage could be celebrated. Then she was betrothed afresh to his successor Man Singh. But Raja Man Singh gave offence to the Rana by ejecting his relative Kishwar Singh from his appanage<sup>a</sup> of Khalirao. Thereupon the Rana proposed to marry his daughter to Raja Jagat Singh of Jaipur, and apprehending trouble from Jodhpur, asked his prospective son-in-law for military aid.<sup>95</sup> Jagat Singh was a voluptuous prince who "would have alienated a part of his domains at any time for a pretty woman".<sup>96</sup> Naturally he welcomed the proposed match. There was an additional attraction too : marriage with the Rana's daughter would enhance the social prestige of the Kachchwa ruler. As Malcolm says, "The... (Rana) family (of Udaipur) is the

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95. Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 536; Vol. II, p. 1082; Vol. III, p. 1412.

Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, pp. 330, 341.

Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune, pp. 295-296.

A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 297. Modern Review, 1942, April: article by N.B. Roy.

96. Foreign Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 124, Memorandum on Jodhpur.

highest in rank among the Rajpoots, and an alliance with it has always been esteemed the greatest honour to which a prince of that tribe can aspire".<sup>97</sup> Apart from its social implications the marriage might also be made to yield political profits. Rai Chand, the ambitious Dewan of Jaipur, wanted to extend his master's political influence over Mewar through this marriage.

In July, 1805, the Raja of Jaipur sent Khush-hal Singh with an army to Udaipur for a final settlement of the matter. Subsequently he decided to send a reinforcement of "four battalions of regular infantry, a body of irregular infantry and about two thousand cavalry" under his minister Sambhu Singh. This detachment marched towards Udaipur probably towards the end of September, 1805. The Raja informed the British Resident at Jaipur early in October that the Rana's daughter was betrothed to him.<sup>98</sup>

Nothing could happen in Rajputana without attracting the attention of the Marathas. Sindhia disliked the despatch of the troops from Jaipur to the assistance of Udaipur, for he was then engaged in collecting tribute from the Rana. The British Government was called upon by Sindhia to compel its ally - the Raja of Jaipur - to recall his troops from Mewar or to allow him to proceed against the Raja as an enemy (October, 1805). In Lord Lake's opinion there were just grounds for Sindhia's appeal. He desired Captain Sturrock to bring the matter to Raja Jagat Singh's notice. He was to explain to the Raja the implications of the treaty between the British Government and Sindhia : neither the British Government nor any of its

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97. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 330.

98. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 136, 138, 140.

A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, pp. 297-298. Modern Review, 1942, April, p. 369. Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune, p. 296.

allies could give any help to the Rana or any of Sindhia's tributaries.<sup>99</sup> Lord Lake disapproved the sending of the large force under Sambhu Singh on another ground as well; at that time Holkar was advancing through that region with the intention of invading the British possessions.<sup>100</sup>

Captain Sturrock met the Raja more than once. The Resident repeatedly objected to the despatch of Jaipur troops to Udaipur. He asked the Raja to recall Sambhu Singh's detachment and also to assist the British army under Major-General Jones against Holkar. Jagat Singh was now anxious not to offend the British. He not only agreed to recall the army under Sambhu Singh but also to co-operate with Major-General Jones. Sambhu Singh's troops returned to Jaipur on October 19, 1805. The Raja then sent a considerable force under Dewan Rai Chand to join the Bombay army under Major-General Jones. The troops of Jaipur gave satisfactory service. They returned to Jaipur in December, 1805. Both Lord Lake and Major-General Jones expressed their appreciation of the services rendered by the troops of Jaipur.<sup>101</sup>

Raja Jagat Singh had hoped that his services would induce Lord Lake to assist him in the accomplishment of the proposed marriage between him and Krishnakumari. In November, 1805, he requested the Commander-in-Chief to write to Sindhia not to hinder the proposed marriage. He believed that a letter from the Commander-in-Chief to Sindhia would ensure the latter's consent. The Raja was anxious to celebrate the marriage between the beginning of the next year and the commencement of the next rainy season. Captain Sturrock, however, told him that no diversion of energy should take place

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99. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 137.

100. Persian Correspondence (Letters Received: English Translations), S. No. 51A, No. 272.

101. Secret Consultations, 1805, December 31, Nos. 2, 14, 48, 57; 1806, January 9, No. 22; January 16, Nos. 42, 44.

during the period of war and advised him to wait until a more favourable time appeared for the accomplishment of his object.<sup>102</sup>

Unable to evade the repeated requests of Raja Jagat Singh, Lord Lake requested Sindhia to permit necessary steps to be taken for the marriage. At the same time he warned Jagat Singh against the adoption of measures which might involve the smallest risk of creating any dispute either with Sindhia or with the chiefs of the Rana of Udaipur. The Raja was also cautioned that he would incur the displeasure of the British Government if he made this marriage a pretext for any interference in the political concerns of the Rana. The Raja assured the Resident that he had no object in view other than what he professed. He promised to avoid disputes with the Rana's chiefs. He also agreed not to interfere in the affairs of Udaipur in any manner which might offend Sindhia or impede his collecting tribute from Mewar. Sindhia granted permission to both the Raja of Jaipur and the Rana to proceed with the marriage. The Raja then ordered Sambhu Singh to proceed to Udaipur with a small escort in order to make arrangements with the Rana for the celebration of the marriage (January, 1806). His own intention to proceed to Udaipur towards the close of the month (January, 1806) was also communicated to the Resident.<sup>103</sup>

When matters appeared to be moving smoothly, Raja Man Singh of Marwar intervened. He considered it necessary to prevent a matrimonial alliance between the Sesodiyas and his hereditary rivals - the Kachchwas. He sent his vakils to Jaipur to remonstrate against the proposed marriage on the ground that the princess had been previously betrothed to him and her marriage with any one else would bring disgrace upon him. When the remonstrances

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102. Secret Consultations, 1805, December 31, No. 57.

103. Ibid, 1806, January 16, Nos. 42, 43; January 30, Nos. 114, 116; February 27, Nos. 13, 46.

of the vakils failed, Man Singh sent three of his principal Sardars to Jaipur " to renew his remonstrances". At the same time he ordered the mobilisation of troops (January 1806). He is said to have been instigated by one of his chief Thakurs, Sawai Singh, who posed as his friend and said: " It is a slight and an injury such as ought never to be put up with that a lady once affianced to the head of this state should be given to the head of another....." The real motive of Sawai Singh was to involve Man Singh ( to whom he was politically hostile) in hostilities with Jaipur, to depose him when he was in trouble, to place his own nominee Dhonkal Singh on the throne of Marwar and then 104 bring the administration of the state under his own control.

As stated earlier, in 1793 Raja Bijay Singh of Marwar had died in the midst of inheritance quarrels. The Bhim Singh, one of his grandsons, captured the throne and proceeded to remove his rivals. Man Singh, another grandson of the deceased Raja, who was adopted by his Oswal concubine, was one of the claimants. He took shelter in the fort of Jalor which was laid siege to by Bhim Singh for about ten years. Bhim Singh died at a time when the fall of Jalor was inevitable. Then Man Singh occupied the throne. Soon after Raja Man Singh's accession, Sawai Singh " took offence, and put himself in hostility to his sovereign". Sawai Singh's grandfather, Devi Singh, had been at the head of the Champawat Rathors and their allies who had captured the government and reduced Raja Bijay Singh to a puppet. The " king's friends", however, contrived to murder Devi Singh and many of the usurping chiefs. Now, Sawai Singh held his dagger " suspended over the head of Raja Man from his enthronement to his own death-hour". He put up Dhonkal Singh, a posthumous son of Bhim Singh, as a rival candidate for the

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104. Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune, pp. 297-298, 304, 311-312. Secret Consultations, 1806, February 27, Nos. 41, 42. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 327.

throne. Infant Dhonkal Singh, however, "was born under suspicious circumstances, and his legitimacy was not generally acknowledged".<sup>105</sup>

In consequence of the opposition of Raja Man, the Raja of Jaipur postponed his intended journey to Udaipur until a more favourable period. Rao Sumbhu Singh who was on his way to Udaipur returned to Jaipur. But the dispute was merely postponed; it was not given up. Captain Sturrock found the Raja determined to push his claim. He advised the Raja to come to an amicable settlement with his rival or to submit the dispute to the British Government in accordance with the treaty of 1803 (which had not yet been cancelled). The Resident warned the Raja that if he did not adhere to the conditions of the treaty he could not expect the benefit of its protection. The Raja assured the Resident of his desire to effect an amicable settlement of the dispute. But things were moving along a wrong track. Captain Sturrock reported on February 3, 1806, that both parties were preparing for hostilities in the event of their not being able to settle the point in dispute to their mutual satisfaction and an appeal to arms might be necessary.<sup>106</sup>

The Raja of Jodhpur applied to Lord Lake for permission to send a vakil. He was informed that he might send a vakil whenever he pleased. At Jaipur the agents of the Raja of Jodhpur acquainted the British Resident with their master's claim for the hand of the Udaipur princess. They pointed out that if the Raja of Jaipur persevered in offering Raja Man Singh an unprovoked insult, the latter was determined to resent it. They also expressed their Raja's hope that the "powerful and just" British Government would

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105. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 1070-1071, 1080-1082. J.N. Sarkar, op.cit., Vol. IV, p. 53. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 324. Ante, pp. 5-6, 11.

106. Secret Consultations, 1806, February 27, Nos. 41, 42.

interfere in the dispute between the two contending Rajas and prevent bloodshed by "an equitable decision". But British intervention was not available. Though Raja Man was permitted to send a vakil, Lord Lake felt that neither Jagat Singh nor Man Singh should be given a hope that the British Government would consent to arbitrate. He wanted the dispute to be settled amicably. This policy was strictly adhered to by the British Resident at Jaipur. He told the vakils of the Jodhpur Raja that the cause of the dispute between the two Rajas being of a private and family nature, the British Government would avoid interfering in it as far as possible. He also communicated to them the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation for settlement of the dispute in an amicable manner which would be conducive to the interests of both states.<sup>107</sup>

Even after this Jagat Singh sent a vakil to Delhi who met and pressed John Malcolm for British intervention (February, 1806). The vakil threw a dark hint that non-interference of the British Government would lead to an appeal to others who would instantly come forward with interested motives. John Malcolm merely repeated the Commander-in-Chief's decision of non-interference. In an interview with the Raja of Jaipur on February 17, 1806, the British Resident, Captain Sturrock, informed him also that the British Government would not interfere in any manner whatever in his dispute with the Raja of Jodhpur. The Raja was also told that if it should lead to hostilities, he must not expect any assistance from the British Government. In reply the Raja referred to article 5 of the treaty which provided that if a dispute should arise between the Raja and any other state, the British Government would offer its friendly mediation to have it amicably settled, and assist him if the opposite party persisted in committing an aggression against him. To this the Resident answered that the article could not be fairly construed to mean that the

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107. Secret Consultations, 1806, March 13, Nos. 15, 16, 17.

British Government was to go to war to help in an object of a private and family nature.<sup>108</sup> Whatever the political or moral justification of British policy might be, there was no room left for misunderstanding on the part of the Rajput princes concerned.

But they were not wise enough to restrain themselves. Having failed to secure promise of British assistance Raja Man Singh appealed for help to Sindhia who was then in Mewar. Anxious to consolidate his position in Rajputana, the Maratha Chief could not fail to take advantage of the conflict between two principal Rajput states. He eagerly responded to the appeal of Raja Man Singh. As Mercer, British Resident with Sindhia, wrote to the Governor-General on April 22, 1806, Sindhia endeavoured to bring about an amicable settlement of the dispute between the two Rajas and for that purpose put forward certain proposals. Either the two Rajas should each have one of the Rana's daughters in marriage, or they should both give up their claims for the present, or they should consent to an arbitration of the neighbouring Rajas on the subject. These propositions were not unreasonable, but they were rendered nugatory by the presence of the Jaipur troops who held the Rana in control. Sindhia had earlier tried, without success, to persuade the Rana to dismiss the Jaipur troops. As Sindhia told Mercer, the control of the Udaipur Rana by the Jaipur troops had induced the Jaipur Raja to reject all offers for an accommodation on fair terms.<sup>109</sup>

At this stage Sindhia seemed to be willing to withdraw his interference, could he find an opportunity of doing so without loss of credit to himself. He had nearly

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108. Ibid, Nos. 25, 26.

109. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 155, 161, 162.

Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune, p. 297.

A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 298. Modern Review, April, 1942, pp. 369-370.

succeeded in realizing the tribute from the Raja of Jodhpur; the Raja of Jaipur also had offered him money. Sindhia also knew that Holkar was then on his march to this territory. Sindhia's own dominions were in a state of confusion; local chieftains who were refractory to his authority would be encouraged to persist in their opposition if they found him engaged in operations elsewhere. Sindhia actually told Mercer that he would retire from Mewar and leave the parties concerned to settle the dispute between themselves if the Jaipur troops were withdrawn. Retirement, however, could not be unconditional. In view of the interest he had already taken in the dispute he could not retire and leave the Jaipur troops in possession of Udaipur as they would immediately, on his falling back, carry off the Rana's daughter to Jaipur and conclude the marriage. Sindhia apprehended that it would tend to destroy his influence and authority over all the Rajas in that region.

In April, 1806, Sindhia advanced with his army to Udaipur in order to induce the Rana to dismiss the Jaipur troops. At the same time he requested the British Resident Mercer to write to the Raja of Jaipur assuring him that Sindhia was not disposed to favour the cause of the Raja of Jodhpur and would give up his interference, provided the Jaipur troops were withdrawn from Udaipur.<sup>110</sup> But the Company had in the meantime dissolved its treaty of alliance with Jaipur (March, 1806). The British Resident replied that the writing of such a letter was out of question; as the British Government had no further connection with the Jaipur state than that of general friendship and goodwill, interference on a subject of this nature would not be proper. The Governor-General approved Mercer's reply as proper and judicious.<sup>111</sup>

The British Government was not prepared to put pressure upon the Jaipur Raja at Sindhia's request. It was also equally unprepared to render any help to the Raja

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110. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 162.

111. Ibid. Secret Consultations, 1806, May 15, Nos. 54, 56.

against Sindhia. In a despatch dated April 29, 1806, Edmonstone, Secretary to Government, communicated to Mercer the Governor-General's policy, after the dissolution of the treaty, towards the Raja of Jaipur who appeared to count upon British help in his contest with the Raja of Jodhpur. The Governor-General was opposed to the idea of any interference, however limited, in favour of Jaipur, first because it would give umbrage to Sindhia, and secondly, because it would be inconsistent with the general system of policy laid down with regard to all the Indian states, unconnected with the Company by the obligation of alliance.<sup>112</sup>

Thus the dispute between the Rajas of two principal Rajput states once more invited Sindhia's intervention in the affairs of Rajputana. Holkar, who, as stated above, was on his march to this region, might also take advantage of this conflict. The British Government had steadily refused to interfere in the interest of either party. The non-interfering attitude of the British Government exposed the Rajput principalities to the ominous possibility of Maratha intervention and exploitation. Both the Rajput states became sensible of the folly and danger of allowing the Marathas to interfere in their domestic disputes. The rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur concluded an agreement in April, 1806. It was decided that neither Jagat Singh nor Man Singh would marry Krishnakumari nor would they allow the Rana to select her husband without their approval. Further, the union between the two states would be cemented by the marriage of Man Singh with Jagat Singh's sister and the marriage of Jagat Singh with Man Singh's daughter.<sup>113</sup> For the time being the two Rajas were reconciled with each other. The Raja of Jaipur applied to Raja Man Singh for his interference to settle the amount of tribute

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112. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 164.

113. Secret Consultations, 1806, May 1, No. 96; May 8, Nos. 96, 97.  
Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune, p. 299.

to be paid to Holkar. Raja Man Singh also desired to finalise with the Raja of Jaipur the adjustment of tribute claimed by Sindhia from that state.

Such co-operation appeared to be a happy augury for the success of the marriage agreement. But Jagat Singh did not really give up the plan of marrying Krishnakumari. He did not immediately recall his troops from Udaipur, which would have been conducive to the success of the agreement and also an expression of his sincerity. Curiously enough, the Jaipur troops did not assist the Rana in his defence against Sindhia. As stated above, Sindhia had advanced to Udaipur with his army in order to dislodge the Jaipur troops from there. The agreement between Jaipur and Jodhpur could not save Udaipur from Sindhia. Jacob's brigade attacked and took possession of the Debari Ghaut, a principal pass to Udaipur. The opposition was feeble. The Jaipur troops remained inactive in the city. Jagu Bapu, with two battalions from the brigade and a body of horse, encamped close to the walls of the city. The remainder of the brigade and other troops were ordered to join Jagu Bapu immediately. Jaswant Rao Bhanu was directed to co-operate with him by attacking the principal pass leading to Udaipur from the south. In this attack he was successful, though with the loss of three or four hundred men. The success was more complete and rapid than was expected by Sindhia. The capital of Mewar lay prostrate at Sindhia's feet.<sup>114</sup>

After this success, Sindhia, who was in alliance with the Company, declared to the British Resident that his ultimate object was the dismissal of the Jaipur troops from Udaipur; he would then leave the Rana the quiet possession of his territory and relinquish any further interference in the dispute between the Jaipur and Jodhpur Rajas. The British Resident did not consider it likely that Sindhia

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114. Secret Consultations, 1806, May 22, No. 23; June 6, No. 55.

Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 162, 163, 168, 204.

would gratuitously relinquish the complete ascendancy which he had nearly attained at Udaipur. The helpless Rana submitted entirely to the wishes of Sindhia whom he met in two friendly interviews. The greater part of the Jaipur troops left Udaipur; but the Rana seemed to be reluctant to dismiss them, and they remained near the city. Sindhia wanted to take advantage of the situation and made a very offensive proposal. He wanted to marry Krishnakumari. There was little prospect of the Rana agreeing to it unless he was reduced to "the utmost extremity". The proud Rana could not be expected to tolerate the idea of entering into matrimonial relations with one whom he regarded as a low-born Maratha. Moreover, the two dominant clans in Mewar, the Chundawats and the Saktawats, would be united in opposing this humiliating proposal. Sindhia soon felt the impracticability of his proposal and gave it up.<sup>115</sup>

At this stage Holkar also indirectly saved Mewar. He was plundering the territory of Jaipur in order to enforce payment of his tribute. He wrote to the Rana about his intention to march soon towards Mewar for the purpose of claiming his tribute. Holkar always claimed half of the Udaipur tribute. It was unlikely that he would leave the whole of the authority and resources of Mewar in the hands of Sindhia without a contest. The approach of Sindhia's rival probably encouraged the Rana; it was one of the factors which compelled Sindhia to withdraw his marriage proposal. Sindhia's attitude now became very uncertain. He agreed to retire from Udaipur with four lakhs of rupees which the Jaipur vakeels promised to pay. They also agreed that the Jaipur troops would immediately return to Jaipur. This arrangement was set aside by an offer from the Jodhpur vakeels of a larger sum on the part of their master, provided Sindhia would force the withdrawal of the Jaipur troops without entering into any further obligation with

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115. Secret Consultations, 1806, May 29, No. 20; June 5, No. 55; June 19, No. 34. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 173. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 299.

that state. Sindhia's concurrence in this last proposition was, according to the British Resident with Sindhia, hastened by two factors: a letter from Holkar urging him not to desert the cause of the Raja of Jodhpur, and a promise on the part of the vakils of Jodhpur that their master would engage to settle the existing differences between Sindhia and Holkar. The Rana of Udaipur consented to the march of the Jaipur troops on the condition that Sindhia would remove his army to a distance from the capital. Sindhia retreated from Udaipur towards the end of May (1806), leaving behind Jagu Bapu and Madhuji Huzure with two battalions and a body of horse to realize the contributions from Mewar and also to await the removal of the troops of Jaipur. Those zealous lieutenants were unable to secure the promised sum; and so they seized some Mewar chiefs and carried them to Sindhia's camp.<sup>116</sup>

In May, 1806. Raja Man Singh sent a vakil to Mercer, the Resident with Sindhia, with the object of concluding a treaty of alliance with the Company. This proposal was, however, unacceptable to Sir George Barlow. First, by the eighth article of the treaty concluded with Sindhia in November, 1805, the British were pledged not to contract any treaty with Jodhpur. Secondly, in view of the policy adopted by the British Government with regard to all the chiefs and states not connected with it by defensive alliance it would be inexpedient to extend the Company's connection with any of them beyond the limits of mere amity and concord. The Raja of Jodhpur was told that the British Government had no other object than to maintain and confirm the existing relations of friendship with him.<sup>117</sup>

The Maratha Chiefs made the fullest use of this attitude of the Company. Taking advantage of the internal conflict in Rajputana and the steady refusal of

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116. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 163, 166, 168, 172, 173, 178, 185.

117. Ibid, No. 182. Secret Consultations, 1806, June 26, Nos. 30-33.

the Company to intervene in its affairs, they carried on their depredations indiscriminately. By <sup>the beginning of</sup> August, 1806, Sindhia sent Madhuji Huzure to Kotah to obtain money from Zalim Singh. A portion of the arrears of pay of his soldiers was discharged by the money received from Kotah. On October 6, 1806, Mercer reported to the Governor-General that Sharza Rao Ghatge had plundered Bhilwara and maintained his people by exactions from villages near Chitor. Gradually Sharza Rao Ghatge established his influence in the Udaipur council. In December Ambaji was nominated to subahdari of Mewar. Meanwhile, in May-June, 1806, Holkar remained in the territory of Jaipur for about a month. His troops wasted the Jaipur territories and he was able to exact several lakhs of rupees. He also demanded money from the Raja of Jodhpur. Early in October Mercer reported that Holkar, having sent his family to Jodhpur, had commenced his march towards Kotah with the intention of levying an immediate contribution upon that state. In November-December he plundered the villages of Jaipur and Kishangarh.<sup>118</sup>

In accordance with the advice of Sharza Rao Ghatge, the Rana in December wrote to the British Resident in Delhi for assistance of troops. His letter was intercepted by Holkar. According to Mercer, its falling into Holkar's hands might not have been accidental but intended to excite his fears. Sharza Rao Ghatge had about the same time requested Holkar not to advance into Mewar and informed him that whatever tribute might appear due to him from that state would be sent to him. Having learnt about this letter from Holkar, Sindhia sought an explanation from the British Resident at his court. Mercer assured him that the British Government would not interfere in the affairs of those 119 states to which it was not bound by any defensive alliance.

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118. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 166, 168, 173, 178, 185, 190, 196, 200, 201, 206, 210. Secret Consultations, 1806, December 18, No. 33. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 241.

119. Political Consultations, 1807, January 29, Nos. 22, 23.

Meanwhile the Pokaran Chief, Sawai Singh, who for his ulterior political motive did not want peace between Jaipur and Jodhpur, contrived to revive the old feud between those states. This secret enemy of Man Singh again under the cloak of friendship set himself to work upon the Raja's pride. He told the Raja that it was beneath him to agree to a double marriage with the ruler of Jaipur on equal terms and to give up his claims to the Udaipur princess with whom he had been first affianced. While Sawai Singh was thus inciting Raja Man Singh to mischief, he secretly instigated the Raja of Jaipur against Man Singh. Jagat Singh was asked to espouse the cause of Dhonkal Singh, Sawai Singh's nominee for the gadi of Jodhpur, overthrow Man Singh, and then accomplish his marriage with Krishnakumari. It was with the support of Raja Surat Singh of Bikaner, another enemy of Man Singh, that the crafty chief of Pokaran endeavoured to bring about the renewal of hostilities between Jodhpur and Jaipur.<sup>120</sup>

Early in November, 1806, Mercer reported that the ruler of Jaipur, in spite of his engagement with Raja Man Singh, was again endeavouring to marry Krishnakumari. He had sent a considerable sum of money to the Rana. Rai-chand, the ambitious Dewan of Jaipur, calculated that "if Man Singh could be deposed, then his influence would rule both principalities, besides having the ascendancy at Udaipur through the marriage of the Raja with the Princess". The Dewan urged Jagat Singh to send his army against Jodhpur.

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120. Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune, pp. 303-304.

Modern Review, April, 1942, p. 370.

Dhonkal Singh's party promised to pay Raja Surat Singh one lakh of rupees and the pargana of Phalodi in order to get his help in connection with the enthronement of Dhonkal Singh at Jodhpur. (Descriptive Lists, prepared by the Directorate of Archives of Rajasthan, Bikaner, of the Kharitas received by the Rulers of Bikaner from the rulers of the neighbouring states and lying in the custody of the Maharaja of Bikaner; Jaipur List, No. 130).

Both sides made preparations for war. They enrolled fresh levies. The Jaipur Raja received assurances from a number of tributaries of Raja Man Singh to assist him in supporting Dhonkal Singh. Several of these chiefs had remonstrated to Raja Man Singh on the necessity of offering to Dhonkal Singh a portion of the Jodhpur territory. In conformity with the suicidal traditions of the 18th century both the contending Rajas, - Jagat Singh and Man Singh - applied to Sindhia and Holkar for aid. Sindhia's Durbar was already eager to profit out of this quarrel of the Rajput Rajas. The Jaipur Dewan wrote to Ambaji proposing payment of money to Sindhia for his assistance besides regular payment of such troops as he might send for that purpose. Sindhia demanded an advance of money. Both Sharza Rao Ghatge, then the de facto ruler of Udaipur as the minister of the Rana, and Ambaji who was Sindhia's Subahdar in Mewar favoured the cause of the Jaipur Raja. Each of them, jealous of the other, sought to bring about an understanding between Sindhia's Durbar and Jaipur through himself. However, the Jaipur Raja had the promise of assistance from Sindhia.<sup>121</sup>

Holkar at first was not very anxious to fish in troubled waters; he wanted to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Jaipur and Jodhpur. Seton, the Resident in Delhi, stated : " It appears probable that under the colour of interfering for the benefit of both, he will take money from both, without benefiting either".<sup>122</sup>

In reply to Raja Man's application for assistance, Holkar informed him that he could not retain his troops without supply of money. But he wrote to the Rana of Udaipur

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121. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 204, 208, 209, 210, 213. Political Consultations, 1807, January 1, No. 32. Duff, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 321. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 327. Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune, pp. 311-312.
122. Political Consultations, 1807, February 12, No. 96.

dissuading him from encouraging the Jaipur Raja's views. At the same time Holkar declared that he himself was not engaged to assist either party. He had intercepted a letter from Sharza Rao Ghatge to the Jaipur Raja describing the measures to be taken for supporting the Raja's interest at Udaipur. This also influenced Holkar's attitude. He asked Man Singh to use every means to avoid any quarrel with Jaipur at that time. Raja Man was told pointblank that should hostilities be unavoidable, he (Holkar) could not assist him but would march immediately to the southern parts of Malwa, as in his present situation he was surrounded by enemies. Holkar also sent a vakil to Jaipur to dissuade Raja Jagat Singh from going to war. In reply, Raja Jagat Singh entreated him to take no part in the contest and offered him four lakhs of rupees as the price of neutrality. It was, however, suspected by the British Resident in Delhi that if his endeavours to prevent the hostilities between the two Rajas were ineffectual, Holkar would take part with Man Singh of whose services in giving an asylum to his family during the late war with the British Government he seemed to entertain the most grateful sense. This assessment of the situation was correct. Holkar's vakil returned to Jaipur with a declaration from his master that if the Raja of Jaipur advanced against Raja Man Singh, he must first attack Holkar himself who was determined to take the side of the Raja of Jodhpur.<sup>123</sup>

Having decided to take an active interest in the dispute, Holkar communicated to Seton, the British Resident in Delhi, a proposal which the Resident described as one of a desperate nature (January, 1807). This communication came through Thakur Das, the Company's newswriter in the camp of Holkar. Holkar proposed the conquest of the Jaipur principality which yielded a revenue of nearly a crore of rupees, provided the British Government would

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123. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 209, 210.

Secret Consultations, 1807, January 29, No. 13.

consent to this measure, assist him with two battalions of sepoy and settle his share of the conquest. To Seton it appeared that this proposal proceeded from a desire to alarm the Raja of Jaipur rather than from a real intention to attack his terriotry; there could hardly be a serious expectation that it would be countenanced by the British Government. The moderate nature of the system of the British Government, Seton thought, was too well-known to warrant a belief that " it would be a party to so unjustifiable a measure".<sup>124</sup> In his reply to Thakur Das: Seton implied a doubt of his(Thakur Das ) having understood Holkar properly. The Resident desired Thakur Das, in the event of Holkar having really made the proposal, to request the Maratha leader to make a direct communication to him on the subject. Only then could a proper reply on behalf of the British Government be transmitted. Seton also informed Thakur Das. that the British Government, although always prepared for war if necessary, was desirous of continuing at peace with all states.

As the matter was important the Resident communicated it to the Governor-General in Council although he believed that after his reply through the newswriter Holkar would not make a direct application to renew his proposal. Seton was, however, mistaken in this belief. Holkar renewed his proposal through Thakur Das and wrote a letter to the Resident as well: "Let four or five Battalions and two Regiments be ordered to co-operate with me, and I will attack and conquer the Raja of Jaipur".<sup>125</sup> He also gave his plan of the respective shares. The British Government could take half of the plunder of every description and also half the territory including the fortress of Amber. He himself would keep the other half of the territory with the

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124. Secret Consultations, 1807, January 29, No.13.

125. Ibid, 1807, January 29, No. 13; February 12, Nos. 9,10, 11.

fortress of Ranthambhor. If the British Government did not agree to this plan, it might take a sum of money by way of Nazarana.<sup>126</sup>

The Resident considered as very objectionable the mode of making the newswriter the medium of communication between Holkar and the British Government on political matters of the most delicate nature such as the present one. That probably explains his demand of a direct communication from Holkar. Holkar's letter clarified the position and called for a formal reply. But Seton was not yet expressly authorized and directed to make any declaration on behalf of the British Government about the proposal of Holkar. In reply to Holkar's letter he could only declare plainly and unequivocally what he knew to be the system of the British Government and the sentiments of the Governor-General. Seton pointed out that the Governor-General would never consent to enter into a war of aggression with the Raja of Jaipur. Further, though there did not at that time exist any treaty between the British Government and the Jaipur ruler, there was no cause of quarrel either. Seton also pointed out that though the British Government, concerned with the protection of its subjects, took precautions to keep its armies in a constant state of preparation for war, it was desirous of continuing at peace and on amicable terms with all the neighbouring powers.<sup>127</sup>

So far as the discouragement of Holkar's proposal was concerned, Seton's stand was in the main approved by the supreme authorities in Calcutta. The Resident was directed to express an unqualified rejection of the proposal in mild and amicable terms. But the Governor-General in Council was doubtful of the expediency of asking Holkar to make a direct application to the Resident about this proposal. According to the authorities in Calcutta, it would have been advisable to have conveyed to

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126. Ibid, 1807, February 12, No. 10.

127. Ibid, 1807, February 12, No. 9.

Holkar a positive refusal to unite in "such a treacherous project" as that which he proposed, without requiring from him any direct communication on the subject. Nor was it necessary, they thought, to refer the proposal to the Government, for it was utterly inconsistent with "the principles and designs of the British Government". Moreover, if this proposal was not contradicted by a declaration on behalf of the Company, it might be made by Holkar a pretext to propagate the belief that "the British Government meditated a project of so atrocious a nature".<sup>128</sup>

While seeking British support for conquest and partition of Jaipur, Holkar had also written to Sindhia about the impolicy of encouraging the disputes between the two Rajput states, but to no avail.<sup>129</sup> These rebuffs were followed by an unexpected change in the conduct of Holkar early in February 1807. He made terms with the Raja of Jaipur.<sup>130</sup> Tod says: "Raja Man had only the gratitude of Holkar to reckon upon for aid, to whose wife and family he<sup>131</sup> had given sanctuary when pursued by Lord Lake to the Attock! Gratitude, however, was not the sole stimulant; Holkar had also taken money from the Raja of Jodhpur. But Jagat Singh succeeded in detaching Holkar from Raja Man. Tod continues: "....the Mahratta, then only eighteen miles from Man, and who had promised to join him next day, made a sudden movement to the south. A bribe of £100,000, in bills upon Kotah, to be paid on Holkar's reaching that city, effected this desertion..."<sup>132</sup> It appears that Holkar took a large amount

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128. Secret Consultations, 1807, January 29, No. 16; February 12, No. 13.

129. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, pp. 314-315.

130. Ibid, No. 216.

131. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1084.

132. Ibid. Seton referred to the amount as 10 lakhs of rupees. Political Consultations, 1807, February 26, No. 29; March 19, No. 21; April 30, No. 28. Secret Consultations, 1807, March 19, No. 3.

in cash. However, he moved to Kotah to realize the bills. His sardars were both amazed and discontented at his abandonment of Man Singh.<sup>133</sup> Such treacherous conduct was not unnatural for Holkar "whose life had been passed in sacrificing every tie to the necessities of the moment".<sup>134</sup> The Resident in Delhi heard a rumour to the effect that Holkar had it in his contemplation to provide indirect assistance to Raja Man Singh; some of his sardars were to be allowed to fight for Jodhpur, provided the Raja agreed to pay him seven lakhs of rupees, it being understood that Holkar was not to appear publicly to support the conduct of his sardars. This rumour was not baseless. The Resident with Sindhia reported in March, 1807, that Holkar had allowed some of his troops under Jeolad Baber to join Raja Man Singh.<sup>135</sup> There was probably nothing which Holkar could not or would not do for money. It is also possible that the dissatisfaction of his sardars at the desertion of Raja Man Singh had some influence on his tortuous policy.

It was not without hesitation that Jagat Singh opened hostilities against his rival. One of the reasons was the lack of steadiness in his character. This defect in his character made it difficult for him to form a judgement of what he might ultimately determine upon.<sup>136</sup> In November, 1806, Mercer stated that "the known imbecility of the Jaipur court" rendered it "improbable" for the Raja to persevere in his object at the risk of a war with Man Singh assisted by Holkar.<sup>137</sup> Jagat Singh seemed to have little

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133. Secret Consultations, 1807, March 12, Nos. 2, 4; March 19, No. 3; March 26, Nos. 2A, 5; June 11, No. 12. Political Consultations, 1807, February 26, No. 26.

134. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 242.

135. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 224, 225. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 331.

136. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 213.

137. Political Consultations, 1807, January 1, No. 32; February 5, No. 126.

confidence in the promised assistance from Sindhia. Both the Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur were "sensible of the views of Sindhia and Holkar in their interference". They knew that the object of the Maratha leaders was to obtain money *from* the parties.<sup>138</sup> But certain factors made hostilities inevitable. The injury which the Raja of Jaipur thought his honour had sustained by the interruption of his marriage, seemed to be the principal obstacle to an amicable settlement.<sup>139</sup> The ambitious Jaipur Dewan influenced the Raja to send an army against Jodhpur.<sup>140</sup> Another impediment to amicable settlement was probably the encouragement of Sharza Rao Ghatge who was then influential in the Rana's Durbar. Sharza Rao obviously wanted to profit out of "the disturbances likely to result from the Rajah's conduct".<sup>141</sup> Bala Rao Ingle, as Holkar alleged, endeavoured to defeat his attempts to restore friendship between the two Rajas.<sup>142</sup> Further, the Jaipur Durbar was hopeful - in case of Holkar's interference in favour of Raja Man Singh - of seducing from Holkar's service some of his troops.<sup>143</sup> Holkar's army was dissatisfied on account of arrears of pay.<sup>144</sup> As stated above, Jagat Singh afterwards succeeded in separating Holkar from Raja Man Singh. Sindhia's troops also advanced towards Jaipur.<sup>145</sup>

Eventually Jagat Singh assumed the leadership of the coalition against his rival Man Singh. In December, 1806, Jaipur troops marched to Shekhawati territory to bring forward Dhonkal Singh and to engage the attention of Raja Man in defence of the Jodhpur territories. Another party of Jaipur troops led by Jéwan Chela joined Sharza Rao Ghatge at Udaipur.<sup>146</sup> In January, 1807, Dhonkal Singh was brought to Jaipur. He was proclaimed the nephew of Amber and

138. Ibid, 1807, March 26, No. 38. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, p. 317.

139. Political Consultations, 1807, January 29, No. 32.

140. Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune, p. 312.

141. Political Consultations, 1807, January 1, No. 32.

142. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, p. 314.

143. Ibid, Vol. XI, No. 211.

144. Political Consultations, 1807, February 5, No. 127.

145. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 218, 221, 224.

146. Ibid, Vol. XI, No. 211.

publicly acknowledged the legitimate ruler of Jodhpur.<sup>147</sup> Man Singh could not but consider this affair as more decidedly hostile to his interest than anything that had previously occurred. The dispute was no longer confined to the marriage proposal; it covered the far more important issue of succession to the gadi of Jodhpur. An amicable settlement of the dispute thus became more difficult and remote.<sup>148</sup> The two parties were now prepared for open hostilities.

Jagat Singh left his capital and, joined by Thakur Abhay Singh of Khetri, the Shekhawati sardar, slowly proceeded towards Jodhpur territory. The Raja of Bikaner marched out with his forces to join the Raja of Jaipur.<sup>149</sup> Thakur Sawai Singh of Pokaran also advanced to meet the latter.<sup>150</sup> As already stated, early in February, 1807, Holkar was induced by the monetary offers of the Jaipur Raja to desert the Jodhpur Raja. Holkar had promised to Raja Man Singh to send the Pathan leader in his service, Amir Khan, to his assistance.<sup>151</sup> The Jaipur darbar negotiated with Amir Khan and his support was purchased towards the end of February.<sup>152</sup> Jagat Singh agreed to pay the entire force of Amir Khan. The Pathan chief received one lakh of rupees. He had endeavoured to dissuade Jagat Singh from continuing to espouse the cause of Dhonkal Singh which, he said, was "inconsiderate". But he undertook to prevent Man Singh from obstructing Jagat Singh's marriage with Krishnakumari. Holkar pretended to Raja Man that Amir Khan was no longer in

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147. Political Consultations, 1807, February 5, No. 127. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 1083.

148. Political Consultations, 1807, February 5, No. 127.

149. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, p. 136. Political Consultations, 1807, February 5, Nos. 126, 127, 128; February 12, Nos. 94, 95, 96, 97.

150. Political Consultations, 1807, February 12, No. 95.

151. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, pp. 241-242.

152. Political Consultations, 1807, March 19, No. 21.

his service.<sup>153</sup> The Pindaris attached to Amir Khan's camp were ordered to move into the territory of Jodhpur for laying it waste.<sup>154</sup>

Meanwhile Raja Man Singh had moved with his army to Parbatsar where he encamped to oppose his enemies.<sup>155</sup> At this critical time the Raja sent a vakil to the Resident in Delhi, apparently for the purpose of soliciting the support of the British Government. Agreeable to its professed principles as well as to the stipulations of the treaty of November, 1805, with Sindhia, the British Government was unwilling to listen to Man Singh's proposal for a more intimate connection and his appeal for interference in the concerns of the Rajput states.<sup>156</sup>

In a letter to Edmonstone, Secretary to Government, dated January 15, 1807, Seton, the British Resident in Delhi, expressed his opinion on the necessity of preventing hostilities between Jaipur and Jodhpur. He wrote: "... an amicable accommodation between the two Rajahs would, in a political point of view, be beneficial to our interest, since their going to war might eventually tend to increase the power of the Marathas".<sup>157</sup> When the commencement of hostilities became imminent, Seton wrote to the authorities in Calcutta: "... the circumstance of so large a force being collected in the vicinity of our dominions could not be viewed with perfect indifference".<sup>158</sup> These

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153. Ibid. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, pp. 245 - 246. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 64.

154. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, pp. 330-331.

155. Political Consultations, 1807, February 12, No. 96. Foreign Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 124, Memorandum on Jodhpur. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 329.

156. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 222.

157. Political Consultations, 1807, January 29, No. 32.

158. Secret Consultations, 1807, March 19, No. 3.

communications of the Delhi Resident failed to change the attitude of the supreme authorities. They were not yet prepared to deviate from the general policy of non-intervention.

Towards the end of February, 1807, a small fort called Meda, under the protection of the Raja of Jodhpur and garrisoned by Rathors, was attacked, taken, plundered and destroyed by a detachment from the Jaipur army. Hostilities had in a manner begun.<sup>159</sup> Sharza Rao Ghatge, joined by Jaipur troops under Jiwan Chela, made an irruption into the Jodhpur territory from Udaipur. He advanced as far as the large and prosperous town of Pali and plundered it.<sup>160</sup> Subsequently he was attacked and completely defeated near this town by a force detached from Raja Man Singh's army.<sup>161</sup> But the Raja of Jodhpur could not take advantage of this success by following it up. About this time, when the enemy's army was "within a very few coss",<sup>162</sup> the Raja discovered a treacherous communication between his chiefs and the party of Dhonkal Singh.<sup>163</sup> The allegiance of almost every Rathor chief was transferred to Dhonkal Singh;<sup>164</sup> only four cheiftains<sup>165</sup> remained loyal to Raja Man. He could now rely only on their quotas and the auxiliary bands of Bundi for any battle.<sup>166</sup> Under such circumstances Man Singh appears to have been unnerved.<sup>167</sup> He was advised by Sheonath of Kuchaman to trust to "the

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159. Secret Consultations, 1807, March 19, No. 3.

160. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, pp. 311, 323. Secret Consultations, 1807, March 26, No. 1.

161. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 224.

162. Secret Consultations, 1807, March 19, No. 3.

163. Political Consultations, 1807, April 23, No. 25.

164. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 333.

165. Chiefs of Kuchaman, Ahor, Jalor and Nimaj.

166. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1084.

167. Secret Consultations, 1807, March 19, No. 3. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 225.

fleetness of his steed".<sup>168</sup> The Raja accordingly left his camp, obviously with a deep sense of dejection. He remarked that " he was the first of his race who ever disgraced the name of Rathor by showing his back to a Kachhwaha".<sup>169</sup> He reached Merta, but considering it " incapable of long resistance" he continued his flight and reached his capital with a slender retinue.<sup>170</sup> After his departure from Parbatsar, his camp there was attacked and pillaged by a detachment from the Jaipur army. Eighteen guns were captured by Bala Rao Ingle, one of Sindhia's commanders, and the lighter equipments, the tents, elephants and baggage were taken by Amir Khan. Besides the camp, Parbatsar and the villages in its vicinity were plundered.<sup>171</sup> The troops which under Jeolad Babu had been allowed by Holkar to join Raja Man Singh do not appear to have offered any resistance.<sup>172</sup>

The Rao Raja of Macheri, through his uncle Sooraj Mul, had already informed the Resident in Delhi that Sindhia, Holkar, the Raja of Jaipur and his allies had entered into a secret alliance to attack, after the conclusion of the Jaipur Raja's marriage with the Udaipur princess, the dominions of the British Government. The Rao Raja apprehended that he would be the first victim of such a combination for the subversion of the British power. The reasons behind an attack on him were apparent; he was in alliance with the British Government, and he had declined to co-operate with the Raja of Jaipur in his contest with Jodhpur.<sup>173</sup> The Resident could not accept the Rao Raja's

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168. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 1084.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid.

171. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 225.

Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 1084-1085.

172. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 225.

173. Secret Consultations, 1807, March 12, Nos. 2, 4; March 26, No. 2A.

report as well-founded; he appeared to be alarmed without cause.<sup>174</sup> But the assurance was given that the British Government, vigilant and attentive, would neglect "no precaution that prudence requires".<sup>175</sup> While communicating this matter to the authorities in Calcutta, the Resident observed : "It does not appear to me that the Rajah of Jaipur can be so blind to his interest, nay to his safety, as wantonly to engage in a war of aggression, which whatever its result must involve him in distress; since the aggrandizement of the Marathas would confirm his dependence, and the success of the British Government might cause the loss of his capital, and eventually that of his dominions".<sup>176</sup> With respect to Sindhia and Holkar, the Resident remarked that co-operation between them was hardly to be expected. The authorities in Calcutta agreed with him and Edmonstone, Secretary to Government, wrote on March 26, 1807: " When the necessary elements of a confederacy such as you have described in your dispatches, are wanting, (and) when the probability of its existence is opposed by every argument of reason, analogy, and fact, it would be unjust and unwise to attribute to the report of such a confederacy any degree of importance".<sup>177</sup> Mercer, to whom the Supreme Government made a reference about the matter, wrote: " I am in possession of no information which could tend to give credibility to the reports made to the Resident at Delhi ( by the Rao Raja)".<sup>178</sup> Naturally the British Government no longer attached any importance to the information given by the Rao Raja.

After Raja Man Singh had reached Jodhpur ( March, 1807),<sup>179</sup> he found that the capital " had no means

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174. Secret Consultations, 1807, March 26, No. 2.

175. Ibid, 1807, March 26, No. 2A.

176. Ibid, 1807, March 26, No. 2.

177. Ibid, 1807, March 26, Nos. 2, 5.

178. Ibid, 1807, June 11, No. 12.

179. Political Consultations, 1807, April 9, No. 25. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 1084.

of defence".<sup>180</sup> He then proceeded to Bisalpur in full flight to Jalor. But at the suggestion of one of his officers he changed his mind and decided to hold out in the capital. Returning to Jodhpur he prepared to defend it. His enemies did not expect it. Raja Man Singh raised a force of five thousand men. His sardars who still followed him took a special oath of loyalty. This "greatly revived the drooping spirit of the Rajah".<sup>181</sup>

The allied army was also approaching Jodhpur. On the way through the Jodhpur territory the sardars were won over. The name and authority of Dhonkal Singh was being established in the territories through which they were passing. In effecting all this the local influence of Sawai Singh was found to be most useful. The town and fort of Nagor were occupied. On April 1 the main body of the allied army under the command of Amir Khan and Chand Singh reached Jodhpur. On the next day they began the erection of batteries. A fortnight after the commencement of the siege the troops of Raja Man had to quit the town of Jodhpur. Man Singh and his adherents retired into the fort. The Jaipur army took possession of the town and continued the siege of the fort.<sup>182</sup>

While Jaipur and Jodhpur were thus fighting among themselves, Holkar remained in the vicinity of Kotah and Bundi. He made large demands of money, viz. ten lakhs of rupees upon Kotah. Holkar declared his intention to encamp under the walls of the city of Kotah if the Raja persisted in declining to pay him the sum of money he demanded (early May, 1807).<sup>183</sup> As Kotah delayed in coming to terms, Holkar

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180. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1085.

181. Political Consultations, 1807, April 30, No. 28. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1085.

182. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 227, 228, 230. Political Consultations, 1807, April 30, No. 28; May 7, No. 22.

183. Political Consultations, 1807, April 23, No. 25; June 11, No. 16.

Holkar towards the end of May ordered a body of 2000 to plunder the Raja's territory. But the marauding party was repulsed with considerable loss. Holkar, however, continued to remain near Kotah. He did not give up his object of exacting money from it.<sup>184</sup> The Raja of Bundi also suffered much from "the vicinity of Holkar's army".<sup>185</sup> Holkar was endeavouring to collect money from him also.<sup>186</sup> The Raja wrote repeatedly to Seton, stating his apprehensions, and soliciting the interference of the British Government for protection of his territory. But under the provisions of the treaty of 1806 with Holkar no British interference was permissible. The Resident thought it his duty to abstain from raising any hope in the Raja's mind. Accordingly, in replying to the letters from Bundi the Resident observed that as that part of the country was not ~~yet~~ the seat of war, the Raja's apprehensions were groundless. Holkar did not fail to take advantage of the helplessness of the Raja of Bundi; a large sum was extorted from him.<sup>187</sup>

In the mean time the Jaipur army engaged in the siege of the fort of Jodhpur had begun to face troubles. It started to suffer severely from want of "water, money and provisions of every description".<sup>188</sup> The Rathor sardars who had espoused the cause of Dhonkal Singh were exhausted by their sufferings and disgusted with the wanton depredations committed in their country by the invaders. Consequently they were quitting with their followers the allied army. Some of the Rathor Thakurs who had joined the Raja of Jaipur left him on a dispute with Sawai Singh respecting their jagirs. On the other hand Raja Man Singh, confident of the bravery and attachment of his followers, was now determined not to give up the fort of Jodhpur. The approach of the detachment

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184. Ibid, 1807, June 25, No. 41. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 233.

185. Political Consultations, 1807, June 11, No. 16.

186. Ibid, 1807, April 30, No. 28.

187. Ibid, 1807, June 11, No. 16.

188. Ibid, 1807, May 7, No. 22 ; June 11, No. 16.

of Sindhia's troops under the command of Ambaji and Bapu Sindhia caused the Raja of Jaipur much uneasiness.<sup>189</sup> The delay in payment of the sum of money promised him by Jaipur displeased Sindhia. He threatened to join Raja Man Singh. It was also rumoured at that time that Sindhia might support the pretensions of Man Singh,<sup>190</sup> a reputed cousin of Jagat Singh, to the gadi of Jaipur, if the Raja of Jaipur refused to pay him a large sum of money without delay. Thus Raja Jagat Singh, who had so far opposed his rival Raja Man Singh's right to the gadi of Marwar, now seemed to have his own right to the sovereignty of Jaipur threatened by Sindhia. He was now to feel the impolicy and danger of his own conduct towards his Rathor rival. Obviously the Raja of Jaipur seemed to have relinquished for the time being his intention of proceeding to Udaipur to celebrate his nuptials. The growing crisis probably unnerved him. He thought of leaving Jodhpur in order to return to his capital, entrusting the conduct of the siege to Amir Khan who jointly with Sawai Singh had the management of the affairs of the young prince Dhonkal Singh.<sup>191</sup> But the tempest would not subside so easily. Amir Khan was not in favour of Raja Man Singh's total expulsion. Moreover, the Rathor sardars who had left the Jaipur army wrote to Holkar for assistance to Raja Man Singh. Holkar also seemed to be favourably inclined towards Man Singh. To the appeal of the Rathor Thakurs he replied that he would

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189. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 231.

Political Consultations, 1807, June 11, No. 16.

190. Man Singh who was said to be the posthumous son of the late Raja Prithvi Singh, uncle of Raja Jagat Singh, then resided at Gwalior. (Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 230. Political Consultations, 1807, June 11, No. 16.). It may be pointed out in this connection that Prithvi Singh died on April 16, 1778, when he was about fifteen years old. (J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 326, 330.).

191. Political Consultations, 1807, June 11, No. 16.

make a diversion in favour of Jodhpur by approaching Jaipur as soon as his demands on Bundi and Kotah were settled.<sup>192</sup> The tide of the war was thus turning against the Raja of Jaipur.

It was about this time that Sir George Barlow relinquished his office and was succeeded by Lord Minto (July 3, 1807).<sup>193</sup> It was "the result of a ministerial reshuffle"<sup>194</sup> in London. The news of the death of Lord Cornwallis reached England at the end of January, 1806, on the eve of the total reconstruction of the Ministry which followed the death of Pitt.<sup>195</sup> With Grenville as Prime Minister, a coalition Ministry of Whigs and Tories<sup>196</sup> succeeded Pitt's ministry.<sup>197</sup> Lord Minto was in charge of Indian affairs as President of the Board of Control. The zeal with which the policy of Lord Cornwallis was being carried out by Sir George Barlow made the Court of Directors favour his continuance as Governor-General.<sup>198</sup> The new Cabinet was, however, "ill-fitted to take a decided line on Indian affairs".<sup>199</sup> Prime Minister Grenville was the "staunchest political friend" of Lord Wellesley. Fox, a leading member of the Cabinet, had consistently opposed Lord Wellesley's policy. Sidmouth, though he chose "a position midway between the two" was unable "to hold the balance effectively".<sup>200</sup> The implication of these differences in the Cabinet was significant. A Cabinet so formed and divided was naturally favourable to the pursuit of a timid non-intervention policy; it also

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192. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 230, 232.

Political Consultations, 1807, June 11, No. 16.

193. Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto, p. 1.

194. Smith, The Oxford History of India, p. 560.

195. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 105.

196. The Ministry of All the Talents.

197. Philips, The East India Company (1784-1834), p. 144. Ramsay Muir, A Short History of the British Commonwealth, Vol. II, p. 232.

198. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 105-106. Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto, p. 2.

199. Philips, op. cit., p. 144.

200. Ibid.

suffered from indecision and abrupt action regarding the appointment of the supreme ruler of the British territories in India. Immediately after its assumption of office the Cabinet hastily met and decided to appoint Barlow as Governor-General. Such a step, it was thought, would not only give Barlow greater influence in his task of pacifying the Maratha chiefs but also afford the Ministers a necessary interval for decision regarding a suitable successor. The Directors were under the impression that no change was to be expected for some time.

Within a fortnight, however, the Ministry began to discuss the question of Barlow's successor. Fox's intimate friend, Lord Lauderdale, who expressed a strong desire for the appointment, was chosen Barlow's successor by the Ministry. It was the outcome of a compromise between Grenville and Fox. Lauderdale was nominated on condition that Fox and his friends would refuse to give any countenance to the attack on Lord Wellesley in Parliament. Lauderdale had been a supporter of Fox's India bills and was also against the Company's exclusive trading privileges. The Court of Directors was naturally indignant at the appointment of Lauderdale. The Directors' complaint against this too quick revocation of Barlow's appointment was also based on the ground that it was necessary to arm Barlow with full authority to settle the various important matters which were left undetermined or doubtful by the sudden death of his predecessor. Minto, however, rejoined that Barlow's appointment was intended to be temporary. "Grenville was in a predicament; the more he pressed the appointment of Lauderdale, the more strongly would the Directors attack Wellesley in Parliament".<sup>201</sup> The conflict between the Ministry and the Directors became serious. Grenville considered that Fox had not supported Wellesley strongly enough in the House of Commons. Fox alleged that Grenville's support to Lauderdale was not wholehearted. In the circumstances

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201. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VII, p. 107. Philips, op.cit., pp. 145-147.

Grenville favoured a compromise; Fox, however, remained firm in his support of Lauderdale. At this stage Lauderdale suddenly withdrew his claim on account of the illness of Fox. This helped to end the conflict between the Ministry and the Court of Directors. As a compromise Grenville nominated Lord Minto as Governor-General and the appointment was accepted by the Directors.<sup>202</sup> Thus the temporary Governor-Generalship of Sir George Barlow came to an abrupt end.

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202. Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto , pp.3-5. Philips, op.cit., pp.146-149.

## CHAPTER IV

## MINTO : NON-INTERVENTION CONTINUED

The Governor-Generalship of Lord Minto (1807-1813) marked no change in the policy of the Company with regard to the Rajput states. There was no change in the general policy of non-intervention laid down by the Home authorities concerning the Indian states. Obviously Lord Minto's business was more or less to maintain the status quo with regard to the Indian powers. After his arrival in India he gave a clear indication of the line he intended to follow. He wrote to Raja Jagat Singh of Jaipur that he would respect and maintain the treaties and engagements which already had been concluded by the Company with the several chiefs of India. As Malcolm points out, Lord Minto would refrain, unless compelled by urgent necessity, from any line of conduct which in its consequences might involve the Company in war or embarrassment. Lord Minto had been one of the prosecutors of Warren Hastings.<sup>1</sup> Therefore he could be expected to abstain from an expansionist policy.

Apart from the clearly enunciated policy of the Home authorities, Lord Minto's character, which was of "a smooth and cautious rather than of a bold and enterprising cast",<sup>2</sup> kept him off the track of expansion. Though Lord Grenville knew him to be "second to no man in his devotion to the honour and interests of the Empire",<sup>3</sup> he was by nature moderate, and the Company's Directors were convinced that "no hankerings after a showy policy would prevent their

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1. Political Consultations, 1808, February 1, No. 88. Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto, p. 5. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 389. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 122-123. Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India, p. 247.

2. Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto, p. 50.

3. Ibid, p. 5.

instructions (on non-intervention) from being vigorously observed".<sup>4</sup> Minto "was a Whig appointed to office as a part of political bargain during the short-lived Ministry of 'All the Talents'".<sup>5</sup> Properly speaking, he lacked the active support "of at least one political party at home".<sup>6</sup> To keep himself in office it was quite natural for him to avoid as far as possible any divergence from the principle of non-intervention in the relations of the Company with the Indian states. There were important political and financial considerations as well. As Smith points out, Britain's position in Europe dictated a cautious policy in India. He says : "His (Minto's) period of office coincided with the height of Napoleonic struggle; events in Europe forbade any diversion of strength for a forward move in India ....."<sup>7</sup> Further, the position of the Company's finances was not satisfactory during this period.<sup>8</sup>

Though Lord Minto believed in and conformed to the principle of non-interference in the Company's relations with the Indian rulers, he from time to time found himself obliged to deviate from the strictest application of this laissez faire attitude.<sup>9</sup> To quote Lord Minto speaking in justification of such a deviation : "Although as a general principle we cordially recognise the wisdom and justice of abstaining from all interference in the contests, disputes, and concerns of states with which we are unconnected by the obligations of alliance, and are fully convinced of the embarrassments and inconvenience of extending our protection to petty chieftains, who are unable to protect their territories from the aggressions of more powerful neighbours, yet we are disposed to think that cases may occur in which a temporary deviation from these general

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4. Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto, p. 5.

5. Smith, op.cit., p. 564.

6. Philips, op.cit., p. 177.

7. Smith, op.cit., p. 560.

8. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VII, pp. 353-354.

9. Roberts, History of British India, p. 267.

principles may be a measure of defensive policy, the neglect of which might be productive of much more danger and embarrassment than the prosecution of it ...."<sup>10</sup>

So far as the Rajput states were concerned, there was, however, practically no deviation from the policy of non-interference laid down by the authorities in England. Besides the restraint of the general policy of non-intervention, the Company did not want to offend the Marathas by helping the Rajputs in violation of its treaties with Sindhia and Holkar. In the early days of the Governor-Generalship of Lord Minto the authorities could not ignore the reports of the French design to invade India and to disturb the British in India. They apprehended that the French might unsettle the minds of the Indian princes by "promises, menaces and intrigues".<sup>11</sup> In the face of this French threat the authorities were anxious to avoid a friction with the Marathas,<sup>12</sup> though, as Colebrooke points out, "how far Napoleon seriously entertained designs on India must ever remain a matter of conjecture".<sup>13</sup> Lord Minto decided to remain "a silent spectator"<sup>14</sup> of the affairs of Rajputana. All applications by the Rajput states for British alliance and protection proved to be abortive. The successive Residents in Delhi, Seton and Metcalfe, supported the idea of taking the Rajput states under protection; but their views failed to bring about any immediate change in the attitude of the higher authorities towards the Rajput states. Even if Lord Minto felt that "a change of front was necessary",<sup>15</sup> he did not want to deviate seriously from

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10. Life and Letters of Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto, p.146.

11. Ibid, p.100.

12. Ibid. Letters from the Court of Directors: Foreign Secret (1808-1810), September 14, 1808.

13. Life of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, Vol. I, p.188.

14. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p.303.

15. Ibid.

the instructions on non-intervention laid down by the Home authorities.

When Lord Minto took over charge of the Company's administration in India from Sir George Barlow, the war between Jodhpur and Jaipur was still distracting Rajputana. As stated in the preceding chapter, though Raja Man Singh was besieged in the fort of Jodhpur, the tide of the war was at that time turning against Jaipur and its allies. Defection had started in that camp. The Rathor sardars, displeased with the conduct of the Raja of Jaipur and his army, had left the coalition against Raja Man Singh. Raja Jagat Singh paid Ambaji Ingle twelve lakhs of rupees in order to pacify Sindhia. Sharza Rao Ghatge quitted the Jaipur army. Amir Khan was also detached from Jaipur.<sup>16</sup> The Rathor chieftains prevailed upon the Pathan leader to support Raja Man Singh by accepting "the proposal to carry the war into the enemy's country : to attack and plunder Jaipur now left unguarded".<sup>17</sup>

The troops of both Amir Khan and Sharza Rao Ghatge proceeded to ravage the Jaipur country. They were also joined by the Rathors. A force was detached against them by the Raja of Jaipur under his Commander-in-Chief Sheolal Bakshi. Sheolal appeared to have been successful in a skirmish with those troops near Kishangarh.<sup>18</sup> Sheolal did not follow up this initial success. Leaving his camp he repaired to the city of Jaipur in order "to partake of its festivities".<sup>19</sup> Amir Khan and his allies took advantage of his "imprudent absence".<sup>20</sup> Amir Khan was joined by the heavy

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16. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, pp. 336, 338.

Political Consultations, 1807, September 1, No. 6A.

17. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1087.

18. Political Consultations, 1807, September 1, No. 6A; September 8, No. 13A. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, p. 338. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1087.

19. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1087.

20. Ibid.

brigade of Muhammad Shah Khan.<sup>21</sup> At a place called Madhorajpura, not far from Jaipur, on August 18, 1807, a second engagement took place between Sheolal's troops and the forces of Amir Khan and his allies. The Jaipur troops were completely defeated, and they took to flight. Their camp, guns and equipage were captured. Amir Khan followed up his success by a rapid march to Jaipur, and the capital "was dismayed by the presence of the victor at her gates".<sup>22</sup>

The confederacy against Raja Man Singh was practically dissolved. The Rajas of Bikaner and Shahpura withdrew from it and marched towards their own territories. Raja Jagat Singh had to abandon the siege of Jodhpur, as his army was "annihilated" and his capital "invested" by Amir Khan and his Rathor allies. With great dismay and confusion in his army Raja Jagat Singh started for Jaipur.<sup>23</sup> This retreat was "signally ignominious". Raja Jagat Singh offered £120,000 to the commanders of Sindhia - Bapu Sindhia, Bala Rao Ingle and Jean Baptiste, "to escort him in safety to his capital". He also "secretly bribed, with a bond of £90,000 more, the author of his disgrace, Amir Khan, not to intercept his retreat".<sup>24</sup> As Tod points out, the Raja who "wanted speed for the rapidity of his flight", killed with his own hand his favourite elephant.<sup>25</sup> The Rao Raja of Macheri disclosed in a letter to Seton, the British Resident in Delhi, that the Rani of Jaipur had urgently entreated him to send troops to protect her and her family against Amir Khan. The Rao Raja solicited the advice of the Resident in this matter. In reply Seton recommended to the Rao Raja not to comply with the Rani's application but to observe "the most perfect

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21. Ibid. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, p. 338.

22. Political Consultations, 1807, September 8, No. 13A. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, p. 338. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1087.

23. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1087-1088. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 334.

24. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1088.

25. Ibid.

neutrality".<sup>26</sup> However, on his way back to Jaipur near the frontier of Marwar, Jagat Singh was defeated by the Rathors. Thus in defeat and disgrace the Raja of Jaipur returned to his capital on October 6, 1807.<sup>27</sup>

The situation now became very favourable for the Pathan adventurer, Amir Khan, who virtually held the destiny of Rajputana in his grip. It was obviously beyond the means of the distracted Rajput states to prevent such a calamity. The second Anglo-Maratha War had struck a great blow to the power of Sindhia. In the subsequent years he failed to recover the lost ground; his power was on the decline. Pecuniary difficulties as well as power-politics of his principal officers and advisers weakened his government. His troops were repeatedly in a state of mutiny for arrears of pay and had degenerated into a lawless horde of plunderers.<sup>28</sup> Holkar also had sunk to "the position of a weak adventurer".<sup>29</sup> His army became greatly reduced. Early in 1808 his whole force at Bampoorah consisted of seven battalions of infantry and two thousand horse. Like Sindhia, Holkar also had to face the mutiny of his troops for arrears of pay.<sup>30</sup> In November, 1808, Holkar became insane,<sup>31</sup> and the crisis in his dominions reached its climax. "Unparalleled anarchy"<sup>32</sup> ensued in his territories. Thus the weakness and discord of the Rajput states, combined with the decline in the power and authority of Sindhia and Holkar, provided for Amir Khan opportunities to extend his own control over Rajputana and to become the most powerful military chief in

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26. Political Consultations, 1807, September 8, No. 24.

27. Ibid, 1807, November 16, No. 1. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1088.

28. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, p. 364; Vol. XIV, No. 23. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 338. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 323-325. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 470; Vol. VII, pp. 44-49.

29. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 365.

30. Political Consultations, 1807, September 1, No. 6A. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 246. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 245. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 319.

31. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XXIII, p. 267. Sardesai states that sometime in October, 1808, Holkar was seized with a fit of insanity. (Op. cit., Vol. III, p. 437).

32. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 259.

central India. The situation was all the more advantageous for the Pathan adventurer because the Company's Government was pursuing a policy of non-interference in the affairs of Rajputana. After making every allowance for the political and financial difficulties of the Company's Government in those days, it may perhaps be said that the British alone could have offered effective check to the power of Amir Khan.

Amir Khan, after his success against the army of Jaipur, got an opportunity to bring the Raja of Jodhpur under his control. The Rathor chieftains who had interrupted Jagat Singh's retreat to Jaipur needed further aid from Amir Khan. For this purpose they gave him £20,000 (two lakhs of rupees). They were helped financially by the Rathor Raja of Kishangarh.<sup>33</sup> Towards the end of August Amir Khan reached Merta with the Rathors "attached to him". Raja Man Singh was then at Jodhpur. Amir Khan invited him to join with them at Merta, so that their united forces might proceed to Nagor and fall upon the adherents of Dhonkal Singh. On the raising of the siege of Jodhpur Sawai Singh had conducted the pretender to the city of Nagor, the appanage of the heirs of Marwar. In reply to Amir Khan's invitation, Raja Man Singh observed that for want of money and supplies he could not afford to leave Jodhpur and join him. The British Resident in Delhi, Seton, stated that Amir Khan's treacherous conduct towards Jagat Singh and his insatiable greed for money had filled the mind of the Raja of Jodhpur with anxiety and distrust. Seton concluded, "It is probable that the Rajah thinks it safer to trust to the effects of time and to the efforts of his countrymen than to place himself in the power of one so capricious and so devoid of good faith as Amir Khan".<sup>34</sup>

Early in December, 1807, the Resident received several letters and a memorandum from Dhonkal Singh

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33. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1088-1089.

34. Political Consultations, 1807, October 26, No. 20. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 335. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1089.

and his principal advisers. They solicited the assistance of the British Government. In his letter Dhonkal Singh referred to a promise of aid said to have been formerly made by Lord Lake. He agreed to give to the British Government, as nazarana, twelve lakhs of rupees and five parganas, if he were put in complete and independent possession of Rathor territory, including the fort of Jodhpur. He also agreed to be guided in every respect by the counsels of "the English Gentlemen" who might be stationed in his capital. He would consider himself as a political dependant of the British Government. He would pay for four battalions of British infantry and four regiments of cavalry which he wished to be stationed at Jodhpur. In reply the Resident observed that the promise ascribed to Lord Lake could never have been made by him, for it would be inconsistent with the determined system of the British Government to abstain from all interference in the disputes of "foreign" states. The British Government, it was claimed, "never entered into wars of aggression". The Resident clearly pointed out that he could not encourage the expectation of Dhonkal Singh attaining his object by deputing a person in his confidence to open negotiations. The Governor-General-in-Council entirely approved the reply of the Resident to the overtures of Dhonkal Singh and his principal adherents.<sup>35</sup>

The Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur also frequently expressed to the Resident in Delhi, Seton, the desire "to form a political connection with the British Government or in other words to be received under its protection". The Resident, however, did not consider himself "at liberty to encourage an expectation that a proposal of that nature from them was likely to be attended with success".<sup>36</sup>

Raja Man Singh was in possession of the whole of Rathor dominions except the fort of Nagor which was occupied by Sawai Singh.<sup>37</sup> This strong fort was protected by a

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35. Political Consultations, 1808, January 4, Nos. 64, 65, 67, 68.

Foreign Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 26.

36. Political Consultations, 1808, March 21, No. 39.

37. Ibid.

double chain of walls and garrisoned by Sindhia's battalions. It was too strong to be captured by Jodhpur troops alone.<sup>38</sup> Raja Man, therefore, had to throw himself into Amir Khan's arms. He sought the Pathan adventurer's help against Dhonkal Singh. Amir Khan was received at Jodhpur "with distinguished honours" and "valuable gifts". There was "an exchange of turbans". The Raja made him an advance of three lakhs of rupees (£30,000)<sup>39</sup> and promised him great rewards in future for success in the projected enterprise against Dhonkal Singh. Amir Khan "swore to extirpate Sawai's faction".<sup>40</sup>

"The Pathan leader", says Malcolm, "...seems from the first to have trusted more to art than force for its accomplishment".<sup>41</sup> From Jodhpur he moved to within a few miles of Nagor.<sup>42</sup> He first induced Bapu Sindhia and Jean Baptiste to withdraw their protection from the fort of Nagor.<sup>43</sup> Then he decided to occupy the place "by treachery unparalleled even in the history of that faithless age".<sup>44</sup> Under the pretext of discontent caused by some revelations of Man Singh's ingratitude he made overtures to Sawai Singh for a friendly connection with him. Sawai Singh suspected treachery, but the crafty Pathan chief succeeded in overcoming his hesitation. Sawai Singh was tempted to conclude with this "soldier of fortune" an engagement in favour of Dhonkal Singh.<sup>45</sup> On the

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38. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 334.

39. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 1089. According to Malcolm, the Raja gave two lakhs of rupees. (A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 335).

40. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 1089. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 335.

41. A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 335.

42. Ibid.

43. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 243, 245.

44. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 334.

45. Political Consultations, 1807, November 16, No. 1. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 335. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 1090.

morning of "the 19th of Chait. S.1864"(A.D.1808) <sup>46</sup> Sawai Singh, attended by the chief adherents of the pretender and about 500 followers, <sup>47</sup> went to Amir Khan's camp. A spacious tent was pitched in the centre of the camp for the reception of Sawai Singh and his followers. The guns were "loaded with grape ready to be turned against them". The guests were "received with the most distinguished courtesy". The dancing girls came. "Nothing but festivity was apparent". <sup>48</sup> Asking to be excused for "momentary absence", Amir Khan went out. The dancing continued. The moment the musicians pronounced the word 'dhaga', the tent sank down upon Sawai Singh and his followers who fell an easy prey to the ferocious Pathans. The head of Sawai Singh was cut off and sent to Man Singh who subsequently rewarded Amir Khan with a jagir and a large sum of money. <sup>49</sup> Dhonkal Singh fled from Nagor. It was plundered by Amir Khan; an immense booty was captured. <sup>50</sup>

Raja Man then proceeded to take vengeance on the various members of the league against him. The Jaipur territory was laid waste by the troops of Amir Khan. The Jodhpur troops, reinforced by the forces of Amir Khan, were sent against Bikaner. On this occasion the Raja of Bikaner, Surat Singh, applied for the protection of the British Government in vain; interference on the part of the British Government was contrary to the policy of withdrawing from

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46. Tod, op.cit., Vol.II, p.1090. A letter written by Raja Man Singh reveals this fateful day to be the second of the month of Safar (March 30). (Political Consultations, 1808, August 29, No. 58).

47. Tod, op.cit., Vol.II, p.1090. Malcolm in his A Memoir of Central India (Vol.I, p.336) states that 700 horse accompanied Sawai Singh.

48. Tod, op.cit., Vol.II, p.1090.

49. Ibid. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol.I, p.336. In his Annals (Vol.II, p.1090) Tod states that Amir Khan received £100,000 and two large towns, Mundiawar and Kuchilawas.

50. Tod, op.cit., Vol.II, p.1090.

political connection with the chiefs to the west of the Jumna. There was "an obstinate contest" between the troops of Jodhpur and those of Bikaner in which the latter were defeated.<sup>51</sup> Surat Singh finally came to terms with Man Singh (December, 1808). The former evacuated the town of Phalodi, which had been assigned to him as the price of joining the confederacy.<sup>52</sup> He further engaged to pay four lakhs of rupees and also to employ a body of his troops in the service of Jodhpur.<sup>53</sup> In return Man Singh relinquished a fort taken from Bikaner.<sup>54</sup>

For Raja Man Singh, however, it was a Pyrrhic victory. He had ultimately to pay a heavy price for the aid of Amir Khan who made himself "the arbiter of Marwar".<sup>55</sup> The complete ascendancy of Amir Khan and his Pathan band throughout Jodhpur territory put the Raja under an eclipse. It is easy to invoke the ghost, but it is difficult to lay it down. With his position consolidated in Jodhpur Amir Khan tried to realize tribute from Jaipur and Mewar.<sup>56</sup>

Though the power of the Marathas was on the decline, they, particularly Sindhia, continued to take advantage of the internal conflict and weakness of the Rajputs to carry on depredations in Rajputana. The situation there grew gradually worse. Early in 1808 Sharza Rao Ghatge and Ambaji

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51. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 267. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1091. Aitchison, op. cit., 1876, Vol. III, p. 225

52. Political Consultations, 1809, January 16, No. 84. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 270. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1091.

53. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 270. Political Consultations, 1809, January 16, No. 84. In his Annals (Vol. II, p. 1091) Tod states that two lakhs were offered by Raja Surat Singh as expenses of war.

54. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 270.

55. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1091.

56. Foreign Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 124, Memorandum on Jodhpur. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 301.

disturbed the peace of Mewar by their mutual conflict. About the middle of 1808 Holkar's troops plundered Kanor and Sadri parganahs near Udaipur.<sup>57</sup> Maratha depredations, along with internal troubles caused by the quarrel among the nobles and the denial of the Rana's authority by many of his Thakurs, alarmingly crippled the revenues of the state of Mewar.<sup>58</sup> In 1809 the situation grew so worse that the Rana had to take a daily allowance of Rs.500 from Sindhia's viceroy in Mewar for the maintenance of his family.<sup>59</sup>

Jaipur hardly suffered less. During 1808-1809 Sindhia's troops mercilessly ravaged the territories of Jaipur. In June, 1808, the Jaipur army under Rao Chand Singh was severely defeated by the troops of Sindhia at Nasereedah (about sixty miles to the south of Jaipur in the vicinity of Tonk). For some time past Sindhia's troops under Bapu Sindhia, Jean Baptiste and Sharza Rao Ghatge had been committing depredations in the territories of Jaipur. The ostensible pretext for this was the Raja's non-fulfilment of a former promise to pay 10 lakhs of rupees, alleged to have been made by him for Sindhia's help in the war with Jodhpur.<sup>60</sup> On July 20, 1808, Close, acting Resident with Sindhia, reported : "Bappoojee Scindiah, Baptiste, Serjee Row Ghauthie and Heera Singh with their collected forces are laying waste the Jaipur territory and exact(ing) contributions from the towns that are unable to resist their demands..."<sup>61</sup> On April 25, 1809, Broughton wrote : "Two detachments under Bapoo Seendhiya and Jugoo Bapoo ... are now employed in levying contributions in different parts of the Jypoor country".<sup>62</sup> Earlier (February - March, 1809), while referring to the ravages of the Jaipur

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57. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, Nos. 247A, 251.

58. Broughton, Letters written in a Mahratta Camp,<sup>1813,</sup> pp. 206-207.

59. Broughton, Letters written from a Mahratta Camp,<sup>1812,</sup> No. XXV.

A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 300.

60. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 257. Political Consultations, 1808, July 18, Nos. 32, 33.

61. Political Consultations, 1808, August 15, No. 18.

62. Letters written from a Mahratta Camp,<sup>1812,</sup> p. 96.

territories, Broughton gave a pathetic picture of several Jaipur districts : "crops all laid waste, the beams and thatch of the houses carried away, the doors and door posts broken down, and villages smoking in ruins".<sup>63</sup> In May, 1809, Jagat Singh concluded an agreement with Sindhia. He would pay 15 lakhs of rupees to Sindhia and two and a half lakhs to his ministers; in return Sindhia agreed to withdraw his troops from Jaipur territories.<sup>64</sup> In April, 1809, when Sindhia's troops were encamped on the borders of Bundi and engaged in foraging, the Meenas<sup>65</sup> of Bundi attacked the foragers and made depredations on the army. The Raja of Bundi endeavoured to conciliate Sindhia by sending a present of two hundred camels to compensate for the depredations of these Meenas.<sup>66</sup>

At this critical period Raja Jagat Singh once more turned to the British Government. In August, 1808, the British Resident in Delhi was visited by Bakhshi Bal Mukund on behalf of the Raja. Bakhshi Bal Mukund delivered two letters addressed to the Resident, one from the Raja of Jaipur and the other from the principal minister of the Raja, Rao Chhattar<sup>^</sup> Singh. The letters related to the mission and its object. The envoy explained to the Resident the distress of the Raja owing to "the wanton and unprovoked invasion" of his territories by the troops of Sindhia. He also suggested the renewal of the defensive treaty which formerly had existed and was dissolved "unfortunately for both states". In reply Seton said that the former treaty had been annulled in consequence of its failure to produce the expected advantages, and that it was not easy to assign a good reason for renewing an arrangement which upon trial had proved altogether useless. But Bakhshi Bal Mukund argued that as "the actual power and

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63. Ibid., Nos. VII and VIII.

64. Ibid., p. 109. Political Consultations, 1809, June 3, No. 30.

65. These people inhabited the hills and jungles and were exclusively employed in 'thieving'. (Broughton, Letters written from a Mahratta Camp,<sup>1892,</sup> p. 85.).

66. Ibid., No. X.

dignity of the ancient sovereigns of India" were then possessed by the British Government, the weaker states, when oppressed, had a right to look up to it for protection. Seton's reply was that the British Government did not pretend to be or wish to be considered as "the arbiter of the differences between the independent states". Its object in keeping its armies in a constant state of preparation was merely to repel aggression, if attempted, with promptitude. Despairing of positive assistance the vakil at length said that on this occasion all that was solicited by the Raja was the mediation of the British Government to procure a fair and amicable adjustment of the differences between him and Sindhia. To this Seton replied that even the exercise of mediatorial intervention would be a departure from the system pursued by the British Government.<sup>67</sup> The Governor-General in Council approved Seton's replies.<sup>68</sup>

Earlier (April, 1808) Lala Hur Sook Rai, "the principal banker" in Delhi, had visited Seton with a letter received by him from Raj Rana Zalim Singh of Kotah, who had requested him to communicate the contents of the same to the Resident in confidence. The letter "related to the distressed and most desperate state" of the Rana of Udaipur owing to the excessive tribute levied by the Marathas and also the painful desolation of his territories by them. The Rana would agree to any terms desired by the British Government if it extended its protection to him. The Rana in his distress might have requested the influential regent of Kotah to help him in securing British protection. While stating the Rana's sentiments in the said letter, Zalim Singh artfully revealed also his own desire for an alliance with the British. As Seton observed, "It is evident to me that though Zalim Singh in his letter to Hur Sook affected to speak the sentiments of the Rana only, he, in fact, described his own case, and expressed his own sentiments". Hur Sook told the Resident that such was the dread as well as the detestation of Holkar and Amir Khan that every Rajput state would be happy to be placed under the

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67. Political Consultations, 1808, September 12, No. 28.

68. Ibid., No. 30.

British Government and to subsidize its troops. The Resident's reply was in usual terms and in conformity with the views of the Supreme Government. The British Government could not entertain such applications for protection as that would be incompatible with its system of non-interference in the concerns of other states.<sup>69</sup> While endorsing the action of the Resident, the Secretary to Government, Edmonstone, observed : "... such a state of circumstance does not at present exist as could be considered to exempt the formation of these solicited alliances from the distinct prohibitions of the Legislature with respect to such political engagements or even independently of that consideration to render it the interest of the British Government to contract them".<sup>70</sup> Raja Bishen Singh of Bundi also solicited the conclusion of "written engagements"<sup>71</sup> with the Company but in vain.

In 1808 the Rawal of Jaisalmer would also have gladly accepted the protection and alliance of the British Government but for the Company's policy of non-interference beyond the Jumna. Though secluded from the aggressions of the Marathas, the state was troubled by domestic quarrels. Moreover, the Rawal's relations with his neighbours — the Nawab of Bahawalpur, the Amirs of Sind, the rulers of Bikaner and Jodhpur — were unfriendly. In the preceding century the neighbouring states of Bahawalpur, Bikaner and Jodhpur had deprived Jaisalmer of most of its outlying districts. The district of Khadal had been captured by Bahawalpur, that of Pugal by Bikaner, and those of Barmer and Phalodi by Jodhpur.<sup>72</sup> In 1808 Maharaja Mulraj, the Rawal

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69. Political Consultations, 1808, May 16, No. 51.

70. Ibid., No. 52.

71. Ibid., 1808, August 29, No. 59.

72. Political Consultations, 1808, May 30, No. 57; October 17,

No. 64. Secret Consultations, 1809, August 5, Nos. 4, 5.

Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XXII, pp. 351-354.

Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1227, 1228, 1235; Vol. III, 1301.

Malleson, An historical sketch of the Native States of India, pp. 121, 348. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 69. The Imperial

of Jaisalmer wrote to the Governor-General : ".... the enemies in my neighbourhood have seized and continue to occupy the forts subject to my authority. My hope ....is that, by your Lordship's friendly aid and assistance I shall be enabled to recover my lands".<sup>73</sup>

The situation remained serious in Rajputana; the different principalities, in spite of repeated disappointments, continued to seek British help and alliance. Perhaps they expected that the Company would at length come to their rescue. In July, 1809, the Resident in Delhi reported that the vakils of Jaipur and Jodhpur were continually pressing him to secure a treaty of alliance from the Governor-General.<sup>74</sup> In a letter to Lord Minto received on October 30, 1809, the Raja of Jaipur requested the British Government to "receive for itself" the tribute payable to the Marathas by him, and to release him from their oppression. The Governor-General also received, on the same day, letters from the rulers of Udaipur and Kotah. These rulers described their sufferings from the Maratha depredations and proposed to pay the tribute to the Marathas through the British Government obviously in order to be relieved from the harassments at their hands. The Rana of Udaipur hoped that the British Government would help him in recovering his lands which his "dependants" had "forcibly" seized.<sup>75</sup>

On his way to the Court of Kabul<sup>76</sup> Elphinstone in 1809 received "friendly attention" from Raja Surat Singh at Bikaner. Afterwards Raja Surat Singh sent two vakils to the Resident in Delhi. They visited the Resident early in July, 1809. Their object was "to solicit the British Government to interest itself with the Rajah of Jodhpur, to induce that

Gazetteer of India, Vol. XIV, p. 3. Rajputana Gazetteers, 1909, Vol. IIIA, Part I, p. 14.

73. Political Consultations, 1808, October 17, No. 64.

74. Ibid., 1809, August 5, Nos. 1 — 2.

75. Political Correspondence of (Lord) Minto (Persian Correspondence: Eng. Translations), Letters Received, Vol. IV, pp. 259-260.

76. Colebrooke, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 192-198.

chief to desist from his present demand of tribute of Bikaner, and to rest contented with the sums which he has already received". Their second purpose was to request the British Government to assist in reducing the refractory chiefs of Churu and Bahaduran on the borders of Hariyana. In reply the Resident said that though the Governor-General was very sensible of the friendly attention paid to Elphinstone at Bikaner, he could not be induced to deviate from the principle of non-intervention. Then a vakil observed that with regard to Jodhpur the Raja sought no military aid but mediatorial interference. The vakil added with earnestness : "... a word from you may be the means of saving our country from being laid waste by the troops of Mahomed Shah Khan, the commandant of such of Amir Khan's troops as are now in Joudpoor". Seton's reply was logical but unhelpful. Mediation by a third power, unless backed by force of arms, was not likely to be successful. To resolve to support its mediation by force of arms would be a complete deviation from the unaggressive and non-interfering system of the British Government. The Raja of Jodhpur was neither a vassal dependant upon the Company's power nor bound by treaty to abide by its advice. The vakils, however, insisted that the mediation of so powerful a state did not run the risk of being rejected. While recognizing that there might be a great deal of truth in this remark, the Resident thought that the Raja of Jodhpur might comply with a request from the British Government, which, however, could not take the risk either of incurring an obligation or suffering a refusal. With regard to the question of military help by the Company to coerce the refractory chiefs of Churu and Bahaduran, the Resident found it less difficult to divert the vakils from urging it.<sup>77</sup>

In June, 1809, the Resident in Delhi received a letter from the Raja of Jaisalmer relating to a projected Franco-Persian invasion of India. The Shah of Persia — so ran the letter — had four or five months ago communicated to Gholam Ali Khan, the defacto master of Sind, that within a

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77. Political Consultations, 1809, August 5, Nos. 1-2.

short period the French army, accompanied by the Persian troops, would proceed in different divisions to Hindustan "by the route of Caubul, Peshwar, and Sind".<sup>78</sup> The ruler of Sind was asked to assist them by providing supplies of grain and other necessaries. The "people" of Sind welcomed this proposal and attached themselves to the Shah of Persia. There was contact through correspondence between the "people" of Sind and the French. The Raja of Jaisalmer offered to co-operate "heartily" with the British Government in averting this danger of invasion. He was prepared to lend his troops and his forts situated on the borders of Sind, if a small British force was sent for the reduction of Sind. Gholam Ali Khan could then be expelled from Sind, and Muhammad Ali Khan Kalhora, the lawful chief of Sind living in a helpless state in Jodhpur, would, if reinstated, remain an obedient ally. The Raja of Jaisalmer added that the chief of Lahore, Ranjit Singh, was not well disposed towards Gholam Ali Khan and had asked Amir Khan to reduce Sind. Amir Khan was anxious to accept this proposal and had actually sought the co-operation of the Raja of Jaisalmer who had given an evasive answer. If, the Raja of Jaisalmer pointed out, Amir Khan should make himself master of Sind, it would mean great trouble to the British Government. It would be prudent and advantageous for the British Government to provide immediately against such accession of power to the Pathan chief.<sup>79</sup>

When the contents of this letter were reported to the Supreme Government, the Governor-General asked the Resident in Delhi to intimate to the Raja of Jaisalmer that the French were not likely to be able to prosecute their

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78. The description of the route is geographically confusing.

It may appear that the Raja of Jaisalmer had little knowledge of geography. Peshawar and Sind are situated along different lines of communication from the north-west to Hindustan, viz., one lying across the Khyber Pass and Peshawar, and the other through the Bolan Pass, Baluchistan and Sind.

79. Secret Consultations, 1809, August 5, No. 5.

hostile projects "against the territories of India" after the success which Britain and her allies had recently gained over them in Europe. Besides, the Shah of Persia had renewed his alliance with the British power. With reference to the Raja's proposition for the employment of British arms for the subversion of the ruling power in Sind, it was stated that the British Government was "on the most amicable terms" with the ruler of Sind with whom engagements of amity had been concluded. The Resident was asked to explain to the Raja the policy of the British Government "which precluded the exercise of our military force excepting only for the vindication of our own rights, or those of our allies". The Resident was authorized to offer nothing more than "a constant and amicable intercourse by the interchange of letters and by the reciprocation of the offices of friendship".<sup>80</sup>

Though in conformity with the views of the higher authorities the Resident in Delhi again and again turned a deaf ear to the requests of the Rajput princes for assistance and alliance, he was not unaware of the value and utility of an intimate political connection between the Company and the Rajput states. Personally he seems to have been favourably inclined towards the establishment of such a connection between the two. He did not hesitate to convey his opinion to the authorities in Calcutta. Seton wrote to Edmonstone on April 15, 1809 : "None of the chiefs in that quarter except the Rao Rajah are in fact under the protection of the British Government. But .... our remaining inactive, while the Marathas are ravaging countries so very contiguous to ours and to the chiefs of which, we are known to be well disposed, would not only be a matter of painful regret but might also be considered as discreditable to our Government in a political point of view ...."<sup>81</sup> On July 15, 1809, he again wrote to Edmonstone : "I am very sensible of

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80. Ibid., 1809, November 28, No. 6.

81. Political Consultations, 1809, May 6, No. 8.

the political advantage of conciliating the chiefs of the Rajput states to the westward of the British possessions, more specially those situated towards the Indus. If the powerful Rajahs of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur - supposing the government of the latter country to be once more organized, - and the petty chiefs of Bikaner and Jaisalmer ..... were cordially attached to us, a barrier might be formed against invasion from the westward".<sup>82</sup>

There were other experienced officers who thought on similar lines. On August 30, 1809, Broughton, commander of the escort of the British Resident with Sindhia, wrote : "A confederation of the Rajput states under the permanent control of the British Government appears to be a measure of all others the best calculated to ensure the permanent security of the whole continent of India by at once connecting the eastern and western limits of our empire presenting a formidable barrier quite across the head of the peninsula to any invader from the north and circumscribing the Marathas within their natural limits".<sup>83</sup>

Lord Minto, however, was not prepared to take upon himself the responsibility of extending the system of alliances. In connection with the question of the suppression of Amir Khan he observed in a minute dated December 1, 1809 : "It was for the Government of England to decide whether it was expedient to observe a strict neutrality amidst these scenes of disorder and outrage which were passing under our eyes in the north of Hindustan or whether we should listen to the calls of suffering humanity, and interfere for the protection of those weak and defenceless states who implore our assistance, to deliver them from the violence and oppression of an ambitious and lawless upstart (Amir Khan)".<sup>84</sup> But the Home authorities as yet intimated no change in the policy of non-intervention.

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82. Ibid., 1809, August 5, Nos. 1-2.

83. Letters written from a Mahratta Camp, p. 186.<sup>1892</sup>

84. Life and Letters of ..... First Earl of Minto (1807-1814), pp. 193-194.

Towards the middle of 1810 Amir Khan was "the most powerful man"<sup>85</sup> in Rajputana and Central India. Jaswant Rao Holkar was then completely mad. Amir Khan, whom Holkar's ministers could not resist, extended his sway over Holkar's state. He even overshadowed Daulat Rao Sindhia. Both Jodhpur and Bhopal were under his control. He claimed tribute from Mewar and Jaipur, though as Holkar's deputy.<sup>86</sup> Early in April, 1810, the authorities at Fort William received from Raj Rana Zalim Singh of Kotah a letter of complaint about the depredations committed by Amir Khan.<sup>87</sup>

The discomfiture of the Jaipur troops (August, 1807) and the ignominious retreat of the Jaipur Raja had not terminated the conflict between the rulers of Jaipur and Jodhpur for Krishnakumari. Neither of the rival Rajas had given up his interest in marrying the princess of Udaipur. Both of them had sought Sindhia's assistance in this matter. The Raja of Jaipur had even showed his interest in placing Dhonkal Singh in possession of his hereditary dominions.<sup>88</sup> After Dhonkal Singh's retirement from Jodhpur his friends had also been in search of assistance in his favour. Their vakils had approached Sindhia's Durbar for help.<sup>89</sup>

However, by the middle of 1810 the rulers of both Jodhpur and Jaipur found their position at stake as a result of Amir Khan's ascendancy. So they, as in April, 1806, arrived at an agreement for mutual reconciliation. Both of them took an oath relinquishing the thought of marrying the Udaipur princess. They also agreed to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance between themselves. They

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85. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 367.

86. Political Consultations, 1810, June 21, No. 42. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1091. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 367.

87. Political Correspondence of (Lord) Minto (Persian Correspondence: Eng. Translations), Letters Received, Vol. V, No. 197.

88. Political Consultations, 1809, May 27, No. 47.

89. Broughton, Letters from a Mahratta Camp, pp. 129, 133. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XI, No. 289.

decided to cement their alliance by a double marriage. The Raja of Jaipur was to marry the daughter of the Raja of Jodhpur. The Raja of Jodhpur would marry the sister of the Raja of Jaipur. The vakils of Jaipur and Jodhpur, who came to announce this agreement to the Resident in Delhi, gave him letters from their masters (June 6, 1810). The Rajas in those letters wanted the Resident to be a party to the agreement. <sup>90</sup>

The problem, however, could not be solved so easily. <sup>91</sup> Referring to Amir Khan's intended march to Jaipur the Resident observed that the defenceless state of the country and the want of unanimity among the Sardars "must" render it an easy prey to the Pathan chief. Then both the vakils of Jaipur and Jodhpur observed, as they had frequently done before, that Jaipur and Jodhpur would never be secure from invasion until they were taken under the protection of the British Government. <sup>92</sup> On June 19, 1810, Fatch Ram Beas Jee, a vakil of Jodhpur, saw the Resident in order to induce him to alter his reply to the communication of his master on the subject of the intended alliance between Jodhpur and Jaipur. The Resident felt that the Rajas of these states were desirous of having it "supposed" that the British Government was "disposed to interfere for the protection of their countries". He considered that a letter from him declaring that the British Government would exert itself in maintaining the alliance between those chiefs would have greatly tended to confirm that idea. In pursuance, however, of the Government's general policy he decided "to act with caution" in this matter. <sup>93</sup>

On June 19, 1810, Seton, the Resident in Delhi, received another letter from the Raja of Jaipur,

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90. Political Consultations, 1810, June 21, No. 42. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, pp. 3, 54.

91. Political Consultations, 1810, July 7, No. 37.

92. Ibid., 1810, June 21, No. 42.

93. Ibid., 1810, July 7, No. 37.

stating "candidly" his critical situation from the depredations of Sindhia and the intended march of Amir Khan to Jaipur. He expressed a hope that the British Government would extend protection to him. Seton's reply was the usual one. He stated that it was inconsistent with the declared policy of the British Government to interfere in the concerns of other states, unless bound by treaties to the contrary.<sup>94</sup>

It was not the victim alone who pleaded for British help. Amir Khan, who was extending his authority in this part of India, also sought to secure the support of the British Government. His vakil, Shahid Khan, visited Seton. He asked the Resident if the British Government "would do anything for Amir Khan". Seton gave him no encouragement. He even declined Shahid Khan's invitation of entertainment at the latter's house, as the Resident's acceptance of it would have tended to support the idea that the British Government was disposed to consider Amir Khan as an independent chief, instead of considering him in the light of a servant or partisan of Holkar.<sup>95</sup> Although Seton <sup>refused</sup> to give any countenance to Amir Khan, the latter in his depredations in the Rajput principalities indirectly derived benefit from the British policy of neutrality, as the Rajput rulers themselves were unable to defend their territories.

As stated above, Amir Khan claimed tribute from Mewar and Jaipur. Devoid alike of humanity and principle, he came to Mewar in May, 1810, with a large force.<sup>96</sup> The Rana, unable to resist the Pathan adventurer, "was in the utmost alarm". The Resident in Delhi was also worried. He wrote to Edmonstone : "It is greatly to be feared that Ameer Khan will at length succeed in getting possession of Oodeypoor and thereby putting an end to the sovereignty of the most ancient and most venerated of the Rajpoot Chiefs. The country is so strong and so easily defended, that if once

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94. Ibid., 1810, July 7, No. 37.

95. Ibid., 1810, July 7, No. 37.

96. Ibid., 1810, July 21, No. 38; August 6, No. 77. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 337.

the Patans were in possession of the strongholds and passes, it would be next to impossible to dislodge them, and in its productiveness they would find immense resources. It would, moreover, insure and facilitate to Ameer Khan the conquest of Jaipur where it would appear that the greatest alarm prevails."<sup>97</sup> But neither the plight of the Rana nor the apprehension of the Resident could move the Supreme Government in Calcutta.

Having arrived near Udaipur Amir Khan wanted from the Rana a promise to pay twelve lakhs of rupees as tribute. He also asked that a body of his troops should be taken into the Rana's service. In return Amir Khan would endeavour to recover the fortress of Kumbalgarh from Sindhia's general Jaswant Rao Bhau. The Rana declined to accept these terms. Amir Khan wanted to meet the Rana at Udaipur.<sup>98</sup> We find in Seton's letter of July 17, 1810, the unfortunate Rana was so afraid of the proposed meeting with "the perfidious Patan" that he "persisted to the last in declining either to admit Ameer Khan into Oodeypoor, or to visit him in camp".<sup>99</sup> Though "despairing of effecting his purpose by mere expostulation", Amir Khan at the beginning was unwilling perhaps "to proceed to a degree of violence which he might deem premature".<sup>100</sup> In the circumstances, Amir Khan moved away three krosas further from "the place"<sup>101</sup> on receiving a promise that on the following day the Rana would give him "unquestionable bankers' security" for the payment of two lakhs of rupees and a half on his reaching Shahpura. Eventually Amir Khan moved to a distance of eleven krosas from Udaipur. The Resident in Delhi rightly considered this adjustment "as a mere respite to the Rana than a measure of permanent or substantial relief". The Resident remarked : "It

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97. Political Consultations, 1810, August 6, No. 77.

98. Ibid., 1810, August 6, Nos. 77, 78.

99. Ibid., 1810, August 6, No. 78. See also Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, p. 59.

100. Political Consultations, 1810, August 6, No. 78.

101. Kheree within three krosas of Udaipur.

may postpone the fall of his house until the wants of the rapacious Patan induce him to renew his demand".<sup>102</sup>

Meanwhile a commandant of Amir Khan, named Muhammad Shah Khan, who was then at Sambhar, had kept Jaipur in a state of alarm. Muhammad Shah Khan demanded from the Raja a lakh of rupees "in specie" and a jagir yielding that sum annually as the price of his withdrawal from his territory. In this connection the Resident in Delhi observed : "The prospect of that unfortunate chief seems to be more gloomy than at any former period".<sup>103</sup>

Amir Khan had not only expected to derive pecuniary advantages from his meeting with the Rana of Udaipur but also appeared to have it in contemplation to extend his political influence.<sup>104</sup> As stated above, the Pathan chief had moved away to some distance from Udaipur not perhaps for giving permanent or substantial relief to the Rana but rather to renew his demand conveniently. "Amir Khan was not the man to take a refusal". Eventually he "forced his way to Udaipur".<sup>105</sup> The Rana was compelled to accept his terms. He agreed to employ in his service a body of Amir Khan's troops. A fourth of his revenues was assigned to the Pathan chief.<sup>106</sup>

Not fully satisfied with his success in Mewar Amir Khan wished to fish in troubled waters for greater gains. He wished to revive the contest between Jaipur and Jodhpur over the question of the marriage of Krishnakumari.<sup>107</sup> The Rajas of Jaipur and Jodhpur, as stated above, had arrived at a compromise by agreeing to relinquish the idea of marrying her. But Amir Khan did not want the compromise to be

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102. Political Consultations, 1810, August 6, No. 78.

103. Ibid.

104. Political Consultations, 1810, August 25, No. 50.

105. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 301.

106. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 68.

107. Political Consultations, 1810, August 25, No. 50. Malcolm indicates that Amir Khan's motive was to bring about a reconciliation between the two Rajas. (A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 339).

effective. As Seton reported on August 4, 1810, "Ameer Khan .... favoured the pretensions of Rajah Maun Singh of Joudpoor, which embarrassed the Rana whose ward was first pledged to the Rajah of Jeypoor".<sup>108</sup> Tod tells us that "the rapacious and bloodthirsty Pathan" gave the Rana two alternatives : "either the princess should wed Raja Man, or by her death seal the peace of Rajwara". Tod further continues : "....the Rana was made to see no choice between consigning his beloved child to the Rathor prince, or witnessing the effects of a more extended dishonour from the vengeance of the Pathan, and the storm of his palace by his licentious adherents - the fiat passed that Krishna Kunwari should die".<sup>109</sup> According to Bhusan Lal, the author of Amir Namah, the Rana agreed to sacrifice his daughter provided Amir Khan promised to wrest Khalirao from Man Singh. It may, however, be doubted whether the helpless Rana was really a free agent in striking such an infamous bargain.<sup>110</sup>

On August 4, 1810, Seton, the Resident in Delhi, stated that the nobles of Udaipur were desperate at the idea that their Rana was being forced by Amir Khan to sanction the marriage as it would dishonour the Rana's family. They held a consultation and determined, as the only means of avoiding the disgrace, to do away with the young princess by poison. Seton also pointed out that the unhappy father and his sister Chand Bai concurred in this very unfortunate decision which was actually carried into effect.<sup>111</sup> The sixteen-year-old princess took three poisoned cups which failed to

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108. Political Consultations, 1810, August 25, No. 50.

109. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 539.

110. Memoirs of the Puthan Soldier of Fortune, p. 399. A modern writer accepts this version (Modern Review, 1942, April, p. 374), but it is criticized by others (A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 302). Malcolm's version (A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, pp. 339-341) is more in agreement with that of Tod and Seton.

111. Political Consultations, 1810, August 25, No. 50.

kill her. Then a powerful opiate was given to her. She "received it with a smile"<sup>112</sup> and exclaimed : "This is the marriage to which I was foredoomed".<sup>113</sup> She took the last cup which proved instantly fatal.<sup>114</sup> It was probably towards the close of July, 1810, that Krishnakumari took the fatal cup.<sup>115</sup> The conflict for Krishnakumari thus ended in a tragic way. But the sacrifice of the fair and innocent princess did not bring peace and tranquillity in Mewar and Rajputana. It did not save them from the vampires - the Marathas, the Pindaris and Amir Khan. After the catastrophe Sangram Saktawat, a vassal of the Rana, exclaimed : ".... the end of our race approaches".<sup>116</sup>

From the time of the settlement of the dispute between Jaipur and Jodhpur the Pathan bands of Amir Khan "ranged over every part of Rajpootana that presented the slightest hopes of plunder".<sup>117</sup> After completing his arrangements at Udaipur Amir Khan marched towards Jaipur, levying contributions on his way on the Rajas of Kishangarh and Bundi, and "other" petty princes, as well as upon the principal towns and feudatory chiefs of Jaipur.<sup>118</sup> When he arrived in the vicinity of Jaipur, the Raja promised to pay "10 or 16" lakhs of rupees. Amir Khan then quitted the place (June, 1811).<sup>119</sup>

It must be admitted that he was in urgent need of money. During his stay in the vicinity of Jaipur Amir Khan was "exposed to the severest insults and oppressions" by

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112. Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 540.

113. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 340.

114. Ibid. Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 541. Cf. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, p. 62.

115. Political Consultations, 1810, August 25, No. 50.

Dr. A. C. Banerjee (The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 303) gives the date as July 21, 1810.

116. Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 542.

117. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 343.

118. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VIII, p. 174.

119. Secret Consultations, 1811, July 12, No. 1.

his mutinous troops. Some time he was even deprived of his food, and some time, of his tent. Almost daily he was for hours kept exposed to the violent heat of the sun. Referring to this condition of Amir Khan, the Resident in Delhi, Metcalfe, remarked : "It affords a very striking proof of the weakness of the Jypoor Government when an army in such a state could make it tremble for its existence". Metcalfe further stated that the Raja of Jaipur was then much annoyed by his troops who were in nearly as bad a state of mutiny for their arrears as the troops of Amir Khan.<sup>120</sup>

As the sole means of escape from this helpless position the Raja of Jaipur continued to apply for a connection with the British Government but in vain.<sup>121</sup> Earlier the Raja of Bundi, reduced to "the utmost verge of distress" by the rapacity and oppression of the "Southern chiefs" and threatened by the presence of Amir Khan in the neighbourhood, had made overtures for British protection. In reply (November, 1810) the Raja was informed that the acceptance of his overtures was incompatible with the principles regulating the conduct of the British Government. He was reminded that it was "the fixed principle of the British Government not to interfere in the concerns of other states, excepting only in the degree required by the positive obligation of treaties already existing", and the British Government had "no desire to extend its influence and control over other states or to augment its dominion". It was further stated that the British Government would never be disposed to deprive any of the chiefs of Hindustan of their possessions or to control their power unless compelled by acts of hostility and aggression on their part to take up arms against them. Any deviation from this policy of "forbearance", it was affirmed, would be injurious to the reputation of the British Government. Thus the overtures of the Raja of Bundi for protection were

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120. Secret Consultations, 1811, July 12, No. 1.

121. Ibid., 1811, July 12, Nos. 1, 2.

summarily dismissed.<sup>122</sup>

In this connection it is important to note that Metcalfe, like his predecessor Seton, felt the advantage of political connection between the Company and the Rajput states. On June 28, 1811, he communicated to Edmonstone the general solicitude of the Rajput states to obtain British protection, and also his reflections on the expediency of affording it. He pointed out : "If the Government could be tempted to deviate from its usual policy and to extend its political relations for the sake of tranquillity of India by a general call of the inhabitants of Hindostan for its protection, that call may be said to be loud in all the peaceable states, universally from the Rajas down to the Ryots". Further, people did not scruple to assert that they had a right to the protection of the British Government. They said that there "always" had existed "some great power in India" to which peaceable states had submitted and in return obtained its protection. The British Government at the moment occupied the place of the "great protecting power and natural guardian" of the peaceable and the weak; but owing to its refusal to use its influence for their protection, they were continually exposed to the oppressions and cruelties of robbers and plunderers. Having thus communicated the prevalent general feeling on the subject of British protection, Metcalfe expressed his inclination in favour of the grant of protection to the Rajput states. He observed : "It is impossible to live in this part of India and to see the scenes which pass before our eyes without regretting that the Rajpoot states are not under our protection. A confederation of the Rajpoot states under the protection of the British Government must be a favourite object with every man who has any charge of political duties in this quarter. Perhaps no event could take place in India that would be attended with

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122. Political Correspondence of (Lord) Minto (Persian Correspondence: Eng. Translations), Letters Received, Vol. VI, pp. 149-152. Persian Correspondence, Letters Issued (Eng. Translations), Vol. 56, No. 274.

so many great advantages".<sup>123</sup>

Metcalf then proceeded to point out the advantages. It would connect the Bengal and Bombay territories by a territory that might then be "considered for all political and military purposes our own lying between Agra and Guzrat". It would deprive the predatory armies of Central India of their principal resource of ravage and plunder. It would tend more than any other practicable event to establish finally the permanent peace of India. If a fresh war broke out between the Company and the Marathas, the British frontiers would be secured by a large friendly country - the Rajput territories - which would also collect in due time an army sufficient, especially in cavalry, for all requisite purposes. The participation of Rajputana "would prevent any co-operation between those Northern and Southern powers that we (the English) have reason to suppose ill-affected towards us". But the situation would be very different if the Rajput states were not under British protection. Metcalfe concluded : "We should always have, for neighbours and allies, princes by nature and habit contented with their own countries, free from the spirit of aggression and encroachment, and delighting in the arts of peace and agriculture. The value of such neighbours will perhaps be forcibly felt should we ever have in their stead a Patan or Marhatta Government". To political and military expediency were to be added considerations of humanity which would call for the interference of the British Government to prevent the overthrow of the Rajput states. Metcalfe, of course, was not insensible of the difficulties involved in reversal of policy. Existing treaties must be set aside. A serious risk - that of military operations of a very extensive nature - had to be taken. The possibility of extending British control over every part of India then excluded from the Company's protecting influence had to be taken into account.<sup>124</sup>

Lord Minto's Government did not disapprove of

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123. Secret Consultations, 1811, July 12, No. 1.

124. Ibid.

the general correctness and importance of Metcalfe's observations, but it was not ready to change its policy of non-interference. Edmonstone reiterated the Government's stand and wrote to Metcalfe : "The opinion of Government regarding the abstract policy of interposing its influence and power with a view to the establishment of an order of affairs in Hindostan conducive to the permanent security of the British dominions in India and promotive of general tranquillity and prosperity in that distracted portion of the Peninsula has long since been decided and recorded. The obstacles which at present insuperably oppose the prosecution of that system of policy are doubtless to be regretted". If, however, events should arise to compel the British Government to take up arms for its defence against the hostility of the rising power of the Pathans or the destructive evils of contiguous and widespread anarchy, they might be accompanied by circumstances requiring the implementation of Metcalfe's views. Edmonstone concluded by saying that no consideration of advantage, however alluring, could tempt the British Government to depart from a scrupulous adherence to the obligations of its engagements.<sup>125</sup>

The repeated efforts of the Rajput princes to ensure their survival through British protection and alliance, and the systematic rejection of their prayers by the British Government, may appear as a sickening tale. None can, however, ignore the urgency of the issue from the Rajput point of view. Actually the situation in the Rajput principalities was gradually getting from bad to worse. It was their utter helplessness which led them to hope that the British could somehow be induced to come to their assistance. But British policy moved within a narrow circle drawn by the Company's immediate interests, and it did not take serious notice of the political disequilibrium developing in Rajputana.

In July, 1811, there was a ministerial reshuffle in Jaipur. Khush-hali Ram Bohra, who had quitted

office a year ago because of "mutual distrust" between him and the Raja, was once again appointed chief minister in place of Megh Singh. The mounting distress of the state and its inability to find funds to pay the contribution settled with Amir Khan led to the change of ministry. Bohra's reputation for efficiency made the Raja invite him to take charge of the administration. Megh Singh was considered to have been completely overawed by the Pathan chief; at any rate he was an advocate of full compliance with Amir Khan's demands.<sup>126</sup> To the Pathan chief the dismissal of Megh Singh meant the loss of a partisan. In consequence he deemed it necessary "to prepare to gain some of his objects on Jypoor, by more formidable measures than those which he has hitherto pursued".<sup>127</sup>

Amir Khan had retired towards Ajmer on the strength of assurances that he should receive the amount of the contribution agreed upon. But finding that the payment was not nearer than before, he threatened to return to his position near Jaipur and actually moved in that direction. He invited Babu Sindhia and his brother Tantia to partake of the plunder of Jaipur. Metcalfe, who was watching the situation, reported to Calcutta on July 23, 1811, that Amir Khan seemed to endeavour to collect forces for the plunder of Jaipur. The Resident apprehended that the plunder of Jaipur, if it really took place, would so much affect the state of affairs in the north-western part of Hindustan as eventually to involve the British Government either in open contests or in embarrassing situations under comparative disadvantages.<sup>128</sup>

The Raja of Jaipur, fully alive to the implications of Amir Khan's advance, was naturally anxious to obtain the protection of the British Government. He sent several vakils to Metcalfe. They acted independently of each other in the matter of securing British help. Metcalfe

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126. Political Consultations, 1811, July 26, No. 55. Secret Consultations, 1811, August 16, No. 1. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, p. 57.

127. Secret Consultations, 1811, August 16, No. 1.

128. Ibid. Political Consultations, 1811, July 26, No. 55.

received from <sup>them</sup> different proposals to which he gave the least encouragement. One of the proposals was that the British Government should mediate a treaty between Jaipur and the Marathas. The latter should bind themselves not to enter the Jaipur territory under any pretence. The British Government should guarantee the engagement, and through it the tribute to the Marathas would be paid by Jaipur. Another proposal was that the payment of tribute to the Marathas should be done away with; Jaipur should pay tribute to the British Government and receive its protection. A third proposal was based on the belief or pretension that the nominal support of the British Government would be quite sufficient. It was claimed that a declaration of the British Government taking Jaipur under its protection would not only be sufficient to drive away the Marathas and the Pathans but would actually impart to Jaipur itself, without any further assistance, such a degree of strength as would enable it to "do wonders" against all its enemies. As Metcalfe apprehended that the destruction of the state of Jaipur "must" affect the interests of the British Government, he communicated all these proposals to the authorities in Calcutta. The reply he received was that though the Governor-General in Council was not insensible of the actual and potential evils resulting from "the state of affairs in the north-western quarter of Hindostan", they were unable to enter upon "the extensive and complicated field of military and political operations" involved in the adoption of the policy of intervention.<sup>129</sup>

Denied assistance by the British, the government of Jaipur under Khush-hali Ram Bohra wanted to come to a settlement with regard to the contribution demanded by Amir Khan. Amir Khan at first agreed to accept a contribution of fifteen lakhs of rupees to be paid in three instalments. But after the arrival of Muhammad Shah Khan the demand was raised to twenty lakhs to be paid in two instalments. Amir Khan left the matter to the management of Muhammad Shah Khan. Megh Singh, the ex-minister of Jaipur, was in the Pathan camp. The forces of Amir Khan and Muhammad Shah Khan were close to

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129. Secret Consultations, 1811, August 16, Nos. 1, 2.

Jaipur. Muhammad Shah Khan threatened to enforce an instantaneous compliance with his demands. Khush-hali Ram Bohra refused to be bullied. Hostilities commenced; skirmishes took place.<sup>130</sup>

About this time (August, 1811) Bapu Sindhia arrived at Udaipur and took up his residence in the city. Demand for money followed. As the Rana was not in a position to resist it, he received Bapu Sindhia with "an appearance of friendship".<sup>131</sup> For about three years - till 1814 - Bapu's men, the "vampires", who encamped in the valley of Mewar, "possessed themselves of the entire fiscal domain, with many of the fiefs, occasionally disputing for the spoils".<sup>132</sup>

Writing to Metcalfe the Raja of Jaipur proposed to despatch Dinaram Bohra and Seth Sawal Das on a mission to Delhi in order to open negotiations for placing his territory under the protection of the British Government. Metcalfe discouraged this mission as under existing circumstances he did not perceive that any advantage would result from it. He received a letter also from the Rana of Udaipur through Bakhshi Bal Mukund, a vakil of Jaipur at Delhi. The Bakhshi stated that the Rana wished to put himself under the protection of the British Government, and to send a vakil to Delhi, provided the British Government were disposed to accede to his wishes. Besides the considerations which opposed British interference in foreign affairs generally, the Resident in his reply referred to the stipulations of the treaties with Holkar and Sindhia prohibiting any connection of a defensive nature with Udaipur. He also pointed out that the mission of a vakil under the existing circumstances might do injury to the Rana instead of helping him to gain the object he had in view. The vakil of Jodhpur, which also had suffered from the interference of the Marathas as well as the Pathan chief, also evinced an inclination to sound the

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130. Political Consultations, 1811, September 20, Nos. 10, 12.

131. Ibid., No. 10. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, No. 67.

132. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 546. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, Nos. 104, 115.

Resident in Delhi on the subject of "an alliance with the Rajpoots". The Resident did not discuss the subject with him partly because the latter was not charged with any specific communications from his court.<sup>133</sup>

Domestic or inter-state conflicts continued ~~to~~ to distract the Rajput principalities. Khush-hali Ram Bohra, minister of Jaipur, was an able man. His "acknowledged talents" might have saved the "tottering state" of Jaipur. Actually under his able management order was being restored in the state. But Raja Jagat Singh "was not prepared to tolerate a powerful man".<sup>134</sup> He himself was improvident and totally devoid of energy.<sup>135</sup> The distrust between the ungrateful master and the able minister became "too great for his continuance at the capital". Early in December, 1811, the Resident in Delhi reported : "Khooshalee Ram Bohora has quitted Jaipur with an appointment according to his own desire, as Manager of Affairs in the Shekhawatee country".<sup>136</sup>

Dhonkal Singh, pretender to the throne of Marwar, had not yet given up his claim to the throne, though the catastrophe of Nagor had rescued Raja Man Singh from the evil genius of the house of Pokaran, Sawai Singh. Dhonkal Singh had fled from Nagor, first to the territory of Bikaner, and then to the British territories. Towards the middle of 1811, the pretender and Thakur Zalim Singh, one of his principal adherents, addressed letters, soliciting aid, to the authorities in Calcutta. In his letter Dhonkal Singh assumed the title of the Raja of Jodhpur. The Resident in Delhi gave no encouragement to Thakur Zalim Singh who had sent the letters to him. The representative of the British Government could not recognize Dhonkal Singh as the Raja of

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133. Political Consultations, 1811, December 21, No. 60.

134. Ibid., 1811, July 26, No. 55. Broughton, Letters from a Mah-ratta Camp,<sup>1892,</sup> p. 92. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, pp. 369, 370.

135. Political Consultations, 1809, January 16, No. 93; 1810, June 21, No. 42.

136. Ibid., 1811, December 26, No. 26.

Jodhpur.<sup>137</sup>

As regards inter-state conflicts, Raj Rana Zalim Singh of Kotah, "the inveterate enemy" of the state of Bundi, had instigated Amir Khan "to destroy the government" of Bundi when the Pathan chief had been in "this quarter" in October, 1810. Subsequently, in 1811, Zalim Singh committed acts of violence and aggression in the territories of the Raja of Bundi. He plundered and laid waste the district of Khoraur, a dependency of Bundi. He also sought to create disturbance in the territory of Bundi by fomenting the dispute between the ruler of that state and his brother, Bulwant Singh.<sup>138</sup>

The internal distractions in the states helped the invaders. As already pointed out, Amir Khan, on his way towards Jaipur after the tragic end of the princess of Udaipur, had levied contribution on the Raja of Bundi. After the dismissal of Khush-hali Ram Bohra, Raja Jagat Singh of Jaipur found it difficult to resist Amir Khan. The conflict between Raja Man Singh and the pretender Dhonkal Singh had invited the Marathas and Amir Khan to Marwar. Owing to the growing influence of the Pathan chief in that state Man Singh found himself in an intolerable position.

Towards the close of 1811 Raja Bishen Singh of Bundi requested the British Government to help him and protect his territory. On behalf of the Raja, his yakil Mohun Lal made a modest request : if it was not practicable to afford the Raja open and avowed assistance, a letter might be addressed in the Raja's favour to Zalim Singh so that the latter might desist from supporting Bulwant Singh and committing acts of violence and aggression in the Bundi territory.<sup>139</sup> The government of Jaipur also renewed negotiations with Metcalfe. Raja Jagat Singh's vakils offered to pay to the Company's Government the money which Sindhia and

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137. Political Consultations, 1808, April 25, Nos. 68, 70; 1811, July 26, No. 55. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 818. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VII, p. 66.

138. Political Correspondence of (Lord) Minto (Persian Correspondence: Eng. Translations), Letters Received, Vol. VIII, Nos. 347, 357, pp. 111-112, 121-122.

139. Ibid.

Holkar extorted from the Raja. The money would be paid in annual tribute or territorial cession.<sup>140</sup>

But in Calcutta there was no inclination to deviate from the policy of non-interference in favour of the Rajput states. Metcalfe could not give any encouragement to the above proposal of the Raja of Jaipur. As a matter of fact he endeavoured to dissuade the Raja from sending to Delhi the special mission which the latter had lately proposed. The Resident, however, did not seem to abandon his personal idea of the value of alliance with the Rajput states. On January 4, 1812, he wrote to Edmonstone : "That these proposals are meant to be tempting, there is no doubt; that difficulties might be started, not now heard of, if the British Government were seriously to attend to these ~~proposals~~ proposals, seems very probable; nevertheless, from the ruinous state of affairs at Jypoor, and from the apparently utter impossibility of retrieving them except by our aid, there is good reason to conclude that an advantageous treaty might now be made with the court of Jypoor, as far as concession on the part of that power would make it so, if such an arrangement should be considered desirable by the British Government".<sup>141</sup>

The Marathas and Amir Khan continued to trouble the Rajput principalities. Early in 1812 Jaswant Rao Bhau and Bapu Sindhia were in Mewar. Bapu Sindhia attacked "a fort belonging to a chief of the state of Oudipoor". The Raja of Jaipur imposed a heavy tax on the inhabitants of his capital for the purpose of enabling himself to pay the tribute levied on him by the Marathas and Amir Khan. Jagu Bapu was inside the territory of Kotah. Zalim Singh made remonstrances to Sindhia on account of the mischief which Jagu Bapu's cavalry and foragers had committed in that state.<sup>142</sup> On March 27, 1812, Strachey, the Resident with Sindhia, reported:

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140. Political Consultations, 1812, January 25, No. 31.

141. Ibid.

142. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, No. 104. Political Consultations, 1812, February 8, No. 24.

"Baupoo Sindeah has taken the fort of Patelah in Meywar".<sup>143</sup> Strachey added that Sindhia avowed an intention of supporting Man Singh,<sup>144</sup> the claimant to the throne of Jaipur, in his pretensions. Man Singh was received in Sindhia's camp with great attention and Sindhia "in marked manner" declared "his inclination to assist him in maintaining his title to the Jypoor Raje". This show of hostility towards Jagat Singh was probably introductory to a demand of money from him. The condition of Jaipur, Sindhia perceived, was such as afforded "a probability of no essential resistance".<sup>145</sup>

In the middle of the year 1812, "the absence of Amir Khan in Jodhpur, whither he had been summoned by Raja Man Singh,"<sup>146</sup> and the reduction by mutiny and desertion of the forces in Jaipur under his colleague Muhammad Shah Khan emboldened the Jaipur commander Chand Singh to assume the offensive. Falling surprisingly upon Muhammad Shah Khan, Chand Singh defeated him. But the exertions of Chand Singh failed to produce any permanent advantage. The troops of Muhammad Shah Khan prepared to renew offensive operations. Chand Singh's Shekhawati friends became discontented and began to retreat to their homes. Amir Khan, to whom Muhammad Shah Khan had applied for help, instigated the Raja of Jodhpur to aid in an incursion into Jaipur territory. Megh Singh, the former minister of Jaipur, who had been expelled from the Court in 1811, leagued with Amir Khan and Muhammad Shah Khan and made efforts to recover his situation by force. He was supported by some powerful dependent chiefs or Thakurs of the state of Jaipur. In this state of affairs Jagat Singh's territory became an easy prey to the bands of Amir Khan and Muhammad Shah Khan.<sup>147</sup>

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143. Political Consultations, 1812, April 10, No. 19.

144. Ante, p. 128.

145. Political Consultations, 1812, April 10, No. 19.

146. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 175.

147. Political Consultations, 1812, October 2, No. 19; 1813, January 15, No. 6. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, Nos. 128, 132. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 175.

With the passage of years it became clearer that without British help and control it was ~~was~~ hardly possible for the principal - not to speak of the smaller - states of Rajputana to save themselves from ruin caused by various internal and external factors. In spite of their earlier disappointments they did not cease to seek British assistance and friendship. In 1812 Raj Rana Zalim Singh of Kotah asked Metcalfe for a treaty and got in reply "the usual friendly excuse".<sup>148</sup> In the same year Raja Surat Singh of Bikaner wanted to send "a confidential person" to the Governor-General in order to explain his "amicable sentiments", but the latter discouraged such a mission.<sup>149</sup> In 1812 Rawal Bijay Singh of Banswara offered to become tributary to the British Government on the sole condition that the Marathas should be expelled, but no definite relations were formed with him.<sup>150</sup> By the middle of 1813 the Raja of Jaisalmer through his agent solicited an alliance with the British Government. But the Company's Government did not consider an alliance with that distant state advantageous. It would be a deviation from the restrictive enactments of the Legislature. Moreover, it was felt that the power, resources and political consequence of the petty state had been grossly exaggerated by the Agent.<sup>151</sup>

As already pointed out, the British Government was prepared to interfere, if necessary, in the concerns of other states only to the extent required by the positive and legally binding treaties already existing. The application of this principle may be noticed in the case of the state of Alwar with which the Company had been connected by a treaty of alliance since 1803. The Rao Raja of Macheri had constructed the bund(embankment) across the Laswari river to which the Jats of Bharatpur objected. In 1805, when the district of Kishangarh was conferred on the Rao Raja, Lord Lake at the insistence of the Jats wanted that they should be

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148. Political Consultations, 1812, October 2, No. 19.

149. Ibid., 1812, August 28, Nos. 114, 115.

150. Rajputana Gazetteers, 1908, Vol. IIA, p. 163.

151. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XXII, pp. 351-354.

allowed to enjoy the benefit of the river. In 1805 Ahmed Baksh Khan made on behalf of the Rao Raja an engagement to the effect that the bund of the Lasward should always be open inasmuch as it was necessary for the benefit of the territory of the Raja of Bharatpur. This engagement, however, did not terminate the dispute between Alwar and Bharatpur over this embankment. The Company intervened. Seton, then Resident in Delhi, endeavoured to adjust the dispute. According to Article 5 of the treaty of 1803 with Alwar, if any misunderstanding should arise between the Rao Raja and any other chieftain, the Rao Raja had to submit the dispute in the first instance to the Company's Government for amicable settlement. The Raja of Bharatpur was also connected with the Company by the treaty of 1805. In 1807 Edmonstone instructed Seton to remind the Raja of Macheri of the agreement of 1805. As a mediator Seton carried on discussions with the vakils of both the Rajas. The Raja of Macheri declared himself ready to keep the bund of the Lasward always open, by making a cut at a place called Neanah which, he maintained, would furnish a sufficient supply of water for the irrigation of the lands of Bharatpur. But the vakil of Bharatpur maintained that from the nature of the grounds it was impracticable to furnish adequate supply of water by way of Neanah. He wished the cut to be made at Jelalpoor. The Rao Raja's vakil objected to this proposal on the ground that it would amount to complete destruction of the embankment. He complained that the object of the Raja of Bharatpur was less to obtain water than to ruin the embankment. It took a long time to adjust the dispute. Seton failed to make the parties agree to an amicable settlement. In reply to the Governor-General's letter dated February 23, 1808, the Rao Raja of Macheri denied the allegation of obstructing the flow of the water. In 1808 the Company's Government decided to ascertain, by a local survey of the adjacent grounds, the best mode of furnishing an adequate supply of water for the cultivation of lands belonging to the Raja of Bharatpur without injuring the embankment. It was ~~also~~ also decided that Lt. White would be accompanied by Metcalfe, then the first Assistant at the Delhi Residency, in this survey. The Rajas of Macheri and Bharatpur were informed of

this decision of the Company.<sup>152</sup>

According to Article 5 of the treaty of 1803 the Company's Government guaranteed to the Rao Raja of Macheri the security of his territory against external enemies. In May, 1809, Close, acting Resident with Sindhia, was instructed to remonstrate with the latter on the aggressive conduct of his troops towards the Rao Raja. As the troops of Sindhia had retreated, the Resident reported that no remonstrances were required.<sup>153</sup>

In 1811 it was discovered that the Rao Raja had interfered in the affairs of the state of Jaipur and had engaged to be security for the payment of Rs.1,50,000 a month to Muhammad Shah Khan for the supply of troops to establish Khush-hali Ram Bohra as minister of Jaipur. Though the treaty of 1803 contained no specific provision to disallow such an interference, the Company's Government disliked it. The treaty of 1803 had, however, rendered the foreign relations of Alwar considerably subject to the control of the British Government. It was now thought necessary to make an engagement with the Rao Raja expressly prohibiting political intercourse with other states without the cognizance and approval of the British Government. A fresh engagement was made on July 16, 1811. The Rao Raja undertook never to enter into any engagements or negotiations whatever with any other state or chief without the knowledge and consent of the British Government. It was, of course, with some reluctance that the Rao Raja agreed to this engagement.<sup>154</sup>

Even after signing this agreement the Rao Raja

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152. Political Consultations, 1808, April 25, Nos. 47, 48; May 9, No. 67; June 6, Nos. 46, 48; September 5, No. 35. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. III, pp. 342, 400, 402.

153. Political Consultations, 1809, June 24, No. 6. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. III, p. 400.

154. Political Consultations, 1811, August 16, No. 32. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. III, pp. 346, 400, 402. Parliamentary Papers relating to the East Indies (1801-1900), House of Commons, Vol. XI, 1818, Paper 371, No. 22, p. 39.

in some degree deviated from its spirit by sending a military escort, consisting of 500 troops, with Khush-hali Ram Bohra into the territory of Jaipur. The Raja gave the Resident in Delhi, Metcalfe, information of his having done so; but it was too late for the Resident to stop the despatch of the escort. He chose to consider the escort merely as a guard for Bohra's personal safety against the common dangers of the road on his march to Jaipur, and from this point of view found no serious objection to what the Raja had ~~done~~ done. But the continued stay of the Rao Raja's troops with Khush-hali Ram Bohra would give room for an insinuation that the Rao ~~Raja~~ Raja was interested in his proceedings. On this ground the Resident asked the Raja to withdraw the escort without delay.<sup>155</sup> The Rao Raja assured Metcalfe that he had given peremptory orders for the return of the troops; but they were actually detained much longer than was necessary for the errand on which they had been sent. On the whole, the step taken by the Raja was considered rather inconsistent with the nature of his engagements with the British Government. The plea under which this escort attended Bohra beyond the frontier of Alwar and even after his arrival at Jaipur, viz. the necessity of his having a guard of his person until confidence should be established between him and the Raja of Jaipur, did not warrant the ruler of Alwar in departing from the terms of his connection with the British Government. The Resident, therefore, remonstrated seriously with the Rao Raja's uncle who was his vakil in Delhi. Metcalfe expressed his hope this would be the last instance of his having to report a deviation on the part of Alwar from the spirit of its engagements.<sup>156</sup>

In the early part of 1812 the Rao Raja took advantage of the distracted state of Jaipur to aggrandize at its ~~expense~~ expense. Jaipur was then engaged in its contests and discussions with Amir Khan and "other enemies". He seized

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155. Political Consultations, 1811, August 16, No. 32.

156. Ibid., 1811, September 20, No. 12.

some territories which actually belonged to the Raja of Jaipur but to which his family had an obsolete claim.<sup>157</sup> The places were the forts of Dhobi and Sikrawa with their dependencies, and the lands of Buswar and Arna. The Raja of Jaipur communicated this to the Resident in Delhi and the Governor-General, obviously expecting that the British Government would cause the Rao Raja to restore the usurped territories. The agent of Jaipur also saw the Resident. Without waiting for any application from the Raja of Jaipur, the Resident, however, had informed the Rao ~~Raj~~ Raja that he could not be supported in such unjust proceedings, that these were violations of his treaty with the British Government, and that he must without delay restore the usurped places to the Raja of Jaipur. The Rao Raja gave the Resident assurances of having complied with his requisition. For a time the Resident believed that the Rao Raja had actually restored the usurped places. But the agent of Jaipur delivered statements which proved that the Rao Raja had deceived the Resident. The latter renewed his demands for the restitution of the places seized. The Rao Raja showed the utmost reluctance to restore any portion of ~~these~~ those ~~acquisitions~~ acquisitions and endeavoured to persuade the Resident that they were not actually in his possession. The Resident continued to remonstrate. After a long time the minor acquisitions, viz. the lands of Arna and Buswar, were restored and assurances were given that the forts and territories of Dhobi and Sikrawa would also be speedily restituted. Actually these assurances were meant only to deceive and gain time. The Rao Raja tried every trick to induce the Resident to allow him to keep those places. He affected to believe that the Resident might be won over to his interests. He sent repeatedly special messengers to ascertain the Resident's sentiments from the latter's own lips. Throughout these negotiations the Rao Raja professed to be ready to comply without delay with the Resident's requisition.

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157. Secret Consultations, 1813, June 25, No. 26. Prinsep, History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the administration of the Marquess of Hastings (1813-1823), Vol. I, p. 18.

tions and "to have no other wish than to obey implicitly the desire of the British Government". But Metcalfe found that ~~all~~ all these assurances were insincere. He pointed out that the Rao Raja had been misled by his ministers who deceived him into a belief that the British Government might at length be induced to permit him to retain the places which he had seized.<sup>158</sup>

Metcalfe's report offers an interesting glimpse into the childlike credulity of the apparently crafty ruler of Alwar. The Resident wrote : "There was a Hindoo, a Bengalee, by name Kishen Chund alias Lala Baboo, residing at Bindrabun .... a man of immense wealth, and .... in the eyes of the Natives of Hindoostan of great importance .... Lala Baboo .... was supposed to have great influence in Calcutta, and with English gentlemen in general,....my attempts to persuade the Rao Raja to relinquish his unwarrantable seizures were thwarted by a constant reference to Lala Baboo". According to Metcalfe's report, sometimes the communications from Lala Babu contained assurances of his being able by his influence with the Resident to overcome his scruples. At other times they implied that by an influence superior to that of the Resident in Calcutta he would carry the Rao Raja's point for him at the Presidency in opposition to the Resident's representations. Metcalfe wrote : "And even my dismissal from the Residency at Dihlee through the interest of Lala Baboo became a subject of speculation at the Rao Raja's court as a necessary preliminary to the uninterrupted preservation of Doobbee and Sikrawa".<sup>159</sup>

Finding at length that all efforts to convince the Rao Raja either by persuasion or remonstrance were alike in vain, the Resident informed him that he must face the consequences of his persisting in his unjustifiable conduct. He was told that his agents would not be received at

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158. Secret Consultations, 1813, June 25, Nos. 26, 30, 31.

159. Ibid., 1813, June 25, No. 26.

the Residency until the actual restitution of Dhobi and Sikrawa. This communication appeared to produce a considerable effect on the Rao Raja, and orders were given for the preparation of an order for the surrender of one of the forts. In this connection Metcalfe, accustomed to the fluctuations of the Raja's determination prompted by alternate fear and ambition, wrote : "I rather expect the recall than the execution of the order ...."<sup>160</sup>

The whole affair appeared to be an extraordinary case in which was to be seen the surprising spectacle of a dependent and protected ally of the British Government daring not only to seize the territories of "a power superior to his", but also to retain those usurpations in spite of repeated requisitions of the British Resident for their surrender. Metcalfe made a few observations with a view to explaining the Rao Raja's strange and unwarrantable behaviour. First, the state of Jaipur was then reduced to such a state of impotence that the Rao Raja felt himself to be possessed of the power of seizing its territories without any fear of retribution. Secondly, the power of Holkar and of his nominal adherents, Amir Khan and Muhammad Shah Khan, was reduced; it had actually ceased to be an object of dread to those who enjoyed the protection of the British Government. Therefore, the Rao Raja entertained no apprehension of Holkar or Amir Khan or Muhammad Shah Khan or any of those who commanded predatory bands. Thus the course of events had removed the checks to ambition, while the connection with the British Government "increased his strength and resources, really and substantially, and in a still greater degree by comparison". The friendship of the British Government added several "fruitful" districts to his territories; and under the powerful protection of the British Government, those means which the Rao Raja had lately seemed disposed to make use of for the gratification of his ambition had greatly increased. Of course there remained one check to his aggrandizement, i.e. the opposition to be expected on the part of the British Government to any unjust or aggressive proceedings. Referring

to this Metcalfe wrote : "How he (the Rao Raja) came to lose sight completely of this great check is not easily to be explained on rational principles, because it could not have happened without a departure from reason". The Rao Raja, according to Metcalfe, had been deceived in some measure by his ministers. The ease with which these places were brought into the possession of the Rao Raja appeared to have made him lose sight of the consequences of the usurpation. The Rao Raja and his ministers were surprised to find that the British Government should interest itself in so strong a manner in favour of the Raja of Jaipur against the interests of its ally. The ministers of the Rao Raja were themselves interested in retaining those places. But in Metcalfe's view it was to the weakness and distraction of the Jaipur state that the Rao Raja's interference was principally to be ascribed.<sup>161</sup>

The Rao Raja's recalcitrance was serious enough to make Metcalfe think of penal measures. The methods by which he might be brought to reason were either that the protection of the British Government should be suspended until he became aware of its importance for his prosperity and safety, or that the British Government should enforce his compliance with the conditions of protection. Of these two, the first one appeared to Metcalfe to be preferable as it would show the advantages of British protection and the dangerous consequences of the loss of that protection. Forcible measures on the part of the British Government might be more instantaneously decisive in their effects, but would engender feelings of hatred and discontent and would also be liable to misconstruction. Further, though military preparations would probably effect the object without actually requiring hostile operations, these preparations would be attended with great expense as also the agitations which on such occasions affected the public mind. Metcalfe, therefore, felt disposed to think that the Rao Raja ought to be made to understand the necessity of complying with the requisitions of the British Government without any warlike preparation on its part. If

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<sup>161</sup>. Ibid.

any obstinate perseverance on the part of the Rao Raja necessitated the despatch of troops against him, he should be made to suffer for his contumacy. He should be made to furnish a substantial indemnification to the British Government besides the restoration of the usurped territories to Jaipur. The indemnification might be found in the cession of those possessions that had been granted to the Rao Raja by the British Government.<sup>162</sup>

The Governor-General in Council took a firm attitude : the Rao Raja was to be compelled to respect the rights of the surrounding states with which the British Government had relations of friendship, to restore to the Raja of Jaipur the usurped territories, and to abstain from future usurpations. But the dissolution of the alliance was not considered desirable. It would, of course, sooner or later bring the Rao Raja to a just sense of the benefits which he derived from British protection; but it might not, "uncoupled with other measures", bring about the early restoration of the occupied forts to the Raja of Jaipur. It was manifestly not in the power of the court of Jaipur to recover the forts by its own exertions. If the Rao Raja did not apply for a renewal of the alliance and as a necessary condition restore the forts, the British Government would be under the necessity either of leaving the complaint of the Raja of Jaipur unredressed or of depriving the Rao Raja of them by force. After the dissolution of the alliance the British Government would hardly have any just right to interfere to procure the surrender of the forts. On the other hand, when the treaty of alliance was in force, the British Government possessed the right of interference by virtue of the Rao Raja's dependent relation to the Company. Adam, the chief secretary to the Supreme Government, wrote to Metcalfe : "It is not apparent on what ground we could interfere in an affair between the Row Rajah and the Rajah of Jypoor with both of whom (after the dissolution of the treaty with the Rao Raja) we should then be equally unconnected by any other tie than the simple relations of amity .....it appears to His Lordship in Council to be decidedly inadvisable to dissolve the alliance and recourse must be had to some other means of

effecting the restitution of the forts". On June 25, 1813, the Governor-General in Council resolved that after making one further effort by a direct address to the Raja of Macheri to prevail upon him to restore the forts and warning him of the consequences of refusal or delay, as soon as the season would admit of operations of troops, the Government would proceed to deprive the Rao Raja of the forts and make them over to the officers of Jaipur. A letter was accordingly addressed by the Governor-General to the Rao Raja. It was also resolved by the Governor-General in Council that a distinct declaration would be made at the proper time to the Raja of Macheri that the movement of the British force had no other object than the occupation of the forts belonging to Jaipur, that no attack was intended on his territory or independence, and that no disturbance was intended of the existing alliance. In the event of military operations, the Raja would be compelled to reimburse the British Government the full amount of the expenses of the military arrangements and operations.<sup>163</sup>

Subsequently after receiving through the Adjutant General the Commander-in-Chief's views with regard to the plan of operations,<sup>164</sup> the Governor-General in Council modified it.<sup>165</sup> On October 1, 1813, Adam wrote to Metcalfe : "The resolutions of the 25th June were adopted under a supposition that there would be no practical obstacle to the reduction of Doobhee and Sikrawa as a distinct measure unconnected with any direct attack on the Rajah of Macherry but as that appears to be altogether impracticable in consequence of the local position of the two forts, and as political considerations have on further reflection appeared to His Lordship in Council to point out the expediency of a different plan of operations, His Lordship in Council has .... determined in the event of the Row Rajah persisting in withholding the forts from the Rajah of Jypore after the final demand for their restitution has been made that the detachment shall proceed directly against Alwar the Rajah's capital and make

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163. Secret Consultations, 1813, June 25, No. 27.

164. Ibid., 1813, October 1, Nos. 93, 94.

165. Ibid., 1813, October 1, Nos. 98, 99.

the reduction of that place the primary object of its operations. This measure will find the most ample justification in the whole character and tenor of the Rajah's proceedings".<sup>166</sup>

The Rao Raja continued to evade the restitution of the two places, Dhobi and Sikrawa, by "a mixture of promise and false excuses". Lord Minto's letter had been received by the Rao Raja without producing a proper effect. On October 23, 1813, Metcalfe wrote to Adam : "He(the Rao Raja) promises to surrender Doobbee and pretends that Sikrawa is not in his power. When required to restore Doobbee in the first instance as a proof of his sincerity .... he says that the possession of Doobbee will enable him to enforce the surrender of Sikrawa".<sup>167</sup> The authorities in Calcutta now took a sterner attitude. They considered that the conduct of the Rao Raja would justify the imposition of a higher penalty even if he should surrender the forts without a war. The "reimbursement" of the charge which the Rao Raja compelled the British Government to incur could not be relinquished. It was to be enforced by the active operations of the troops if it was either refused or evaded. If actual hostilities took place, it was the intention of the Governor-General in Council to punish the Raja not only by the reversion of the districts conferred on him by Lord Lake but even by annexing his entire territories, if, of course, his conduct justified such a measure.<sup>168</sup>

Before concrete steps were taken Lord Minto was succeeded by the Earl of Moira. However, military preparations were in progress and finally an army was sent against the Rao Raja. When the troops were within one march of the capital, the Rao Raja yielded. He restored the seized territories and also paid three lakhs of rupees as the expenses of the British expedition.<sup>169</sup>

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166. Ibid., 1813, October 1, No. 99.

167. Ibid., 1813, November 12, No. 1.

168. Ibid., 1813, November 12, No. 2; November 19, No. 1.

169. Political Consultations, 1814, April 22, No. 11. Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe, Vol. I, p. 279. Malleon, op. cit., p. 108.

Towards the close of the Governor-Generalship of Lord Minto there came to happen another affair which revealed that Lord Minto's Government would not hesitate to deviate from the policy of neutrality to uphold the Company's honour and interest. In 1812 an expedition was intended against Shyam Singh, an important Shekhawati vassal of the Raja of Jaipur, who had plundered the merchants near Behil. Metcalfe, the Resident in Delhi, thought that the outrage had occurred within the British frontier. The Jaipur government, exhausted and beset with enemies, expressed its inability to punish or restrain Shyam Singh. The Company planned the expedition. The news of its preparations produced the desired effect. The Raja of Jaipur felt the expediency of exerting his authority over Shyam Singh with a view to warding off the consequences of an invasion of the domains of his vassal. The property seized at 'Pursyampoor' was restored. The persons confined there were released. The value of the property plundered near Behil was paid to the Resident in Delhi. Letters were also delivered to the Resident from the Raja of Jaipur and Thakur Shyam Singh relating to the future conduct of the latter. If the government of Jaipur had resisted the Company, - which it had the right to do because Shyam Singh was its vassal - the British troops would have been compelled to proceed to hostilities against the Raja of Jaipur and the British military operations would have embraced a wider field than that originally in contemplation. However, that unfortunate situation did not arise. The Company's prestige was vindicated "in a manner not to be mistaken".<sup>170</sup> Metcalfe observed : "I trust that this example will operate for the future to prevent outrages similar to those which called forth the notice of the British Government".<sup>171</sup>

Early in October 1813 Lord Minto left the office of the Governor-General. Then Rajputana was lying prostrate in the midst of devastation. The Company's policy of non-intervention aggravated this deplorable condition in

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170. Political Consultations, 1812, August 21, No. 21. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, No. 123A.

171. Political Consultations, 1812, August 21, No. 21.

Rajputana. The repeated appeals for succour made by the Rajput princes, weakened by internal conflicts and inefficiency of administration, and an easy prey to the ravages of the Marathas, Amir Khan and the Pindaris,<sup>172</sup> had fallen on the deaf ears of the Company's supreme authorities. Referring to the Pindari atrocities, Prinsep notes : "... every one whose appearance indicated the probability of his possessing money was immediately put to the most horrid torture, till he either pointed out his hoard, or died under the infliction. Nothing was safe from the pursuit of Pindaree lust or avarice; it was their common practice to burn and destroy what could not be carried away; and, in the wantonness of barbarity, to ravish and murder women and children, under the eyes of their husbands parents ..."<sup>173</sup> Duff points out : "The awful consequences of a visitation from the Pindharees can scarcely be imagined by those who have not witnessed them".<sup>174</sup>

Reference may be made to the general conditions prevailing about this time in some of the principalities of Rajputana. Mewar under its indolent and improvident

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172. The Pindaris, "a class of the lowest freebooters", were "a mere collection of vagrants from various countries and of different castes and religion, brought together from an inability of otherwise procuring the means of subsistence, divided amongst themselves, and ready at all times to desert their leaders, and enter service of any prince or state who may support them". (~~John Duff~~ Origin of the Pindaries, <sup>(London: 1819)</sup> p. 128. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 325.).

When the Marathas "ceased to spread themselves", the Pindaris, who had been auxiliaries to their armies, were found "to plunder the territories of their former protectors for subsistence". For a time their depredations were mainly confined within the limits of Berar, Malwa and Rajputana. (Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 327-329. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, No. 32.). See also Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons: Concerning the aggressions of the Pindaris), Vol. XI, 1818, Paper 370.

173. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 39-40.

174. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 329.

Rana was in a miserable condition. Tod's description of it is vivid : "Mewar was rapidly approaching dissolution, and every sign of cultivation fast disappearing; fields laid waste, cities in ruins, inhabitants exiled, chieftains demoralized, the prince and his family destitute of common comforts".<sup>175</sup>

Jaipur which "bore many years of distress and devastation" had also fallen into a condition of extreme degradation. The government and the police were both inefficient. The Raja and his servants were "mutually dissatisfied" and there was an appearance of apathy or despair in their proceedings. The city of Jaipur was harassed by continual robberies. While Jaipur territory itself was a prey to the bands of Amir Khan and Muhammad Shah Khan, the military tribes of Shekhawati occasionally plundered the frontier of Hariyana. The state of Jaipur became so degraded as to become an object of contempt to comparatively petty states like Alwar and Bharatpur. Like the Rao Raja of Macheri, the Raja of Bharatpur was also eager to aggrandize at the cost of Jaipur. The Resident in Delhi of course asked the Raja of Bharatpur, an ally of the Company, to refrain from all acts of violence against Jaipur.<sup>176</sup>

Raja Man Singh of Marwar also "found himself in an intolerable position" as Amir Khan was then "the arbiter of Marwar". Amir Khan had stationed his garrisons in Nagor and Nawa and partitioned the lands of Merta among his adherents.<sup>177</sup>

As we have already seen, the condition of the petty states does not offer a better picture. For instance, it may be mentioned that the Raja of Karauli, Hari Bak<sup>h</sup> Pal, was a man of "natural timidity" and "very limited capacity".<sup>178</sup> Early in 1813 his territories were attacked by Jean Baptiste.<sup>179</sup>

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175. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 546-547.

176. Political Consultations, 1813, January 15, No. 6.

177. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1091. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 335.

178. Broughton, Letters from a Mahratta Camp,<sup>1812</sup> p. 9.

179. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VII, p. 185.

During his Governor-Generalship of more than six years Lord Minto himself did not deviate from the general policy of non-intervention in favour of the Rajput states. Yet he was partly responsible for the abandonment of this policy during the administration of his successor, the Earl of Moira, who adopted the bold and comprehensive policy of extension of British protection to, and control over the Rajput principalities. As Malcolm points out, "The government of Lord Minto had no result more ~~important, than~~ important than the impression it conveyed to the authorities at home, of the utter impracticability of perseverance in that neutral policy which they had desired to pursue".<sup>180</sup>

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180. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 440.

## CHAPTER V

## CHANGE OF POLICY : NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAIPUR

On October 4, 1813, the Earl of Moira, afterwards Marquis of Hastings, assumed the office of the Governor-General. At the same time he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army.<sup>1</sup> The offices of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were combined in a person whose "political insight and strategical grasp were nicely matched" and whose "gift for spacious planning was balanced by a faculty for vigorous action". Firmness and conciliation were mingled in his character.<sup>2</sup> It may be pointed out in this connection that Lord Hastings' ability and high personal character as well as his close and long intimacy with the Prince Regent of England weighed with the Home Administration when deciding the question of his appointment.<sup>3</sup> He was entrusted with the charge of the British dominions in India at a ~~most~~ critical moment when the defective nature of the political arrangements made by the British authorities in 1805-6 as also of the policy of non-intervention had become evident from the state of anarchy prevailing in Malwa and Rajputana.<sup>4</sup>

Lord Hastings had been severely critical of the ambitious policy of Lord Wellesley. But after his arrival he

1. Ross-of-Bladensburg, The Marquess of Hastings, pp. 37-38.

Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3.

2. Smith, op. cit., pp. 572-573. Ross-of-Bladensburg, op. cit., pp. 32, 37, 40, 158-159, 216, 218.

3. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 2. Ross-of-Bladensburg, op. cit., pp. 34, 36-37.

4. Duff, op. cit., p. 389. Roberts, History of British India, p. 282.

"found himself called upon by circumstances" to carry the same policy to completion.<sup>5</sup> On February 1, 1814, Lord Hastings wrote : "In short, I see around me the elements of a war more<sup>6</sup> general than any which we have hitherto encountered in India". Though the Peshwa was a man of vacillating character, Sindhia weakened and Holkar crippled by internal feuds, the Marathas nurtured in their heart of hearts feelings of jealousy against the English and were eventually engaged in intrigues with a view to leading once more a confederacy against the English.<sup>7</sup> Amir Khan who controlled Holkar's forces was "professedly inimical"<sup>8</sup> to the English. He as well as Ranjit Singh of the Punjab became connected with the Maratha intrigues.<sup>9</sup> The situation in Rajputana and Central India was chaotic. The troops of Sindhia and Holkar through their ravages were dislocating agriculture and commerce.<sup>10</sup> The Pathan bands of Amir Khan were "the special scourge of Rajputana",<sup>11</sup> The Pindaris received secret encouragement and support from the Maratha chiefs who counted upon utilisation of their strength in war. The strength of these professed freebooters under several leaders was estimated at 30,000, mainly consisting of cavalry.<sup>12</sup> As P.E. Roberts points out : "The ravages of the Pindaris had done more than anything else to discredit the policy of non-intervention. Their expeditions grew more and more daring and ferocious".<sup>13</sup> In 1812 they made a raid upon the district of Mirzapur (in U.P.), disclosing the vulnerability of the British frontier in that quarter. In the winter of 1814-15 they twice

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5. Ross-of-Bladensburg, op. cit., pp. 33, 216-218. Ramsay Muir, The Making of British India, p. 249. Smith, op. cit., p. 565.

6. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. I, p. 47.

7. Duff, op. cit., ~~Vol.~~ Vol. III, Chapters XV, XVI; p. 459. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 230-234.

8. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. I, p. 46.

9. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 230-234.

10. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 181.

11. Smith, op. cit., p. 563.

12. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. I, p. 42.

Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 389-390. Mehta, Lord Hastings and the Indian States, pp. 10, 22. Sardesai, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 478.

13. Roberts, History of British India, pp. 282-283.

traversed the dominions of the Nizam from end to end, laid waste portions of the Presidency of Madras and captured booty worth £100,000.<sup>14</sup> Thus the Pindaris were growing into a menace to the territories ruled and protected by the British in India.

The policy of non-intervention was obviously inadequate and unreal in the context of growing insecurity. For reasons of tranquillity as well as the safety of the British territorial and political interests it would be necessary - sooner rather than later - to crush the Marathas and to suppress the predatory hordes. Smith points out : "Minto's six years of watching and waiting made it clear that while the situation might still be watched it would not wait much longer".<sup>15</sup> Operations in Central India against the Marathas and the predatory bands would require the co-operation of the Rajput principalities, as in the Second Anglo-Maratha War. On February 6, 1814, Lord Hastings wrote : "Our object ought to be to render the British Government paramount in effect, if not declaredly so. We should hold the other states as vassals, in substance though not in name; .... they should .... (enjoy) internal sovereignty, and (be) only bound to repay the guarantee and protection of their possessions by the British Government with the pledge of the two great feudal duties. First, they should support it with all their forces on any call. Second, they should submit their mutual differences to the head of the confederacy (the British Government), without attacking each other's territories; a few subordinate stipulations on our part, with immunities secured in return to the other side (especially with regard to succession), would render the arrangement ample without complication or undue latitude".<sup>16</sup> Thus Lord Hastings envisaged a comprehensive plan that in effect would reverse the policy of non-interference, extend the system of Subsidiary Alliance and complete Lord

14. Smith, op. cit., pp. 567-568. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 192-193.

Origins of the Pindaries, pp. 128-129. Burton, op. cit., p. 6. Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons), Vol. 11, 1818, Paper 370, Nos. 3, 4.

15. Op. cit., p. 563.

16. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. I, pp. 54-55.

Wellesley's work in India. Hence after a decade once again there appeared the prospect of the establishment of political ties between the Company and the Rajput states.

Inadequacy of the policy of non-interference became clear step by step to the Home authorities as well. In 1814 a strong representation on the formidable and rapidly augmenting power of the predatory bodies was made to them by Lord Hastings' Government.<sup>17</sup> As stated in the preceding chapter, Lord Minto's Government had also conveyed to the authorities in England its impression of impracticability of the continuance of the policy of neutrality. Another factor deserves mention. In 1811 Malcolm's Political History of India was published. In this work the circumstances leading to the establishment and dissolution of the Anglo-Jaipur treaty of 1803 were referred to. As Prinsep points out : ".... it produced a revolution in the sentiments of those intrusted with the home administration of the affairs of our Indian empire, in conformity with the spirit of whose policy the previous treaty with Jypoor had been dissolved, and the principality abandoned to the oppression and exaction of the Mahrattas and Putans".<sup>18</sup> A change in the opinion of the Home authorities was evident as early as in 1814 when they not only regretted "the manner in which some of the Rajpoot states had been thrown off" but desired to take the Raja of Jaipur under British protection.<sup>19</sup> Though the Court of Directors was at first against adopting any measure against the predatory hordes that might embroil the British with Sindhia, Lord Hastings felt that no step could be taken for the suppression of those gangs which would not have a tendency to involve the Company in hostilities with those Maratha rulers who regarded the Pindaris as their dependants. The financial question involved in the settlement of Central India also influenced the attitude of the Home

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17. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 228-229. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 390.

18. Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 370.

19. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 390. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 370.

authorities.<sup>20</sup> Subsequently (1817), however, the Government of Lord Hastings were instructed by the Home authorities to undertake active measures for the suppression of the predatory bands. They were asked to dislodge the Pindaris from their haunts in Malwa and Sagar and to make such arrangements with the chiefs in the neighbourhood, or those who had lost territories to the Pindaris, as would secure the British against the re-establishment of those predatory forces in that part of India.<sup>21</sup> Thus during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Hastings the Home authorities eventually decided to abandon the policy of non-intervention pursued since the time of the departure of Lord Wellesley.

About the time when Lord Hastings assumed charge of his important offices, Napoleon was decisively defeated by the Coalition at the battle of Leipzig (October, 1813). With this defeat the Napoleonic edifice collapsed. On the field of Waterloo (June, 1815), the final battle that the great conqueror fought, his star set for ever. The overthrow of Napoleon and the restoration of peace in Europe relieved England from the anxiety and embarrassments of a long and bitter continental war. It was now possible for the British in India to abandon their neutral policy pursued for a decade and to march forward in response to the logic of events to Paramountcy in this sub-continent.

There were, of course, difficulties in the way of speedy action. Upon his arrival Lord Hastings found the Company's Government in "a state of great pecuniary distress". Its army though well disciplined was not sufficient in number.<sup>22</sup> "The embarrassments (arising out of the 'inefficiency' of its 'immediate resources') were", says Mill, ".... surmounted by the activity and energy which the character and example of the Governor-General diffused throughout the Company's establishments".<sup>23</sup> For instance, to surround the Pindaris in Malwa the

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20. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. I, p. 153.

Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe, Vol. I, p. 325.

21. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 18.

22. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. I, p. 39.

23. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 4.

Governor-General was able to gather a huge army of 113,000 men and 300 guns.<sup>24</sup> The Governor-General, himself an adroit strategist, trusted to "time and favourable coincidences"<sup>25</sup> for the execution of the comprehensive plan of British supremacy in India. Besides, Lord Hastings "had the good fortune to be assisted by some of the most distinguished Anglo-Indian administrators that <sup>have</sup> ever served in the East.... few stand more prominent than Elphinstone, Munro, Malcolm, Metcalfe, and Ochterlony".<sup>26</sup>

From the beginning of his administration, Lord Hastings received applications for help and protection from different Rajput states. "The unfortunate Rajput states of Jyepore, Joudpore, Oudipore mercilessly wasted by Scindiah, Holkar, Ameer Khan, Mohummud Shah Khan, and the Pindarries, have assailed me with repeated petitions to take them under protection as feudatories to the British Government" : so wrote Lord Hastings on January 15, 1815.<sup>27</sup> On May 21, 1815, Metcalfe, Resident at Delhi, wrote to Adam, Secretary to the Government, Fort William : "The Rajas of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur continue to be urgent for the protection of the British Government, especially the first ...."<sup>28</sup> In September, 1814, the Company received a letter in which the Raja of Bundi expressed his eagerness for British protection and assistance.<sup>29</sup> In April, 1815, the Company received a letter from Salim Singh, the minister of the Raja of Jaisalmer, saying that they had been anxiously "looking forward to experience the protection of the British Government".<sup>30</sup> In 1814-15 the Raja of Banswara also endeavoured to secure British protection. He was prepared to pay three-eighths of the revenues of his hereditary territories for military support. Even as a temporary arrangement he wanted the service of "one or two military gentlemen skilled in their profession" who

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24. Roberts, History of British India, p. 283.

25. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. I, p. 55.

26. Ross-of-Bladensburg, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

27. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. I, p. 300.

28. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, p. 269.

29. Persian Correspondence: Letters Received (Eng. Translations), S. No. 58A, Part II, No. 297.

30. Ibid., S. No. 59, Part I, No. 180.

would be placed at the head of his army.<sup>31</sup> The Raja of Karauli also sought British protection.<sup>32</sup>

These prayers evoked no prompt response; the Rajput states were not immediately taken under British protection by Lord Hastings. Naturally he was guided more by motives of expediency and British interests than by purely humanitarian considerations. In June, 1814, he received the orders of the Home authorities for taking Jaipur under protection as stated above.<sup>33</sup> He was, however, not prepared to take an isolated step in favour of a single state. Renewed political connection with Jaipur might be a part of a comprehensive plan for the suppression of the predatory hordes. Taken by itself, however, it appeared to be of little importance; moreover, it might involve the British in hostilities with the Marathas, for which the Government was not yet prepared. Lord Hastings considered it premature to undertake his comprehensive plan at once and decided to postpone it until a favourable season. Moreover, as the Company was then involved in hostility with the Gurkhas of Nepal, it was not possible to antagonize the Marathas.<sup>34</sup> Lord Hastings himself wrote : "Our occupation in the Gorkha war prevented my acceding to his (Raja of Jaipur) wishes lest Sindhia should oppose the alliance and hostilities be inconveniently excited in that quarter".<sup>35</sup> The Home authorities afterwards admitted the propriety of this postponement.<sup>36</sup> As Dr. A. C. Banerjee observes : "As long as the shadow of the Maratha empire survived the Rajputs could not expect British protection, for the East India Company could not offend Sindhia and Holkar by asking them to withdraw their ~~stranglehold~~ stranglehold from Rajputana. Britain came to the rescue of

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31. Political Consultations, 1814, April 15, No. 38; 1815, May 23, No. 54. Secret Consultations, 1815, May 8, Nos. 39, 46. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, No. 182.

32. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, No. 188.

33. Ante, p. 188. See also Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 370.

34. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 228-229, 369-371. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 390-391.

35. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. II, p. 127.

36. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, No. 1. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 371.

the Rajputs only when their assistance became necessary in the final war for the termination of the Maratha power".<sup>37</sup> In this connection it may be pointed out that in 1814, while replying to the solicitation of the agent of the Raja of Jodhpur for an alliance, Metcalfe referred to certain articles of the treaties with Sindhia and Holkar as obstacles to compliance with that proposal.<sup>38</sup>

The policy of non-intervention so steadfastly pursued by the Company produced a reaction in Rajputana. Discouraged by systematic discouragement of its overtures the Jodhpur Darbar for some time did not renew its proposal for a connection with the British Government. The Raja of Bundi, who had previously made repeated applications for protection, did not make any direct application for some years after 1814.<sup>39</sup>

But the Rajput states were not able to improve their position. Until Lord Hastings came forward to take them under British protection and to crush the Marathas along with the predatory hordes the miseries of Rajputana - caused by external aggression and internal distractions - did not diminish. References may be made to the miserable condition of the Rajput principalities after the arrival of Lord Hastings in India.

Early in 1814, in order to save his territories from the depredations of Amir Khan, Raja Jagat Singh of Jaipur concluded "a regular engagement" with Amir Khan. The Raja would pay the Pathan adventurer a fixed sum. The latter, who had occupied a portion of Jaipur territory, agreed to withdraw his military posts from the Raja's dominions. The Raja expected that he would be within a short time relieved from his troubles.<sup>40</sup> He had, however, left the crafty Marathas out of account. At the instigation of Amir Khan, Holkar wrote to Metcalfe, Resident at Delhi, "cautioning him against the ~~shameless~~ character of the court of Jaipur in order to prevent any

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37. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part II, p. 419.

38. Political Consultations, 1814, April 22, No. 11.

39. Secret Consultations, 1817, October 28, No. 26.

40. Political Consultations, 1814, July 12, No. 14A.

British protection to it.<sup>41</sup> Again, Bapu Sindhia, who had been wasting the entire fiscal domain of Mewar since 1811, marched from Mewar and invaded the territories of Jaipur. He plundered "the districts" and levied collections from "the forts". Raja Jagat Singh's appeal to the Governor-General for help was in vain.<sup>42</sup>

After ravaging Jaipur Bapu reappeared in Mewar where he engaged himself in dislodging Amir Khan's military posts and substituting his own. Meanwhile Amir Khan had gone to Jodhpur and encamped there. Raja Man Singh agreed to pay eighteen lakhs of rupees by instalments. The amount was later reduced by various deductions on account of advances, damages, etc., to the sum of eight lakhs of rupees to be paid by instalments. While Amir Khan himself remained stationed at Jodhpur, his three armies, as reported by Metcalfe on October 15, 1815, plundered and took possession of different districts of Jaipur. According to Metcalfe's report, the chiefs who had assembled at Jaipur for the defence of the Raja's territory increased the distress of the state by violent dissensions. These were naturally taken advantage of by the Pathans, who introduced their thannas (military posts) within a few miles of the city.<sup>43</sup>

At Jodhpur Amir Khan gave no respite to the Raja. He connected himself with a domestic intrigue and worsened the situation at the Rathor capital. A powerful party at the court, led by the Rani and the Raja's son, was against the Raja's minister, Induraj, and his arrogant and rapacious guru, Deonath, who were the Raja's "only counsellors".<sup>44</sup> Tod says, ".... all the oppressions which the chieftains suffered through this ... foreign interference were attributed to their

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41. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, No. 255.

42. Political Consultations, 1814, July 12, Nos. 14A, 16. Secret Consultations, 1814, December 6, No. 102.

43. Political Consultations, 1815, October 20, No. 47; November 10, No. 13.

44. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1091. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 178.

advice".<sup>45</sup> In order to remove them the discontented chiefs decided to engage Amir Khan, reputed "for dexterity in schemes of assassination", who agreed to oblige them for a large sum of money.<sup>46</sup> Tod gives the amount as seven lakhs of rupees (£70,000).<sup>47</sup> A plot was hatched. Early in October, 1815, some of Amir Khan's Pathan followers, under the pretext of quarrelling with the minister for their arrears, put him and the Raja's spiritual guide, Deonath, to death within the fort of Jodhpur.<sup>48</sup> According to Tod, it was believed by some that Raja Man consented to the murder of the minister.<sup>49</sup> Prinsep points out that Raja Man Singh from jealousy of the power and influence of his minister intrigued with Amir Khan to have him murdered. He further states that the assassins were protected from the populace by the Raja and sent back in safety to Amir Khan who by agreement held one of the gates of the city during the time of the murder.<sup>50</sup> According to a report received by Metcalfe, Raja Man sent persons to escort the assassins out of the fort. They safely reached Amir Khan who "had been sitting in his Palankeen between his army and the town of Jodhpur".<sup>51</sup> Subsequently, Metcalfe stated in a communication to Adam that Induraj had been murdered by Amir Khan with the sanction of the Raja.<sup>52</sup> But the murder of the Raja's spiritual guide was a different matter. As Tod points out, when Raja Man found that the minister's death incidentally involved the death of his guru, his reason was affected. "He shut himself up in his apartments, refused to communicate with any one, and soon omitted every duty, whether political or religious ..."<sup>53</sup> So the chiefs of Marwar compelled him to hand over to his son,

45. Op.cit., Vol. II, p. 1091.

46. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VIII, p. 178.

47. Op.cit., Vol. II, p. 1091.

48. Political Consultations, 1815, November 10, Nos. 14, 16. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 1091. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, pp. 343-344.

49. Op.cit., Vol. II, p. 1092.

50. Prinsep, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 338.

51. Political Consultations, 1815, November 10, No. 16.

52. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 8, p. 95.

53. Tod, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 1091-1092.

Chhattar Singh, the management and control of the affairs of the state as Regent. The Raja went through the necessary ceremony on the occasion in public with apparent willingness. But the situation did not seem to improve. Jodhpur tried in vain to get rid of Amir Khan and Bapu Sindhia both of whom were demanding money and plundering the country.<sup>54</sup> Such was the helplessness into which the Rajput states had sunk before they were taken under British protection in Lord Hastings' regime.

Alwar was an ally of the Company since the days of Lord Wellesley. In January, 1815, its Raja, Bakhtawar Singh, died. The succession was disputed by two factions on behalf of two minors, his nephew and adopted son Banni Singh, and his illegitimate son Balwant Singh. The former was supported by the Rajput chiefs, and the latter by Nawab Ahmed Bakhsh Khan. It was finally arranged with the approval of the British Government that Banni Singh would be the titular head while Balwant Singh would exercise actual power.<sup>55</sup>

In March, 1816, the Gurkha War came to an end.<sup>56</sup> Meanwhile the rapid increase of the predatory bands in number as well as in strength was causing a good deal of anxiety to the British Government. During the military season of 1815-16 (October to May) the Pindaris increased their depredations to a great extent and at times pushed well within the British frontier. At the end of 1815 they advanced as far south as the banks of the Krishna and entered the confines of the district of Masulipatam. Early in March, 1816, a formidable body committed fearful ravages in Guntur, Cuddapah and Masuli-

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54. Political Consultations, 1817, June 14, No. 13; August 15, No. 40. Secret Consultations, 1816, May 11, No. 11; June 11, No. 28; June 15, Nos. 10, 11; October 12, No. 16. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VII, pp. 165-166; Vol. XVI, p. 355. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, p. 366.

55. Persian Correspondence: Letters Received (Eng. Translations), S. No. 59, Part I, No. 181; S. No. 59A, Part II, Nos. 307, 378, 379.

56. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 73.

patam.<sup>57</sup> From the British point of view the question was particularly serious as the Maratha chiefs took interest in the preservation of the Pindaris.<sup>58</sup> The Pathan adventurer, Amir Khan, as already pointed out, not only committed depredations in Rajputana but also entertained hostile intentions towards the British. During the Gurkha War conferences took place between Bapu Sindhia and the Pathan adventurer, indicating an understanding between the latter and Daulat Rao Sindhia.<sup>59</sup> Naturally after the termination of the Gurkha War the Company was expected to take up the question of the suppression of the freebooters in their haunts in Central India. Such a measure would obviously require the co-operation of the Rajput states. But immediately after the end of the Gurkha War the Company's Government could not undertake any comprehensive plan for this purpose. On April 20, 1816, while referring to the question of the reduction of the Pindaris, the Governor-General in his minute wrote : "All plans of this nature have been for the present extinguished by the orders received from the Secret Committee under date of the 29th September 1815 not to undertake anything against the Pindaris which may embroil us with Daulat Rao Sindiah as it is impossible to say what might not embroil us with Daulat Rao Sindiah ...." Lord Hastings' personal view was different. Referring to the prohibitory order of the Court he remarked : "The fear of giving umbrage to a Mahratta Chief is a reason humiliating for a British hand to inscribe on record in explanation of forbearance from those proceedings which ordinary policy would dictate. The apprehension, however, is enjoined by those to whom I owe obedience, and my feelings must submit".<sup>60</sup> Thus the Company's Government was

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57. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, No. 1. Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons), Vol. 11, 1818, Paper 370, Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40. Sardesai, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 480. Duff, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 395. Mill, op. cit., Vol. 8, p. 194. Origin of the Pindaries, pp. 128-129.

58. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, No. 1. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. 2, p. 153. Duff, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 390, 395-396.

59. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, No. 1.

60. Ibid.

not yet prepared to offend the Marathas and uproot the Pindaris. Obviously the Rajput states would still have to wait for British protection and alliance.

An exception, however, was made in the case of the state of Jaipur. Lord Hastings himself wrote : "After the termination of that (Gurkha) war, the distresses which the Jyepore Rajah had been suffering from the exactions of Ameer Khan in those territories augmented formidably, and at length the Raja, forced to confine himself to his capital, witnessed the preparations of Ameer Khan for besieging him in that city, his last refuge. In these circumstances the Rajah renewed his petition. It was favourably met ..."<sup>61</sup> Actually the situation of the state of Jaipur early in 1816 was so distressing that an envoy from the Raja told the Resident at Delhi that ~~were~~ <sup>there</sup> were no terms to which his master was not willing to accede in order to secure British protection. The Raja through the envoy offered either tribute to the utmost amount that the resources of the state could afford, or territorial cessions in any quarter, and even tendered the entire management of the territory, the appointment of the ministers, and the complete obedience and subservience of the court in every way.<sup>62</sup>

Besides the humanitarian factor arising out of Jaipur's intolerable distress there were other vital considerations which induced Lord Hastings to decide in favour of the Raja's prayer. This decision was, in the opinion of the Governor-General, in conformity with the views of the authorities at Home. Earlier they had distinctly called the attention of Lord Hastings' Government to Jaipur, expressing a decided opinion that the renewal of connection with that state would be of great benefit to the Company's affairs and expressing the hope that the "former departure from Equity" would be healed up by taking Jaipur once again under the protection of the Company. Lord Hastings himself concurred in this view; British honour, he felt, would be gratified by undoing what had been done in regard to the treaty of 1803 in the dissolution of which "our (the Company's) supposed convenience had

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61. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. 2, p. 127.

62. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 15, No. 45.

perhaps too much share".<sup>63</sup> Of course the execution of the order of the Home authorities had to be postponed owing to the embarrassments of the Gurkha War. The Home authorities approved the postponement. Lord Hastings believed that this approval implied their expectation that their instructions would be implemented as early as the state of affairs would allow.<sup>64</sup> That opportunity presented itself after the termination of the Gurkha War.

On April 20, 1816, the Governor-General wrote to Duncan, the Governor of Bombay : "The repeated solicitations of the Raja of Jyepur to be received under the protection of the British Government having recently been renewed with augmented earnestness and the general situation of our affairs appearing to be favourable for carrying into effect the instructions which this Government has received from the Hon'ble the Secret Committee for negotiating a treaty of alliance and subsidy with the state of Jyepur, we have instructed the Resident at Delhi to commence negotiations with the Raja . . . ." <sup>65</sup> Lord Hastings thought that no further reference to the Court of Directors about it was necessary. So far as the opposition of Sindhia was concerned, the Home authorities agreed that "nothing would induce Sindhia to go to war on this ground". The Governor-General also contended : "There is . . . every probability that he (Sindhia) would not oppose our protection, when our force is at liberty, when it is in the most efficient condition, and when its quality is displayed in a light so impressive to the native Sovereigns, by its having trodden under foot the hitherto invincible Gorkhas".<sup>66</sup>

It seems that the alarming increase in Amir Khan's strength was an important factor in the Governor-General's interest in Jaipur. An alliance with Jaipur would enable the Company to station a force within its territory.

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63. Ibid., 1816, April 20, No. 1.

64. Ibid.

65. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, No. 267.

66. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, No. 1.

The Governor-General considered this an advantage of "the first rate". He was afraid that the resources of Jaipur might be acquired by Amir Khan who was already at the head of "the best army in India next to our own"; it was also possible that these might ultimately fall into the hands of Sindhia, with whom the Pathan chief was establishing closer relations. These ominous possibilities, he thought, demanded intervention in favour of Jaipur. The Governor-General's special concern at the encroachments of Amir Khan upon Jaipur was expressed in the following words : "Ameer Khan would, as sovereign (of Jaipur), add to the native strength of Jyepore an army better composed, higher disciplined and more fashioned to service than is possessed by any other chieftain in India. The very structure of this army, and all its circumstances, make our opulent provinces the object". Lord Hastings obviously wanted to take Jaipur under British protection as a part of the plan for the suppression of the predatory hordes, though he had not yet been permitted by the Home authorities to pursue a comprehensive plan against them. He was no longer anxious about finance; the funds of the Company would, he felt, suffice to meet any exigency.<sup>67</sup>

The decision to conclude an engagement with Jaipur, however, could not be taken by the Governor-General without opposition or difference of opinion in his Council. The deliberations in the Council throw light on the attitude of the British authorities towards Jaipur as also towards the Rajput states in general at that time. When the proposal for an alliance with Jaipur came up before the Council for consideration, first Edmonstone and then Dowdeswell, among its members, opposed it. Explaining his views in a Minute Edmonstone, in the first place, raised the question of the connection between the conclusion of an alliance with Jaipur and the suppression of the ~~predatory~~ different predatory bodies. He pointed out that though the term "predatory powers of Hindostan" was taken to mean "the organized troops" of the Pathan leaders as well as the Pindaris, they were in essential respects widely different. The former consisted chiefly of

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67. Ibid.

infantry and artillery regularly formed and disciplined, to which was also added cavalry such as was "usually found in the ranks of native armies". Of course these troops were employed in "overawing and depressing" the states of Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaipur, particularly the territories of the latter, where they exacted contributions and practised those outrages which were "systematic among native troops". In spite of these predatory activities the Pathan troops were not, as the Pindaris were, mounted robbers without organization or discipline. Nor did they go forth as the Pindaris did in bands to distant quarters for the purpose of committing robbery and plunder indiscriminately in all the territories accessible to their incursions. Edmonstone pointed out that the alliance with Jaipur would affect the interests of the Pathans and would not constitute a necessary step in an expedition against the Pindaris.<sup>68</sup>

Edmonstone's second point was that the plan to destroy Amir Khan's control over Jaipur was a part of the Governor-General's comprehensive scheme for the general settlement of Central India. He questioned the propriety of the immediate execution of such a plan. He did not rule out the possibility of Sindhia's opposition. Even then he was not so much concerned with the contingency of Sindhia's immediate opposition, as with the fact that the formation of the proposed alliance with Jaipur would necessitate ~~further extension~~ further extension of the sphere of British protection and control. The conclusion<sup>of</sup> an alliance with Jaipur, he thought, "must of necessity lead by an uninterrupted and unavoidable gradation of procedure and events, to that extended system of paramount sway" which the Governor-General had earlier described. Edmonstone was afraid that such a material change in the existing system of the Company's political relations was prohibited by the Home authorities. In support of this argument he quoted from the despatch of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated September 29, 1815 : "...we are chiefly desirous that by prudent management our affairs should be maintained in the same relative state under which

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68. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, No. 2.

our possessions have now<sup>for</sup> ten years continued in a state of tranquillity". Edmonstone observed that the continued exclusion of the state of Jaipur from the range of the Company's political alliances was essential to the maintenance of the system referred to by the Secret Committee.<sup>69</sup>

Dowdeswell gave his views in his minute dated April 19, 1816. He opposed the conclusion of alliance with Jaipur on similar grounds. The proposed measure would not only involve the Company in hostilities with Amir Khan but also cause a rupture with Sindhia. He said : " .... I feel restrained .... from giving my voice for the adoption of a measure (the projected alliance with Jaipur) which is likely to lead to consequences entirely at variance with that moderate and pacific course of policy which they (the authorities at home) obviously wish should be pursued in the conduct of the affairs of this Government ..... my mind is not prepared for the adoption of a course of policy so much opposed to the system pursued for many years by the British Government, and leading to consequences, the extent, duration and ultimate result of which seem to me<sup>to</sup> set human foresight at defiance .... the maintenance of the peace of India, and a reduction of the public burdens should be the great object of Government ....."<sup>70</sup>

Seton, another member of the Council, was formerly the Company's Resident in Delhi. He differed from Edmonstone and gave strong support to the Governor-General's proposal. It may be recalled in this connection that as Resident in Delhi he had been in favour of taking the Rajput states under British protection. After a perusal of the minutes of the Governor-General and Edmonstone, he expressed his views regarding the proposed alliance with Jaipur in his minute dated April 17, 1816. He gave his "decided opinion" that in conformity with the proposal of the Governor-General the Company's alliance with Jaipur should be revived. He even laid emphasis on the conclusion of alliance as early as

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69. Ibid.

70. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, No. 5.

possible. The critical condition of Jaipur was a strong argument for avoidance of delay.<sup>71</sup>

The former Resident put forward an elaborate list of the "benefits" which could be expected from the proposed alliance. It would prevent Jaipur from falling into the hands of Amir Khan. Seton judged it to be no "mere negative advantage", because Jaipur could in "no case" remain neutral. He said : "If its resources are not with us, they must be employed against us (;) if not thrown into our scale of influence, they must be thrown into that of our enemies (;) there is no medium". As an ally Jaipur would assist in the expansion of the "useful political influence" of the Company towards the west. As a subordinate power Jaipur would virtually become an advanced military cantonment in that quarter and form "a species of connecting link" between the western frontier of the Presidency of Bengal and the province of Gujarat. To these political and military factors was added a humanitarian interest in Jaipur's welfare. Seton hoped that British protection and "well directed" influence would help to restore "the once flourishing country" of Jaipur to its "former state of prosperity and happiness". Moreover, the alliance would have a "pleasing" consequence by removing the "somewhat" unfavourable impression caused by the dissolution of the former treaty in 1806. Seton ever considered the dissolution of that treaty as a harsh and hasty measure. The new alliance would make amends to the Raja in respect of the injurious consequences of that dissolution.<sup>72</sup> Next, Seton gave replies to certain objections with regard to the conclusion of the alliance.

Dealing with the objections urged by Edmonstone , Seton referred to the vital question whether the renewal of the alliance with Jaipur was prohibited by the instructions of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. He was not convinced that an alliance with Jaipur was "necessarily calculated either to involve us in immediate

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71. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, No. 3.

72. Ibid.

hostility or to give rise to a system of political relations more extensive or complicated than that which actually prevails". He added : "Sindiah could not in justice consider it as a ground of discontent; far less could he regard it as a legitimate cause of war. If he did, it would in my judgement amount to a demonstration that he was at all events and under any circumstances disposed to quarrel that he was prepared not merely to seek but to make an opportunity". What Seton contemplated was an alliance exclusively confined to Jaipur, not a system of alliances involving all Rajput states. The instructions of the Secret Committee, dated September 29, 1815, prohibiting any material change in the Company's system without its previous sanction, did not, in Seton's opinion, cover the case of Jaipur. The acquiescence of the Secret Committee in the postponement of the negotiations with Jaipur during the Gurkha War was interpreted by him to mean that "in consideration of the measure in question appearing to the Indian Government to be unreasonable, the Honorable Committee consents to give up its own opinion and to acquiesce in that of its local government". From this interpretation he drew the conclusion that "so soon as the local Government should entertain different sentiment and be of opinion that the measure was advisable and might be adopted without risk, the Honorable Committee would not object to its adoption".<sup>73</sup>

Seton also referred to two other objections, one of which was that the alliance would give offence to Amir Khan by depriving him of the power of making further exactions from Jaipur, long "victim of his tyranny and rapacity". He felt that the Pathan chief's "restless ambition, ... if left unrestrained, must become more and more dangerous to the tranquillity of our Western Provinces". Sooner or later the British must check his progress, and it was obvious that he might be opposed with greater effect before he became master of Jaipur and possessed himself of its resources. Another ground of objection was that Amir Khan as a partisan of the

House of Holkar might plead its right to tribute from Jaipur. Seton recalled his talks in Delhi with the vakils of Jaipur and Jodhpur. They "did not absolutely deny the right of Sindhia and of Holkar to a pecuniary demand as a species of tribute, but what they bitterly complained of .... was that under the pretext of levying this tribute armies were stationed in their masters' dominions". Their masters, they said, "would be happy if the stipulated sum could be paid through the medium of the British Government".<sup>74</sup>

Despite such differences of opinion the Governor-General's Council finally concurred in his proposition. It was decided to instruct the Resident in Delhi to commence negotiations with the Raja of Jaipur for the conclusion of an alliance.<sup>75</sup> It was not apprehended that Sindhia would involve himself in those dangers which a rupture with the British Government would entail on him. But it was recognized that Sindhia would not regard without dissatisfaction the conclusion of an alliance with Jaipur and that he was likely to throw every impediment in his power in its way.<sup>76</sup> Necessary instructions were issued to Close, the British Resident with Sindhia, to meet any enquiry that the Maratha chief might make as regards the Company's negotiations with Jaipur. He was instructed to tell Sindhia that the British Government had responded to the Jaipur Raja's "supplications" because, in its view, the Company and the Raja were "equally at liberty to make what arrangement they might deem consistent with their respective interest as long as their view did not extend to any measures calculated to invade the interests or otherwise give umbrage to any other states". The Maratha chiefs, Close was asked to say, had no claim over Jaipur and its alliance with the British Government would constitute no deviation from the Company's treaty of 1805 with Sindhia, which the Company had so far observed

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74. Ibid.

75. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, Nos. 5, 6. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. V, pp. 73-80.

76. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, No. 9.

"religiously". The eighth article of that treaty related to Rajputana and stated that the Company engaged to enter into no treaty with Sindhia's tributary chiefs in Malwa, Mewar or Marwar. The alliance with Jaipur was obviously beyond its scope.<sup>77</sup>

Though for the present it was decided to take Jaipur only under British protection, it marked the beginning of the departure from the policy of non-intervention pursued by the Company's Government with regard to the Rajput states for over a decade. The negotiations with Jaipur were unusually protracted. Here we have a glimpse into the diplomacy and court-politics of a Rajput state at that time. In spite of the delay for which the Court of Jaipur was held responsible, the British authorities in their own interest pursued to completion its plan of a subsidiary alliance with that State.

On April 20, 1816, instructions<sup>78</sup> were issued to Metcalfe, the Resident in Delhi, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of alliance with Jaipur. He was told that the recently<sup>renewed</sup> solicitations of the Court of Jaipur would form "the most convenient as well as the most natural basis of the proposed negotiation". With his knowledge of the character and disposition of the Indian courts, and of Jaipur in particular, the Resident was asked to conduct the negotiations in such a manner as to make the Raja feel that it was his interest and not that of the British Government which was principally concerned in their success. The Raja should understand that the British Government were complying with his solicitation and not seeking their own advantage. He should be sensible of the great importance of the British alliance to his security, nay, even to his existence as a Prince. To deserve the benefits of the alliance he must enter into it with a firm resolution to adhere at all events to the British Government. The Raja must agree to be guided by the Company's Government in all his political views and measures. He was not only to look after his own security; he was also to be prepared to pay for obtaining such a vital benefit by making

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77. Ibid. Aitchison, op. cit., 1876, Vol. III, p. 292.

78. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, No. 6.

considerable sacrifices. These were the principles on the basis of which the terms of the treaty of alliance should be framed. The Raja should agree to the establishment in his territory of a British force, the whole or a large portion of the expenses of which were to be borne by him. British control should be established over the conduct of the exterior relations of the state of Jaipur. All foreign influence and power should be excluded from the state. An article providing for the arbitration and award by the British Government in ~~ad~~ all questions arising between the Raja of Jaipur and other states would necessarily form a part of the proposed treaty, and this provision would embrace any claim of tribute from Jaipur which might be advanced by Sindhia or Holkar. The Governor-General in Council was of course satisfied that neither of those chiefs possessed any just claim to tribute from Jaipur. The resources and military power of Jaipur should be utilised for all purposes connected with the interests of the alliance and the general welfare of the two states. Some fortress of Jaipur, conveniently situated, would be assigned as the depot for the stores of the British troops, a defined though not considerable extent around which should be under the British Commanding Officer. The British Government on its part would defend the Raja against all foreign and domestic enemies. It would guarantee the integrity of his territory and the independence of his government. It would afford the aid of the British troops in restoring and establishing the Raja's just authority over his rebellious chiefs and subjects. But the British Government desired to ~~exercise~~ exercise no interference in the internal administration of the state of Jaipur nor in any way to interpose between the Raja and his subjects except by his express desire.

With regard to the military arrangements with Jaipur and the settlement of its subsidy Metcalfe was given a few more specific instructions. The subsidiary force to be permanently stationed in Jaipur "could not consist of less than six battalions of native infantry and two regiments of native cavalry with a field train and a suitable proportion of artillery men and pioneers". It would probably be found

necessary at all times to station a detachment at Jaipur for the immediate protection of the Raja's person and the maintenance of British ascendancy at the capital. The Raja would be required to pay a subsidy for the maintenance of the British forces in his territory. The treaty must also provide for the right of the British Government to introduce into the territory of Jaipur at all times any number of troops it might be requisite for the common interests of the two states. The Raja, however, would not be subjected to any additional charge on this account except when the troops were augmented at his express solicitation, exclusively for his own objects. With regard to the amount of the subsidy Metcalfe was authorized to fix it according to his own judgment formed on the basis of the resources of the state of Jaipur. Though it was desirable that the whole charge of British protection should be defrayed from the resources of that state, this principle must necessarily be modified by a fair and liberal consideration of its means. It was also to be determined by the political object of not placing that subsidy on such a scale as to render the punctual discharge of it a matter of difficulty and a source of dispute between the two Governments as also of hazard to the true interests of the alliance. The amount and period of instalments in which the subsidy was to be paid would be regulated according to the discretion of the Resident consulting the convenience of both Governments.

Whatever might be the amount at which the subsidy would be fixed the Governor-General in Council was apprehensive that it would not be in the power of the Raja of Jaipur to discharge any part of it until his territory and government should be restored to some degree of order. If the resources of Jaipur were in a condition to admit of their bearing such a charge, it would be reasonable to expect that state to defray the expense which the British Government would incur in settling the territory and restoring the Raja's authority by the employment of means exclusive of the established subsidiary force. Though the Governor-General in Council was sensible of the superior advantages on every

account of obtaining a cession of territory in lieu of subsidy, such an arrangement was not possible because between the frontier of Jaipur and the British frontier the possessions of other chiefs intervened. Therefore, the commutation of the subsidy for territory could not be contemplated. It would be expedient, however, even as a stimulus to the Raja to pay the subsidy with regularity to insert a clause providing for the assignment of territory in the ~~the~~ event of any failure or material delay in the pecuniary payments. It was considered to be a point of material importance for the maintenance by the Raja of Jaipur in a state of constant efficiency of a body of horse to be at the disposal of the British Government for all purposes of common interest; the strength of this force must be regulated by the means of the state. It would be necessary to secure to the British Government the right of periodical inspection. Exclusive of the stipulated contingent, the Raja must engage to bring forward his whole military force and to employ all the resources of his territory in case of a joint war.

A treaty with such provisions would combine, it was hoped, every necessary object of security and tranquillity for the state of Jaipur and of influence and control on the part of the British Government. As the British Government pledged itself not to suffer the continuance of any foreign troops within the dominions of the Raja of Jaipur, Amir Khan must necessarily withdraw his force ~~himself~~ beyond its limits. At a proper time the British Government would not object to listen to any claim which Holkar's Darbar might produce. But whatever might be the merits of this question, they could not justify Amir Khan in remaining in the territory of Jaipur. Amir Khan must be apprised that should he disregard this expectation, the British troops would necessarily be obliged to attack any thing that might oppose them for the consequences of which he alone would be responsible.

It was not the intention of the Governor-General in Council that any preparations for "emancipation" of Jaipur should be made in a manner to attract public observation before the treaty should be actually concluded.

The Raja of Jaipur must be made sensible of the importance of maintaining secrecy regarding the object and progress of the negotiations in order that the success of the whole arrangement might not be exposed to any hazard by a premature disclosure of the British views to those who must be interested in counteracting them. The Governor-General in Council reposed "the most entire confidence" in Metcalfe's judgment, talents and experience in accomplishing the task with which he was now entrusted.

The Governor-General hoped that these objects would be accomplished without involving the Company in hostility or estrangement with Amir Khan and his confederate chiefs, with the nominal Government of Holkar, or with Sindhia. The Governor-General particularly did not apprehend that Sindhia would adopt any measures of an extreme nature to oppose the Company's proposed alliance with Jaipur. Yet motives of obvious precaution prescribed preparations to meet any contingency; a display of force and resolution at the outset might deter from opposition those who otherwise would be disposed to resist the Company's measures. It was considered necessary to assemble at Rewari and Mathura strong detachments of troops composed of cavalry, infantry and artillery, European and Indian, fully equipped for service in every respect. The force would be placed under the command of Major-General David Ochterlony. The political talents and experience of Ochterlony, added to his knowledge of the intentions and views of the Government and also his distinguished professional ability, rendered him especially qualified for this important charge. The army would advance from the two points of assembly into the Jaipur territory and, either separately or united, pursue such objects as circumstances might require. A corps of reserve would be formed at Cawnpore for the purpose of operating as a check on any disposition which Sindhia might have to impede the Company's measures. It would act directly against his territories in Hindustan, in the event of his active hostility which, however, the Governor-General did not consider as a probability at all. The Bundelkhand Division would be maintained in a state

of efficiency and equipment for service; and the subsidiary forces in the Deccan and Gujarat, augmented as the occasion might require, would be so disposed as to be immediately available for any exigency which might arise. The Raja of Machery would, it was expected, offer the services of a body of troops which it would be desirable to accept in order to establish their habit of co-operation with the Company's forces.<sup>79</sup> Suitable measures would also be taken for the defence of the British frontier against the incursions of the "predatory hordes". Any deliberate or unprovoked act of hostility by Amir Khan against the British Government would compel it to "prosecute operations" against him; ".... in such an event his retreat from Jyepore will no longer be sufficient, .... they (i.e. Amir Khan and any one who might support him) shall be deprived of all their possessions and their power be utterly broken and destroyed",<sup>80</sup>

On April 20, 1816, instructions were issued to Major-General David Ochterlony. He was told that it would be the primary object of his exertions when he would advance into Jaipur to induce Amir Khan and his associates to withdraw in a peaceful manner. Should Amir Khan or any other chief persist in opposing him after explicit warning, they must be attacked and driven from the Jaipur territory. As soon as the territory should be cleared of intruders and the necessary provisions were made for its external security, Ochterlony would help the Raja in restoring his authority.<sup>81</sup>

The negotiations between the Company and Jaipur did not remain secret either to Sindhia or Amir Khan. Sindhia sought to prevent the extension of British influence in Rajputana. For his own preponderance in the affairs of the Rajput states he also wanted to weaken the Pathan adventurers hold in that part of India. He sent reinforcements to Bapu

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79. Ibid. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. V, pp. 88-89, 128.

80. Secret Consultations, 1816, April 20, No. 6.

81. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VI, pp. 57-65.

Sindhia, who was then in Rajputana; but at the same time he ordered him to conciliate the Rajputs by every means in his power. Sindhia wanted to refrain from making any extravagant demands upon the Raja of Jaipur at that time; he hoped that if he should relieve the Raja, the latter would not be disposed to make sacrifices to obtain British support. Sindhia also hoped that Amir Khan probably would not consider himself equal to the double task of subduing the Raja of Jaipur and of opposing the forces under Bapu Sindhia. If the Pathan chief retired from Jaipur, the field would be left open to Sindhia who would then be "at liberty to regulate his proceedings according to the disposition which he found prevalent in the Jeypore Durbar".<sup>82</sup>

Sindhia's calculations did not carry much weight in the British camp. Close, the British Resident with Sindhia, told Metcalfe that the Raja of Jaipur would feel no hesitation in discouraging by all means the expectation of Sindhia if the Raja was convinced that the principal object of Sindhia in expelling the Pathan chief was to establish his preponderance for securing to himself the undisturbed plunder of his territory.<sup>83</sup> So far as Sindhia's attitude was concerned, Close wrote on May 22, 1816 : "We cannot, from past experience, imagine that Scindia will remain silent under the prospect of his dominions being too nearly approached in their most vulnerable points, by the powers of the British Government, or perhaps even that His Highness will altogether abstain from movements of a menacing appearance with a view to making a last effort to deter us from advancing". But he did not apprehend any open act of hostility on his part.<sup>84</sup> Writing on June 2, 1816, he observed that Sindhia "appears now neither to possess the means of effectually assisting the Rajah of Jyepore, nor does he as it seems to my judgement apply those he has to any advantage".<sup>85</sup>

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82. Secret Consultations, 1816, May 25, No. 32; June 11, Nos. 27, 28; June 22, No. 26.

83. Ibid., 1816, June 11, No. 27.

84. Ibid., 1816, June 11, No. 28.

85. Ibid., 1816, June 15, No. 11.

Pushed into a corner by British diplomacy, Sindhia and Amir Khan tried to form a coalition against the Company. Sindhia declared to the vakil of Jaipur in his camp that in the event of his master veering round to the English, he would unite his interests with those of Amir Khan and would "carry ravage and destruction" throughout Jaipur territories. Perhaps this was no idle threat. Actually a change in Sindhia's policy towards Amir Khan was noticed. To exclude British influence from Jaipur Sindhia now sought to come to an understanding with Amir Khan. Amir Khan's situation also favoured an understanding with the Maratha chief. On receipt of information about negotiations between the British and Jaipur, he began to press Jaipur more closely than ever and brought together the divisions of the forces under himself, Raja Bahadur, Jamshid Khan and Mahtab Khan, to invest the city. Amir Khan was aware of the difficulty of subduing Jaipur while being opposed by the forces of Sindhia. He opened secret negotiations with Sindhia, persuaded him to forget their former enmity and urged joint action for the common object of keeping the British power out of Jaipur. Sindhia, too, appeared to apprehend some danger to his general interests in alienating the Pathan chief. An agreement with Amir Khan, he thought, would alarm the Raja of Jaipur and restrain him from "putting his seal irrevocably" to any treaty with the Company. Close had the information that Sindhia had encouraged Amir Khan to fear nothing from him.<sup>86</sup>

While such an understanding was growing between the Maratha chief and the Pathan adventurer, the latter was engaged in active operations almost under the walls of Jaipur. In June, 1816, several actions took place between his forces and those of Jaipur. There were losses on both sides. Amir Khan's forces failed to achieve a decisive victory, though the Raja found the situation critical. After these "unsuccessful contests", Amir Khan effected his retreat

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86. Secret Consultations, 1816, May 25, No. 32; June 11, No. 27;

June 15, Nos. 10 and 11; July 13, No. 12. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, No. 277.

from Jaipur.<sup>87</sup>

Meanwhile, in accordance with the orders of the Governor-General in Council, Metcalfe had set about negotiating for the proposed alliance between the Company and Jaipur. But, curiously enough, the response of Jaipur was found unsatisfactory, and the negotiations were delayed. In his letter to Close dated May 26, 1816, Metcalfe stated : "The conduct of the Court of Jypoor, since it received intimation of the disposition of our Government to negotiate a treaty of protection and alliance, has not corresponded with its former eagerness in pressing its own overture".<sup>88</sup> For a few days the vakils of Jaipur stationed in Delhi "even omitted their ordinary visits on stated days, which they had never before omitted for years, as if ashamed of the apparent inconsistency of their own court".<sup>89</sup> The delay may be due to different factors. As Metcalfe thought, the ministers of Jaipur probably found it difficult to make up their minds as to the terms on which they should enter into the proposed alliance. A section in the Court of Jaipur was even averse to alliance. Many chiefs, with their strong national prejudices, opposed the alliance either from jealousy of the introduction of a European power, or from a dread that the restoration of power to their prince would curb their weight and independence, and in several cases diminish the usurped acquisitions which they possessed in consequence of his weakness.<sup>90</sup> The rumour that the British troops were immediately to march to Jaipur<sup>91</sup> also might have had some effect. Metcalfe wrote to Adam : "The private notifications from me of my being authorized to negotiate, was accompanied by public rumours of vast military preparations on our part.... It is possible that the court of Jyepoor may have had its suspicions excited by these reports, and perhaps to this may be

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87. Secret Consultations, 1816, June 29, No. 12; July 6, No. 25; July 27, No. 10.

88. Ibid., 1816, June 15, No. 8.

89. Ibid., 1816, September 7, No. 5.

90. Ibid., 1816, September 7, Nos. 5, 6.

91. Ibid., 1816, June 15, No. 10.

attributed the caution and delay which preceded the commencement of the negotiation".<sup>92</sup> On the other hand, the courts of Sindhia and Holkar endeavoured to prevent the accomplishment of the alliance. The conciliatory policy of Sindhia roused in Raja Jagat Singh a hope of relief from him and also of his help against Amir Khan. This probably made the Raja rather indifferent towards the proposed alliance with the Company.<sup>93</sup> It would not probably be incorrect to state in this connection that dilatoriness and indecision were not unnatural for the government of Jaipur headed by a Raja lacking steadiness in character which rendered it difficult to form a judgement of what he might ultimately determine upon.

In his despatch to Adam, dated August 7, 1816, Metcalfe reported that "the first semblance" on the part of the vakils of Jaipur "to enter on serious negotiation" was a proposal to the effect that "an English Gentleman" should be sent to Jaipur for the purpose of negotiating the proposed alliance. Metcalfe also observed that the motives of this proposal were evident. Amir Khan was advancing in full force against Jaipur. The mission of "an English Gentleman" would have indicated to him the determination of the British Government to protect Jaipur and would have had nearly the same effect as a treaty in deterring him from violent measures. The mission of "an English Gentleman" would also have shown the anxiety of the Company to accomplish the alliance and apparently would have reversed the relative positions of the two powers in the negotiations. Though the mission might possibly "have tended to expedite the conclusion of a treaty from the advantage of direct intercourse with the Rajah and his principal ministers", Metcalfe could not overlook the chance of failure and its effect. Naturally he rejected the proposal. He expected that the greater the apprehension entertained of Amir Khan by the court of Jaipur, the more speedily the treaty would be concluded on the terms of the Company. From the British point of view it was indispensable that the

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92. Ibid., 1816, September 7, No. 5.

93. Ibid., 1816, May 25, No. 32; June 15, No. 8; June 29, No. 13; September 7, No. 5.

Raja of Jaipur should seek the British alliance ostensibly as well as in reality. An unsuccessful attempt was next made by the vakils of Jaipur to persuade Metcalfe to mention the terms on which a treaty would be agreed to before any person had been appointed by Jaipur with full powers to negotiate.<sup>94</sup>

Meanwhile Amir Khan had collected all his forces and advanced to attack Jaipur. As Metcalfe observed, the Pathan chief "wished to anticipate the connection (between the Company and Jaipur) that he apprehended and sought by a decisive blow completely to prevent it, either by bringing the Rajah entirely within his own power or by effecting at least a change in the Ministry and putting in men connected with himself".<sup>95</sup> The attack of Amir Khan and the change in Sindhia's policy as stated above were followed by the revival of the earnestness on the part of the government of Jaipur for British protection and alliance.<sup>96</sup>

Sankar Das, a respectable banker, who had considerable influence at the court of Jaipur, was sent from Jaipur to negotiate with Metcalfe for the proposed alliance. The vakils of Jaipur, residing in Delhi, also joined Sankar Das in the negotiations. The latter was made "the principal and most responsible person". Thus "the negotiation opened, with the advantage on our (British) side of their (the vakils of Jaipur) master being hard pressed by his enemies and with every appearance of earnestness on their part".<sup>97</sup>

At first it was agreed that in lieu of the protection sought by the Raja of Jaipur, the British were entitled not only to payment of the expenses incurred in affording that protection but also other conditions necessary for the efficient working of the alliance. With regard to the amount to be paid by Jaipur, Metcalfe informed the vakils that the expenses of the subsidiary force, to be stationed in Jaipur for its protection, would amount to

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94. Secret Consultations, 1816, September 7, No. 5.

95. Ibid.

96. Secret Consultations, 1816, June 15, No. 10; June 29, No. 13; July 6, No. 25; July 13, No. 12; September 7, No. 5.

97. Ibid., 1816, September 7, No. 5.

25 lakhs of rupees per annum. This was, however, too large a sum and the revenues of Jaipur - "either under present circumstances or in past years of prosperity" - would be inadequate for such heavy payment. The vakils of Jaipur could not agree to the amount suggested by Metcalfe. Then the latter wished to insert in the treaty an article to the effect that the proposed sum of 25 lakhs of rupees should be paid whenever the resources of Jaipur should admit of it; in the meantime the Company should take a smaller sum, determined according to a fair and just consideration of the resources of Jaipur, on which point the British Government should be the sole judge. The vakils of Jaipur were decidedly averse to the mention of 25 lakhs, as it would prove a warrant for insisting on the full payment of that sum at any time. So Metcalfe abandoned that plan and proposed that Jaipur would pay 15 lakhs of rupees when security and prosperity would be established in that country. The vakils pleaded the inability of the Raja to pay so large a sum. Metcalfe could not ignore the factor that the devastation which had affected the territories of Jaipur for many years, and the actual occupation of a considerable portion of the country by its enemies, afforded the vakils of Jaipur a reasonable ground for alleging the payment of any considerable sum at first as impracticable. He then endeavoured to induce a more ready compliance with the ultimate payment of 15 lakhs by the prospect of a respite for some years. He proposed that the full amount would not be taken until after the expiry of five years and for those five years the following arrangement might be made : for the first year nothing was to be paid on account of the ruined state of the country, for the second and third year 5 lakhs each, for the fourth and fifth year 10 lakhs each, and afterwards 15 lakhs annually. The question of subsidy was thus agreed upon and no material difference seemed to exist on any other point. It was agreed that the treaty would be finally settled and signed on the following day. Metcalfe wrote : "We parted that day with an apparent conviction on their(the vakils of Jaipur) part and certainly a real one on mine that our discussions were brought to

a close, and that the treaty would be signed on the ensuing day".<sup>98</sup>

On the next day Metcalfe noticed an unexpected change in the attitude of the vakils. They were unwilling to accept and sign the draft of the treaty prepared by Metcalfe in the light of the discussions in their previous meetings. They commenced their observations upon it in a decidedly altered tone. They objected to the amount of the subsidy for the first five years. Metcalfe agreed to reduce the amount, for the fourth and fifth years, from 10 lakhs to 8. The vakils then demanded the restoration of the territories of Tonk and Rampura which had formerly belonged to Jaipur. These districts were then in the nominal possession of Holkar but under the actual control of Amir Khan. Metcalfe told the vakils that if neither of them opposed the execution of the terms of the proposed alliance, those places "must in good faith remain in their possession". These districts had long been separated from the dominions of Jaipur. Tonk and Rampura were occupied by the British from Holkar in 1804 and restored to him in 1806. Metcalfe pointed out that when these districts had been for two years (1804-1806) in the possession of the Company during the period of its former alliance with Jaipur, no demand for their restoration had been made by the Raja. On the contrary, when they had been offered to the Raja before they were restored to Holkar, the Raja declined lest he should offend Holkar. Metcalfe further stated that the proper time for making any claim for Tonk and Rampura would come if they ever came into the Company's possession. It would then be at the option of the British Government to negotiate any arrangement for the disposal of those districts or to retain them in its hands as might seem best.<sup>99</sup> Metcalfe personally was in favour of keeping them in the Company's hands for their strategic importance. Metcalfe wrote to Adam : "The fort of Rampoor is a post of which we know the value by experience and the district yields four or five lacs of annual revenue".<sup>100</sup> Having

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98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. Secret Consultations, 1816, August 3, No. 4.

heard Metcalfe, Sankar Das, the chief among the vakils, declared that he was not at liberty to sign any treaty without obtaining a satisfactory promise with regard to Tonk and Rampura. As Metcalfe refused to yield on this point, the vakils declared it necessary to refer the matter to the court of Jaipur. Hence the negotiations remained suspended.<sup>101</sup>

In explanation of this unexpected change on the part of the vakils of Jaipur Metcalfe wrote to Adam : "Either I had misunderstood them or they had altered their minds or they had received fresh instructions from Jyepore". Actually this unexpected turn in the negotiations was due to more than one factor. Metcalfe had failed to notice earlier that the terms so far agreed upon had not been to the real satisfaction of the other party. Later he himself observed : " .... it is very probable that it (the court of Jaipur) flattered itself that this (British protection) might be obtained on easier terms than those which have been proposed".<sup>102</sup> Further, the government of Jaipur probably was not still in a position to give final instructions to its vakils. Metcalfe wrote to the authorities in Calcutta : "It is perhaps most probable that the court of Jyepoor has not really determined what course to pursue, and that there are at present two parties at work, one recommending an alliance with us on the terms insisted on, and the other objecting either to the terms or to the alliance, and urging an arrangement with the plunderers of the country".<sup>103</sup> The chiefs who, either for "national prejudices" or fear of reduction of their power, were opposed to the alliance, were still quite powerful and influential.<sup>104</sup> Even those who were well-disposed to the alliance were "jealous of the present minister, and anxious he should not have the credit of accomplishing it".<sup>105</sup> Another vital factor was perhaps the retreat of Amir Khan which for the time being seemed to render the need of the British protection less

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101. Ibid., 1816, September 7, No. 5.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Secret Consultations, 1816, August 3, No. 3; September 7, Nos. 5, 6.

105. Ibid., 1816, September 7, No. 6.

urgent. It also appeared that the Jaipur Darbar wanted to protract the negotiations with the Company in order to obtain better terms from Sindhia and Amir Khan.<sup>106</sup>

This unexpected disappointment, however, did not dishearten Metcalfe. He wrote to Adam that he did not "despair of making the treaty at last", for the distress of the government of Jaipur was of "a permanent nature" and "the permanent relief" lay in British protection.<sup>107</sup> Jealousy and natural dislike of external influence could not - he thought - keep Jaipur suspicious of British connection for any length of time. He confidently believed that the sight of "so many petty states" enjoying tranquillity and prosperity under British protection, and of countries excluded from it but devastated and torn to pieces, must have its effect in spite of all prejudices.<sup>108</sup> The observations made by Close, the Resident with Sindhia, in his letter to Adam, dated June 14, 1816, also support Metcalfe's expectation. Close wrote : "The Rajah of Jyepore must sooner or later perceive (if he has not already done so) how vain it is to place any dependence upon the assistance of this(Sindhia's) Government ..... Even if he(Amir Khan) should be compelled by force of arms to retire from Jyepore, his army would still be at liberty to range through the country and lay it waste with all the animosity and resentment embittered by disgrace, for the Rajah's army constituted, as it now is, would never be able unassisted to cope with Meer(Amir) Khan in the field at a distance from the capital".<sup>109</sup> Actually after his retreat from before the city of Jaipur Amir Khan continued to plunder some parts of the state.<sup>110</sup>

After the postponement of the negotiations Metcalfe saw the vakils of Jaipur occasionally but only to hear their excuses for the delay which had occurred in the

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106. Secret Consultations, 1816, August 3, No. 3; September 7, Nos. 5, 6, 7.

107. Ibid., 1816, August 3, No. 3.

108. Ibid., 1816, September 7, No. 5.

109. Ibid., 1816, June 29, No. 13.

110. Ibid., 1816, September 7, No. 5.

arrival of a definitive answer from Jaipur. In the meantime he had informed the Supreme Government in Calcutta of the interruption of his negotiations with the vakils of Jaipur. On the receipt of the first report from Metcalfe the Governor-General in Council decided that the "delusive conduct" of the Raja of Jaipur entitled him to no consideration.<sup>111</sup> The character and honour of the British Government required that he should be distinctly apprised of "the impression which his conduct ... made on the mind of the Governor-General in Council". It was thought that such an intimation would probably bring him at once to a decision. Metcalfe was instructed to inform the vakils of Jaipur that if the Raja did not "immediately recover the false step he ... (had) taken and conclude the alliance on the terms already (proposed) ...., he must consider the negotiation at an end and must abide the consequences of this decision in the ruin and devastation of his country without an effort on the part of the British to save him",<sup>112</sup> Metcalfe communicated with the vakils of Jaipur in accordance with the instructions of the Governor-General in Council. He also addressed a letter to the Raja in the same spirit. Then Metcalfe received two letters from Jaipur, one of which was written by the Raja himself. The substance of these letters was that a minister was to be deputed to negotiate with him for the final adjustment of the terms of a treaty. Metcalfe felt that it would mean "further delay" and "protracted negotiation", while "the issue would be doubtful". He, therefore, declared the negotiations to be at an end on account of the "persevering evasion" of the court of Jaipur. He thought that the "total cessation of every appearance of readiness" on the part of the British to afford assistance might perhaps bring the court of Jaipur to its senses. He still believed that in view of the permanent nature of its distress and also in the context of the political condition of India, the government of Jaipur would have eventually to accept British protection.<sup>113</sup>

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111. Ibid., 1816, August 3, Nos. 3, 4, 5; September 7, No. 5.

112. Ibid., 1816, August 3, No. 5.

113. Ibid., 1816, September 7, Nos. 6, 7.

Further instructions were received by Metcalfe from the authorities in Calcutta. The "deceitful and evasive conduct" of the court of Jaipur no doubt provoked the disgust of the Governor-General in Council. Yet, in view of the consideration that the advantages of the proposed alliance were not "immaterial" to the Company, it was decided by them "to leave it to the operation of time and events to awaken the Rajah (of Jaipur) to a just sense of his interests". The Governor-General in Council authorized Metcalfe to entertain any proposition from the Raja of Jaipur for the conclusion of a treaty of alliance, should the terms previously agreed upon be revived by the Raja. They particularly wanted in the treaty the inclusion of a provision to the effect that any demands of other states on the Raja of Jaipur should be submitted to the arbitration of the British Government and that the Raja would abide by its award. Such a provision was necessary to counteract "the pretence" on the part of Sindhia or other powers that the treaty invaded their rights in relation to Jaipur. The Governor-General in Council also expressed their satisfaction at the conduct of affairs by Metcalfe. They considered the whole of his "proceeding throughout this negotiation to have displayed the same ability, zeal, firmness and addresses which ... (had) uniformly distinguished ... (his) official conduct in the many arduous and important transactions in which (he) .... (had) been engaged".<sup>114</sup>

In his reply Metcalfe informed the authorities in Calcutta that in the event of the conclusion of any treaty the above stipulation about arbitration would form a part of it according to their orders. At the same time he did not fail to bring to their notice the fact that he had not been unaware of the importance of the inclusion of such a stipulation in the treaty; indeed, the first draft prepared by him had contained a provision that all disputes between the Raja of Jaipur and other powers and all claims on him by other powers should be submitted to the arbitration of the British Government. This provision had to be dropped owing to "extreme apprehension and reluctance" against it on the part of the

urged Metcalfe to promise the Raja of Jaipur in writing that he would endeavour to prevail on the Governor-General to comply with their wishes if by any event Tonk and Rampura should come into the possession of the Company. Metcalfe told the vakils that it was not in his power to make any such promise. Then the vakils seemed to abandon the matter. "It appeared as if the attempt had been made with a previous conviction that it would not succeed".<sup>119</sup> The vakils then urged upon Metcalfe what he called the "most preposterous proposal", the grant of jagirs or pensions for themselves. Metcalfe rejected it as absurd. The vakils also made a request to the effect that the British Resident at the court of Jaipur might be a man of "mild and kind disposition and deportment". Metcalfe replied that "it was to be presumed that any gentleman appointed would possess the qualities".<sup>120</sup>

Then Metcalfe proposed the additional stipulation lately enjoined by the Governor-General in Council, regarding British arbitration in all claims that might be advanced against the state of Jaipur. The proposed article was as follows : "The Rajah of Jypoor will not negotiate with any other state without the approbation and advice of the Hon'ble Company's Government, and if any one pretend to have a cause of dispute or claim against the Rajah, the settlement of it shall be referred to the arbitration of the Hon'ble Company". The vakils strongly opposed it. They considered that the proposed stipulation might lead to "an investigation of the right of Rajah Jugut Sing to the sovereignty of Jypoor", and would bind him to abdicate in the event of the British Government sanctioning the claim of another. Particular allusion was made to Man Singh, the pretender to the dominion of Jaipur, who was <sup>then</sup> residing at Gwalior. Metcalfe then agreed to include in the treaty a special guarantee of the sovereignty of Jaipur in favour of Raja Jagat Singh and his offspring. The vakils further stated that they did not know to "what extensive and indefinite demands" they might be subjecting themselves, should they bind themselves to abide by the British Government's decision on every claim that might be brought forward

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119. Ibid., 1816, December 17, No. 2.

120. Ibid.

against them. Metcalfe endeavoured to allay the alarm of the vakils about the stipulation. He pointed out that the provision of such a stipulation would evince the desire of the British Government to respect all just rights and enable it to reply satisfactorily to "any clamour" by the "foreign" courts against the alliance. Metcalfe was also willing to modify the language of the article in order to render it acceptable to both parties. He offered to replace "the settlement of such claims shall be referred to the arbitration of the Hon'ble Company" by "the settlement of such claims shall be effected with the concurrence of both states".<sup>121</sup>

It appeared to Metcalfe that the alarm of the vakils was particularly directed towards a bond for an immense sum given by the Raja of Jaipur to Holkar "many years ago" and also towards some later personal engagements with Muhammad Shah Khan and Mahtab Khan, the partisans of Amir Khan. Metcalfe did not consider it incumbent on the Company's Government to listen to the personal demands of the partisans of Amir Khan. He suggested a change of the article to the effect that if Sindhia and Holkar advanced any claims against the Raja of Jaipur about matters arising since the dissolution of the British alliance with the Raja in 1806, such claims should be referred to the arbitration of the British Government. The proposal seemed to be satisfactory to the vakils. To Metcalfe the final conclusion of the treaty then seemed to be feasible.<sup>122</sup>

At this stage the vakils of Jaipur raised a new obstacle to the conclusion of the treaty. They did not "expect" that the ratification of the treaty by their Raja "would be received in the regular way". So they desired Metcalfe "to be satisfied for the present with a treaty signed by themselves". Metcalfe rejected "this extraordinary proposal", as no treaty concluded with the vakils could be acted on until regular ratification. Metcalfe doubted the sincerity of the vakils in their professed desire to conclude a treaty. As he observed, it looked "as if procrastination were still their object". In this connection Metcalfe wrote to the authorities in Calcutta :

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121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

"A protracted and open negotiation is attended with many advantages to the Rajah of Jypoor. It overawes his enemies, and enables him to make better terms with them. It does not bind him to anything and it puts it in his power to close with the terms offered in a case of necessity. It is attended with some of the advantages, without any of the sacrifices and restraints of an actual alliance. And it keeps open the chapter of accidents in which the politicians of this country delight to put their trust".<sup>123</sup>

The vakils persevered in pursuing their objective in spite of Metcalfe's categorical rejection. They proposed further discussion on the point and, in the event of its failure, reference to their court about it. Metcalfe did not agree to this proposition; he thought that it would not be productive of any beneficial result but a revival of tedious and protracted negotiations. He discontinued the negotiations at this stage, although he did not give up his hope that Jaipur's distress would compel it to seek British protection once again.<sup>124</sup> This break in the negotiations was followed by a very "extraordinary proceeding" on the part of the authorities at Jaipur. Raja Manji Das, the chief minister of Jaipur, gave out publicly that the agents of Jaipur had never been authorized by him to conclude a treaty including a stipulation for payment of money. The vakils of Jaipur at Delhi endeavoured to "apologize" for this declaration. They pointed out to Metcalfe: ".... the negotiation having failed, notwithstanding their agreement on the subject of money payments, the consequences might be serious to the Minister from internal factions and to the Government from external enemies, were not the truth which had been buzzed abroad publicly denied ...."<sup>125</sup> They further said that the majority of the chiefs of the state of Jaipur were averse to the connection, specially if coupled with pecuniary sacrifices, and might combine for the overthrow of the minister if they "believed" the reports of "the extent of the payment to which he had agreed". Amir Khan might also be

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123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Secret Consultations, 1817, February 4, No. 1.

determined to wreak his vengeance on the state of Jaipur if he were aware of the terms to which the court of Jaipur had ~~assented~~ assented without accomplishing its object. To this explanation Metcalfe gave credit in some measure. He did not believe that the negotiators agreed to the stipulation in the proposed treaty regarding money payment without authority. He wrote letters to the Raja of Jaipur and the Minister, expressing his strong ~~xxxxxxxx~~ resentment at this turn of events. He observed: ".... either the negotiators had agreed to those stipulations in disobedience of their instructions, in which case they deserved punishment and were not fit to be employed, or the Court after giving assent to those stipulations had uttered a falsehood in denying it .... in either case it would be difficult to place any confidence in the future negotiations of the Court".<sup>126</sup>

Early in 1817 Amir Khan advanced once again in the direction of Jaipur. This movement was followed by some slight indications of a desire on the part of Jaipur to set on foot again the negotiations for British alliance. Metcalfe did not think that the conclusion of the alliance was even then really intended. The Jaipur court was also negotiating with Amir Khan. Metcalfe suspected that the revival of the negotiations with him might be intended to influence the "proceedings" of Amir Khan. The court of Jaipur not only made a considerable delay in replying to ~~M~~ Metcalfe's remonstrances about Manji Das' statement but gave an evasive answer. Though it was admitted that the payment of money was the principal subject of discussion, it was implied that "the agents had agreed to more than they had authority for". Metcalfe had, however, some satisfaction ; the reply had shown that the minister could not adhere to his declaration. The vakils of Jaipur in Delhi seemed to look forward to the removal of the present minister from power as an event which would facilitate the conclusion of the alliance which, they said, the Raja had much at heart. They wished Metcalfe to give encouragement to another party to assume the reins of government, but the

British Resident refused to take part in their internal dissensions.<sup>127</sup>

Towards the end of June, 1817, Metcalfe reported to the authorities in Calcutta that the Raja of Jaipur had thrown into confinement his chief minister Manji Das and his colleagues. The cause assigned for this measure was the general mismanagement<sup>of affairs.</sup> The immediate cause appeared to be the murder of one of the Raja's favourites by the order of the minister. The agents of Jaipur in Delhi seemed to think that the dismissal of Manji Das would lead to a renewal of overtures. They even sounded Metcalfe as to the likelihood of any modification of the terms on which he had insisted in the late negotiations. Metcalfe neither invited nor discouraged the renewal of overtures as regards the conditions already discussed and understood. He was not yet sure that the dismissal of the minister would be immediately attended with any improvement in the Company's relations with the court of Jaipur. He believed that the Raja was inclined to place himself under British protection, but some of those who had most influence over him were not of the same way of thinking. Metcalfe, of course, continued to believe that distress would ultimately force him to rush into British arms.<sup>128</sup> But he had to wait for the development of Lord Hastings' comprehensive policy for political reconstruction of Central India and Rajputana.

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127. Secret Consultations, 1817, April 19, No. 2.

128. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VIII, p. 99.

## CHAPTER VI

## ALLIANCES WITH RAJPUT STATES

While Metcalfe was trying to overcome the almost inexplicable scruples and vacillations of the vakils of Jaipur, the question of the extirpation of the Pindaris had become an urgent one. From the point of view of peace and security as well as British prestige it could no longer be ignored. The "impunity" with which in March, 1816, the Pindaris had made inroads into Guntur, Cuddapah and Masulipatam encouraged them to renew their depredations either in British territories or in allied states. By the middle of November a considerable body of Pindaris entered into Berar. A group advanced into the territories of the Nizam and followed a westerly direction in order to ravage the British territories to the south of the Tungabhadra. The indecision of the leaders, however, hindered their movement. A detachment of the Hyderabad subsidiary force under Major Macdowall took advantage of it and fell upon them near Bidar. Many of the Pindaris were killed and a thousand horses were taken. About the same time another party of Pindaris proceeded towards Ahmedabad through Berar. Major Lushington, who with the 4th Madras native cavalry was returning from the Peshwa's territory, took them by surprise. In the skirmishes that followed, the main body of this Pindari party was broken up, several hundreds being killed and numerous horses being captured. In December a large body of the Pindaris also made incursions into the Northern Circars. They plundered and burnt the town of Kimeri and the neighbouring villages. They committed ravages in the district and the town of Ganjam. Even Cuttack was in danger, when they moved to the rugged country northwest of Cuttack. Finally, they retreated to the neighbourhood of their haunts along the upper course of the Narbada, having suffered at the hands of the troops commanded by Lt. Borthwick, Col. Adams, Captain Caulfield and Major

Clarke.<sup>1</sup>

The news of the ravages of the Pindaris in the Northern Circars reached the authorities of Calcutta. In December, 1816, the Governor-General in Council held the unanimous opinion that the extirpation of the Pindaris must be undertaken immediately. But there were difficulties in the way of the immediate implementation of this decision. The Governor-General had not yet received instructions from the Home authorities to undertake a comprehensive scheme for the eradication of the Pindaris. It was also found not practicable to make effective military arrangements for the purpose until after the rainy season of the following year. As the Governor-General wrote on December 23, 1816, the ravages of the Pindaris in the Ganjam district, with the consequent danger of Cuttack, and their depredations in the territories of the Nizam, led the members of his Council to take an unanimous decision for immediate extirpation of the Pindaris, notwithstanding the orders of the Court of Directors against adopting any measures against those predatory forces which might embroil the Company with Sindhia. "No step", Lord Hastings observed, "could be taken for the suppression of those gangs which would not have a tendency to involve us in hostilities with Scindiah and Holkar, who regard the Pindarries as their dependents". But he could not do "what honour and interest advised .... in the teeth of the Court's prohibition" and opposition from his colleagues. Now the Council was on his side, but the climate was against him. As he remarked, "Before I could assemble the different divisions requisite for expelling the Pindarries from their fortresses, and for, at the same time, overawing Scindiah, the hot winds would be at hand; and I dare not

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1. Mill, op.cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 194-200. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. II, pp. 153-154. Parliamentary Papers, (House of Commons), Vol. 11, 1818, Paper 370, Nos. 45, 46, 47. Duff, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 395-396. Prinsep, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 402. Ross-of-Bladensburg, op.cit., pp. 96-97. Origin of the Pindaries, p. 129. Burton, op.cit., pp. 7-8.

expose to such a season our troops, which, native as well as European, have been singularly debilitated by the most severe and extensive epidemic fever ever known in India".<sup>2</sup> In short, Lord Hastings had to wait till the end of the next rainy season.

In the mean time the Governor-General received instructions from his superiors in England to take effective measures for the suppression of the predatory bodies. He was authorized to dislodge the Pindaris from their haunts in Malwa and Sagar and make such arrangements with the chiefs in neighbourhood or with those to whom the British might restore the lands recovered from the Pindaris, as would prevent their re-establishment in that part of India.<sup>3</sup>

Lord Hastings' endeavour for the suppression of the Pindaris and the extirpation of the predatory system necessitated not only extensive military operations against them but also comprehensive political arrangements in Rajputana and Central India. The co-operation or submission of Sindhia, Holkar and Amir Khan was considered necessary for the success of the scheme. The Governor-General thought that the treaties concluded with Sindhia and Holkar in 1805-6 had become virtually invalid since the Pindaris, dependent on them, were plundering the territories of the Company. Besides the treaty of confederacy<sup>4</sup> by which the Maratha chiefs engaged to

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2. The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, Vol. II, pp. 153-154.

3. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 18.

4. In 1814 the Peshwa, engaged in intrigues with the object of organizing once more a confederacy of the Maratha chiefs against the British, sent envoys to Sindhia, Holkar and Bhonsle. A secret treaty of general confederacy was "actually" concluded. Its object was to strengthen themselves and unite together in case the Company should contemplate any further encroachment on their rights or territories, or even to take the offensive against the English if any opportunity should arise. (Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 364. Sardesai, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 452. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 147.).

obey and serve the Peshwa, the Governor-General had many proofs of secret hostilities, particularly on the part of Sindhia. He decided to declare the treaties of 1805-6 cancelled and to propose to these two powers new treaties of alliance. The dissolution of the treaty of 1805 with Sindhia would automatically relieve the Company from the obligation of the 8th article of the treaty which restrained the latter from entering into treaties with the Rajput Rajas. Sindhia was now to be asked to agree that the British would be free to conclude such engagements as they might think proper with the Rajas of Udaipur, Jodhpur, Kotah, Bundi and every "substantive" state on the left bank of the Chambal. The government of Holkar would be asked to engage to abstain from all interference or connection with the states of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Kotah, Bundi, and all "substantive" states on the left bank of the Chambal.<sup>5</sup> In short, Lord Hastings decided to ask Sindhia and Holkar to withdraw from Rajputana. It would facilitate his effort to secure the co-operation of the Rajput states against the Pindaris and to extend the long-awaited British control and protection to them. On October 8, 1817, Adam wrote to Metcalfe : "... the several petty states of Hindostan (the Rajput states) ... will be relieved from the thralldom of the military and predatory powers by the result of our negotiations with Scindia and Holkar, or by the success of our arms, should those chiefs compel us to wage war against them".<sup>6</sup> Amir Khan was to be required to withdraw his forces from the territories of the Rajput Rajas and to restore to them their lands and forts "held by his officers". The Pathan chief was also to engage never to interfere in future with those Rajas. The British would treat him as an enemy if he did not immediately withdraw from the Rajput territories and desist from his predatory course of life.<sup>7</sup>

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5. Secret Consultations, 1817, October 28, No. 13. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 9, pp. 86-136, 277-287. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 10-17, 20-21, 26-27. Duff, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 397-400.

6. Secret Consultations, 1817, October 28, No. 26.

7. Ibid., 1817, October 28, No. 13. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 9, pp. 222-226.

The Governor-General planned to establish political connections with the Rajput states. The general object was to establish a barrier against the revival of the predatory system and the extension of the power of Sindhia and Holkar beyond the limits to be assigned to it by the measures now in progress. Engagements were to be concluded with the Rajput rulers "on conditions which should give to the British Government the entire control over their political relations and proceedings with each other and with foreign states, secure to them the enjoyment of their territorial possessions and the independent exercise of their internal administration under our (British) protection and guarantee, and render their resources available for defraying the charge that will be incurred in the establishment and support of this system". The question of tribute due to Sindhia and Holkar from these states was to be treated as one between the British Government and those two Maratha chiefs exclusively so that all direct intercourse and connection between the Rajput states and the Marathas should cease.<sup>8</sup>

Lord Hastings thought that his object might be accomplished either by combining the Rajput states, at least the three principal states of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur, in a common league under the ~~own~~ paramount authority of the British Government, or by concluding separate engagements with each state on conditions suitable to "its peculiar circumstances and situation". The first alternative might appear to be more advantageous than the second, on account of "the similarity of features which in some respects they all exhibit". But there were such distinctions in their circumstances and situation as would render it difficult to frame "any system of general confederation" which would adapt itself to the circumstances of all. Further, "feelings of pride and jealousy" might induce them to desire a separate alliance with the Company by which each would preserve the appearance and form of a substantive power. They might feel that a union "would bring their common dependence on

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8. Secret Consultations, 1817, October 28, No. 26.

the British Government too prominently forward". Hence the Governor-General was of opinion that it would be necessary to conclude engagements with each separately. Of course the same general principles would form the basis of a treaty with each state.<sup>9</sup>

It was considered expedient for the British Government to conclude such treaties with the following states : Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Kotah, Bundi, Karauli and Banswara. The system was probably to be extended to other small states which were situated on the borders of Gujarat and exposed to the ravages of the troops of Sindhia and Holkar and of other predatory hordes. A connection with Jaisalmer and Bikaner would probably also be expedient but it would not require to be so close as that contemplated with the above states.<sup>10</sup>

With regard to the conditions of an alliance with Jaipur, no major deviation from those already agreed upon appeared to be necessary. Lord Hastings contemplated changes only in respect of the stipulation of British arbitration in matters of pecuniary claims of other states upon Jaipur, the amount of the subsidy, and the demand of a fort for stationing British troops. The Governor-General thought that in the then circumstances neither Sindhia nor Holkar could maintain any claim to tribute from Jaipur. It appeared to him quite unnecessary to insist on the provision for British arbitration which had been found to be "so repugnant to the wishes and alarming to the fears of the Government of Jyepore". As regards subsidy, Adam wrote to Metcalfe on October 8, 1817 : "As Jyepore is not alone to reap the benefit of our protection, it may not be necessary to require from her the full amount of subsidy originally demanded, but .... she ought to contribute in a large proportion to the charge of the general defence".<sup>11</sup> The "unqualified demand" of a fort might not be necessary; it was not certain, indeed "not probable", that the force that might be allotted for

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9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

the protection of that part of India would be stationed in Jaipur.<sup>12</sup>

Jodhpur might be "a country of small pecuniary resources", but "the proverbial bravery of its inhabitants" would enable its government to furnish a powerful body of auxiliaries for the service of the British Government and the allied states. This should be "the principal description of aid" to be required from Jodhpur in the event of the establishment of an intimate connection between the Company and that state. Besides, a pecuniary contribution towards the cost of the protecting force should, "if attainable", be required from Jodhpur. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities with Sindhia or Holkar, the amount of the fixed tribute received by those chiefs should be appropriated to <sup>the</sup> ~~this~~ ~~the~~ purpose of the maintenance of the protecting force. In the opposite event a corresponding sum must be paid to the British Government for the purpose of "making good their engagements with Scindia or Holkar, or both".<sup>13</sup>

Udaipur was considered "to be a very productive country and capable of yielding a large revenue". But at that time it was in a state of great distraction. To make it a useful unit of the proposed league it was necessary to establish the Rana's authority and settle the country. The same task would have to be taken up with respect to both Jaipur and Jodhpur which were almost in an equally distracted state. The Rana of Udaipur had lately made a direct application for British protection and offered a fourth of the estimated revenue of the country. To Lord Hastings' Government it afforded "the most favourable opportunity of opening a negotiation for this purpose".<sup>14</sup> The Governor-General considered it desirable to obtain as large a proportion of the revenues of Udaipur as might be practicable on account of the subsidy. "If any accurate estimate could be

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12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 8, pp. 114-115.

formed of the probable resources of Oudypore when the country is in a state of order and quiet, it might be expedient to stipulate for a fixed sum rather than a proportion of its revenues, which would be fluctuating and require a periodical adjustment of accounts".<sup>15</sup>

The engagement with Kotah would be framed on principles similar to those on which the British connection with other states would be established. The local situation of the territory of Kotah and the character of its de facto ruler, Raj Rana Zalim Singh, would render him a useful adherent in the approaching operations against the Pindaris, and an efficient instrument for upholding and promoting the system which it was proposed "to substitute for that which has so long desolated the central provinces of India". Raj Rana Zalim Singh should, therefore, be invited to co-operate with the British Government in this work under an assurance of British protection and guarantee on their part on the other terms above enumerated. The amount of the tribute due from Kotah to Sindhia or Holkar must be "secured" or, in the event of the British being engaged in war with those chiefs, transferred to the Company. In that event, the districts which the Raj Rana had rented from those powers might be annexed permanently to the dominions of Kotah, unless they were conveniently situated for incorporation in British territory. No pledge of this nature was, however, to be held out in the first instance, although expectations were to be encouraged if Zalim Singh's conduct was found to be satisfactory in the event of hostilities with the Maratha chiefs. He was to be urged and encouraged by every practicable means to employ his troops with zeal and vigour in intercepting and destroying the Pindaris retreating before the Company's armies.<sup>16</sup> The co-operation of Kotah and Bundi, especially of the former, was essential for guarding the principal passages of the Chambal to "obstruct the flight of any bodies of Pindarries who may take that

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15. Secret Consultations, 1817, October 28, No. 26.

16. Ibid.

direction on the advance of the British troops".<sup>17</sup>

The resources of Bundi were "very inconsiderable". Yet, in view of "all the circumstances" of the Company's former relations with that state, the Governor-General was willing to afford it the protection of the British Government on the simple condition of allegiance, including the liability of employing its military force with zeal and spirit in the common cause. The customary subsidiary arrangements for giving the Company control over its political relations would be comprehended in the proposed engagement.<sup>18</sup>

The Governor-General also wanted an intimate connection with the petty state of Karauli, situated on the eastern limit of Jaipur. The connection would be established on the basis of the usual conditions of general allegiance, military service and British protection.<sup>19</sup> It was also thought that the chief of Banswara and other petty Rajas on the frontier of Gujarat might be with great advantage included in the proposed system. The advance of the British troops in the direction of their territories would probably bring them forward and afford opportunities of treating with them directly.<sup>20</sup>

Equally intimate relations were not considered necessary in the case of the more distant states of Jaisalmer and Bikaner. But an improvement of the British relations with those states was regarded as advisable. Adam wrote to Metcalfe : "...we should even spontaneously notify to them the object of the intended operations and call on them to exert themselves in attacking and destroying any bodies of plunderers who may seek refuge in their territories".<sup>21</sup> Any overtures from the rulers of Bikaner and

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17. Secret Consultations, 1817, November 28, No. 3.

18. Secret Consultations, 1817, October 28, No. 26.

19. Ibid. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VII, pp. 180-181; Vol. VIII, No. 56.

20. Secret Consultations, 1817, October 28, No. 26.

21. Ibid.

Jaisalmer should be welcomed and listened to. While "the formation of a nearer connexion"<sup>22</sup> with Bikaner was desirable, the distance of Jaisalmer made it "an object of little solicitude" to the Company.<sup>23</sup>

The task of negotiating with the Rajput states was entrusted to Metcalfe. In communicating the views and instructions of the Governor-General Adam wrote to Metcalfe on October 8, 1817 : "The completion of all the details of these arrangements is not material as the accomplishment of the general object of securing their co-operation to the extent of their means against the freebooters and their agreement to place their forces and the resources of their country at our disposal contributing, each according to its means, to the charge which the British Government will incur in their protection. General stipulations to the above effect will necessarily lead to such a degree of dependence on the British Government as will answer every purpose of more detailed provisions, and it will not be desirable to clog the negotiation with the latter, if their accomplishment is likely to be attended with delay or difficulty".<sup>24</sup>

A reserve division of the Bengal forces was formed at Rewari under Major-General Ochterlony. The division was intended to co-operate with other troops in overawing the Pathans or attacking the Pindaris, to assist the establishment and maintenance of the proposed new relations with the Rajput chiefs, and to suppress any opposition that might be offered to the establishment of these relations.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, Major-General Donkin was to be directed to establish a strong post at Dholpur and then to move with his principal force up the left bank of the Chambal "for the purpose of

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22. Ibid.

23. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1236.

24. Secret Consultations, 1817, October 28, No. 26.

25. Ibid. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. IX, pp. 310-333. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 11. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 229-231. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 399-400.

giving confidence to the Chiefs and people of Cotah and Boondie and supporting the dispositions they may make for guarding the passages of the river and intercepting the retreat of the Pindarries through those countries".<sup>26</sup>

The political fortunes of the Rajput states were thus vitally linked up with the issue of the extinction of the Pindaris. As already indicated, the course of the Anglo-Maratha relations of the time, too, were shaping the destiny of the Rajputs in the direction of British control and protection. Appa Saheb of Nagpur concluded a treaty of subsidiary alliance with the Company on May 27, 1816.<sup>27</sup> The Peshwa, however, was recalcitrant. The anti-British activities of Baji Rao II had already created apprehension in the British camp. By the year 1817 matters became very threatening. The Peshwa was engaged in "the most active negotiations" with Sindhia, Holkar, the Bhonsle ruler of Nagpur, Amir Khan and even the Pindaris against the British. He also sought to strengthen his army. His intentions were decidedly hostile to the British Government at a time when the question of the suppression of the Pindaris became a pressing issue.<sup>28</sup> The Governor-General decided to curb the power of the Marathas. On May 10, 1817, Elphinstone, the British Resident at Poona, received instructions "for the purpose of circumscribing the Peishwa's power, of imposing such restrictions as should prevent the evils apprehended from the course of policy pursued by the Court of Poona for several years".<sup>29</sup> On June 13, 1817, the Peshwa was compelled to sign the treaty of Poona. It was a great blow to his power and prestige. He relinquished the headship of the Maratha empire and subjected himself to British control. He ceded territories to the Company. By the 14th article of the treaty he engaged not to interfere in the affairs of Hindustan. He surrendered to the Company all rights and claims over his tributaries in Malwa and Hindustan. This surrender

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26. Secret Consultations, 1817, November 28, No. 3.

27. Aitchison, op. cit., 1863, Vol. III, pp. 93, 101-108.

28. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, Chapters XVI and XVII. Sardesai, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 442-448, 470-472, 474-475.

29. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 385.

included the tribute of Rs.25,000 paid by the Raja of Karauli per annum.<sup>30</sup>

The Peshwa's surrender was followed by pressure on Sindhia. On November 5, 1817, Daulat Rao Sindhia had to sign the treaty of Gwalior. By this treaty of subsidiary alliance he not only bound himself to co-operate with the Company in suppressing the Pindaris but also gave the Company complete liberty to conclude treaties with the states beyond the Chambal. According to Article 5 of the treaty, Sindhia agreed to relinquish his tribute from Jodhpur, Bundi and Kotah to the British Government for a period of two years. Article 9 provided that the British Government would be at full liberty to form engagements with the states of Udaipur, Jodhpur, Kotah<sup>and Bundi</sup> and other "substantive" states on the left bank of the Chambal. The British Government, however, promised, in the event of its forming any engagements with the above mentioned states or with any others on the left bank of the Chambal, to secure to Daulat Rao Sindhia his ascertained tribute and to guarantee the same in perpetuity to be paid through the British Government. Sindhia on his part engaged not to interfere in any shape on any account or pretence whatever in the affairs of those states without the concurrence of the British Government. On June 25, 1818, a further engagement was signed between the Company and Daulat Rao Sindhia. By the previous treaty of 1817 the revenues of the districts of Hindia and Asirgarh were set aside for payment of the contingent to be employed against the Pindaris. Sindhia now engaged that if Hindia and Asirgarh were restored to him by the British Government before the entire cessation of operations against the Pindaris, the third year's tribute on the states of Kotah and Jodhpur, due to him, should be assigned, if necessary, for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the said contingent.<sup>31</sup> In

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30. Aitchison, op.cit., 1863, Vol. III, pp. 79-87. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 393. Camb. Hist. of India, Vol. V, 379. Malletson, An Historical Sketch of the Native States of India, p. 85.

31. Aitchison, op.cit., 1876, Vol. III, pp. 295-300. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. IX, pp. 86-136, 149-167. Duff, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 401-402. Camb. Hist. of India, Vol. V, p. 380.

short, the Company's engagements with Sindhia checked his pretension of control over the Rajput states. The Company was no longer hindered by any treaty with Sindhia in respect of alliance with, and control over, the Rajput states. Indeed, the treaties with the Peshwa and Sindhia paved the way for the execution of the Company's plan to enter into engagements of subsidiary alliance with the Rajput states.

The Maratha chiefs, however, could not really reconcile themselves to the loss of their independence as also of opportunities of aggrandizement. The Peshwa was anxious to free himself from British control and the other chiefs had full sympathy for him. Baji Rao's emissaries were trying to organize a confederacy against the British Government. On the day of the signing of the subsidiary treaty by Sindhia, the Peshwa burnt the British Residency at Poona and attacked the British force at Khirki. Though Sindhia was compelled to accept the terms of the treaty with the Company, he not only watched the course of events in the Deccan but also intrigued with the Peshwa and even endeavoured to incite the Gurkhas of Nepal to unite with the Marathas. Appa Saheb and Malhar Rao Holkar II, son of Jaswant Rao, took the field against the British. Thus the Third Anglo-Maratha War broke out. The operations against the Pindaris covered the closing months of 1817 and the early months of 1818.<sup>32</sup> Thus the British were engaged simultaneously in operations against the Marathas and the Pindaris, who were harboured by Maratha chiefs.

Early in December, 1817, Chitu, the Pindari leader, pursued by Malcolm, found refuge in Holkar's camp in the vicinity of Mahidpur. After the battle of Mahidpur (December 21, 1817), in which Holkar's forces were routed, Chitu proceeded towards Jawad. After the reverses of Holkar at the hands of the British, Sindhia became "perfectly tractable"; but some of his officers were determined to give support to the Pindaris. For instance, Chitu was admitted into the camp of

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32. Aitchison, op.cit., 1863, Vol. III, p. 93. Duff, op.cit., Vol. III, Chapters XVII, XVIII, XIX. Prinsep, op.cit., Vol. II, Chapters XIV-XVI. Sardesai, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 474-475, 482-490.

Jaswant Rao Bhau. The latter, instead of arresting or expelling the Pindaris from his camp, gave him shelter and protection. His camp was eventually stormed and the town of Jawad taken on January 29, 1818.<sup>33</sup> The outbreak of hostilities with the Marathas, which synchronised with the operations against the Pindaris, brought into prominence the question of the Company's alliance with the Rajput states.

Unable to continue the struggle, the young Holkar tendered his submission at Mandasor. On January 6, 1818, the treaty of Mandasor was concluded. Holkar's power and prestige received the final blow. By this treaty of subsidiary alliance he subjected himself to British control and ceded territories to the Company. According to Article 3 of the treaty, the parganas of Pachpahar, Dag, Gangrar, Awar and others rented by Raj Rana Zalim Singh of Kotah were to be ceded in perpetuity to that chief by Holkar. According to Article 4, Holkar agreed to cede to the British Government all claims to tribute and revenue of every description which he had or might have upon the Rajput princes, such as the Rajas of Udaipur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kotah, Bundi and Karauli. Article 5 stipulated that Holkar renounced all right and title to all his territories, such as Rampura and Lakheri, within or north of the Bundi hills.<sup>34</sup> In short, Holkar agreed to withdraw from Rajputana. The British were now freed from the obligation of their previous engagement with Holkar preventing them from entering into treaties with the Rajput chiefs. Thus the Company's new treaty with Holkar, like the treaties already concluded with Sindhia, facilitated the conclusion of engagements of subsidiary alliance between the British and the Rajput rulers.

Meanwhile, Amir Khan had come to terms with

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33. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 124A, p. 237. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 459, 464-465. Duff gives the date of the capture of Jawad as January 28.

34. Aitchison, op. cit., 1876, Vol. III, pp. 344-347. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 464. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, p. 321. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 135-136. Rajasthan District Gazetteers, Jhalawar, 1964, pp. 190, 278-279.

the English. He became a subordinate chief under them. He agreed to disband the Pathan army and to give up his artillery. He was to abstain from predatory practices. It was also settled that the territories belonging to any of the Rajput states and forcibly occupied by him should be given up on the requisition of the Company's Government.<sup>35</sup> Thus, after the frightful desolation of Rajputana for over a decade, the Pathan adventurer had to withdraw from his sphere of ravages.

The establishment of political connection with the Rajput Rajas, as contemplated by Lord Hastings, had two aspects. One related to the Company's arrangements with the Marathas and Amir Khan, by which they, as noticed above, engaged to refrain from interference in the Rajput principalities and from obstruction to the conclusion of treaties between the Company and the Rajput states. The British treaties of 1805-06 with Sindhia and Holkar, which had hitherto stood in the way of the conclusion of alliance between the Company and the Rajput states, were abrogated. The other aspect dealt with the negotiation of separate treaties of alliance and protection with the Rajput states themselves. As already stated, Metcalfe was, in the first instance, entrusted with this part of the work.

Agreeably to the instructions of the Supreme Government, Metcalfe had commenced negotiations with the different Rajput states. The latter had been invited to send their envoys to Delhi and to negotiate with Metcalfe with the object of entering into the proposed alliance with the British Government. Though for more than a year the negotiations with Jaipur had proved to be abortive, Metcalfe, in conformity with the orders of his superiors, did not exclude Jaipur from the proposed arrangements and was now prepared to resume talks with that state.<sup>36</sup> The Governor-General, as already pointed out,

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35. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 244-245. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 8, p. 137. Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of ... Lord Metcalfe, Vol. 1, p. 331. Mill, op. cit., Vol. 8, p. 208. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 35-36. Duff, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 403-404.

36. Secret Consultations, 1817, November 14, No. 50. Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of ... Lord Metcalfe, Vol. 1, p. 332. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 352.

had thought that though a connection with Bikaner and Jaisalmer would probably be expedient, it would not require to be so close as that contemplated with the other states included in his scheme. Metcalfe asked the Raja of Bikaner to appoint an agent for negotiations. About the connection with Bikaner and Jaisalmer, Metcalfe on October 18, 1817, wrote to Adam : "The territories of this State (Bikaner) join ours on the Hureeana frontier and we are suffering at the present moment from the effects of the predatory operations of Meer Khan's army in that country. The same operations ought to make the Raja sensible of the necessity of our protection. The country of Jusulmeer being remote, and not likely to be affected by the probable events of the present season, I have not thought it necessary to address the Raja of that country at present".<sup>37</sup>

In October, 1817, the resident agents of Jaipur at Delhi communicated to Metcalfe their expectation of the speedy arrival of envoys or instructions from the Raja to conclude a treaty. Metcalfe did not disbelieve their sincerity, but he found - as he reported to Adam on October 18, 1817 - that the court of Jaipur still persevered in "a very perverse policy" and continued "unaccountable, ... interminable and mutually faithless negotiations" with Amir Khan.<sup>38</sup> In view of the apparently interminable delay he deemed it expedient to arrange an advance of the division of the army under Major-General Sir David Ochterlony into the territory of Jaipur without waiting for the previous consent of its Raja. On November 21, 1817, Metcalfe wrote to Ochterlony : "An advance into the country of Jypoor may I hope bring the procrastinating councils of the Raja to a decision in favour of the immediate conclusion of the alliance.... The same movement will also carry you... far on your way towards the accomplishment of any ulterior plans, that you may have in view, with reference to the approaching operations against the Pindarees".<sup>39</sup> Only a few days ago the Company had concluded its treaty with Amir

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37. Secret Consultations, 1817, November 14, No. 50.

38. Ibid.

39. Secret Consultations, 1817, December 19, No. 112.

Khan (November 9, 1817), and the army of Major-General Donkin was moving towards Kotah.<sup>40</sup> At this stage the advance of the army under Ochterlony towards Jaipur was likely to produce the desired effect, for it would be an "implied threat of military operations for the purpose of coercing Jagat Singh into submission".<sup>41</sup> Metcalfe also expected that Ochterlony's advance would invite overtures from the chiefs dependent on the Raja of Jaipur. Such overtures he was prepared to welcome as a factor urging upon the Raja the need of an expeditious treaty. In the event of continued obduracy on the part of the Raja, it might become expedient to make separate arrangements with each of these dependent chiefs.<sup>42</sup>

Major-General David Ochterlony with his troops marched from Rewari, causing considerable sensation and alarm in Jaipur. The court of Jaipur hurried to reopen its talks with Metcalfe. While one deputation advanced from Jaipur to meet Ochterlony for warding off the "apprehended hostilities", another deputation was sent to Delhi to settle the treaty there. Sheo Chand Bhandari, the principal Minister of Jaipur, and Rawal Bairisal, one of the Raja's relations and a chief of great influence, led the deputation to Delhi. Other factors also influenced the course of action of the court of Jaipur. A considerable portion of its territory was reoccupied by Amir Khan, who was aware that Jaipur had not yet resumed its negotiations with Metcalfe. Moreover, the fact that the British were entering into engagements with the other Rajput states also made the court of Jaipur anxious for resumption of the negotiations with Metcalfe. In his despatch to Adam dated January 29, 1818, Metcalfe wrote : "The conclusion of our alliances with other states operated naturally as an example and also exacted alarm lest being the only one left out of the pale of our protection, Jaipur should sustain some injury".<sup>43</sup>

Meanwhile, Metcalfe had begun to negotiate with the tributary chiefs of the Raja of Jaipur. In the same

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40. Ibid.

41. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 386.

42. Secret Consultations, 1817, December 19, No. 112.

43. Ibid., 1818, February 20, No. 26.

despatch to Adam he reiterated the object of his communication with those chiefs. What he wanted really was "to alarm the Court of Jypoor and stimulate them to the conclusion of a suitable alliance by showing that we were not entirely dependent on their will but were able and willing to establish order without their concurrence". If, however, the court remained "so senseless as not to be moved by the prospect of the dissolution of its power over the dependent states", the latter were to be brought under British protection through separate engagements. Metcalfe's principal objective was fulfilled. The negotiations with the tributary chiefs produced the desired effect. There was "great sensation" at Jaipur, leading to evident anxiety on the part of the court to expedite the progress of the mission appointed to proceed to Delhi. The Jaipur agent stationed at Delhi showed "unfeigned alarm" and repeatedly implored Metcalfe to suspend negotiations with the dependent chiefs till the arrival of the envoys.<sup>44</sup> It should also be noted that the court of Jaipur anxiously sent its envoys to Delhi when the Company's successes in its war against the Marathas had rendered their cause "desperate".<sup>45</sup>

In spite of obstacles including an attempt on the part of Thakur Lachhman Singh, the Shekhawati chief of Sikar and a partisan of Amir Khan, to thwart the mission on its way to Delhi, the envoys of Jaipur arrived at Delhi about the middle of February, 1818. Negotiations started,<sup>46</sup> but again the question of the amount of tribute caused delay. On March 8, 1818, Metcalfe wrote to Adam that he could not yet "submit any confident opinion as to the result of the discussions".<sup>47</sup> An ostensible pretext for delay was provided by the news of the death of the Raja's only son.<sup>48</sup>

As regards tribute, Metcalfe demanded fifteen lakhs while the envoys of Jaipur offered only two lakhs

44. Ibid.

45. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 371.

46. Ibid. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VIII, pp. 240-241.

47. Political Consultations, 1818, March 27, No. 19.

48. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VIII, pp. 242-243.

and forty thousand. They argued that the British demand was far beyond what the resources of Jaipur could ever afford. Metcalfe then proposed, in lieu of any fixed tribute, payment of a certain portion of the revenue; the envoys, reluctant to entertain this alternative, offered eight lakhs. Metcalfe wanted one-fourth of the revenue or twelve lakhs, the lowest sum which he would agree to take as permanent tribute. The envoys did not agree; the Raja's revenue, they said, in prosperous times had scarcely ever exceeded thirty-two lakhs, and would never be sufficient to bear the burden of twelve lakhs. Metcalfe contended that the Raja's revenue would soon amount to sixty or perhaps eighty lakhs. The envoys then proposed eight lakhs to be paid so long as the revenue of Jaipur did not exceed forty lakhs, and, in addition, one-fourth of the revenue exceeding that amount. Metcalfe agreed to "the principle which was founded on the assumed basis of one-fourth"; but as eight was the fourth of thirty-two, the Company was entitled to two lakhs more out of the remaining eight of the total revenue of forty lakhs. To compensate for this difference Metcalfe proposed that the British share of the excess over forty lakhs should be three-eighths instead of one-fourth. It was at last settled that it should be five-sixteenths. In consideration of the dilapidated condition of Jaipur Metcalfe agreed to commute the tribute for the first year. The court of Jaipur made an unsuccessful effort to have the amount of tribute reconsidered through the influence of Major-General Donkin.

When the financial - and perhaps the most disturbing - factor in treaty-making was finalised, other provisions were arranged without difficulty. The negotiators wanted some provision in the treaty for their own benefit, a request with which it was not possible for Metcalfe to comply. Thus at last, after extraordinarily protracted negotiations with some breaks, the treaty was concluded on April 2,

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1818.<sup>49</sup> It may be remembered that as early as 1816, of all the Rajput states, the British Government had decided to take under its protection Jaipur alone. Lord Hastings, for political and strategical reasons, had been keen on an alliance with Jaipur. But Jaipur could not avail itself of the Company's special attention; it could not conclude the treaty before the Company had decided to enter into engagements with other Rajput states. When the neighbouring Rajas decided to fall within the Company's orbit, Jaipur found itself pushed into a position in which it could ~~not~~ no longer keep itself in isolation.

Metcalf, who had lately received overtures from Jodhpur for the revival of the unratified treaty of 1803, made no delay in his communication with that state regarding the connection contemplated by Lord Hastings. Following his talks on the subject with the agent of Jodhpur stationed at Delhi, the latter applied for fresh instructions.<sup>50</sup> In this connection Metcalf informed Ochterlony that the talks originated in overtures from Jodhpur.<sup>51</sup> But it took some time for the properly authorized envoys to arrive at Delhi from Jodhpur for the purpose of negotiation with Metcalf. The court of Jodhpur was at that time hardly in a position to take prompt action on a vital issue like the acceptance of a subsidiary alliance with the Company. Raja Man Singh's eldest son Chhattar Singh had been invested by his father with the Regency and the Raja had retired from the management of affairs. The enemies of Chhattar Singh, however, alleged that Raja Man was kept under restraint. Another feature of Jodhpur politics was the disaffection of a section of Thakurs or chiefs.<sup>52</sup> On November 21, 1817, Metcalf wrote to Ochterlony : "...no person having yet received authority to treat on the part of the Raja, I consider this negotiation as

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49. Secret Consultations, 1818, April 17, No. 74. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VIII, No. 106. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. III, p. 69.

50. Secret Consultations, 1817, November 14, No. 50.

51. Ibid., 1817, December 19, No. 112.

52. Ibid., 1817, December 19, No. 112; 1818, February 6, No. 102.

devolving on you from the time of your advance".<sup>53</sup> As stated above, when the court of Jaipur delayed to reopen negotiations, Metcalfe urged an advance of Ochterlony's army to force the Raja to an immediate decision. Jodhpur's delay naturally suggested to him a similar line of action, particularly because Ochterlony was about to proceed to Rajputana with ~~the~~ <sup>his</sup> army. However, envoys led by a Brahmin named Byas Bishen Ram came and started negotiations with Metcalfe in December, 1817.<sup>54</sup>

There was not much disagreement or delay in the settlement of the terms of the treaty in accordance with the principles laid down by the Governor-General. In recognition of the proverbial bravery of the Rathors Metcalfe had been instructed by the Supreme Government to require, as "the principal description of aid" from Jodhpur, the services of a powerful body of auxiliaries. Accordingly Metcalfe sought to obtain the services of a considerable body of Rathor horsemen. The strength of the cavalry which the Rathor Raja could muster did not generally exceed 6,000. The envoys could not agree to place more than one-fourth of this number at the disposal of the British Government for "foreign service". This, it was argued, was the maximum number the resources of the state could furnish in a condition of efficiency. The Government of Jodhpur required a considerable number inside the state for its own support. Moreover the horsemen were, for the most part, provided by the dependent chiefs who would not agree to send them abroad. Metcalfe expressed his disappointment over his inability to obtain the services of a larger body of horse than 1,500. But he hoped that if the alliance ripened into a cordial and intimate connection, the contingent for service abroad might be increased.

Other provisions of the treaty were speedily settled. The envoys wanted an assurance that the Jodhpur contingent would not be employed to the southward of the Narbada. Metcalfe could not disagree. The envoys further wanted Metcalfe to engage that the British Government would not listen

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53. Ibid., 1817, December 19, No. 112.

54. Tod, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1092-1093.

to "self-interested proposals" put forward by the Raja's relatives or the Rajput Thakurs against "the interests of the State". Metcalfe did not find it necessary to make any specific provision to this effect; the Raja's position was safeguarded sufficiently by the provision that he should be the absolute ruler of the state and the jurisdiction of the British Government should not be introduced in his territory. Then the envoys put in demands for assurances that the British Government would not oppose their government in the following matters. The court of Jodhpur intended to resume the jagir granted to Amir Khan and to recover the fort of Amarkot taken by the chiefs of Sind. It was unwilling to restore to Mewar the pargana of Godwar ceded to it during the reign of Bijay Singh. Metcalfe could give them only verbal assurances on these points. Further, it was represented by the envoys that it had been the invariable practice of the government of Jodhpur to afford protection to all who might seek asylum. They expressed the hope that the British Government would respect this custom. To this Metcalfe agreed, provided the refugees were not enemies of the British Government. Another point deserves mention. The treaty was negotiated and concluded with Maharaja Man Singh through the Regency of Maharajkumar Ch<sup>h</sup>attar Singh. Of course this did not mean that the British Government was bound to support any usurpation on the part of the Regency.<sup>55</sup>

Mewar, in deep distress for many years, did not fail to respond to the invitation of Metcalfe for negotiations on the proposed alliance. Tod, the contemporary observer, says : "Of all the (Rajput) princes who obtained succour at this momentous crisis in the political history of India, none stood more in need of it than the Rana of Udaipur".<sup>56</sup> Thakur Ajit Singh, who then actually held the post

55. Secret Consultations, 1818, February 6, No. 102. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XVI, pp. 165-171. Ochterlony Papers, p. 2.

56. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 548.

of the chief minister<sup>57</sup> of Udaipur, was 'the principal' of the agents of Mewar. He joined the other vakils of Mewar at Delhi where Metcalfe had opened negotiations in November, 1817.<sup>58</sup>

With regard to the vital question of acknowledgement of British supremacy by Mewar Metcalfe had an apprehension that there might be some objection on the part of the vakils because of the "high pretensions" of the Rana. The Resident knew that the Ranas of Udaipur had always boasted of their never having acknowledged the sovereignty of "the Mahomedan Dynasty of India";<sup>59</sup> they had assumed titles such as "King of the Hindus" and "the Enemy of the King of Delhi". The high rank of the house of Udaipur was generally acknowledged. The war between Jaipur and Jodhpur in 1807 for the hands of the Rana's daughter was a recent proof of the honour "attached to a close connexion with his family". On the ground of expediency Metcalfe was even prepared to modify the provision of British supremacy so as to avoid giving offence to the Rana's sentiments. But somewhat surprisingly the vakils did not object to the recognition of British supremacy. One of them, however, proposed that an Article should be inserted to provide that the mission of an envoy to Delhi and the submission of the Rana to the Company "should not be drawn into a precedent for his allegiance to the Mahomedan Dynasty" and that the British Government should not make him over at any time to any other power. Had the

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57. The office of the Premier was hereditary in the house of Salumbar. Padma Singh, Rawat of Salumbar, was a minor when the treaty was negotiated. Ajit Singh, the grand uncle of the Rawat, then actually held the office of Premier. (Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 216-217).

58. Secret Consultations, 1817, November 14, No. 50; December 19, No. 112. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 8, No. 89. Aitchison, op.cit., 1932, Vol. III, pp. 22-23. Tod, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 216-217, 548. Prinsep, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 359.

59. This is not historically correct. Rana Amar Singh's treaty (1615) with Jahangir implied definite acknowledgement of Mughal suzerainty, although on special conditions.

insertion of such a provision in the treaty been strongly urged, Metcalfe would have agreed; he saw no material objection to the inclusion of such an Article. He assured the vakils that though such a proposal might not be expressed in the treaty, the spirit of the proposal would remain in force. The vakils did not press further and the matter ended there.<sup>60</sup> In this connection a modern writer says : "It seems strange that the Udaipur envoy should have failed to secure better terms for his State, which Metcalfe was prepared to concede. It is possible that Thakur Ajit Singh was not disinterested enough in the execution of his duty".<sup>61</sup>

Though the revenues and authority of the state of Udaipur were then reduced to "a wretched extreme", Metcalfe hoped that these would revive with astonishing rapidity after the restoration of security. In this connection he wrote to Adam : "It is understood that the Country of Audeepoor is most productive country, that the soil is fertile in the greatest degree, and that the inhabitants are uncommonly industrious and devoted to agriculture".<sup>62</sup> In determining the amount of tribute to be asked from Mewar Metcalfe naturally considered both the prevailing miserable situation and the prospect of future prosperity under British protection. Of course similar considerations guided the British Government in the cases of other Rajput states as well. On account of the prevailing poverty of the state Metcalfe considered it impossible to obtain an adequate fixed tribute. In expectation of a considerable increase of prosperity in future he considered it advantageous to make the tribute proportionate to the revenue. The vakils proposed one-fourth of the revenue; Metcalfe wanted three-eighths. It was decided finally that it would be one-fourth for the first five years and three-eighths afterwards.

The vakils submitted to Metcalfe a memorandum

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60. Secret Consultations, 1818, February 6, No. 107.

61. Mehta, op. cit., p. 135. The insinuation against the chief minister is not explained.

62. Secret Consultations, 1818, February 6, No. 107.

on the Rana's claim for restitution of territories which had "fallen by improper means into the possession of others". Among the latter were mentioned Sindhia, Holkar, Amir Khan, and the rulers of Jodhpur and Kotah. Metcalfe could not ignore all these claims entirely. He had to give an assurance of consideration of all these claims, while he reserved to the British Government the right of acting on these claims in such a manner as the Governor-General might deem just and expedient. An Article to this effect was embodied in the treaty. In the above memorandum the restoration of the Rana's sovereignty over the principalities of Banswara, Pertabgarh and Dungarpur, formerly dependent on Udaipur, was claimed. But Metcalfe could not agree to this demand. The British Government had decided to recognize the independence of these petty states.<sup>63</sup> When the terms of the treaty were finalised, Ajit Singh sought to introduce a clause guaranteeing the office of the bhanjgarh or premier to his minor relative, Rawat Padma Singh of Salumbar. Although such a guarantee would have been consistent with the prevailing practice in Mewar Metcalfe rejected this proposal, but he gave the vague assurance that "the good conduct of the Minister would ensure His Lordship's approbation".<sup>64</sup>

For reasons stated earlier, the British Government attached special importance to alliance with Kotah and Bundi among the minor Rajput states. Metcalfe invited both of them to join the proposed alliance. When the negotiations were opened, the Governor-General decided to depute Captain Tod, then first Assistant to the Resident with Sindhia, to induce the rulers of those states "to act as much as possible from their own sense of expediency" against the Pindaris. Tod's local knowledge was expected to enable him to expedite the arrangements. So he was entrusted with the task of "prosecuting to a conclusion the negotiations" which Metcalfe had commenced with

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63. Ibid., 1818, February 6, No. 107; February 20, No. 29; March 6,

Nos. 5, 7. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. III, pp. 22-23.

64. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VIII, No. 89. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 216-217.

their rulers. At the same time Tod was to induce them "to make such dispositions of their troops and such arrangements for guarding the principal passages of the Chumbul as shall obstruct the flight of any bodies of Pindarries who may take that direction on the advance of British troops".<sup>65</sup>

Leaving the British Residency at Gwalior, Tod reached Raj Rana Zalim Singh's camp at Rauta, about 25 miles S.S.E. of Kotah, on November 23, 1817. He was cordially received there by Zalim Singh, the de facto ruler of Kotah. Meanwhile an agent from Kotah was on his way to Delhi. Metcalfe decided that if on his arrival the agent was prepared to conclude a treaty, he himself would conclude it without delay. If, however, the agent was not so prepared, Metcalfe would immediately transfer the affair to Tod in accordance with the instructions of the Governor-General. As Metcalfe had not yet received intimation of despatch of any envoy from Bundi, he decided that Tod should take up the negotiations with that state. Accordingly intimation was sent to Tod.<sup>66</sup> Metcalfe's decisions were approved by the Supreme Government.<sup>67</sup>

While Tod was concerting measures with Raj Rana Zalim Singh for employment of forces against the Pindaris, the treaty was being finalised by Metcalfe at Delhi in accordance with the principles enjoined by the Governor-General. In October, 1817, Zalim Singh had been requested by Metcalfe to furnish either his resident agent at Delhi or some other person with the requisite powers to negotiate a treaty. The shrewd chief had then, through his resident agent, professed in an unreserved manner his readiness to enter into the Company's views.<sup>68</sup> To quote Tod, "The eagle-eye of Zalim saw at once the virtue of compliance, and the grace attendant

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65. Secret Consultations, 1817, November 14, No. 50; November 28, No. 3. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. X, pp. 5-7.

66. Secret Consultations, 1817, December 19, No. 112; 1818, January 9, No. 55. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XIV, pp. 7-10. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 1578.

67. Secret Consultations, 1818, February 13, No. 21.

68. Ibid., 1817, November 14, No. 50; 1818, January 9, No. 55. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 1578-1582.

on its being quickly yielded".<sup>69</sup> Zalim Singh's Maratha counsellors were naturally opposed to his alliance with the British Government. For a moment he himself hesitated to break "the bond which had so long united him with their policy" and, above all, to sacrifice the independence of his state. Eventually he chose to accept British alliance as the key to security. His calculations were reinforced by a hint, given through his envoy, that at the end of hostilities the territories conquered from Holkar in Central India would be assigned to the allies of the Company.<sup>70</sup>

The treaty was concluded on December 26, 1817. The agents of Kotah signed it in the name of Maha Rao Umed Singh, the Raja of Kotah, though the real negotiator was Raj Rana Zalim Singh. Metcalfe had expected that the overmighty premier would wish to stipulate for continuation of the administration on its present footing in order to safeguard his own position and that of his descendants. In consideration of the Raj Rana's special position, and important services to the state of Kotah Metcalfe was fully prepared to accede to such a proposition. But the British Resident was surprised to find that no such demand was made. On the contrary, the agents of Kotah seemed to think that the Raj Rana might not wish to have such a stipulation inserted in the treaty. Zalim Singh saw no reason to ask for any guarantee, as the plenary exercise of the powers of the sovereign for more than fifty years had consolidated his position as the de facto ruler of the state. Moreover, his sense of pride might have "stifled" any desire for guarantee. However, when Metcalfe signed the treaty it was understood that the administration was guaranteed to Zalim Singh and his heirs without any formal stipulation.<sup>71</sup>

The Raja of Bundi "was one of the foremost to join" the proposed alliance with the British Government. Before Tod reached Bundi, the Raja had communicated with him at Kotah and also with the authorities in Calcutta. But

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69. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 1578.

70. Ibid., pp. 1580-1581.

71. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VIII, No. 79. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 1582, 1588-1589.

circumstances connected with the operations against the Pindaris and "other" enemies prevented Tod from proceeding early to Bundi and delayed the final adjustment of the terms of the intended alliance. Tod reached Bundi on February 8, 1818. Two days later the treaty was concluded.<sup>72</sup>

Regarding the question of tribute from Bundi the British Government had inherited Sindhia's claim for an annual tribute of Rs.105,000. Tod, however, calculated that the amount would be about Rs.80,000 or Rs.90,000. At first Lord Hastings had the impression that the amount was Rs.10,000 only. In view of the Company's friendly relations with Bundi and the latter's valuable services in the past, the Governor-General was in favour of its exemption from payment of this small amount. But Metcalfe knew better, and at his suggestion the Governor-General decided that Bundi should engage to pay to the British Government the tribute it had so far paid to Sindhia. The tribute paid by Bundi to Holkar was, however, relinquished.<sup>73</sup>

There was another question : the restoration of territories which Bundi had lost to Sindhia, Holkar and Kotah. In response to the Raja's hope of getting these back the British Government agreed to restore the districts conquered by British forces from Holkar and also negotiated the surrender to the Raja of the districts held by Sindhia on payment of an annual sum. The Raja expressed his gratitude to Tod. But at the same time he was deeply disappointed, as the "old Machiavelli of Kotah had been before him in signing himself 'fidwi Sarkar Angrez' (the slave of the English government), and had contrived to get Indargarh, Balwan, Antardah, and Khatoli, the chief feudatories of Bundi, under his protection".

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72. Secret Consultations, 1817, November 28, No. 5; 1818, February 13, No. 21. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 16, pp. 59-62, 63-67, 131-132, 259-260. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 229-230. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 1517. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 402.

73. Secret Consultations, 1817, December 19, No. 105; 1818, March 13, No. 19. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 229-230. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 366.

The Rao Raja regretted that this arrangement amounted to "clipping his wings".<sup>74</sup>

Metcalf concluded treaties with the petty states of Karauli and Kishangarh on November 9, 1817, and March 26, 1818, respectively. Karauli was the first state to join the league between the Company and the Rajput states as envisaged by Lord Hastings. The noteworthy feature in the Company's negotiations with both these states was the omission of payment of tribute. By the treaty of Poona (June, 1817) the Peshwa had surrendered to the British Government his claim to the tribute of Rs. 25,000 from Karauli. In consideration of its "favourable sentiments" towards the British in the past, Metcalfe exempted it from the payment of tribute. Its revenues were then "at a low ebb". As Kishangarh had never paid fixed tribute to any state, Metcalfe demanded nothing from it.<sup>75</sup>

In 1818 Lieutenant Dyson, an officer working under the Governor-General's Political Agent in Malwa, Sir John Malcolm, was sent to enquire about the conditions of the states of Banswara, Pertabgarh and Dungarpur, situated between Rajputana and Gujarat. Dyson's reports on these three offshoots of Mewar were very useful in furnishing essential materials for the final decisions on the settlement of these principalities and the Company's future relations with them.<sup>76</sup>

On September 16, 1818, Metcalfe concluded, at Delhi, a treaty with the yakil of Maha Rawal Ummed Singh of Banswara. This treaty was ratified by Lord Hastings on

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74. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XVI, pp. 59-62, 63-67. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. III, pp. 229-230. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 1517.

75. Secret Consultations, 1818, April 17, No. 77. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VIII, No. 56. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. III, pp. 104-105, 384-385. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 37-38

76. Secret Consultations, 1818, November 7, No. 60. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 40, pp. 115-116, 117-128; Vol. 42, pp. 397-408; Vol. 43, pp. 459-466; Vol. 47, pp. 195-206. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, pp. 405, 421-450.

October 10, 1818.<sup>77</sup> The Maha Rawal, however, denied that he had sent any envoy to Delhi with authority to conclude a treaty with the British Government; but he declared himself still desirous of British protection. Captain Caulfield, an assistant of Sir John Malcolm, was sent to Banswara to negotiate directly with the Maha Rawal and conclude a new treaty. With a few modifications regarding tribute, employment of 'foreign' troops and British help to restore the Maha Rawal's authority, the new treaty, concluded on December 25, 1818, was substantially the same as the one previously concluded.<sup>78</sup>

Under the guidance of Sir John Malcolm, Captain Caulfield was also entrusted with the task of concluding treaties with the two neighbouring states of Banswara — Dungarpur and Pertabgarh. The treaty with Pertabgarh was signed on October 5, 1818, and that with Dungarpur on December 11, 1818. Thus the three offshoots of Mewar to its south were brought under British protection. In his negotiations with these principalities Caulfield found it necessary to make provision for the expulsion, from these territories, of mercenaries such as Arabs, Sindhis and Makranis, from whom these territories had suffered, in addition to Maratha raiders.<sup>79</sup>

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77. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 22, pp. 461-463. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 466-468.

Apart from the usual conditions the treaty provided for payment of tribute to the extent of  $\frac{3}{8}$ ths of the revenue of the state and for furnishing troops on requisition according to its means for the service of the British Government.

78. Secret Consultations, 1818, October 31, No. 97. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 45, p. 437. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 468-470. Mill, op. cit., Vol. 8, p. 414.

79. Secret Consultations, 1818, November 7, No. 60. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 26, p. 564; Vol. 40, pp. 117-128; Vol. 42, pp. 369-374, 397-408; Vol. 43, pp. 459-466; Vol. 45, p. 394; Vol. 47, pp. 195-206. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 450-452, 460-463, 468-470. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. 1, pp. 505-506. Mill, op. cit., Vol. 8, p. 416. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, Part 2, Appendix A.

"Although situated beyond the ordinary sphere of predatory aggression, and offering little temptation to the plunderer, the Rajput state of Bikaner had not wholly escaped, and therefore gladly joined its neighbours in the general appeal to British guardianship".<sup>80</sup> Though the Governor-General at first had not intended a close connection with Bikaner, it was, from Metcalfe's point of view, a political necessity in the interest of peace on the Hariana frontier. The disturbed state of that frontier — adjoining Bikaner and the Bhatti country — was occasionally brought to the notice of the Governor-General by Metcalfe. This area was occupied by "nests of plunderers, leagued together by common habits and interests". These plunderers included the subjects of Bikaner. A number of its petty chiefs, who had thrown off the Raja's authority, indulged in plunder and pillage in "the most open and undisguised manner". They even committed flagrant depredations on the Company's territories.<sup>81</sup>

Eventually Metcalfe was empowered to negotiate a treaty with Bikaner, bringing that state into no less close relation with the Company than the other Rajput states. He found it necessary to hold the Raja responsible for outrages committed by his subjects and bind him to suppress these freebooters. He promised him assistance for that purpose and obtained security for the payment of the Company's expenses. In order to render British protection most beneficial to the Raja Metcalfe saw the need of helping the Raja to bring back under subjection his rebellious subjects.<sup>82</sup> In endorsing Metcalfe's views Adam wrote to him : "It is manifest that, unless the authority of the Government of Bikanere be firm and efficient, it will not have the means of fulfilling the most important stipulations of the treaty, while, on the other hand, it is strictly equitable that the British Government should be paid any expenses it may incur on this account".<sup>83</sup> Metcalfe had also in view an engagement with the Raja for "the

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80. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 434.

81. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VIII, pp. 244-246, 260-263

82. Ibid.

83. Secret Consultations, 1818, May 1, No. 16.

furtherance of our project for opening the best roads for commercial communications with North-Western countries". All these matters vitally determined the scope of his negotiations with Bikaner. With regard to the question of tribute, Metcalfe found it inadvisable to demand any payment. Bikaner had never paid fixed tribute to any state, and its resources, not exceeding three or four lakhs per annum, were not sufficient for "the suitable support of the Raja and his Government".<sup>84</sup> Metcalfe concluded the treaty with the agent of Bikaner at Delhi on March 9, 1818.<sup>85</sup>

Though the distance of Jaisalmer "made it an object of little solicitude" to the British Government, they could not obviously disregard its strategical and commercial importance and its appeal for protection. To quote Tod, "To have disregarded the appeal of Jaisalmer for protection, to have made her the sole exception in all Rajputana from our amicable relations, would have been to consign her to her numerous enemies, and to let loose the spirit of rapine and revenge, which it was the main object of all these treaties to suppress; the Bhattis would have become a nation of robbers, the Bedouins of the Indian desert. Jaisalmer was the first link in a chain of free States, which formerly united the commerce of the Ganges with that of the Indus, but which interminable feuds had completely severed; the possibility of reunion depending upon a long continuance of tranquillity and confidence. This object alone would have warranted our alliance with Jaisalmer. But if we look to futurity, to the possible invasion of India, which can be best effected through the maritime provinces of Persia, the valley of the Indus will be the base of the invader's operations. The possession of Jaisalmer would then be of vital importance, by giving us the command of Upper Sind, and enabling us to act against the enemy simultaneously with our armies east of the Delta, the most practicable point of advance into India!"<sup>86</sup>

On December 12, 1818, Metcalfe concluded, at Delhi

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84. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 8, pp. 244-246.

85. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 288-289.

86. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 1236, 1238.

a treaty with the agents of Maha Rawal Mulraj.<sup>87</sup> It is said that Salim Singh, the all-powerful minister of Mulraj, held long and serious consultations with his oracles before the conclusion of the alliance. The minister was doubtful of the security of his authority if the Maha Rawal became a subordinate ally of the Company, but ultimately he had to abandon his hesitation; he could not take the greater risk of keeping Jaisalmer as the sole state in Rajputana outside the pale of British protection, "which would have left him to the mercy of those enemies whom his merciless policy had created around him". Further, the Company did not appear to be inclined to disturb him in his office; rather it engaged to remove his apprehensions as to external foes. But he tried, though unsuccessfully, to provide in the treaty that the office of minister would be hereditary in his family.<sup>88</sup>

The small state of Sirohi, situated on the south-eastern borders of Jodhpur and about 45 miles to the west of Udaipur, lay along the line of communication between Gujarat and Rajputana. In 1817 Carnac, British Resident at Baroda, had received overtures from Sirohi for British support and alliance. This request received favourable consideration. But the conclusion of an alliance was delayed by the claim of Jodhpur that since the days of Raja Bijay Singh Sirohi had been its tributary dependency. Jodhpur urged upon the British Government not to "prohibit the continuance of that connexion". Lord Hastings' Government thought that if the claim was correct, the British would not be warranted in forming any separate connection with Sirohi. The Governor-General, therefore, had to defer the decision on the question of alliance with Sirohi till its relation with Marwar was ascertained. But the claim of Jodhpur was found to be at variance with the information obtained by Tod, according to which Sirohi was strictly an appanage of Mewar. Its chief belonged to a branch of the Rana's family. When the Rana's family was reduced to distress by the depredations of the

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87. Aitchison, op.cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 212-213.

88. Tod, op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 1236. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 410.

Marathas, the chief of Sirohi discontinued "the little service ever imposed on his house". Jodhpur took advantage of the Rana's weakness "to impose a tribute on Sirohi or rather a contribution which it levied from time to time by force of arms". According to Tod, if the ruler of Sirohi owed allegiance anywhere, it was to "his own family and sovereign, the Rana". The British Government, therefore, rejected the pretensions of Jodhpur to suzerainty over Sirohi. Though the Raja of Jodhpur or some of his Thakurs had occasionally invaded Sirohi in order to levy "arbitrary contributions", no engagements of allegiance had ever been made. Meanwhile, on account of his oppressive and tyrannical rule, Rao Udaibhan, Raja of Sirohi, was dethroned and kept in confinement by the chiefs. His younger brother, Sheo Singh, became the ruler. In 1819 Raja Man Singh of Jodhpur sent his troops to Sirohi to restore Udaibhan to power, but the Jodhpur army returned unsuccessful. During this invasion Rao Sheo Singh sought British help and protection. In 1823 the treaty between the Company and Sirohi was concluded.<sup>89</sup> Sirohi was the last among the Rajput states to be taken under British protection.

Before concluding our discussion on the course of negotiations with the different Rajput states, an interesting matter may be referred to. Those who were opposed to the British Government made use of an argument which was supposed to have a great effect on the mind of the Hindus. The "atrocious crimes" of beef-eating and peacock shooting were attributed to the British character at the courts of the different states.<sup>90</sup> Every Rajput Raja would feel himself degraded by the slaughter of the "sacred" cattle in the territory under his rule. In January, 1818, Metcalfe received "most pressing

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89. Secret Consultations, 1818, February 6, No. 102; March 6, No. 7. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 22, pp. 348-362. Ochterlony Papers, p. 28. Aitchison, op. cit., 1864, Vol. 4, pp. 156, 158-161. Mill, op. cit., Vol. 8, pp. 416-417. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 412. Malleon, An Historical Sketch of the Native States of India, pp. 125-126. The Rajputana Gazetteer, 1880, Vol. 3, p. 100.

90. Foreign Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 124.

applications" from Raj Rana Zalim Singh of Kotah, "excited" by the recent slaughter of cattle for the consumption of the troops who had participated in operations in his territory. The Rajput Rajas sought to have a provision included in the treaties against the slaughter of horned cattle in their territories. Though Metcalfe declared it impossible to admit such a stipulation into a treaty, he assured the Rajas that all possible attention would be paid to their religious feelings.<sup>91</sup> The Governor-General approved Metcalfe's stand. He decided that measures would be adopted under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief to prevent slaughter of horned cattle by troops operating or stationed in the territories of the Rajput princes.<sup>92</sup>

By the year 1819 all the Rajput states, with the exception of Sirohi, had entered into alliance with the East India Company. The treaties concluded by Lord Hastings with the Rajput states were of the same general character, being based on the same principles. In general they involved the exchange of British protection and security for subordinate co-operation and the payment of tribute or military service or both. The terms of the treaties did not generally sanction any interference in the internal administration of the allied states; some degree of interference to the extent of advice and assistance was provided for in case of some states which were considered nearly incapable of retrieving their affairs or even sustaining themselves without such help.<sup>93</sup> The variations in the provisions of the treaties were due to the distinctions in the circumstances and situation of

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91. Secret Consultations, 1818, February 6, No. 107.

92. Ibid., 1818, March 6, No. 5. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XVI, pp. 397-400.

Every year in the month of June the Commander-in-Chief issued a proclamation prohibiting cow slaughter in the neighbourhood of every Hindu holy place of Mathura and Brindaban. The proclamation was intended to produce a favourable impression on the mind of the Hindus and to silence the clamours of the adversaries of the British Government. (Foreign Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 124.)

93. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XXI, pp. 295-317.

the different states.

The treaties<sup>94</sup> with the principal states — Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur — as well as some of the lesser states — Kotah, Bundi, Bikaner, Karauli, Dungarpur, Banswara and Kishangarh — contained the following important common provisions :-

(1) There should be perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interests between the contracting states.

(2) The British Government would protect the Rajput state concerned.

(3) The Rajput state acknowledged the supremacy of, and engaged to co-operate with, the British Government.

(4) The Rajput Raja would not commit aggression on any one. He would not enter into negotiations with any one without the consent of the British Government. If any dispute arose it would be submitted to the arbitration and award of the British Government.

(5) Except in the cases of Bundi and Karauli, it was provided that the friends and enemies of one of the contracting states should be regarded as friends and enemies of both. Further, the Rajput Raja would not have any connections with other chiefs or states; he would, however, continue the usual or customary amicable correspondence with his friends and relations. In view of the Company's past experience of the favourable sentiments and valuable services of Bundi and Karauli, no such specific provisions were felt necessary in their cases, although they were implied in the relevant treaties.

(6) The Raja was recognized as the absolute ruler of his own dominions and the British jurisdiction was not to be introduced therein.

(7) The Raja should furnish troops according to his means or, as in the case of Banswara or Dungarpur, his military force, at the requisition of the British Government. The provision for military assistance in the case of Jodhpur was different to a certain extent. Jodhpur was to furnish 1,500

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94. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, 1932, Vol. III, pp. 22-23, 68-69, 104-105,

128-130, 229-230, 288-290, 357-361, 384-385, 450-452, 468-470.

A.C. Banerjee, *The Rajput States and the East India Company*, pp. 305-307, 337-338, 387-388, 393-394, 396, 403-404, 406-407, 408-409.

horse for the service of the British Government whenever required; and when necessary, the whole of the Jodhpur forces should join the British army excepting such a portion as might be required for internal administration. As already pointed out, Metcalfe had agreed that the Jodhpur contingent would not be employed in the Deccan.

(8) Except Bikaner, Karauli and Kishangarh, which were exempted from payment of tribute for reasons already stated, all other states would pay tribute to the Company. The amount payable by different states were settled as follows:

Jaipur :- The first year - in consideration of the devastation prevailing for years in this principality - nothing. The second year - four lakhs. The third year - five lakhs. The fourth year - six lakhs. The fifth year - seven lakhs. The sixth year - eight lakhs. Afterwards - eight lakhs until the Raja's revenue should exceed forty lakhs, when, in addition to eight lakhs, the Company would receive five-sixteenths of the surplus above forty lakhs (Article 6). In this connection Tod observes : "The Jaipur court justly deemed one-fifth (eight lakhs) of the gross revenues of the crown, a high rate of insurance for protection; but when we further stipulated for a prospective increase of nearly one-third of all surplus revenue beyond forty lakhs, they saw, instead of the generous Briton, a sordid trafficker of mercenary protection, whose rapacity transcended that of the Mahratta".<sup>95</sup>

Mewar :- The Rana would pay one-fourth of his revenue annually as tribute for the first five years; three-eighths after that term in perpetuity. He would have no connection with any other state on account of tribute; if any one advanced claims of that nature, the British Government would reply to them (Article 6).

Marwar :- The tribute hitherto paid by Raja Man Singh to Sindhia (1,08,000 Jodhpur rupees) was to be paid in perpetuity to the Company. The engagement of Jodhpur with Sindhia regarding tribute should cease. If Sindhia or any one else laid claim to tribute from Jodhpur, the British Government would reply to such a claim (Articles 6 and 7).

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95. Tod, op.cit., Vol. III, p. 1369.

Kotah :- The money hitherto paid by Kotah to the Marathas should be paid to the British Government. No other ruler should have any claim to tribute from Kotah. In case of any such claim, the Company would reply to it (Articles 7 and 8).

Bundi :- It was exempted from payment of the tribute which was due to Holkar who had transferred his right to the British Government. This was 'a substantial proof' of the British Government's recognition of Bundi's good services in the past, e.g., during Monson's retreat through Haraoti in 1804.<sup>96</sup> Bundi, however, was required to pay to the British Government the tribute hitherto paid to Sindhia, amounting to Rs. 80,000 per annum (Articles 4 and 5).

Banswara :- The Maha Rawal engaged to pay to the British Government all arrears of tribute due to the Raja of Dhar or any other state. The tribute was to increase annually as the territory of Banswara recovered its prosperity till it rose to whatever amount the British Government might deem adequate to cover the expenses incurred by the protecting State, provided that such tribute did not exceed three-eighths of the total revenue. The British Government was authorized to collect through an Agent the taxes levied at the Chhubutra and its dependent Nakhas if the state failed to make punctual payment of tribute (Articles 8, 9 and 13).

Dungarpur :- All arrears of tribute due to Dhar or any other state were to be paid to the Company. In addition, the Raja would pay an amount which was to be regulated by the prosperity of the country but never to exceed three-eighths of the total revenue. If the tribute was not paid punctually, an Agent of the British Government would be appointed to collect the amount from the "town duties" of Dungarpur (Articles 8, 9, 13).

Besides these common features, the treaties with some of the above states had certain important special features. Article 9 of the treaty with Jaipur provided that so long as the Maharaja evinced a faithful attachment to the British Government, his prosperity and advantage should be favourably considered and attended to. This clause was

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96. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 366.

obviously inserted in view of the hesitating conduct of the Raja in the past.

By Article 7 of the treaty with Udaipur, which related to the Rana's claim for the restitution of his territories misappropriated by others, it was provided that though the British Government in the absence of accurate information was not able to enter into any positive engagement on the subject, it would always keep in view the renovation of the prosperity of the state of Udaipur and, after ascertaining the nature of each case, would use its best exertions for the accomplishment of that object on every occasion on which it might be proper to do so. In case of territories thus restored to Udaipur by the aid of the British Government, three-eighths of the revenues should be paid in perpetuity to the British Government.

Three Articles of the treaty with Bikaner also deserve special mention. As already pointed out, the Hariana frontier was occupied by nests of plunderers, among whom there were the subjects of Bikaner. Lately they had made two daring inroads on the Company's men.<sup>97</sup> By Article 6 the Maharaja undertook to suppress all the robbers and plunderers in his principality and to restore the property seized by his subjects from the British territories up to the time of the conclusion of the treaty. By Article 7 the British Government engaged to restore the Maharaja's authority over his refractory Thakurs and subjects, provided he paid "all the expenses of the force employed" for the purpose. This clause was included as the Supreme Government felt that unless the authority of the Bikaner Government became firm and efficient, it would not have the means of fulfilling the most important stipulations of the treaty; on the other hand it was strictly equitable that the British Government should be paid any expenses it might incur on this account. By Article 10 the Maharaja undertook to take effective measures for the protection of all the trade routes within his territories in order that these might be rendered passable and safe for trade to and from Kabul, Khorasan and adjoining areas.

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97. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. VIII, pp. 260-263.

Though, according to Article 4 of the treaty with Dungarpur, the Raja was the absolute ruler of his territory and the British jurisdiction was not to be introduced therein, Article 5 sanctioned British intervention in the internal affairs of the state. It provided that the affairs of the principality of Dungarpur should be settled according to the advice of the British Government, in which the latter would pay all practicable attention to the will of the Maha Rawal. The Raja would exercise his absolute authority according to the advice of the British Government. By Article 11 the Maha Rawal engaged to discharge from his army all Arabs, Makranis and Sindhis, and to entertain no soldiers but "natives of the country". The British Government agreed not to countenance the relatives of the Maha Rawal who might be disobedient, and promised him aid in bringing them under due control (Article 12).

Articles 4 and 5 of the treaty with Banswara were similar to those of the treaty with Dungarpur. Article 5 was intended to be "purely temporary". On September 22, 1818, Metcalfe wrote : "The fifth article was introduced in order to secure to us the right of interposing our advice and authority for the settlement of the disturbances which at present prevail in the State of Banswara".<sup>98</sup> As in the case of Dungarpur, the Maha Rawal of Banswara, according to Article 11, agreed not to entertain in his service Arabs, Makranis, Sindhis or "other foreign troops"; his army was to be composed of the military class of the inhabitants of the country. By Article 12 the British Government undertook not to countenance the connections or relations of the Maha Rawal, who might prove disobedient, and also to afford the Maha Rawal aid in bringing them under control.

The treaties with Jaisalmer and Pertabgarh deserve separate treatment. So far as Jaisalmer was concerned, the Company did not contemplate a close connection with this remote territory, while for reasons stated earlier it was not

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98. Letter from Metcalfe to the Supreme Government, quoted in A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 406.

considered expedient to leave it entirely beyond the pale of British control and protection. The treaty<sup>99</sup> with Jaisalmer contained the usual conditions of perpetual alliance and subordination (Articles 1 and 4) in addition to two special clauses :- (1) The posterity of Maha Rawal Mulraj should succeed to the principality of Jaisalmer (Article 2). (2) In the event of any serious invasion directed towards the overthrow of the principality of Jaisalmer or other danger of great magnitude occurring to the principality, the British Government would exert its power for the protection of the principality, provided that the cause of the quarrel be not ascribable to the Raja of Jaisalmer (Article 3). No tribute was demanded from Jaisalmer, nor was any liability imposed upon it for furnishing troops at the requisition of the British Government.

Though the treaty with Pertabgarh was based on the same general principles as those underlying the engagements with the other Rajput states, it had, obviously on account of the circumstances and situation in the state, some distinctive features. Certain provisions were similar to some of the terms of the treaties with Banswara and Dungarpur, the two neighbouring states and, like Pertabgarh, offshoots of Mewar. Instead of the usual Articles on perpetual alliance and subordinate co-operation, the treaty<sup>100</sup> with Pertabgarh contained the following stipulations :- (1) The Raja promised to give up all connection with other states and, to the utmost of his power, to prove his obedience to the British Government. The latter would assist him in re-establishing order in his principality and protect him from the claims and trespasses of all other states (Article 1). (2) All arrears of tribute due to Holkar were to be paid to the British Government. The annual tribute hitherto paid to Holkar was now to be paid to the British Government. If punctual payment was not made, the British Government would collect the dues from the "town

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99. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 212-213. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 409.

100. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 460-463. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, pp. 407-408.

duties" of Pertabgarh through an agent of its own (Articles 2,3,12). (3) By Article 4 the Raja agreed not to entertain Arabs or Makranis in his service. He was to maintain 50 horsemen and 200 foot soldiers who were to be at the disposal of the British Government. (4) Article 5 gave the British Government the right of interfering in the internal administration of the state in regard to "the settlement of all predatory tribes" and "the re-establishment of tranquillity and good order". By the same Article the Raja engaged not to "levy any unusual duty on the mint<sup>101</sup> or merchants, or on merchandise, throughout his territories". (5) The British Government engaged to help the Raja in maintaining his authority over his subjects (Articles 6,7,8,9). (6) The British Government would afford the Raja the benefit of its influence in recovering or adjusting his just claims upon any of the "neighbouring" states or the "surrounding" Thakurs. The British Government would mediate to settle any dispute between the Raja and those states or chiefs (Article 10).

While the treaties with the Rajput states were being negotiated, the British were engaged in vigorous military operations against the Marathas and the Pindaris. In their operations in Central India the British received useful co-operation from the Rajput states. The British required the latter's support even before the treaties with them were signed. In his instructions to Tod, who, as stated earlier, was sent on a mission to Kotah and Bundi to ensure their co-operation in obstructing the flight of the Pindaris along the Chambal, Adam wrote : "The co-operation of the States of Cotah and Boondie in measures for the immediate object of destroying the Pindarries will not depend on the previous conclusion of permanent engagements of alliance but is a duty incumbent

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101. The ancestors of the Raja of Pertabgarh were officers of the Delhi Emperors. One of them, Salim Singh, was a great favourite of Emperor Muhammad Shah, who gave him permission to coin money in his own name. Accordingly Salim Singh established a mint in Pertabgarh where rupees called Salim Shahi were struck. (Malleon, op. cit., pp. 133-134).

on them and all other states which the British Government has a right to demand".<sup>102</sup>

Towards the end of November, 1817, the Pindaris were driven from their "accustomed haunts" in Malwa and Sagar. The durras of Karim Khan and Wasil Muhammad moved towards Gwalior. They were invited by Sindhia. Chitu, in expectation of help from Holkar and Jaswant Rao Bhanu, Sindhia's officer at Jawad, retired to the north-west. The British forces moved to cut off the Pindaris under Karim and Wasil from Gwalior. Lord Hastings with his division marched to Soonaree, about 30 miles from Gwalior. This alarmed Sindhia. The Pindaris gathered in the broken ground and jungles near Shahabad. General Marshall and Colonel Adams closed in upon them. For the Pindaris escape was possible only by forcing their way through either the passes of Haraoti to the south-west or those of the Chambal towards Jaipur. But the state of that river, and the advance of British troops from Agra and from General Donkin's division to guard the principal passes in the region of the Chambal towards Jaipur, rendered entirely impracticable any attempt to force the passage of the Chambal lower than Haraoti. David Ochterlony with the reserve army had also moved to the neighbourhood of Jaipur to strengthen the line of defence including the Karauli frontier.<sup>103</sup>

The country of Haraoti comprehended the two principalities of Kotah and Bundi. Tod, as stated above, was sent on a mission to these states. Raj Rana Zalim Singh blocked all the passes in the territories of Kotah. A contingent of 500 cavalry and 1,000 infantry, with four guns, was sent to co-operate with General Sir John Malcolm. Early in December the troops of Kotah had a skirmish with the freebooters at "Burrode" and killed "a few dozens" of these

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102. Secret Consultations, 1817, November 28, No. 3.

103. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XIV, pp. 7-10, 79-82, 101-104, 111-112, 123-127. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 112-113. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 457-458. Burton, op. cit., p. 43.

"scoundrels".<sup>104</sup> As Tod says, "Throughout that brilliant and eventful period in the history of British India, when every province from the Ganges to the ocean was agitated by warlike demonstrations, the camp of the regent was the pivot of operations and the focus of intelligence. The part he acted was decided, manly, and consistent; and if there were moments of vacillation, it was inspired by our own conduct, which created doubts in his mind as to the wisdom of his course".<sup>105</sup> As regards the hearty co-operation of Bundi in the operations for cutting off the flight of the Pindaris, Tod says: "Throughout the contest of 1817, Bundi had no will but ours; its prince and dependents were in arms ready to execute our behest...."<sup>106</sup> On December 10, 1817, General Donkin reached Bundi. On receiving from Tod the news of the position taken by the Pindaris about Shahabad he marched eastward to intercept them.<sup>107</sup>

These Pindaris about Shahabad attempted to force an entrance into Haraoti by Umri Ghat, close to Digdaoli. An action took place between them and the Kotah troops there. The latter repelled the Pindaris, killing several of them. Then the Pindaris succeeded in forcing the passage of the Lodwana Ghat, near Sirsi, leading into Haraoti. It was attributed to the "ill conduct" of the body of Zalim Singh's troops posted there. General Marshall reached the Lodwana Ghat (afternoon of December 14) after the Pindaris had forced the passage. His forces then advanced to surprise them at Bichi Tal, a short distance only from the top of the Ghat. General Marshall succeeded in taking much baggage; but only a few were killed and the rest were able to escape.<sup>108</sup>

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104. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XIV, pp. 7-10, 79-82. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 1441, 1578. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 114. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 404.

105. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 1578.

106. Ibid., p. 1517.

107. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 114. Burton, op. cit., p. 43.

108. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XIV, pp. 123-124. Burton, op. cit., pp. 43-44, 61. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 114-115. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 458.

With these fugitives Karim and Wasil moved to the west in order to cross the Chambal by the Loharee Ghat. But General Donkin's forces intercepted them. Near Burod General Donkin made a night attack on the advance guard of the Pindaris. Leaving the rest to disperse, the two Pindari leaders, with about 4,000 well mounted followers, fled to the south. They were successful in by-passing Colonel Adams' division. They passed through the territory of Kotah in the direction of Mewar. Many of those who had been left behind were cut up by British troops and villagers. On December 23 a small party of Tod's escort attacked a very considerable body of these Pindaris who were still in the territory of Kotah and eventually put them to flight to the south.<sup>109</sup>

Operations against the Pindaris were now confined to the region of Mewar. Chitu, Karim and Wasil had moved in that direction. Chitu, pursued by Malcolm, first took shelter in the camp of Holkar in the vicinity of Mahidpur.<sup>110</sup> After Holkar's defeat at Mahidpur Chitu proceeded to Jawad and took shelter in the camp of Jaswant Rao Bhau, one of Sindhia's officers. Bhau eventually desired Chitu to withdraw from his camp. Chitu for some time lingered in the neighbourhood. Bhau continued his protection to the Pindaris. On January 29, 1818, Jawad was taken by assault. Bhau fled into Mewar with a few horsemen, but pursued by Malcolm, surrendered to him on February 14, 1818. General Donkin was ordered to reduce the districts and forts of Kamalmir, Raipur and Ramnagar, usurped by Bhau from the Rana of Mewar. The General moved from Shahpura. These fortresses were occupied by the middle of February, 1818.<sup>111</sup>

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109. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 115-117. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 458. Burton, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

110. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. XIV, pp. 79-82. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 459. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 118. Burton, op. cit., pp. 45, 62.

111. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 124A, pp. 237, 238, 253. Duff, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 464-465. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 140-144. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, p. 406. Kaye, The Life and Correspondence of .... Malcolm, Vol. II, p. 230.

Chitu who from Jawad moved north-west was pursued by the Gujarat division. Very much harassed by the British army, Chitu suddenly turned, penetrated through a very difficult region to the south of Mewar, and appeared near Dhar. During his flight Chitu was killed by a tiger in the jungles in the neighbourhood of Asirgarh.<sup>112</sup>

Karim was left behind in a jungle during the flight with his broken durra, and that of Wasil, through Haraoti. The followers of Karim under Namdar Khan, along with Wasil and his followers, came to Kotri, on the Kali Sindh (January 12). Colonel Adams was waiting at Gangrar, within a few miles of the above place. A detachment from his army destroyed a large number of these Pindaris. The entire body was dispersed completely. Karim Khan, who was sheltered by Jaswant Rao Bhanu in Jawad, became a wanderer after its capture. The freebooters entirely evacuated Mewar. Namdar Khan and Karim Khan finally surrendered to the British. Wasil, who sought shelter in Sindhia's camp at Gwalior, was surrendered to the British. Many persons belonging to the durras of Wasil and Karim, loitering in the jungles and mountains of Haraoti, surrendered to Raj Rana Zalim Singh.<sup>113</sup>

Zalim Singh's troops acted with Tod in taking possession of every district of Holkar's territory adjacent to Haraoti.<sup>114</sup> Besides, while early in 1818 the British settled the very turbulent district of Sondwara lying to the west of Malwa, Zalim Singh's forces "co-operated with the utmost alacrity".<sup>115</sup> The Raj Rana's commander, Mihrab Khan, and his troops particularly distinguished themselves in the assault

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112. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 146-147, 152-153. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 465-467.

113. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 124A, p. 238. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIV, pp. 406-407. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 147-150. Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 466-467. Burton, op. cit., p. 75. Mill, op. cit., Vol. VIII, pp. 295-296.

114. Tod, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 1577.

115. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 213-214. Burton, op. cit., p. 75.

of the village and fortress of Narella. When the breach was hardly practicable, the Kotah commander stormed Narella. He captured it with the loss of 200 men and a few officers. It was "an exploit which reflects the highest credit on every one engaged".<sup>116</sup> In the military operations in Central India in 1817-18 the Rajputs rendered useful political and military co-operation to the British for the overthrow of the predatory system and the Maratha power.

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116. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 29, pp. 91-92. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. 1, p. 500. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 213-214. Burton, op. cit., p. 75.

## CHAPTER VII

## EPILOGUE

After the conclusion of the treaties with the Rajput states the new political system had to be placed on a regular footing and on a permanent basis. Sir David Ochterlony, with his "approved diplomatic and military experience, judgment and ability", was appointed Resident in Rajputana and Commissioner-General for the affairs of the Rajput states (1818). Tod's thorough acquaintance with the affairs of Rajputana, particularly those of Mewar, accounted for his selection by the Governor-General to represent him at the Rana's court with the title of 'Political Agent in Mewar and Haraothi'. As his designation indicates, he was also entrusted with the political relations with Kotah and Bundi. Tod had to act under the authority and superintendence of Ochterlony. Later he was designated 'Political Agent to the Western Rajput States'. To his former duties was added the conduct of political relations with the Western Rajput states such as Marwar and Jaisalmer.<sup>1</sup>

After the elimination of the Marathas and the Pindaris the new relations between the Company and the Rajput states began to take shape in the context of the internal situation. The treaties, broadly speaking, were intended to ensure peace and security in these principalities under British control and protection. But although external aggression and Pindari depredations were no longer to be feared, the restoration of internal authority and order proved to be a very baffling task. British interference was needed even though the treaties hardly warranted it. Under British

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1. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 21, pp. 295-317, 271-274; Vol. 22, pp. 420-422, 502-505; Vol. 23, pp. 173-174, 177-178. Secret Consultations, 1818, March 6, No. 7. Ochterlony Papers, pp. 20-25, 62. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. XXVI and 548; Vol. 2, pp. 1094, 1243.

superintendence crown lands were resumed, royal revenues showed increase, agreements clipping the wings of refractory nobles were concluded, foreign mercenaries were disbanded, freebooters were expelled, and cultivation tended to improve.<sup>2</sup> On November 6, 1819, Wilder wrote to Ochterlony about the Pushkar fair : "The merchants and others that were present at the Fair, this year, were chiefly from Jeypoor, Kishengurh, Nagore, Meerta and Palee, with a few from Kotah, Boondoe, and Mundisore, but formerly people came from much more remote Districts, and Traders used to be seen there from Gujarat, Sindh, Jesselmere, Bhawalpoor, and even Shikarpoor on the other side of the Indus. The restoration of order and tranquillity in these territories, by the complete extinction of the Pindarries and the daily improving state of the country all round, seems now to have so fully established confidence among all classes of people, that I have no doubt, the Pokhur Fair will soon be resorted to by Foreigners from all parts, as formerly, and that in a few years it will be better and more numerously attended than even Hurdwar or any other meeting of the kind in India".<sup>3</sup>

Although there were encouraging signs of improvement, a satisfactory settlement of the internal affairs of the Rajput states could hardly be achieved with<sup>-in</sup> a few years. It would not be out of place to refer to some of the complications the British Government had to face in regularizing their new relations with the Rajput states.

Early in March, 1818, Tod arrived in Mewar as the first British Political Agent there. His pro-Rajput sentiments are well known. His admiration for Rajput chivalry was high. Moreover, of all the Rajput states Tod had special affection and

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2. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 8, pp. 297-298, 302-303; Vol. 26, pp. 686-689; Vol. 22, pp. 484-498; Vol. 45, pp. 481-483, 515-516. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. 1, p. 506; Vol. 2, pp. 243-244, 376-377. Prinsep, op.cit., Vol. 2, Chapter 22. Tod, op.cit., Vol. 1, pp. 583-584; Vol. 3, p. 1370. Aitchison, op.cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 23-24. Brookes, History of Meywar, p. 28. Malletson, op.cit., p. 36.

3. Ochterlony Papers, p. 101.

regard for Mewar.<sup>4</sup> He came to Udaipur "enthusiastically filled with the idea of raising Mewar from the depressed condition into which she had sunk, of reconstructing her Government on its old footing, and of raising her court to the splendour it had enjoyed in the time of Sangram Singh".<sup>5</sup> But the obstacles in his way were many and serious. The Rana was "naturally defective in energy" and "swayed by faction and intrigue". With his precarious revenues, the Rana was greatly indebted to Raj Rana Zalim Singh of Kotah for the means of subsistence. His chief civil minister Agarji Mehta was in "every way unequal" to his office. The prejudices and infirmities of the prince, the depressed condition of the court, the general distress, disunion and anarchy prevailing throughout the territory, the insolence and refractory spirit of the Thakurs, widespread corruption and inefficiency among the officers of the state were the maladies from which Mewar suffered at that time. Reconstruction was all the more difficult for the Political Agent when he had to keep in view the restoration and preservation of old institutions which had lost their vitality. He had to harmonize the restoration of the authority of the prince with the protection of the Thakurs in the enjoyment of their legitimate privileges. In short the renovation of the prosperity and happiness of Mewar under "the fostering care of the British Government" was the task to which the zealous Political Agent devoted himself.<sup>6</sup>

It was soon evident that Mewar could not be raised from her depressed condition without violating Article 9 of the treaty which restricted British intervention in her internal affairs. Tod received instructions from the Governor-General to intervene, if necessary, in the internal affairs of Mewar. On March 26, 1818, Adam wrote to Tod : "You are aware of

4. Indian Historical Records Commission Proceedings, 1944, Vol. 21, Part 2, pp. 94-96. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 308; Lectures on Rajput History, pp. 177, 179, 185, 186.

5. Brookes, op. cit., p. 23.

6. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 15, pp. 4-10. Secret Consultations, 1818, May 15, No. 25. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 511, 522, 554.

the strong objections that exist to anything ~~like~~ like systematic interference in the affairs of the Rana's Government which is equally precluded by the treaty and by general considerations of policy. In this actual state of the Court of Oudeypore some more active interposition on your part than would be justifiable in a more wholesome condition may not only be excusable but actually indispensable for the success of the measures in view". Tod was, however, reminded that intervention, if needed, must be exercised "with the utmost moderation, caution and discretion and in the form of private advice, not of authority".<sup>7</sup>

To restore law and order in the state it was vital to secure acknowledgement of the Rana's authority by his nobles. The presence of the nobles at the capital was considered by Tod as the "surest sign" of such recognition. Tod succeeded in drawing the nobility to the court. He writes : "In a few weeks the Rana saw himself surrounded by a court such as had not been known for half a century.....in a few weeks the whole feudal association of Mewar was embodied in the capital!"<sup>8</sup>

Tod next held negotiations with the chiefs in order to appease their feuds and to secure the redemption of the usurpations made by them not only on the Rana but also on each other. He also wanted them to perform their customary duties to the state. The question of restitution of usurpations naturally alarmed the chiefs. Further, as Tod points out, "To bring the wolf and the goat to drink from the same vessel was a task of less difficulty than to make the Chondawat and Saktawat labour in concert for the welfare of the prince and the country".<sup>9</sup> But his persistence bore fruit. Tod prepared a charter of the rights and duties of the crown and the chiefs. After protracted negotiations his Kaulnama (Agreement) was signed by the Rana and all the sixteen principal Thakurs at a general meeting held on May 4 and 5, 1818. Subsequently, on account of the extreme jealousy of the chiefs, provision for restitution of

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7. Secret Consultations, 1818, May 15, No. 25.

8. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 559.

9. Ibid., p. 563.

usurpations made both on the Rana and on one another by them was modified to the effect that such lands, instead of being given up to the family which had lost them, were to be retained by the Rana and added to Khalsa. This arrangement enabled Tod to put the Rana's establishment on a respectable footing. According to the Kaulnama, all Khalsa villages seized by the chiefs in times of trouble and commotion should be restored. The chiefs would perform personal service at Udaipur with the quota of troops according to the ancient custom. They would not harbour in their pattas thieves and robbers. They would restore all customs and other duties usurped from the state. The Rana on his part agreed to respect their ancient and hereditary privileges.<sup>10</sup> This settlement was arrived at "without a shot being fired, or the exhibition of a single British soldier in the country, nor, indeed, within one hundred miles of Udaipur".<sup>11</sup> Brookes considers this settlement as an evidence of the great personal influence of Captain Tod and of the authority which the presence of British armies in Central India gave at the time to all British officers employed at 'Foreign Courts'.<sup>12</sup>

While the authority of the Rana was being thus acknowledged by the feudal chiefs, Tod asked the Rana to restrain the rapacity of his officers and compel them to respect the rights of the landholders and ryots. Tod's endeavour was highly appreciated by the Supreme Government.<sup>13</sup>

Tod's Kaulnama secured the restoration of many Khalsa villages usurped by the refractory chiefs. Other arrangements were also made for the recovery and extension of the area of the Khalsa lands. As a result of Tod's negotiations Jahazpur and Sanganeer were restored to the Rana by Raj Rana Zalim Singh of Kotah. Soon afterwards, (1821), however, Jahazpur was assigned for liquidation of arrears of tribute to the British Government.

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10. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 22, pp. 484-498. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 23-24. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 563-565.

Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 362-364. Brookes, op. cit., pp. 23, 114.

11. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 565.

12. Brookes, op. cit., p. 24.

13. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 15, pp. 4-10.

Kamalmir, Raipur, Rajnagar and Sadri-Kunera were recovered from the Marathas. In 1819-20 the district of Mhairwara, inhabited by wild aboriginal people, and claimed by both Mewar and Marwar, was brought under subjection by a British detachment and taken under British management.<sup>14</sup>

The recovery of the Khalsa lands was partly responsible for the increase in the royal revenue. The figures relating to the collections from 1818 to 1821 are as follows:<sup>15</sup>

A.D.1818	.....	Rs.1,20,000
" 1819	.....	Rs.4,41,218
" 1820	.....	Rs.6,49,100
" 1821	.....	Rs.8,77,634.

The fiscal revenues, i.e. the revenues of Khalsa lands during these years were as follows:<sup>16</sup>

A.D.1818	.....	Rs.40,000
" 1819	.....	Rs.4,51,281
" 1820	.....	Rs.6,59,100
" 1821	.....	Rs.10,18,478.

This steady increase in royal revenue was partly due to the "active superintendence" of the Political Agent. This is clearly proved by the fact that as soon as this superintendence was almost entirely withdrawn in 1822, the amount of the fiscal revenue sank to Rs.936,640.<sup>17</sup>

The restoration of order resulted in the return of a considerable section of the "exiled" population to Mewar. There was a noticeable increase in population in some of the chief towns. Steps were taken for the economic recovery of the state. In agriculture the number of ploughs was "more than trebled". The restrictions on external commerce were removed. The scales of duties were revised. Foreign merchants and bankers

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14. Ibid. Persian Correspondence (Letters Received: Eng. Translations), S.66, No.70. Tod, op.cit., Vol.1, p.583. Prinsep, op.cit., Vol.2, p.360. Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol.1, p.498. Brookes, op.cit., pp.24-27. A.C.Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p.311.

15. Brookes, op.cit., p.28.

16. Tod, op.cit., Vol.1, p.584.

17. Ibid.

were invited to establish connections in the principal towns of the state. Cultivation "quadrupled". Branch banks and mercantile agents functioned in every town of Mewar. The commercial duties increased from Rs. 96,683 in 1819 to Rs. 220,000 in 1821.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, signs of economic improvement were evident on all sides.

Tod sought zealously to harmonize British supremacy and intervention with the rejuvenation of old institutions of Mewar, without realizing that such a policy was futile from a long-term point of view. In 1821, according to the instructions of the superior authorities, he started to relax his control over internal administration. The authority of the Rana was partially restored. But confusion began to revive all around. "The spirit of the age and the basic features of foreign rule were altogether inconsistent with the full survival of the old order in Rajasthan".<sup>19</sup>

Not only in Mewar, but also in Marwar, the situation in consequence of intestine discord was equally distressing when it came under British protection. Shortly after the ratification of the treaty the incapable Regent, Ch<sup>h</sup>attar Singh, died. "Youth and base panders to his pleasures" had seduced him from his arduous duties. Tod says that this young man died, according to some, as the victim of illicit pursuits, and according to others, from a wound caused by the hand of a<sup>a</sup> chieftain whose daughter he tried to seduce.<sup>20</sup>

After Ch<sup>h</sup>attar Singh's death the faction led by Salim Singh, the chief of Pokaran and the son of the late Sawai Singh, apprehended Raja Man Singh's resumption of power. This group at that time controlled the government. They obviously sought to prevent Raja Man's resumption of authority and kept him in restraint. They sought to have the only son of the Raja

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18. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 561-562, 583-584. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 310.

19. A. C. Banerjee, Lectures on Rajput History, pp. 169, 192.

20. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 37, pp. 67-71, 74. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 1091. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, pp. 338-339. Ochterlony Papers, p. 485.

of Idar as their sovereign. The Raja of Idar declined to accept this offer unless it was endorsed by all the nobles of the state. As unanimity was unattainable the party of Salim Singh had to restore authority to Raja Man Singh.<sup>21</sup>

On November 29, 1818, the functions of government were resumed by Man Singh, and on January 1, 1819, he entered the city in state.<sup>22</sup> The situation, however, did not improve. Raja Man failed to resume the reins of power effectively. Moreover, he disapproved "part of the treaty, and especially the article relating to the armed contingent of his vassals to be at the disposal of the protecting power, in which he ... saw the germ of discord, from the certainty of interference it would lead to".<sup>23</sup> Man Singh "seemed to have forgotten" the previous hostility of the Pokaran faction which continued to conduct the ministry. Salim Singh was the Bhanjgarh and Akhai Chand the Dewan. They kept the Raja himself and all the officers of the government under control. There was a nucleus of opposition organized by the brother of the murdered minister, Fateh Raj, who was in charge of the city. The administration was totally disorganized. Justice was unknown. The mercenary bands of Sindhis and Pathans were in "miserable plight" for arrears of pay. Sometimes they were "seen begging in the streets of the capital".<sup>24</sup>

As in the case of Mewar, the Company found it difficult to escape from interference in the internal affairs of Marwar. On September 5, 1818, Adam wrote to Ochterlony that the Company "should exercise the power of effectual interference to the full extent demanded by the nature of the case"; it was, however, to be confined as much as possible to "general political arrangements", and "direct interference in the internal administration of the country" was to be avoided. He felt, however, that "the circumstances of the country may be such as to compel

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21. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 1092-93. Rajputana Agency Office Records Vol. 37, pp. 68-71, 79, 90-94.

22. Persian Correspondence (Letters Received: Eng. Translations), S. 66, No. 46.

23. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 1093.

24. Ibid., pp. 1093-1095. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, pp. 339-340.

us, as in the case of Jyepore and Oudeypore, to take a more direct and ostensible part". He concluded : "The result of a similar proceeding at the two other principal Rajpoot Courts, as far as it has yet been developed, encourages the hope that it will not only be beneficial but well received".<sup>25</sup>

In December, 1818, Wilder, Superintendent of the district of Ajmer, was sent to Marwar to report on its condition and also to offer the Raja British help for the settlement of his affairs of his state. The Agent met the Raja and offered the assistance of British troops for restoring order and authority in the state. But the Raja, "with a Machiavellian caution", declined the offer. He pleaded "reliance on himself to restore his State to order". He was aware that British dictation and interference in the internal administration of Marwar would follow the acceptance of the proposed aid. This was a contingency he wanted to avoid. At the same time, with a view to utilizing the British offer in its political aspect, he tried to keep his chiefs under restraint by disseminating the impression among them that British troops would come to his help. Wilder tried in vain to convince the Raja that the situation in Marwar was "irretrievable without the direct aid of the paramount power". In February, 1819, he left Jodhpur for Ajmer.<sup>26</sup>

Then Tod was entrusted with the affairs of Marwar. He went to Jodhpur early in November, 1819. The situation in Marwar had not really changed since the departure of Wilder. Tod writes : "..... the points to which he (the Raja) had to direct his mind were neither few nor slight, for they involved every branch of government". The problems, according to Tod, were as follows :

- (1) Formation of an efficient administration.
- (2) Consideration of finances; the condition of the crown lands; the feudal confiscations.
- (3) The reorganization and settlement of the 'foreign' troops, on whose service the Raja chiefly relied.

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25. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 24, pp. 5-10. Ochterlony Papers, p. 3.

26. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 1093-1095. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 37, pp. 123-124.

- (4) An effective police on all the frontiers, to put down the wholesale pillages of the Mers in the south, the Larkhanis in the north, and the desert Sahariyas and Khosas in the west; reformation of the tariff which was so high as almost to amount to prohibition; and at the same time to provide for the security of commerce.<sup>27</sup>

Tod stayed at Jodhpur for nearly three weeks. He had several private interviews with the Raja. He tried to persuade him to avail himself of the support of the British Government for the welfare of his state. He told the Raja : "By your resolution, your external enemies are now gone: you have the British Government as a friend; rely upon it with the same fortitude, and, in a very short time, all will be as you could desire". The Raja's response was not favourable. He replied : "In one twelve-months, my affairs will be as friendship could wish". Tod rejoined : "In half the time, Maharaja, if you are determined". His efforts to persuade the Raja to accept British help in the internal matters proved as fruitless as Wilder's.<sup>28</sup>

Hardly had Tod left Jodhpur when fresh disorders broke out. The ruling faction, either to raise money or to gratify ancient animosities, proceeded to strike at those chiefs who were considered recalcitrant. Ghanerao, the chief fief of Godwar, was sequestered and then released on payment of a fine of more than a year's revenue. All the minor chiefs of this tract suffered similarly, and their lands were placed under the control of a brother of the minister. Chandawal, which had also been sequestered, was released on payment of a very heavy fine. At last Akhai Chand, the Dewan, "had the audacity to put his hand on Awa, the chief fief of Marwar". As Tod says, "Gloom, mistrust, and resentment pervaded the whole feudal body".<sup>29</sup>

During this period the Raja, says Tod, "resumed his sequestered habits,..... Raja Man was only heard of as an automaton, moving as the Diwan pleased". But by the middle of

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27. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 1094-1096.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., pp. 1096-1097.

1820 the Raja threw off the mask of insanity. He proceeded to inflict terrible punishment on the Pokaran faction. His pretended "insanity" thus "proved to be but a cloak to the intensity of his resentment". Akhai Chand, Nagji,<sup>30</sup> and Mulji Dandal were treacherously killed. These and other victims of Raja Man's cruelty were forced to give up the wealth they had amassed. Fateh Raj was appointed Dewan. The attempt to kill the Pokaran chief, Salim Singh, however, did not succeed. He "fled to his asylum in the desert". But his "constant associate", Surthan Singh of Nimaj, was put to death. The Raja relentlessly followed the policy of crushing the chiefs irrespective of their treachery or loyalty in the past. In his letter to the Supreme Government on these events, dated July 7, 1820, Tod observed: "The danger is, that success may tempt him to go beyond the line of necessity, either for the ends of justice or security. If he stops with the Pokaran chief, and one or two inferior, concerned in the coalition of 1806 and the usurpation of his son, with the condign punishment of a few of the civil officers, it will afford a high opinion of his character; but if he involves Awa, and the other principal chiefs, in these proscriptions, he may provoke a strife which will yet overwhelm him. He has done enough for justice, and even for revenge, which has been carried too far as regards Surthan Singh, whose death ..... was a prodigal sacrifice".<sup>31</sup>

Tod's apprehension came to be true. Raja Man's "acts of treachery and cold-blooded tyranny" completely estranged his chiefs. Isolated, they were unable to resist the Raja's mercenary battalions of one thousand men, excluding the quotas. Nor could they form a league for self-defence from "the dreaded threat held over them, of calling in the British troops". The helpless chiefs took refuge in the neighbouring states of Mewar, Jaipur, Kotah and Bikaner. In 1821 the expatriated chiefs of Marwar appealed to Tod, then Political Agent of the Western Rajput states, against the tyranny of their master. But the British Government was then reluctant to intervene in their favour. Tod considered the conduct of the chiefs as

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30. the Kiladar, the commander of the fort.

31. Tod, op.cit., Vol. 2, pp. 1097-1100.

"exemplary"; but he had to tell them in pursuance of official policy that "if in due time no mediation was held out, they must depend on themselves for redress!" Tod's commentary on the whole affair is not at all complementary to the Raja's ruthless policy. He says: "Had a demoniacal spirit of revenge not blinded Raja Man, he had a fine opportunity to lay the principles of order on a permanent basis, and to introduce those reforms necessary for his individual welfare as well as for that of ~~that~~ of the State. He had it in his power to modify the institutions, to curb without destroying the feudal chiefs, and to make the whole subservient to the altered condition of affairs. Instead of having the glory of fixing the constitution of his country, he has (reposing on external protection) broken up the entire feudal association, and rendered the paramount power an object of hatred instead of reverence".<sup>32</sup>

As in Mewar and Marwar, disorder and confusion prevailed in Jaipur. Its political life was characterized by the defects of its incompetent and dissolute prince, the inefficiency of its ministers and officers, and the conflict between the prince and the nobles. In May, 1818, Ochterlony proceeded to Jaipur for the purpose of introducing "some regularity and system into the administration of its affairs". On June 21, at a general meeting of the Thakurs held in the presence of the Raja and under Ochterlony's superintendence, the chiefs were called upon to execute a paper laying down the fundamental rules of their future relations with the Raja, including the question of relinquishment of their usurpations. The chiefs signed this document with great reluctance but the arbitration in Jaipur was "easy, and left no unpleasant feeling". According to this agreement all the "recent" usurpations of the Thakurs were to "be disposed of according to the will of the Durbar". The chiefs promised not to harbour thieves and robbers. They would not molest but protect the merchants in their respective domains. They engaged to render service at home and abroad agreeably to the usages of the Durbar. Their brothers, sons and dependants, having separate pattas from the Durbar, should render service to the Durbar. The duties levied

32. Ibid., pp. 1100-1101.

on merchandise in the past belonged to the state. No Sardar should oppress his ryots. The Raja also on his part gave an assurance that the chiefs who were obedient and well disposed should enjoy their ancient rights and domains. But some of the Thakurs showed a disposition to evade the obligation of restoration of Khalsa lands. It was considered necessary to make an example in order to impress on the minds of the other chiefs of Jaipur the importance and the necessity of their rigid adherence to the engagements into which they had entered and to the maintenance of which the faith and honour of the British Government were virtually pledged. Accordingly the strongholds of Kushalgarh and Madhorajpura (or Madhogarh) were reduced. These measures not only contributed to the restoration of Khalsa lands but to the establishment of the Raja's just authority throughout his territory. In order to ensure proper exercise of that authority Ochterlony induced the Raja to give increased attention to the affairs of government.<sup>33</sup> Thus in violation of the provision of the treaty Ochterlony had to intervene in the internal administration of Jaipur.

The operation of the sixth Article of the treaty, relating to tribute, also necessitated some deviation from the principle of non-interference in the internal matters of Jaipur. As Tod points out, "..... the 'absolute rulers' of Jaipur have been compelled to unfold to the resident Agent the whole of their financial and territorial arrangements, to prove that the revenues did not exceed the sum of forty lakhs, as, of the sum in excess (besides the stipulated tributary fifth), our share was to be three-sixteenths".<sup>34</sup>

On December 21, 1818, Raja Jagat Singh died, leaving behind no natural or adopted heir. Next morning a boy

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33. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 24, pp. 23-24, 83, 105, 126-129; Vol. 37, pp. 2-7. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1364-1365, 1370. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 373, 374. A. C. Banerjee, Lectures on Rajput History, p. 172. Ochterlony Papers, pp. 25-26.

34. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1371-1372.

of nine, named Mohan Singh,<sup>35</sup> was placed on the gadi by Mohan Nazir, the chief eunuch of the rawala (seraglio), who then had the reins of power in his hands. The Nazir, as Tod points out, was "a man of considerable vigour of understanding, and not without the reputation of good intention in his administration of affairs". But Tod has not failed to mention that the choice of Mohan Singh as Jagat Singh's heir "savoured more of self-interest than of loyalty". The long minority of the young prince, facilitating the exclusive possession of power by the Nazir, suggested his real intention. The Nazir's principal co-adjutor was Thakur Megh Singh of Diggi. The personal servants of the crown and all the subordinate officers of the household supported the Nazir. He claimed that the adoption of Mohan Singh was in accordance with the wishes of the late Raja. But there was no evidence in support of this assertion. Moreover, the selection was in violation of the established usage, according to which succession in case of failure of lineal issue was the privilege of the descendants of Raja Man, and the branch Madhani, generally styled Rajawat, of whom the chief of Jhalai was the first claimant. There was "no previous consultation or concert amongst the military vassals, or the queens" in respect of deviation from this usage. The Nazir acted fully on his own responsibility; the queens and Thakurs were highly offended at his conduct. It was alleged that when the late Raja was in the last stage of his illness, the Nazir artfully persuaded the Thakurs to leave Jaipur and return to their homes. Presumably he was afraid that on his setting up the child of his choice on the gadi they might create some disturbance. It was only after the enthronement of Mohan Singh that the Nazir proceeded to get the approval of the nobles and the British Government. The nobles refused to commit themselves.<sup>36</sup>

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35. Son of Manohar Singh, ex-Raja of Narwar, who "was chased from his throne and country by Sindhia". This minor was a distant relation of the ruling family of Jaipur. (Ibid., pp. 1372-73).

36. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 44, pp. 1-4, 41-117. Persian Correspondence (Letters Received: Eng. Translations), Vol. 66, Nos. 47, 48, 89, 102. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1366, 1369, 1372-1374. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 374. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput states and the East India Company, p. 389.

All "eyes were directed to the paramount power". On being entreated by the Nazir, the Resident in Delhi deputed his confidential Munshi to Jaipur to make an enquiry into this issue of succession. The Munshi reached Jaipur six days after Jagat Singh's death. His report went in favour of the Nazir. On February 7, 1819, confirmation of the succession of Mohan Singh by the British Government was formally announced at Jaipur.<sup>37</sup>

Even after the approval of the paramount power the queens and the nobles refused to accept Mohan Singh as the legitimate ruler of Jaipur. In order to weaken opposition the Nazir asked the chief queen of the late Raja to adopt the boy. He also adopted coercive tactics threatening the chief queen and also the other queens with the confiscation of their jagirs and "other privations". But the chief queen "breathed nothing but open defiance of the Nazir and his junta". The nobles supported her. Early in March, 1819, the Rajawat chief of Jhalai determined to have resort to arms to establish his right to the gadi. The chiefs of Sarwar and Isarda, belonging to the same stock, sided with him. Another party was inclined to revive the right of Man Singh, the posthumous son of Prithvi Singh, who for many years had been living in exile at Gwalior. From Gwalior he had already written a letter to Ochterlony, soliciting British support for his claim. Confronted by such serious opposition, the Nazir sought to enlist the support of Raja Man Singh of Marwar and Rana Bhim Singh of Mewar. He even attempted to arrange a marriage between the minor ruler and the granddaughter of the Rana. But his diplomacy was fruitless. Meanwhile he was preparing to move troops against the Thakurs and the relations of the deceased Raja who opposed him. A force was actually despatched against the chief of Malarna. Civil war seemed imminent, but it was averted by the timely discovery that one of the queens of the late Raja - the Bhattiani queen - was pregnant. On April 25, 1819, she gave birth to a son. In order to adjust these matters Ochterlony again went to Jaipur. Mohan Singh was removed from the gadi. The child, who

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37. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 45, pp. 487-488. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1374-1375. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 389.

was named Jai Singh III, was acknowledged as the legitimate ruler both by the chiefs of Jaipur and the British Government, and the Bhattiani queen became the Regent.<sup>38</sup>

The new arrangement did not improve the situation; Jaipur continued to be "a scene of misgovernment and corruption". Unpleasant occurrences, originating in the violence of the parties and attended with loss of lives, took place. The British Government found it necessary to appoint a Political Agent especially to superintend Jaipur affairs. In 1821 Major Stewart, who had acted for some time as Resident at Sindhia's court, was sent to Jaipur with this commission.<sup>39</sup>

Thus within the first two or three years after the conclusion of the treaty with Jaipur, the British Government had to intervene in three important issues : relations of the prince with the nobles, finance, and succession. The eighth Article of the treaty, providing for non-interference in internal matters, was rather observed in violation than in adherence. In this connection Tod remarks : "While, therefore, we deem ourselves justified in interfering in the two chief branches of government, the succession and finances, how is it possible to avoid being implicated in the acts of the government-functionaries, and involved in the party views and intrigues of a court, stigmatised even by the rest of Rajwara with the epithet of jhutha darbar, 'the lying court'?" Intervention, however, necessary, had a wider political implication. When the British Government dealt with the intrigues regarding succession, their ignorance of the ~~establishment~~ established rights and usages rendered their action offensive to Rajput sentiment and made the nobles of Jaipur repent the alliance which "temporary policy" had induced their late ruler to accept.<sup>40</sup>

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38. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 44, pp. 4-5, 41-117. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1375-1378. Persian Correspondence (Letters Received: Eng. Translations), Vol. 66, No. 102. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 374. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, pp. 389-390.

39. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 169A, Letter to Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur, June 30, 1821. Ochterlony Papers, Nos. 91, 92. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 1377. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 374-375.

40. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1370, 1372.

Among the minor Rajput states the principality of Kotah affords us a very striking illustration of the intervention which was forced upon the British Government by internal discord and the defects of the treaty. Soon after the conclusion of the treaty it was discovered that Raj Rana Zalim Singh would have preferred the introduction of a special Article guaranteeing administrative authority to himself and his heirs. According to Tod, who was then the "medium" of the Company's political relations with Kotah, the overtures for addition of such a provision "in all probability originated not with" the Regent but with his elder son Madho Singh. The Company could not ignore the necessity of recognizing those who were the rulers de facto. On February 20, 1818, a supplementary Article was executed at Delhi to the following effect : Maha Rao Ummed Singh should be succeeded by his eldest son and heir apparent, Kishor Singh, "in regular succession and perpetuity"; but the entire administration of the affairs of the principality should be vested in Zalim Singh and, after him, his eldest son Madho Singh, and his heirs "in regular succession and perpetuity". Thus one person was acknowledged as the titular ruler and another recognized as the actual ruler. This supplementary Article was ratified by the Governor-General on March 7, 1818.<sup>41</sup> Thus there were three parties to the Kotah engagement : the British Government, Ummed Singh and his heirs, and Zalim Singh and his heirs. Upon all these three parties the stipulations of the treaty, original and supplementary, were equally binding. In this respect this treaty happened to differ from the Company's engagements with the other Rajput states. It was a complicated situation unlikely to preserve political equilibrium. In this connection Tod points out : "There is not a shadow of doubt that the supplemental articles of the treaty of Kotah, which pledged our faith to two parties in a manner which rendered its maintenance towards both an impossibility, produced consequences that shook the confidence of the people of Rajwara

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41. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 169A, No. 44. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, p. 361. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 1589. A.C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 397.

in our political rectitude".<sup>42</sup>

Troubles started in Kotah after the death of Maha Rao Ummed Singh in November, 1819. Ummed Singh had three sons, Kishor Singh, Bishan Singh and Prithvi Singh. Kishor Singh, the heir apparent, was "mild in his temper and demeanour". Being "brought up in habits of seclusion, he was more conversant with the formulas of his religion, and the sacred epics, than with the affairs of mankind". His nature and training "had well fitted him to follow the path of his father" in leaving the country to be governed by the Regent. Bishan Singh was "equally placid in disposition" and "much attached to the regent". Prithvi Singh, however, was of a different mould. He was "eager for action in the only career of a Rajput -- arms". He considered the existing state of things of Kotah as "one of opprobrium and dishonour". His mind "was made up to enfranchise himself and family from the thralldom in which his father had left them, or perish in the attempt".<sup>43</sup>

Zalim Singh had two sons, Madho Singh (legitimate) and Gobardhan Das (illegitimate). The elder son, Madho Singh, the Faujdar of the state, was indolent and arrogant. Gobardhan Das, who then held the office of Pardhan, was intelligent and daring. He was jealous of Madho Singh. He "lived on terms of confidential friendship" with the royal brothers, especially with the heir apparent and Prithvi Singh, "whose disposition corresponded with his own".<sup>44</sup>

The death of Ummed Singh was followed by a conflict among his sons and those of the Regent. Soon after the Maha Rao's death Zalim Singh was attacked by a stroke of the palsy. The occasion was seized by the party led by Gobardhan Das, who aimed at the subversion of the guaranteed authority of

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42. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 1588.

43. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 169A, No. 44. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 62, p. 107. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1583, 1585, A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 397.

44. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 62, pp. 108-110. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1583-1584. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 397.

Madho Singh and at winning over Maha Rao Kishor Singh to their views. Prithvi Singh was associated with Gobardhan Das. They formed part of the council of Kishor Singh. Troops were secretly enlisted and applications were made to the neighbouring chiefs, the Raja of Bundi and Amir Khan, for help in the "meditated struggle". The communications with "Foreign Powers", being wholly without the knowledge and concurrence of the British Government, involved a breach of the stipulations on the part of Kishor Singh; he had not only sanctioned them but was even led to write some of them with his own hand. Before the plot was brought to maturity Zalim Singh recovered, and Tod, as the British Political Agent, proceeded to Kotah in March, 1820, to exercise his authority in preventing the threatened disturbance of public tranquillity.<sup>45</sup>

The personal animosities which had been excited among the parties were irreconcilable. The British Government, however, was determined that Zalim Singh was to be secured in full exercise of the authority guaranteed to him and that his authority was to be so established as to imply an assurance that it would descend unimpaired to his eldest son to whom succession to authority had been similarly guaranteed.<sup>46</sup> This was the only position which the paramount power could take consistent with its treaty obligations.

The counsellors of Kishor Singh, aiming at the subversion of the authority of the Regent, advised the new Maha Rao to demand the fulfilment of Article 10 of the treaty according to its literal interpretation. According to this Article the British Government engaged that the Maha Rao, his heirs and successors should remain absolute rulers of their country. It was contended that this clear engagement could not be reconciled with their subsequent determination to guarantee to Madho Singh and his heirs the enjoyment of authority which made him the de facto ruler and "reduced the gaddi of Kotah to a simple heap of cotton". It was argued that while the seals of all the contracting parties were affixed to the original treaty, the

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45. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 169A, No. 44. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1585, 1586, 1590. Mill, op. cit., Vol. 8, p. 422.

46. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 169A, No. 44.

late Maha Rao "died in absolute ignorance" of the supplementary Article. Though the policy of the party led by Gobardhan Das was directed not so much against Raj Rana Zalim Singh, who was very old and quite blind, as against the would-be Regent Madho Singh, the question of the validity of the supplementary Article obviously affected the position of the old Raj Rana. <sup>47</sup>

The British Agent, in accordance with instructions of the Supreme Government, informed Kishor Singh that "no pretensions of the titular Raja can be entertained by us in opposition to our positive engagement with the regent; that he alone was considered as the head of the Kotah State, and the titular Raja no more deemed the ruler of Kotah, than the Raja of Satara the leader of the Mahrattas, or the Great Mogul the ~~Raja~~ emperor of Hindustan". The Maha Rao refused to listen to the Agent and professed to deem "the person who could compare his case to others so little parallel to it, as his enemy". It was felt that so long as Prithvi Singh and Gobardhan Das remained the trusted advisers of Kishor Singh, the "titular Raja" could not be persuaded "to resign himself to his destiny". So the removal of both from his council was considered indispensable. Further, the removal of Gobardhan Das, the "instigator" of the threatened commotion, from Kotah altogether was regarded as essential to preservation of tranquillity. The demand for his surrender was softened by a pledge of security of his life and an offer of a large jagir "for his maintenance in comfort and security". <sup>48</sup>

For three months efforts were made to detach Prithvi Singh and particularly Gobardhan Das from the Maha Rao. The Maha Rao preferred identifying his cause with that of the Raj Rana's "profligate son" and refused to abandon him. The moderation and extreme tenderness of Zalim Singh prevented adoption of measures of coercion for the accomplishment of the object in view. At last, at the beginning of June, after the

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47. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1589-1590. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, pp. 397-398.

48. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1590, 1595. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 169A, No. 44. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 1, pp. 43-60, 123; Vol. 62, p. 40.

failure of every other means of bringing matters to an adjustment, the Raj Rana was induced to take measures for investing the fort in which the "refractory Prince" and his own "ungrateful" son had taken shelter. But he would not allow use of guns lest those who were inside the fort should be killed; he would rather starve them to surrender. His object was to correct rather than punish the "refractory" spirit of the prince and his son.<sup>49</sup> The old man's strategy served its purpose. Being reduced to extremity, the prince broke through the blockade at the head of 500 horse. He was, however, overtaken by the British Agent and conducted by him back to the fort. Gobardhan Das was deported to Delhi as a state-criminal. Prithvi Singh gave Tod assurances of avoiding all interference in affairs of state. A public reconciliation took place between Kishor Singh and Zalim Singh. On August 17, 1820, the formal ceremony of the re-installation of Kishor Singh on the gadi of Kotah was held.<sup>50</sup> The British Agent was "the first (following the priest) to make the tika, or unction of sovereignty on the forehead of the prince; and having tied on the jewels,.... he girded on, amidst salutes of ordnance, the sword of investiture".<sup>51</sup> Madho Singh was at the same time invested with the Khilat of succession to the Regency.<sup>52</sup>

Tranquillity being "to all appearance perfectly restored", Tod left Kotah. Before long, however, the quarrel revived with enhanced violence and broke out into actual hostilities. The cupidity of those around the Maha Rao led them to excite his weak mind, "stimulating him to grasp at a power whence they hoped to draw great personal profit though at the expense of public interests". The Maha Rao's adoption of their suggestions showed itself in efforts to seduce the soldiery from their obedience to the Raj Rana and Madho Singh.<sup>53</sup>

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49. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 169A, No. 44.

50. Ibid. Rajputana Agency Office Records, Vol. 1, pp. 43-65, 67-71, 73-75, 77-81, 83, 105-115, 117-121, 123; Vol. 62, pp. 40-48. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1590-1593. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 398.

51. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 1593.

52. Ibid. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 169A, No. 44.

53. He was then Faujdar of Kotah.

Correspondence was maintained with Gobardhan Das, who, permitted to visit Malwa in connection with a marriage ceremony, moved about on the frontier of the Kotah state. On December 24, 1820, Saif Ali, the commander of the 'Royals' (Raj Paltan), was induced to raise the standard of revolt. He declared publicly for the Maha Rao and denounced the authority of the Raj Rana as usurpation. Zalim Singh invested the fort. The Maha Rao, Prithvi Singh and their adherents fled to Bundi. The Maha Rao subsequently returned to Kotah at the head of a tumultuous host.

Thus troubles broke out afresh, threatening the guaranteed arrangement as well as the tranquillity of Kotah. The British Government had to intervene. On October 1, 1821, the Maha Rao was defeated by the British troops at the battle of Mangrol. Prithvi Singh was killed. The Maha Rao retreated to Mewar. Soon afterwards he was induced to return to Kotah. An engagement was signed on November 22, 1821. The Maha Rao not only recognized the validity of the supplementary Article of the treaty of 1817 but also promised to submit "cheerfully" to "all that the British Government may command".<sup>54</sup>

Incidentally, reference may be made to the differences between Ochterlony and Tod which in 1822 culminated in the latter's resignation. A clash started shortly after their assumption of duties in Rajputana; it reached its climax in connection with the affairs of Kotah and led to an irreconcilable breach between the two in 1822. In the early stage the Governor-General in Council appreciated the way in which Tod was dealing with the affairs of the states placed under his care; later disapproval and distrust replaced appreciation. As a result Tod's official status and authority were eventually reduced. That was highly resented by him; he resigned.<sup>55</sup> In this

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54. Tod, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 1593-1611. Foreign Misc. Records, Vol. 169A, No. 44. Mill, op. cit., Vol. 8, pp. 422-423. Ochterlony Papers, No. 82. Prinsep, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 355-357. Aitchison, op. cit., 1932, Vol. 3, pp. 362-363. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, pp. 398-399.

55. Indian Historical Records Commission Proceedings, 1944, Vol. 21, Part 2, pp. 94-96. Ochterlony Papers, Introduction, pp. xxi-xxvi.

connection Crooke says : "Whatever may have been the real reason for the premature termination of his official career at the age of forty, ill-health was put forward as the ostensible cause of his retirement".<sup>56</sup> This episode has its personal aspect in so far as it arose out of the mutual relations of Ochterlony and Tod and their conflicting views about the limits of their power and position. But a more fundamental issue was involved : the nature and extent of British intervention in the affairs of the Rajput states. In retrospect it is clear enough that if Tod's sympathetic and liberal outlook had been shared by his ~~superiors~~ official superiors, British policy in those critical days might have been much more conducive to the welfare of the Rajput states emerging out of the chaos of a century.

Tod's sympathy and respect for the "Land of Rajas", particularly Mewar, was not to the liking of the Resident. The latter accused Tod of becoming "too much of a Rajpoot himself"; he was not "steady and impartial", particularly towards Mewar.<sup>57</sup> In order to restore order and peace in Mewar, Tod advised the Rana to invite the long-exiled inhabitants of Udaipur to return home. His action in allowing his own name to be "blended" with that of the Rana in this invitation was disliked by Ochterlony. The latter thought that this active association with an administrative measure would give too much "publicity" to British interference.<sup>58</sup> The Governor-General in Council, however, did not disapprove of Tod's action; it was actually appreciated as a "meritorious" work. In the opinion of the Supreme Government Tod had displayed "a just and accurate knowledge of the interests of the Rana and his subjects", as also "a correct sense of the principles" by which British relationship with the state of Udaipur should be regulated.<sup>59</sup> They thought that the insertion of Tod's name in the proclamation inviting the return of the exiled inhabitants had been necessary. In this connection Adam, Secretary to the Governor-General, wrote to Ochterlony : "..... the degraded condition of

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56. Tod, op. cit., Vol. I, Introduction, p. xxviii.

57. Ochterlony Papers, pp. xxi, 304-305.

58. Ibid., p. xxii; also No. 16.

59. Ibid., No. 18.

the Rana's authority .... as well as the general poverty, distress and desolation of the country led him (Tod) to anticipate the necessity for some more active and avowed interposition in the affairs of Meywaur than would on general principles be desirable. His Lordship is disposed to think the case at present under consideration is one in which it would have *been* difficult if not impracticable for Captain Tod to have pertinaciously resisted the entreaties of the Rajah to lend his name and the guarantee of the British Government to the measure without the hazard of checking the Rana's disposition to seek his counsel and assistance on other occasions, a habit which it is so essential to encourage by every proper means". The Governor-General, however, tried to reconcile the conflicting views of Ochterlony and Tod. Adam wrote to Ochterlony : "The Governor-General relies on Captain Tod's discretion and judgment under the guidance of your experience and ability for a cautious exertion of his species of interference".<sup>60</sup>

In October, 1818, differences arose once again between the two. Raj Rana Zalim Singh of Kotah had given Amir Khan temporary shelter in Shergarh. Amir Khan had promised to shift his family to his own jaidad at the end of the rains. But he continued to stay there even after the rains. He also plundered and harassed the local inhabitants. On receipt of a letter from Raj Rana Zalim Singh about it Tod considered it necessary to protest and ask Amir Khan to retire from Shergarh immediately. He wrote directly to Amir Khan. Ochterlony deemed this as highly improper. As Amir Khan was under Ochterlony's immediate authority, the latter questioned the propriety of Tod's addressing the Pathan chief direct except in case of special emergency. Ochterlony did not consider the present case to be an urgent matter. According to him Amir Khan's family occupied "a house or houses in a fort strongly garrisoned by Zalim Singh's troops, at no great distance from which he had his horse in superior numbers to the Khan from which he could at all times repress misconduct by a few cannon shot". But Tod held a different view. Convinced of the urgency and importance of the matter, he wrote to Ochterlony : "The lawless conduct of

Meer Khan's followers is too well known not to believe them capable of any outrage and Zalim Singh's proud spirit would not brook it for an instant ..... This, and the Raj Rana's asseveration that his Horse were committing aggressions on his Ryots, induced me instantly to address him".<sup>61</sup>

Not satisfied with Tod's explanation, Ochterlony brought the matter to the notice of the Governor-General. He wrote to Adam : "I shall not trust myself to dwell on an interference which independently of all personal consideration or the respect due to the superior powers vested in me by the Most Noble the Governor-General appears to me to be liable to many and great political objections and to involve a clashing of authorities which might eventually be very prejudicial to the public interests. Were Captain Tod in every respect independent of the Resident of Rajpootana I humbly conceive there would be as great an impropriety in his writing to any Chief placed immediately under me as if the Resident at ~~the~~ Hoolkar's Court was to commence a direct correspondence on public business with Jaipoor. It occurred to me on the perusal of your instructions that Captain Tod was expected to advise, consult or even occasionally to refer to me for my opinion on any measures he might propose for the settlement of Oodeepoor the more immediate seat of his political Agency but I have never received one line from him on this subject excepting those which have been transmitted to Government and are details of what has been actually done .....!"<sup>62</sup>

In spite of this categorical complaint from the Resident the Governor-General in Council did not disapprove of Tod's action. Meanwhile Amir Khan had retired from the territory of Kotah. Adam, in communicating to Ochterlony the view of the Governor-General in Council, stated : "The Governor-General in Council has perceived with regret the difference of opinion which has arisen between you and Captain Tod..... In ordinary circumstances it would have doubtless been the duty of Captain Tod to have addressed you on that subject and His Lordship in Council is persuaded that in deviating from this regular

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61. Ibid., p. xxii; Nos. 29, 29a, 29b, 29c, 29d, 29e, 29f, 29g.

62. Ibid., No. 29.

course Captain Tod acted under an impression of the urgency of the occasion requiring the immediate interposition of the nearest British authority. It is not necessary under present circumstances to pursue this subject further..... Ameer Khan has retired from the Kotah territory....."<sup>63</sup> The conflict between Ochterlony and Tod did not end here. Unable to forget "these discomfitures", Ochterlony henceforth "made use of his personal prestige .... to humiliate Tod whenever he got an opportunity".<sup>64</sup>

In December, 1818, Ochterlony took charge of the Residency of Delhi from Metcalfe, in addition to his duties as the Resident in Rajputana which directly related to the affairs of Jaipur and the petty states of Karauli and Kishangarh. Tod, as already stated, was placed in charge of the affairs of Jodhpur, in addition to those of Udaipur, Kotah, Bundi, and Jaisalmer. In July, 1819, Ochterlony informed Metcalfe, then Secretary to the Supreme Government, that the court of Jodhpur had expressed great dissatisfaction with this arrangement as, according to the treaty, all business was to be transacted with the Resident at Delhi. He added that it was Rajput pride which induced the Raja of Jodhpur "to prefer communications with a Resident and General Officer to one they (the Rajputs) may have been led to suppose is more humbly designated in his political capacity as well as in army rank". In August, 1819, Tod was informed that British relations with the court of Jodhpur would revert to the charge of the Resident at Delhi. However, when Tod personally communicated this decision to the Raja of Jodhpur, he told Tod that he had neither "predilection for Delhi" nor "preference of any officer of the British government to another". Subsequently the ruler of Jaisalmer desired transfer of the affairs of his state from Tod to Ochterlony, but in that case Lord Moira's Government allowed no change.<sup>65</sup>

Deprived of his authority in Jodhpur affairs, Tod was soon afterwards involved in serious troubles in Kotah.

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63. Ibid., No. 31.

64. Ibid., pp. xxii-xxiii.

65. Ibid., p. xxiii; Nos. 26, 42, 43.

As stated above, the death of Maha Rao Ummed Singh in November, 1819, was followed by a prolonged conflict among his sons and those of the old and almost blind Regent, Zalim Singh. Tod's policy of moderation failed to restore tranquillity; the issue was decided finally by the battle of Mangrol. The Governor-General in Council thought that Tod had committed a "great error" in protracting negotiations. The "tone and tenor" of Kishor Singh's letters, it was pointed out, had made it clear that "every effort of persuasion unaccompanied by demonstration of immediate attack was totally fruitless", and that conviction had been strongly expressed to Tod by Chand Khan, his own ~~agent~~ agent in the Maha Rao's camp. The Supreme Government expressed their "regret" that "Captain Tod did not attach sufficient importance to the information and opinions of his vakeel, when repeatedly endeavouring to impress him with the necessity of 66 dispersing a force which was receiving augmentation every day".

Tod sent an explanation to the authorities in Calcutta, indicating the unfavourable state of weather as the reason for the delay in attacking Maha Rao Kishor Singh. On receiving this explanation the Governor-General in Council decided to exonerate Tod from the censure for his delay in commencing operations. But at the same time they observed with displeasure that Tod had failed to state distinctly in his earlier despatches the reason for the delay. On April 16, 1822, Swinton, Secretary to the Supreme Government, wrote to Ochterlony : "The unfavourable state of the weather for some days previous to the action with Kishore Singh's troops on the 1st of October, as particularly described by Captain Tod,.... shew that it was impracticable to bring our Artillery into action at an earlier period.....the Governor-General in Council is not disposed to deny that it would have been imprudent to have engaged the enemy without the aid of that arm. His Lordship in Council is happy to exonerate Captain Tod from the imputation of delay in commencing active operations at that period. His Lordship in Council regrets that Captain Tod did not in his former dispatches distinctly explain these circumstances and thus relieve the Government from the painful necessity of

passing a censure which every fair conclusion from the statement before it rendered inevitable".<sup>67</sup>

Thus the events of Kotah from the death of Ummed Singh to the action of Mangrol "mark Tod's fall from grace".<sup>68</sup> Already his official status and authority had begun to be reduced. On October 20, 1821, orders were issued by the Supreme Government directing Tod to communicate with it through Ochterlony, then the Resident in Malwa and Rajputana.<sup>69</sup> Authorities in Calcutta were not unaware of the bitter personal relationship between Ochterlony and Tod. The new arrangement was, therefore, extremely unpleasant for Tod on official as also on personal grounds. He also resented the way in which Ochterlony announced the supersession of his independent authority. Anxious, perhaps, "to make an exhibition of the ascendancy which he had acquired over Tod", the Resident in Malwa and Rajputana sent to the Rana of Udaipur "a Native Agent of Rank numerously attended ... with the letter of the Governor-General and one from himself", to announce Tod's demotion from independent authority. On February 18, 1822, Tod wrote from Mewar : "The supersession of my hitherto independent political control.... could not but impress the rulers around with the idea that my <sup>Government</sup> was dissatisfied with my services - an impression which cannot fail to cripple the effect of my authority; and as almost the first step of this Superior Authority is meant to strengthen this impression and diminish my influence, Government will not attribute my mention of it but to the sole motive, my desire that these States should not entertain an idea so injurious to my reputation as my having incurred its disapprobation".<sup>70</sup> The Governor-General in Council could not approve Ochterlony's mode of the announcement of this official arrangement. Swinton wrote to Ochterlony : "....the Governor-General in Council desires me to express his concern that the mode of announcing

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67. Ibid., No. 117a.

68. Ibid., Introduction, p. xxiv.

69. Ibid., No. 103.

70. Ibid., No. 117b; Introduction, p. xxv.

your assumption of the authority vested in you should have been of a nature to impair Captain Tod's influence at the Court of Oodeepore. It would have been more expedient, in His Lordship's judgement, to have transmitted the letter announcing the arrangement to Captain Tod, accompanied by (the letter to) me from yourself, calculated to uphold his consequence at a court where he is still to be the local representative of Government".<sup>71</sup>

Tod placed himself in a wrong position by virtual defiance of the orders of the Supreme Government. He sent his despatches direct to the authorities in Calcutta and transmitted only copies of them to Ochterlony. The Governor-General in Council expressed their disapprobation of the neglect of their orders.<sup>72</sup> In April, 1822, Tod suffered a further degradation in his authority and status. Captain Caulfield was appointed Agent in Harauti, and Wilder, the Agent in Ajmer, was entrusted with the charge of the affairs of Kishangarh and Jaisalmer. Tod was now designated Agent at Udaipur, and his sphere of authority was confined to Mewar only.<sup>73</sup>

Meanwhile the question of the settlement of the villages in dispute between Udaipur and Jodhpur, as also between Udaipur and Ajmer, had led to a further conflict between Ochterlony and Tod. By Tod's orders those villages were placed in the possession of Udaipur, pending final settlement which according to Tod was delayed because of "his limited establishment". Ochterlony very much disapproved Tod's arrangement. He complained to the Supreme Government that Tod had "conducted all his proceedings with an apparent bias and partiality, and an abuse of power highly discreditable, and in my opinion deserving the severest mark of the disapprobation of His Lordship in Council".<sup>74</sup>

Things moved in such a way that Tod was eventually compelled to relinquish office. In February, 1822, he expressed his desire to go to Europe shortly on the ground of

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71. Ibid., No. 117a.

72. Ibid., Nos. 117, 120a.

73. Ibid., Nos. 115, 116a; Introduction, p. xxv.

74. Ibid., Nos. 118, 119, 119a.

ill-health. On April 12 he applied for leave. He also decided to hand over immediately the charge of his office to Captain Waugh. Ganesh Narain, Ochterlony's representative, started intriguing against Tod. Ganesh Narain's agent began to tell the people at Udaipur that Tod was ruined and that Captain Waugh was also going to be removed. Tod was highly indignant at this conduct of the agent of Ganesh Narain, which, in his opinion, was extremely detrimental to his position and prestige. He publicly seized the agent and sent him to Ochterlony as a prisoner. He wrote to Ochterlony : "Should Gunnes Narrain take refuge in a falsehood and deny this agent, it may be as well to remand him to Captain Waugh to receive public chastisement ... ..!"<sup>75</sup> To Tod this incident was, so to say, "the last straw". Then came his resignation. Thus "things came to such a pass that despite his brilliant record as a diplomat and administrator Tod had to leave the country and the people he ~~loved~~ loved so well".<sup>76</sup>

The tragedy of Tod's career illustrates one aspect of the complications which the Company experienced in their relation with the Rajput states. These are to be ascribed partly to the peculiar characteristics of the medieval Rajput polity and partly to the inherent defects of the treaties of subsidiary alliance. It has been rightly said : "No adjustment was possible between the clan system and the demands of the new age, nor could there be any rational reconciliation of the prince's so-called 'absolute power' with the traditional privileges of the nobles and the undefined authority of the paramount Power".<sup>77</sup> Further, it is necessary to remember the basic defect of the subsidiary system : "the native Prince, being guaranteed in the possession of his dominions, but deprived of so many of the essential attributes of sovereignty, sinks in his own esteem, and loses that stimulus to good government, which is supplied by the fear of rebellion and deposition....."

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75. Ibid., Nos. 117b, 117c, 137; Introduction, p. xxv.

76. Indian Historical Records Commission Proceedings, 1944, Vol. 21, Part 2, pp. 94, 95.

77. A. C. Banerjee, The Rajput States and the East India Company, p. 419.

The higher classes, coerced by external ascendancy, in turn lose their self-respect, and degenerate like their master".<sup>78</sup> As a consequence of demoralisation at the top the people suffered from this complicated and oppressive system.

Tod, who from 1818 to 1822 acted as the Company's political agent in several Rajput states, including the two principal states of Udaipur and Jodhpur, has left his unfavourable impression of the provisions of the treaties with the Rajput states. He says : "There is a perpetual variation between the spirit and the letter of every treaty; and while the internal independence of each State is the groundwork, it is frittered away and nullified by successive stipulations, and these positive and negative qualities continue mutually repelling each other, until it is apparent that independence cannot exist under such conditions. Where discipline is lax, as with these feudal associations, and where each subordinate vassal is master of his own retainers, the article of military contingents alone would prove a source of contention. By leading to interference with each individual chieftain, it would render such aid worse than useless..... the tributary pecuniary stipulation... , unsettled and undetermined, leaves a door open to a system of espionage into their revenue accounts — a system not only disgusting, but contrary to treaty, which leaves 'internal administration' sacred".<sup>79</sup>

Prinsep argued that "the exclusive aim of our interference" was the welfare of the Rajput princes and "the tranquillity of their country".<sup>80</sup> But Lord Hastings in his relation with the Rajput states was actually guided more by political expediency and strategic advantages. His Governor-Generalship constituted the most decisive chapter in the history of Anglo-Rajput relations. The period from the close of the 18th century to the first quarter of the 19th was one of critical transition in the history of Rajputana. On release

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78. Owen, quoted in A.C. Banerjee, Lectures on Rajput History, p.167.

79. Tod, op.cit., Vol.1, p.146.

80. Prinsep, op.cit., Vol.2, pp.348-349.

from Mughal domination, the Rajput principalities, suffering from internal weaknesses and dissensions as well as from external aggression, could not retain their independence but were driven to seek protection from expanding British imperialism. The administration of Lord Hastings was the final phase in this process of transition. What Lord Wellesley could - but was not allowed to - complete and what his immediate successors refused to do was finally accomplished by Lord Hastings. The lengthening shadow of British imperialism overcast the political horizon of Rajputana. The Rajput states mortgaged their independence to the East India Company for peace and security. This surrender coincided with the overthrow of the predatory system in Central India, the final blow to the Maratha power, and the final establishment of British paramountcy in India. Once vassals of the Mughals and subsequently victims of Maratha assault, the Rajput states finally passed under a new suzerain, the British. Their relations with the new paramount power were determined only in part by the words of the treaties which linked them up with the East India Company. The political needs of the paramount power no less than their own needs, weaknesses and follies contributed to the development of a political system of which the foundations were laid in the days of Lord Hastings.

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